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This monograph is concerned with the nature of the process of macroeconomic
growth that has characterized the U. S. experience, and manifested itself in the changing
pace and sources of the continuing rise real output per capita over the course of the past
two hundred years. A key observation that emerges from the long-term quantitative
economic record is that the proximate sources of increases in real GDP per head in the
centurybetween1889 and 1999 werequitedifferent from thosewhich obtained duringthe
first hundred years of American national experience. Baldly put, the economy's ascent to
apositionoftwentieth-centuryglobalindustrialleadershipentailedatransitionfromgrowth
based upon the interdependent development and extensive exploitation of its natural
resources and the substitution of tangible capital for labor, towards the maintenance of a
productivity leadership through rising rates of intangible investment in the formation and
exploitation of technological and organizational knowledge.
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Prologue: Focus, Method and Structure of the Work
The focus of this extended essay is the nature of the macroeconomic growth process that has
characterized the United States experience, and manifested itself in the changing pace and sources
oftheriseofrealoutputpercapitainU.S.economyduringthepasttwohundredyears.Althoughour
maininterestherelieswiththedynamicsofthetwentieth-centuryeconomy,webelievethatitsmajor
characteristics and the nature of the underlying forces at work are most clearlyseen in comparisons
between the century just past and the one that came before.
A keyobservation that emerges from the long-term quantitative economic record is that the
proximatesourcesofincreasesinrealgrossdomesticproductpercapitainthecenturybetween1889
and 1989 were quite different from those which obtained during the first one hundred years of the
American national experience. Baldly put, the national economy moved from an extensive to an
increasinglyintensivemodeofgrowth,anditsdevelopmentattheintensivemarginhasbecomemore
and more dependent upon the acquisition and exploitation of technological and organizational
knowledge.
Our first objective, therefore, must be to assemble and describe the components of the U.S.
macroeconomic record in some quantitative detail, in a manner that exposes the nature and
dimensions of the contrast between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We approach this task
withinthewell-establishedframeworkof“growthaccounting”.This enables us toshow the secular
acceleration that occurred in the growth rate of total factor productivity, which is the weighted
average of the productivities of capital and labor, and the growth in the importance of total factor
productivity as a source of labor productivity and per capita output increases. Further, by taking
account of changes in the quality of the productive inputs, we arrive at “refined” measures of total
factor productivitygrowth which highlight two contrasts between the eras preceding and following
the transitional decades, 1879-1909.
The first of these is the enlargement of that element in the long-term growth rate of labor
productivity that remains unexplained by the factor inputs we can measure and thus is associated,
but not identical, with advances in technological knowledge– includingin the latter the knowledge
permitting realization of economies of large scale production. The second major contrast between
thenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesisthediminishedrelativeimportanceofconventionaltangible
capital accumulation in the twentieth century and the rising role of intangible capital formation
through investments in education and training, on the one hand, and the organized investment in
research and development (R&D) on the other.
After the turn into the twentieth century, the substitution of fixed capital for labor was
governed by conflicting forces. It was strengthened for many decades by slower growth of labor
supply and a concomitant tendency for wages to rise more substantially than they would otherwise
have done. These developments stemmed in part from demographic changes, including the-2-
immigration restrictions following World War I, in part from the downward trend in hours of work
andinpartfromthelengtheningyearsofeducation.Atthesametimetherewerealsoimportantnew
opportunitiestoreducecostsbydevelopingmethodsofintensifyingtheutilizationoffixedfacilities.
This was a strategy that was first implemented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries byconsolidation of railroads, bythe technological innovations designed to increase train-
speedsandpowerutilization,andbythegrowthofcontinuousprocessindustries,notablypetroleum
extraction, transport, and refining, and its extension to petrochemicals. Its roots also can be found,
as Alfred Chandler (1977, 1990: Ch.1) has pointed out, in the high throughput manufacturing
regimesthatappearedafter1870whenproductionanddirect-sellingbymanufacturerswereextended
to serve increasingly wide markets.
The challenges of operating greatly enlarged technological and commercial systems on a
continental scalecontributed to the rising demand for a more formallyeducated breed ofmanagers,
as well as workers with higher levels of literacy and numeracy. They also called forth new control
technologies,whichplayedarolein initiatingthepioneeringU.S.advancesincommunicationsand
information technologies, beginning with the telegraph system’s close relationship to railroad
operationsinthemid-nineteenthcentury,andleadingontothedevelopmentofthetelephonesystem,
and the computer systems of the present century.
Thus, however distinct and different was the new technological spirit of the twentieth
century, wemaysee that the wayin which a succession of general-purposetechnologies cameto be
elaborated and implemented in the U.S. during the present century – how electricity,
telecommunications, the gasoline-powered internal combustion engine, and, most recently, the
digital computer have reflected the interplay of global developments that were expressed, first and
most fully, in American circumstances, and so took forms that owed much to the particular legacy
of America’s nineteenth-century development.
Our second purpose, therefore, is to advance an interpretation of the forces underlying the
ascent of the U.S. economyto its internationallydominant position in the twentieth century, and to
accountforthetransformationsthathaveoccurredintherelationshipsamongtheproximatesources
of America’s macroeconomic growth. The principal elements of our interpretation to be presented
by Part Two can be identified under two headings. First are those forces that can best be regarded
as generic, global tendencies, linked to internationally shared advances in science and technology
broadly construed. The emergence of new and greater potentiality for knowledge-based economic
development during the twentieth century, and the working out of its implications for production
methods and the endogenous growth ofproductiveresources in thecontext oftheU.S., is thus to be
understood not as a unique, national phenomenon. Rather, these form part of a much broader set of
tendencies, far more global in their ultimate manifestations, which took an earlyand particularistic
form in the American setting.
Part Two mobilizes quantitative andqualitativeevidence, and theoretical considerations to
supporttheviewthathistoricalexperienceoftechnologicalandorganizationalchangehasbeenthat
of persisting significant differentials among the rates of “factor input-saving” due to such-3-
1 See Endnote 1 of Part Two for further discussion of concepts of “neutrality” and “non-neutrality” or “bias” in
connection with the impacts of technological change.
2 Because the associated concepts are central to the interpretation advanced in this chapter, it is important at the
outset that the terms "factor-saving" and "factor-using" should be understood to be defined relatively, i.e., in relation
to output. Endnote 1 of Part Two may be consulted for further discussion and formal definitions.
innovations. The existence of such differences affecting the relative usage of the factors of
production represents a departure from the condition that economic theoryconventionallyrefers to
as one of “neutrality” in technological change, a usage that we shall follow here.
1 But, even more
significantlyforourinterpretation,thepredominantpatternofnon-neutrality,or“biasedness”inthe
direction of technical and organizational progress itself underwent a transformation between the
nineteenth and the twentieth century.
We read the available evidence as indicating that the overall bias of innovation during the
nineteenth century was strongest in the direction of labor-saving changes; that the latter were not
only relatively more pronounced than the tendency towards natural resource-saving, but were
markedlystronger than the impacts on use relative to usage of tangible reproducible capital-inputs.
Indeed, we contend that technological progress in the nineteenth century was characterized by an
absolute capital-using bias.
2 Bycontrast, from the experience of the U.S. macroeconomyit appears
that the twentieth century has been characterized by a bias towards innovation of an intangible
capital-usingkind,andtheemergenceoftangiblecapital-savingtechnicalchangealongsideordinary
labor-saving innovation – albeit with a bias in favor of the latter that represents a continuation of
what had been experienced in the preceding century.
Among the second broad category of forces are some that may be held to constitute more
specificallyAmericannationalcharacteristics,conditionswhichattheopeningofthepresentcentury
properlycould be viewed, and were cited bycontemporaries as responsible for the differences they
perceived between the ways that production and distribution were organized and conducted in the
U.S., compared with the economic practices prevalent in the Old World. Some of these had their
roots in thetrajectories ofresourceexploitationandtechnologicaladaptations that wereestablished
previously,duringtheextensivedevelopmentalphaseoftheprecedingera.Otherscertainlyreflected
features of the socio-economic structure, political institutions and cultural ethos that were peculiar
to or most prominently displayed by the young society that had taken shape in this region of recent
Europeansettlement.Thewaysinwhichthetechnologicallydrivendemand-sideforcesinthefactor
marketselicitedthesupply-sideresponsesnecessaryfortheformationofnew,andnon-conventional,
stocks of intangible capital, and the specific demographic and institutional developments that also
contributed to shifting factor supply conditions, are shown in Part Two to account for the salient
features distinguishing the U.S. growth path in the twentieth century from the preceding course of
macroeconomic development. Nevertheless, in the continuing accumulation of capital at a pace
which has exceeded the rate of growth of output, the long-run dynamics of the contemporary
economy displays an important element of continuity with its past experience.-4-
Part Three turns from the U.S. growth performance in the present century to that of the
preceding epoch, and examines the American path of development in relation to the
contemporaneous experiences of the other industrial nations. The twentieth century's opening half
had witnessed the U.S. ascent to a position of international economic leadership in regard to the
averagelevelofrealincomeenjoyedbymembersofthepopulation.This,aswillbeseen,wasbased
upon the early establishment and further widening of the country's productivity lead vis-à-vis the
other industrialized and industrializing nations. Consequently, the years immediately following
World War II found the U.S. at the pinnacle of comparative affluence and preponderance in the
international economy, a position that soon began to be eroded by the recovery of other, war-torn
economies, and the emergence of strong tendencies among the industrial economies not only to
converge in their levels of productivity but to "catch up" with the U.S., and in some instances to
forge ahead. These international perspectives on the American growth experience are developed
more fullyin Part Three, where we offer a broad account of the keyforces that have worked to alter
the economy's relative position on the global stage. A number of the important elements that had
contributed to the creation of “American exceptionalism” in both the material and technological
domains subsequently lost their former significance – having been either transformed at home, or
come into existence more ubiquitously among the world’s industrially advanced societies in the
courseofthepresent century.Suchdevelopments,especiallythosethat cametofruition inthepost-
World War II era, will be seen to help account for the modifications that have occurred in the U.S.
position of industrial leadership.-5-
3 Several chapters in Volume III of the Cambridge History deal with the same subjects. See in particular the
chapter by Robert E. Gallman, “Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nineteenth Century” and by
Robert A. Margo, “The Labor Force in the Nineteenth Century”.
Part One
A Statistical Profile of American Growth Since 1800
1. Problems of Measurement
Output per head of a nation's population, said A.C. Pigou in a classic study, is the "objective,
measurable counterpart of [its] economic welfare." Output per head is only part of the content of
economic welfare, but it is with this in mind that we make the growth of per capita output the focus
of this chapter. Our purpose here is two-fold: first, to draw a statistical picture of American growth
and of the proximate elements or sources from which it derived; and, secondly, to search for the
conditionsorforcesthatcontrolledthestrengthoftheseelementsandtheirchanges.Weidentifythe
proximate sources of growth in the manner of John Stuart Mill:
We maysay, then, ... that the requisites of production are Labour, Capital and Land.
The increase of production, therefore, depends on the properties of these elements.
It is the result of the increase either of the elements themselves, or of their
productiveness." (Principles of Political Economy, Ashley Edition, p. 156)
We shall in the end search for the forces that lie behind the increase of the "elements" and their
"productiveness". But our search is a limited one. It goes as far as our own understanding and the
length of this chapter allow. We draw attention at this early point, therefore, to the deepest causes
ofgrowththatlieinAmerica's attitudes andaspirations,intheinstitutions that governtheoperation
of the American economic system and in the incentives that support work, capital accumulation,
enterprise and the advance of practical knowledge; but we cannot attempt a systematic exploration
of these fundamental conditions. Our first task is simply descriptive.
3
Thegrowthwithwhichwecandealwithsomedegreeofassuranceisthegrowthasitappears
in the available statistics. The growth rates of aggregate and per capita output that appear in the
statistics are thegrowth that can bemeasured; with fewexceptions that means the output that flows
through commercial markets. Such measures are neither comprehensive nor unbiased. The goods
and services that are produced in the home or on farms but that never reach the market must be
included, if theycan be, on the basis of rough estimates or else neglected entirely. Significant parts
oftotaloutput–landclearinganddrainage,timberfellingandsawing,barnraising,foodpreparation
and canning, the care of children, the sick and the aged, the repair of equipment and furniture, the
provision of knowledge and entertainment, have moved from the household to the market and
sometimes back again and so biased measures of growth either upward or downward. There are
analogoustroubleswithourmeasuresofthesourcesofoutputgrowth.Inparticular,thecontributions-6-
of the various sources, which appear in the tables as if they acted on growth independently of one
another, are, in fact, to some unknown but significant degree, the result of the joint action of two or
more sources. Perhaps most important of all, the great advances in the qualityand variety of goods
and services register quite inadequatelyin our measures of output. Whether bacterial pneumonia is
treated with poultices or penicillin makes no difference to our measures of output so long as their
unit cost in the base years of the GDP indexes is the same. And so with communication by pony
express, by telegraph, telephone or E-mail. A quality adjusted measure of output would on this
account rise faster than the existing measures. But existing measures also neglect the disseminates
and costs of growth, for example the congestion, pollution, noise, and crime of cities – to be
balanced,ofcourse,againsttheirculturalwealth,intellectualvigor,andstimulation.Noonecansay
exactly how a truly comprehensive measure of growth would look and there is no utterly objective
waytoprovideone.Thesereal difficulties mustbesetaside,butnotlosttomind.Wereturntothem
later. Meanwhile we study the growth of output per capita because it is the only measure of the
aggregate of goods and services available to people on the average over long periods of time.
The growth we studyin this chapter refers to the long-term or sustained increase in national
product. This means the growth that persists, not only across the inevitable year-to-year ups and
downs of business activity, but also across the more extended fluctuations that reverse themselves
onlyoveraperiodofyears.IntheAmericaneconomyofthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,
these fluctuations took two forms. One was the familiar "business cycle," which until the 1960s
typically had a duration in this country of about five years. When, however, the effects of such
business cycles are attenuated bycalculating growth rates between the average levels or peak years
ofsuccessivecycles,asecondwaveoflongerdurationemerges.InAmericanexperience,these"long
swings"succeededoneanotheratintervalsoffifteentotwenty-fiveyearsfromearlyinthenineteenth
century until about 1930 and, with some differences in mechanism, thereafter as well. To measure
the trends of sustained growth properly, therefore, we must calculate growth rates between similar
phases of long swings and choose years to represent those phases that are comparable in their
business-cycle position. The years or groups of years that bound the periods so identified appear in
Table IA and in the corresponding “A” tables that follow them in the Statistical Appendix.
A glance at Table 1: IA suggests a remaining element of irregularity. It was especially
important during the long-swing intervals of 1855 to 1871 and 1929 to 1948. The first spans the
CivilWaranditsdisturbed aftermath. Thesecond spans theGreat Depression ofthethirtiesandthe
intense but war-directed activity of World War II. Both were marked by large and anomalous
slowdownsinoutputgrowth.TheDepressionofthethirties,whichdiscouragedinvestment,andthe
war,whichimposedrestrictionsoncivilianinvestment,causedaseriousreductioninprivatecapital
accumulation and retarded normal productivitygrowth. The effect of the Civil War was even more
pronounced.Theextraordinaryupsurgesofoutput,capitalaccumulationandproductivitygrowthin
the periods that followed these wars and depressions were, in part, rebounds based on exploiting
backlogs of postponed investment and technological innovation and, in the case of the Civil War,
graduallyovercoming the post-war disruption of the economyof the South. Combining the records
ofthedisturbed periods withthereboundsthat followed offers abetterviewoftheunderlyinglong-
term trends of economic advance. Table 1: I and similar tables in the text below are designed to do
that.-7-
4 See Endnote 1 of Part One for further discussion of the long-period dates.
Finally, the figures throughout are afflicted by errors of estimation, but we judge that these
aremoreseriousbeforetheCivilWarthanafter.Togetamoreaccuratepictureoflong-termgrowth,
it seems better, therefore, to view the pre-Civil War development as a whole. The result is the long
period 1800-55, which appears in both Tables I and I-A and in later tables. We call the figures in
Table 1: I and in analogous later tables "Measures Across Long Periods." They appear in the text.
4
Thecorresponding“A”tablesprovidefiguresforsubperiods.Wecallthem“MeasuresAcrossLong-
Swing Intervals”. Together with descriptions of sources, they appear below in the Statistical
Appendix.
The scope of output on which the chapter focuses attention is the "private domestic
economy."Thisissomewhatsmallerthanthenationalproductasawholeinthattheformerexcludes
"government product," which is the payments made by governments directly to the factors of
production. Essentially that means the compensation of government employees, since the national
accounts treat government interest payments, not as factor compensation, but as transfers. In order
toproduceatotalproductmadebyfactorsworkingwithinthecountry,theprivatedomesticeconomy
also excludes net factorincomes from abroad, that is,theexcess ofincomes earned bythelaborand
capital ofU.S.nationalsemployedabroad overtheincomes earned byforeign nationals and foreign
capital situatedin the U.S.Neitheritem wasofsignificant sizeinthenineteenthcentury.Andwhile
government product has become of much greater importance since, the long-term rates of growth
of aggregate national product and private domestic product have remained quite similar.
Private domestic product, nevertheless, is a better basis for productivity measurement than
istheaggregatenationalproduct.Thatisbecausethereal,inflation-corrected,productofgovernment
is obtained by deflating current dollar wage payments by an index of nominal wages per worker.
Real government product, therefore, emerges essentiallyas a measure of the growth of government
employment. The productivity change, presumably the increase in productivity, of government
workers,disappears,whichintroducesadownwardbiasintomeasuresoftheproductivityofnational
rather than private scope.
Frame I in each table deals with the nineteenth century, Frame II with the twentieth. The
sources and, to some degree, the methods of estimate of the output figures are somewhat different
in thetwo frames. Thetables, therefore, showfiguresforoverlappingperiods around theturn ofthe
centuryonbothbases.TheFrameIfiguresfortheturnofthecenturyarebetterforcomparisonswith
earlier years; the Frame II figures for the same period are better for comparisons with later years.-8-
Table 1: I The Output Growth Rates of the National Economy and
the U.S. Private Domestic Economy, 1800-1989
(Average compound rates over “Long Periods,” in Percent per Annum)
GNP GPDP Population Per capita rates Intensive growth
fraction
GNP/P GPDP/P GNP GPDP
Periods (percentages)
Frame I: The Nineteenth Century
1800-55 3.99 3.93 3.03 0.93 0.87 23 22
1855-90 4.00 3.92 2.41 1.55 1.47 39 38
1890-27 3.56 3.50 1.73 1.80 1.74 51 50
Frame II: The Twentieth Century
1890-27 3.76 3.70 1.73 2.00 1.94 53 52
1929-66 3.18 3.05 1.30 1.86 1.73 58 57
1966-89 2.69 2.86 1.00 1.67 1.84 62 64
Note:HereandinTablesII-IV,thedates1855,1890and1927arethemidpointsoffive-yearaverage
ending with the peak year of a “long swing”. Thus the period 1855-90 is more properly 1853-57 to
1888-92. Other terminal years are single years chosen to represent the peaks of long swings.
Sources: Following Table 1: IA in Statistical Appendix.
The output figures in Table 1: I and in most later tables represent gross product before
allowance for depreciation. Net product after depreciation would, indeed, be a better measure of
output relevant to economic welfare. The long-term growth rates of net and gross output, however,
arenotsignificantlydifferent,andgrossoutputisabetterbasisforthemeasurementofproductivity.
2. Output, Population and Output per Capita
Table 1: Iand Tables 1: IIto IV that follow encapsulate the main features of nearlytwo centuries of
American development as it appears in the pace of measured output growth and its proximate
sources. These numbers can be only the beginning of a search for the forces governing growth, but-9-
they are a useful beginning, a framework that suggests the quantitative outlines of the American
experience.
When we look at the record across the long periods of Table 1: I, it appears that the 1800s
were a century of 4 percent growth of aggregate product. And this was true whether we look at
growth in the national economy (GNP) or in the private domestic economy (GPDP). Beginning
around the turn of the century, however, thepacebegan to fall off. From the4 percent growth ofthe
last century, it has graduallydeclined until in themost recent quarter-centuryit was under3 percent
a year. Both the 4 percent rate of the 1800s and the gradual slowdown in the 1900s, however, were
the outcome of divergent movements in the components of aggregate output growth, that is,
population growth and per capita output growth.
Population growth in the first half of the last century was very rapid. With few reversals it
has slowed down ever since. The transient baby boom years of the 1950s and early 1960s were a
notableexception.Percapitaoutput growth, however, speeded up. Itdidsointwosteps,alargeone
between the first and second halves of the last century, a smaller but still substantial one between
the second half of the nineteenth centuryand the first quarter of the twentieth. The rate of about 1.8
or 1.9 percent a year that was achieved in private domestic product per capita between 1890 and
1927 was then roughly maintained, when viewed over suitably long periods, for the rest of the
century. It was, indeed, a remarkably rapid pace. Sustained so long, it was enough to make the
measured level of private output per head nearly six times as high in 1990 as it had been a century
earlier.
Withpopulationgrowthdeclining,thebigstep-upofpercapitagrowthduringthelastcentury
was enough to sustain the pace of growth of the aggregate in the 1800s. With population growth
declining still faster in the 1900s, the smaller step-up in per capita growth across the turn of the
century, a fortiori its stability since that time, was not. So aggregate output growth measured over
long periods, has declined steadily since the beginning of the present century.
This is the big picture. Within the long periods of Table 1: I, however, economic growth
sufferedfluctuationsthatdeservenotice.Themoreimportantoftheseemergeinthemeasuresacross
long-swing intervals (Table 1: I-A in the Statistical Appendix). For example, the private per capita
growth rate in the cross-Civil War interval (1855-71) fell to a pace approaching zero, while in the
seventies and eighties, during the rebound from the War, the growth rate was higher than in any
similarintervalbeforeorsince.Therethenfollowedaslowdown,theseriousnessofwhichisperhaps
muted by the timing of long-swing intervals in the Table. The impact of the Great Depression and
World War II, taken together, however, emerges clearly; and so does the rebound that followed.
Although the text hereand laterconcentrates on the measures across long periods, readers can refer
to the Statistical Appendix for a picture of growth across shorter intervals.
If we look beyond the simple arithmetic of Table 1: I, it is clear that output per capita and
populationgrowthinteract.Theoutcomehasturnedonabalanceofoffsettinginfluences.Ontheone
side, powerful influences connected with the rise of per capita product and productivity and, more
especiallywith the technological progress behind it, made for a decline in mortality. The migration-1 0-
5 See Richard Easterlin, “Twentieth-Century American Population Growth,” in Stanley Engerman and Robert
Gallman (Eds), The Cambridge Economic History of the United States,v o l .I I I .A l s oE a s t e r l i n ,“ I n d u s t r i a l
Revolution and Mortality Revolution: Two of a Kind”? Evolutionary Economics, 5(1995), 393-408, and Michael R.
Haines, in Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman (Eds), The Cambridge Economic History of the United States,v o l .
II..
to the cities, however, where death rates were relatively high, at first tended to raise mortality.
Beginning around 1870, a movement to improve sanitation, together with a gradual betterment of
nutrition, served to curb disease and morbidity generally. Still more important, the advance of
knowledge that supports productivity growth included the germ theory of disease. It persuaded
people to accept the expensive projects needed to bring clean water to the growing cities and to
remove their wastes. Building on the anti-bacterial work of Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur in the
1870s and 1880s, growing knowledge also led to the great reductions of small pox, diphtheria,
scarlet fever and measles made possible by vaccination and the inoculation of anti-toxins. Later in




High and risinglevels of income and,mainlyin the nineteenth century, cheap land attracted
immigrants.Andalargeflowofimmigrantsdid,indeed,accountforaconsiderable,partofthetotal
increase of population from earlyin the last centuryuntil World WarI. From the 1840s until World
War I, approximately a quarter of the growth rate of total population was attributable directly to
immigration. The children of immigrants added still more. Between the early twenties and about
1970, theflowofimmigrants, restricted byfederal legislation, was much less important. It madeup
onlysome11percentoftherateofpopulationgrowth.Inthelast25years,however,migration,legal
and illegal, has again risen in importance.
It is the birth rate, however, that has been most weightyin governing changes in the growth
of population. It is true that rising levels of income, taken by themselves, make it easier for young
peopletomarryearlyandtoraiselargefamilies.Othercircumstancesaccompanyingincomegrowth
itselfhave, nevertheless, worked in theoppositedirection and produced thelong-term trend toward
lower birth rates and a decline in the rate of population growth. In the nineteenth century, the
intensification of settlement gradually raised the price of land and made it difficult to establish
numerous children on nearby farms. Industrialization attracted people to the cities where the costs
of space were higher and where children were less well able to contribute to familyincome. It also
weakened the economic bonds between generations that family farms and other family businesses
create. So it reduced theeconomicsecuritythat children offered to parents and in that wayundercut
the attractions of a large family. It enlarged the opportunities of women for paid work outside the
homeandsoraisedthecosts ofdevotingeffort andattentionto family. Remunerativeandattractive
employment in this century came to depend increasingly on higher levels and longer years of
education,whichagainraisedthecostsofbringingchildrentoadulthood.Thetechnicalprogresson
which, as we shall see, per capita output growth largely rests, included progress in the means of
contraception.Andthespreadofeducationhelpedtodiffuseknowledgeofcontraceptivetechniques-1 1-
6 Easterlin, “Twentieth-Century American Population Growth,” and his “The American Population” in Lance
Davis et al. American Economic Growth, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, Ch.5.
and made people more ready to use them. In sum – the decline in population growth and thus in
aggregate output growth stemmed in large part from the rising level of per capita output, or, better,
from the forces that support it and the conditions of life that go with it.
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There are also reverse influences that run from population growth to the rise of per capita
output.Anincreaseinpopulation,ifitpressesonscarceresources,tendstoreduceoutputpercapita.
In the conditions of land and resource abundance characteristic of the United States, however, the
chiefeffectofpopulationgrowthhasbeentoraisethelevel ofaggregateoutput byits effect,subject
to a lag, on the growth of the labor supply. Byits effect on thesizeofthedomesticmarket it opened
the way to a larger exploitation of the economies of large-scale production and so to higher output
per capita as well. In these circumstances, the declining rate of population growth in the present
centurywould haveacted to limit the potential contribution of the economies of scale to the growth
of productivity and per capita income. This century’s declining population growth rates may,
therefore,havebeenaconstraintonaggregateoutputgrowth,notonlybecausetheytendedtoreduce
the growth rate of the labor force but also because they held back the growth of labor productivity.
But labor productivity rose for other reasons, and these must still be explored. We turn first,
however, to review the course of labor input.
3. The Changing Contribution of Labor Input per Capita
Per capita output growth may be viewed as the sum of the growth rates of the annual number of
hours of work per year per head of the population and of output per hour.
During the nineteenth century, per capita labor input roseat aratesomewhat underone-half
percent a year (Table 1: II). This seemingly modest pace, however, amounted to more than 50
percent of the still low growth rate of per capita output in the first half of the last century. But even
in the second half, when per capita output growth had risen toward rates more familiar now, about
a quarter of the advance was still derived from the growth of labor input per head.
Inthepresentcentury,bycontrast,thingswerequitedifferent.Theinputoflaborhoursbegan
to decline on a per capita basis and did so at an accelerating pace. Given the high and steadyrate of
per capita output growth, this implies that long-term labor productivitygrowth was accelerating, at
least through the first three quarters of the century (1890-1966). And then there was a reversal.
During the quarter-century since 1966, the growth of per capita labor input jumped again to the
higher rates characteristic of the nineteenth century, while labor productivity growth fell back to a
slow pace not seen since the turn of the century, perhaps earlier. The two developments were, to
some degree, connected, as our later discussion of the Slowdown shows (Part Two, Section 5).-1 2-
7 John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press for the
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961, Table A-IX, and Paul A. David, “Real Income and Economic Welfare
Growth in the Early Republic,” forthcoming, available from the author.
Thegrowth of labor hours per capitacan itselfbedecomposed, and this is donein Tables III
and IIIA. Here the growth of labor hours per head is viewed as the sum of the growth rates of the
labor force per head of the population, of full-time equivalent persons at work ("persons engaged")
per member of the labor force, and of hours of work per person engaged. The sum of the latter two
rates is the growth rate of hours per member of the labor force.
The strong growth of per capita labor input during the nineteenth centurywas due in part to
the first of these components, that is to the faster growth of the labor force than of population. This
is traceable partly to the effect of immigration, which brought in more people of working age than
it did children, women and old dependants, and partly to the manner in which population growth
declined. Because birth rates fell faster than death rates, the proportion of dependent children and
youth declined relative to adult groups, and the population of working age rose compared with the
general population.
Thegrowthoflaborinput,especiallyinthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,wasbolstered
as well by increases in the ratios of employment to labor force and of hours per person employed.
Both developments were connected with the shift of population and employment from farming and
rurallifetothetownsandcitiesandtoemploymentinthegrowingnon-farmsectors.Urbanlifegave
women a better chance for paid (and, therefore, recorded) employment outside the home. And full
time annual hours of work on the farms, because of its seasonal nature, were only some 75 percent
as long as annual hours in the non-farm sector.
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As one moves into the twentieth century, the balance of forces changed, producing first a
slow, then a very rapid decline in labor input per head which continued into the 1960s. Both long-
term and transitory factors were at work. In the first third of the century, from about 1890 through
1929, the same balance of demographic developments, the relative growth of the population of
working age, reflecting the decline of birth rates and, therefore, of dependent children, and until
World War I, the continued flow of immigrants in large numbers produced a continuing rise in the
importance of the working-age population and in the ratio of labor force to population. This was
morethan offset, however, byamorerapid drop in non-farm hours ofwork. Thehours declinetook
place especiallyrapidlyduringWorld War Iwhen workers took advantage of tight labor markets to
gainshorterhourswithoutadropinpay.By1919,thisdropinaveragenon-farmhours,togetherwith
a smaller rise in average annual farm hours, had made annual hours per worker in the two sectors
about equal. The farm-non-farm shift no longer worked to support the growth of labor input.
Apart from these long-term developments, an important feature of the years since 1929 was
alargeand protracted fluctuationinlaborinputpercapita.Thedeclinewhichhadbegunintheearly
part of the century accelerated between 1929 and 1966 and proceeded at a multiple of its earlier-1 3-
8 The size of the more severe retardation is uncertain. Comparing 1929-66 with our own estimate for 1890-1927
(shown in Frame I) puts the retardation at 0.5 percent a year. Using Kendrick’s estimate for 1890-1927 (Frame II)
makes the difference even greater.
pace.
8 And then it turned around; for the last quarter-century, it has been rising almost as fast as it
fell during the preceding four decades. Without the decline of labor input per capita in the middle
decades of the century, the rate of advance of per capita output during the post-war growth boom
wouldhavebeenstillmorerapid;withouttheriseintheseventiesandeightiesthesevereslowdown
of labor productivity growth would have produced a marked decline in output per capita as well.
The sources of the large fluctuation in the growth of labor input per capita in the present
century are complex. Some of the considerations are suggested by the informal table that follows.
Here we view the growth of labor-force per capita (the labor-force ratio) as the sum of the growth
rates of the working-age ratio – that is the ratio between the working-age and the total population
– and the gross participation rate, that is, the ratio between the number of persons in the labor force
and the working-age population. We call it the gross rate because it reflects changes both in the
participation rates of specific groups, distinguished byage, sex and other characteristics, and in the
importance of the groups.-1 4-
Table 1: II Contributions of Labor Input and Labor
Productivity Growth Rates to the Growth Rate of Output per Capita:
U.S. Private Domestic Economy, 1800-1989







Frame I The Nineteenth Century
1800-1855 0.87 0.48 0.39
1855-1890 1.47 0.41 1.06
1890-1927 1.74 -0.26 2.01
Frame II The Twentieth Century
1890-1927 1.94 -0.07 2.00
1929-1966 1.73 -0.78 2.52
1966-1989 1.84 0.60 1.23
Sources: See Statistical Appendix, Table 1: IIA.-1 5-
Table 1: III Decomposition of the Growth Rate of Manhours per Capita
U.S. Private Domestic Economy, 1800-1989














I. The Nineteenth Century
1800-1855 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.15
1855-1890 0.41 0.33 0.07 0.02
1890-1927 -0.26 0.16 -0.17 -0.26
II. The Twentieth Century
1890-1927 -0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.24
1929-1966 -0.78 -0.09 -0.24 -0.44
1966-1989 0.60 1.12 -0.11 -0.37
Sources: Following Table 1: IIIA in Statistical Appendix.-1 6-
Table 1: III-Addendum
Components of Change in the Growth Labor Force Participation Rate, 1929-89








1929-1948 0.19 0.17 0.02
1948-1966 -0.38 -0.57 0.19
1966-1989 1.12 0.48 0.64
Sources: Underlying data from:
Population:EconomicReportofthePresident,Jan.1993,Table B-29 (Residentpopulation1929-48;
total population including armed forces overseas after 1948.)
Working-age population: Ibid. Table B-29 (Population, ages 16-64).
Labor force: Ibid, Table B-30 (Civilian labor force aged 16+.)
Note: Growth Rate of Gross Participation rate ={1+[Col.(1)]/100}/{1+[Col.(3)]/100}-1]x100.
Inthefirstperiodabove,from1929to1948,thegrowthoftheworking-ageratiowasmodest.
This was a direct consequence of the birth rate reversal, from the low and declining rates that
prevailed during the late twenties and the decade of the Great Depression, to the higher fertility
levels that accompanied the tightening of labor markets during the forties. The depressed birth rate
cut the fraction of children in the population and so pushed up the working-age ratio, whereas after
1945 the beginnings of the Baby Boom reversed the process.
The two decades following World War II saw no reversals of comparable magnitude in the
fertilityofAmericans:thebirthrateandthegeneralfertilityrateclimbedrapidlytoapeakattheend
of the 1950s, and held at high levels for some years thereafter. Consequently, the proportion of the
population made up of young dependants rose rapidly and the working-age ratio dropped sharply
overtheperiod1948-66,asmaybeseenfromtheAddendumtoTable1:III. Whilethis was partially
offset by a modest rise in the participation rate, the net effect was that labor force per capita fell
rapidly during that interval.
Towardthecloseofthesixties,however,birthratesstartedtheirrecentdramaticdeclineand
thus ushered in thelatest period when theworkingageratio rosealmost as rapidlyas it had dropped
inthetwodecadesafterWorldWarII.Theturnaround,whichraisedthegrowthrateoftheworking-
age ratio bya full percentage point (from –0.57 to +0.48 percent ayear)accounted for70 percent of
the marked increase in the growth of labor force per capita.
The large fluctuation in birth rates and the accompanying decline and then increase in the
growth rates of the working-age and labor-force ratio have been well explained by Richard-1 7-
9 See Easterlin’s “Twentieth-Century American Population Growth,” and Richard Easterlin (1968), Population,
Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research (distributed
by Columbia University Press, N.Y. and London).
Easterlin.
9 On his hypothesis, fluctuations in birth rates are caused by changes in the economic
circumstancesandprospectsofyoungadultsintheirmostfertileyears,takeninconjunctionwiththe
expectations they had earlier formed in their parents’ households. Given the twenty-year or so lag
between birth and entryinto labor force and marriage, a kind of cycle is generated. Thus the cohort
who came of age during the Great Depression, and who carried with them expectations formed in
the prosperous twenties, married late and had few children. By contrast, the young adults of the
fifties and earlysixties were a much smaller cohort, reflecting the low birth rates of the thirties and
earlyforties. This smallsupplyofyoungworkers,meetingthebuoyantlabormarket ofthepost-war
years, found good jobs and enjoyed early promotion and rising wages. And given the modest
expectations they had formed in the depressed thirties, they married early and generated the Baby
Boom.Theythenspawnedthelargecohortofyoungpeoplewhoseexpectationswereconsistentwith
the happystate of their parents’ households. And these then entered the labor force in the seventies
and eighties where they met the recent Slowdown of productivity growth, the accompanying
stagnation of real wages and slower promotion. A rapid decline of birth rates followed.
A competing hypothesis lays greater stress on the long-term trend towards lower birth rates
to explain the low rates of recent decades. It sees the Baby Boom as an aberration and the more
recent decline in the birth rate as primarilya response to the forces controlling the long-term trend.
There is, in fact, much to be said about the sources of the long-term trends that have helped bring
birth rates to their present low levels. The economic and social conditions of the century have,
indeed, made children more expensive to raise and perhaps reduced the benefits that parents may
derive from them. Children can no longer contribute to the ordinary family's work and income as
theydidonthefarmsofacenturyago.Theyoccupymorecostlyhouseroominthecity.Theyrequire
long years of increasinglyexpensive medical care and education. Theycompete for the time, effort
and income of their mothers when the world of paid employment has been opened to women. As
adultstheyliveseparatedfromtheirparentsbyindependentemploymentandoftenbylongdistances;
they cannot offer the support and care for the elderly that they once did. And the parental support
they used to provide is now far less important when the elderly can depend on Social Security and
private pensions, on Medicare and on retirement communities. Young adults, therefore, are less
likely to see the benefits and virtues of large families.
Still, there are birth rate effects that stem from disjunctures between labor demand and
supply. When they occur, they have effects that echo a generation later. Moreover, they may echo
onceagain,perhapswithdiminishedforce,untilanewdisjunctureofindependentoriginoccursand
starts the process once more. The Easterlin echo effects have been an important component of the
growth of labor input in the present century and earlier, and we may see them again.-1 8-
10 See Endnote 1 of Part One.
11 This is the contention of William J. Baumol, Sue Ann Batey Blackman and Edward N. Wolff, Productivity and
American Leadership: The Long View, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1989, Ch. 4.
4. Labor Productivity Growth and its Sources
Between the first half of the nineteenth century and the second half (counting the years from about
1855 to about 1890 as the "second half"), the pace of labor productivitygrowth more than doubled.
Then between the second half of the last century and the first third of the present century (1890-
1927),itdoubledagain.(Table1:IV).Andbetweenthefirstandsecondthirdsofthepresentcentury,
it increased still again, by26 percent. Counting, therefore, from the slow rate of the first part of the
nineteenthcenturytothefarmorerapidpaceofthemiddledecadesofthetwentieth,thereweremore
than a hundred years of accelerating long-term labor-productivity growth. True, this record of
unbroken acceleration emerges when growth is measured over the long periods identified in Table
1:IV.Withintheselongperiods,acrossthe“longswingintervals”theyspan,therewasasuccession
of slowdowns and accelerations (Table 1: IVA). And if we broke the record into still shorter
intervals, the fluctuations of the labor productivity growth rate would be still more marked. Wars,
depressions, post-war rebounds and booms, the vagaries of the pace of technological progress have
all counted. Still, the record of long-term acceleration is clear enough.
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Against this accelerating trend of labor productivity growth rates, the quarter-century from
1966 to the present time is something of an anomaly. The occurrence of a slowdown is not in itself
strange. As said, there have been many precedents. It is the severity of the current retardation and
its duration which give this latest episode its special character. Compared with the preceding long
period between 1929 and 1966, the rate of advance fell 51 percent. Compared with the booming
growth of the post-war years (1948-66), the rate declined no less than 60 percent. Not since the
second half of the nineteenth century, if we depend on the long-period measures, has the pace of
labor productivity growth been so slow.
It is sometimes argued that the slowdown in the years since the latter sixties is not in itself
evidence of long-term retardation. In this view, the slowdown may be only a transitory matter,
comparable with the declines in productivity growth that accompanied serious depressions in the
past.
11 The slowdown that began after 1966, however, had by the close of the eighties gone on for
almostaquarter-century,whichislongerthanthefulllongswingsofthepast,theircontractionsplus
their expansions. Signs of a faster long-term growth rate in the years since 1989 are still uncertain.
The decline of the labor productivity growth rate between the previous long swing (1948-66) and
the period of slowdown thus far (1966-89) is 1.9 percentage points. Earlier in the present century,
the most drastic slowdown was that betweentheprosperous twenties andthe depressed thirties; the
decline in the growth rate then was much less – 0.75 points. Yet the recent period was not one of
severedepression.Theaveragecivilianunemploymentratefrom1966to1989was6.1percent;from
1929 through 1939, it was nearly 17 percent. The future may well see a return to the labor
productivity growth rates of the earlier twentieth century. But even if that does happen, the slow-1 9-
growth from 1966 to 1989 and perhaps longer will still remain as an episode of severe retardation
that persisted for a significantly long period.
What were the elements from which the long acceleration of productivitygrowth arose and
then the recent slowdown followed? The most elementary decomposition of labor productivity
growth is one that divides it into two sources. One is the increase in productivity attributable to the
enlargement of the stock of tangible capital that is available to aid each worker per hour of work
(Table 1: IV, line 2). We sometimes call this the contribution of the growth of "capital intensity".
The other element is the remainder of the increase of labor productivity. We call it the growth of
"crude total factor productivity" (or "crude TFP"). It appears in line (3) of Table 1: IV. We term it
"crude" because it is a remainder or residual which is itself an amalgam of various elements. These
are discussed and, to some extent, measured in the lines of the Table that follow.-2 0-
12 See Endnote 2 of Part One.
Table 1: IV The Source of Labor Productivity Growth, Private
Domestic Economy, 1800-1989, Sources in Percentage Points
Measures Across Long Periods
I Nineteenth Century II Twentieth Century
1800-1855 1855-1890 1890-1927 1890-1927 1929-1966 1966-1989
1. Output per manhour 0.39 1.06 2.01 2.00 2.52 1.23
Sources
2. Capital stock per manhour 0.19 0.69 0.62 0.51 0.43 0.57
3. Crude total factor prod. 0.20 0.37 1.39 1.49 2.09 0.66
4. Labor quality - - 0.15 0.15 0.40(0.30) 0.31(0.16)
5. Capital quality - - - - 0.24 0.31
6. Refined total factor prod. 0.20 0.37 1.24 1.34 1.45(1.55) 0.04(0.19)
Addenda















8. Vintage effect - - 0.04(0.05) 0.00(0.01)
9. Age-neutral refined
total factor prod. - - 1.41(1.50) 0.04(0.18)
Sources: See text discussion and Notes and Sources following Table 1: IIIA in Statistical Appendix.
The formula for carrying out such a decomposition, commonly called a “growth account”,
was presented years ago by Robert Solow.
12 As applied to a decomposition of aggregate output, it
reads:
............................Y *=,K K* + ,L L* + A* (1)
In the formula, Y stands for output, L for labor hours and K for tangible capital stock (including
land). The asterisk (*) denotes theperannum rate of increase over a trend interval; so Y* stands for
the growth rate of output over a period of years, and similarly for L* and K*. The coefficient ,K is
the elasticityof output with respect to capital andrepresents theweight tobeattached to the growth-2 1-
13 See Endnote 3, and the publications by Robert Solow and others cited in Section III of the Bibliography.
14 Under the assumption that aggregate production relations are characterized by constant returns to scale we
obtain this by making use of the restriction that the elasticity coefficients sum to unity, and hence: Y = (,K + ,L)Y.
of capital in contributing to the growth of output. It is measured bythe fraction of the value of total
output that constitutes the compensation of the owners of capital stock for the use of their property:
2K = ,K. The “property income share” is the sum of before tax interest, rents, dividends and the
retained profits of corporations plus an allowance for the compensation of capital in non-corporate
business.Inthegross terms in whichwemakeouroutputcalculations,italsocontainsanallowance
for the depreciation (or retirement) of reproducible capital goods.
Since at any given time, and subject to certain assumptions, the (before-tax) earnings of




progress is raising the productive efficiencyof the combined bundle of inputs. So the residue of the
proportional growth of output, A*, that is, the part not accounted for by the sum of the weighted
factorinputs,measuresthecontributionoftheproportionategrowthincrudetotalfactorproductivity
(TFP) – along with that of anyinputs left out of the accounting altogether, and also the net effect of
errors in the data.
Underthesameassumptionsanalternativeformulacanbederivedbysimplyrearrangingthe
terms in Equation (1):
14
...............................A *=2K (Y*-K*) + (1-2K)(Y*-L*) . (2)
ThisequationtellsusthatA*,thatis,crudeTFP,istheweightedsumofthegrowthofoutput
perunitofcapitalandofoutputperunitoflabor.Andthatiswhyitiscalledtotalfactorproductivity
growth. Technological progress, the advance of economically useful knowledge actually
incorporatedintoproduction,ispresumablyanimportantcomponentoftotalfactorproductivity.But
there are other contributors to this remainder.
An expression for the growth rate of real output per unit of labor input can also be obtained
directly from Equation (1):
............................... ( Y *-L * )=A * +2K (K*-L*) . (3)
Since (K* - L*) represents the growth rate of capital stock per labor unit, Equation (3) gives
usaformulaforpartitioningtheproportionategrowthoflaborproductivityintotwocomponents,the
contributions of the capital intensity growth and those made by the growth of crude TFP. This
relationship is applied in makingthegrowth accountingcalculations underlying Tables IV and IVA.-2 2-
15 See Endnote 4.
Thedecomposition oflaborproductivitygrowth,thatappearsin thesecond and third lines of
Table 1: IV, crude as it is, reveals a striking difference between the growth records of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. The present century, for most of its course, not only enjoyed a much faster
rate of labor productivity growth than did the nineteenth century, but drew its advance from largely
different sources. So far as these measurements can tell us, the labor productivity growth of the
nineteenth century, and particularly its second half, found its source primarily in an enlargement of
the tangible capital stock at the disposal of workers, and it owed its acceleration between the earlier
and later parts of the century chiefly to a speed-up of such capital accumulation. In the present
century, on the other hand, the major sources of both labor productivity growth and its period-to-
periodchangesweretheelementsofadvancethattogetheraccountforcrudetotalfactorproductivity
growth.
15 The following figures, derived from Table 1: IV, bring out these conclusions plainly.
Table 1: IV-Addendum
The Relative Importance of Crude TFP Growth Among the Sources of Labor Productivity Growth
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1855/1890 to 1890/1927 -7 107
II:1929-1966 17 83 1890/1927 to 1929/1966 -15 115
II:1966-1989 46 54 1929/1966 to 1966/1989 -11 111
Notes and Sources: Computed from Lines 1,2,3 of Table 1: IV; inter-period changes within Frame I, and Frame II.
Thecontrastbetweenthetwocenturiesisreal,but,toadegree,overdrawn.CrudeTFPwhich
became the predominant part of twentieth-century growth is less an answer to our search for the
sources of growth than a question that presses for answer. The growth account at the level of lines
(2) and (3) in Table 1: IV is, to begin with, incomplete. It leaves out of account the contributions-2 3-
16 See Endnote 5.
17 Dale E. Jorgenson, “Measuring Economic Performance in the Private Sector,” in Milton Moss (Ed..), The
Univ. Press 1973, 233-351. See also Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni in the Bibliography below.
made by changes in the composition of labor input and capital input which alter the effectiveness
of hours of labor or units of tangible capital.
Labor hours are not homogeneous. They differ from one another because of differences in
three major characteristics of the workers who provide them: their experience, which is a function
of their age, their sex and their level of education. If we may judge marginal productivity by
earnings,theproductivityofworkersriseswithlengthofschoolingand,formostworkers,withtheir
age. Bythe same test, an average woman is less effective than the average man of the same age and
level of education. Byclassifying worker hours according to the levels of education of the workers
who provide them and weighting the hours of each class by their relative average earnings, one
obtainsameasureoflaborinputthattakesaccountofdifferencesineducation.Iflevelsofeducation
have been rising, such a weighted measure of labor input will rise faster than the unweighted index
oflaborhours,Andthedifferencebetweenthegrowthratesoftheweightedandunweightedindexes
is a measure of the growth of labor input attributable to the rising level of education. By analogous
methods, one obtains measures of the growth of labor input due to changes in the age and sex
composition of labor hours employed in production. We call the sum of the three growth rates
attributabletoage,sex,andeducationtheinputgrowthofLaborQuality. Weighted bylabor’s share




returns to units ofcapital stock,forexample,varyamongassets ofdifferent classes. Structures with
a long service life carry a smaller gross rate of return than does shorter-lived equipment; the
depreciationrateonstructuresisnaturallylower.Non-depreciableassetssuchaslandandinventories
have still lower gross returns. Differential tax treatment causes the gross rate of return before tax to
differ according to the legal form of the organizations employing the capital: corporate business,
unincorporated business, households and so on. Differences in risk produce differences in gross
returns across industrial sectors. DaleJorgenson and his collaborators havemadeindexes ofcapital
stock weighted by average gross return to capital in cells differentiated jointly by all three
characteristics: asset class, legal form of organization and industry.
17 Again the difference between
the growth of the resulting index of weighted capital stock and that of unweighted capital stock is
a measure of input growth attributable to changes in the composition or qualityof the capital stock.
As such, it enters into the growth account subject to capital’s share of total income. It should be
understood that when we speak of the growth of Capital Quality, we do not refer to the important
changes in the characteristics of capital goods which raise their productivity but are the result of
technologicalprogress.Thateffect,forwhichtherearenodirectmeasures,remainsembeddedinthe
TFP residual.-2 4-
18 See Endnote 6.
Of the several sources of change in capital’s composition, that by asset class was by far the
most important at least since 1948. According to Jorgenson’s estimates, the shift of capital among
asset classes, principally the relative growth of short-lived, high gross rate-of-return equipment
compared with structures, accounted for over 80 percent of the total growth of capital quality from
all sources between 1948 and 1966.
18
The contributions of Labor and Capital Quality growth were still small in the early part of
the present century. Although high school enrollments speeded up, their effect on the educational
level of the workforce itself remained limited until the twenties. As for Capital Quality we argue
below that its contribution in the nineteenth centurywas verysmall and confined to the years from
1870 to 1900, and the same appears to be true in the early twentieth century since the rapid growth
of the relatively short-lived Equipment fraction of the capital stock does not begin until the 1940s.
Afterthe1920s, however, growth in thequalityoffactorinputsmadenotablecontributions.
The schooling level of the labor force rose more rapidly and somewhat later there was a rapid
increase in the relative importance of Equipment. Taken together, thetwo developments accounted
for 25 percent of Labor Productivity growth in the long period from 1929 to 1966. (Table 1: IV).
Inthemostrecentquarter-century–intheperiodofSlowdown–therewerefurtherchanges.
Thecontributionofthetwoqualitysourcestakentogetherremainedquiteunchanged,but,ofcourse,
theywere responsible for a larger fraction of the much-reduced growth of Labor Productivity. This
outcome was the result of offsettingdevelopments in the components of qualitygrowth. The rise in
the level of Education of the labor force went on apace. Changes in age and sex composition,
however, both worked to reduce the measured productivity of workers. The coming-of-age of the
BabyBoomersbroughtlargeadditionsofyoung,inexperiencedworkersintoemployment.Theentry
ofwomenintothepaidlaborforcespeededup.TakingAge,Sex,andEducationtogether,thegrowth
ofLaborQualitybecameslower. On theotherhand, the impact oftheSlowdown on investment fell
more heavily on Structures than on Equipment, so the pace of improvement in Capital Quality
became faster.
The figures for qualitychange in Table 1: IV refer entirelyto the twentieth century. Yet we
believethatcontributionstogrowthbecauseofchangeinthecompositionofcapitalinputmusthave
been quite small during most of the last century, probablysmaller than seems to have been the case
evenintheearlyyearsofthepresentcentury.Theremay,however,havebeenamodestriseincapital
quality between 1870 and 1900.
Weargueasfollows,startingwithLaborQuality.Inthepresentcentury,itsprincipalelement
has been the rise of the educational level of the workforce. In the nineteenth century, however, this
was growing far more slowly and making a much smaller contribution to growth. At mid-century,
in 1850, the fraction of young people, aged 5-19, enrolled in schools at some time during the year
stood at just under 50 percent, and for these, the average number of school days per year was still-2 5-
19 See Endnote 7.
20 Historical Statistics, Series H-420 and 424.
small. The fraction enrolled was probably not a great deal lower in 1800, and hardly rose between
1850 and 1870. There was, indeed, a significant increase between 1850 and 1870 in the number of
daysspentinschoolbyastudent,andthiswouldhaveraisedtheeffectiveschoolingofthoseworkers
who as children had attended schools in those years – essentially those who entered the workforce




growth between 1870 and 1890, but it would have been small. Since an increase of days in
attendance took place only after 1850 and that of enrollments only after 1870, they could have
affected only the younger workers of the post-1850 years and then mainly after 1870. The bulk of
the labor force whose school-age years had been passed before mid-century would have been
unaffected. Moreover, the rise in schooling remained confined to the elementary level. As late as




school and hardly at all to the higher differential between such unschooled workers and those with
a secondary school education.
Whether there was also some significant change in the age and sex composition of the
workforce taken together is hard to say. The average age of workers was rising slowly under the
influenceoffallingbirthrates;butimmigration,whichbroughtinadisproportionateshareofyoung
adults, was an offsetting force. The median age of the whole population, however, was rising very
slowly. To what degree the effect of the rise in age, whatever it was, may have been offset by an
increase in the proportion of women in paid work is also not clear. Movement off the farm and the
riseofnon-farmemploymentsurelyenlargedwomen’sopportunitiesforworkoutsidethehome,and
the expense of urban life would have pressed women to take such work. The rate of rise of persons
engaged per member of the labor force is consistent with such a development (Table 1: III). Having
regard to these various considerations, we believe that the contributions of labor quality change to
productivitygrowth in the second halfofthenineteenth centurywould havebeen smallerthan even
the quite low contributions suggested by our estimates for the early years of the present century
(Tables 1: IV and 1: IVA).
TurningtoCapitalQuality,itappearsthattheremayhavebeenasmallcontributionfromthis
source in the years between 1870 and 1900. In the first half of the century, the total capital stock
consisted almost entirely of long-lived assets, cleared and improved land, houses and other
structures. Equipment made up only a small and stable fraction of all assets – between 5 and 7
percent of the total. By1870, however, the Equipment Fraction had become 11 percent of the total,-2 6-
21 See his chapter in Vol. II of this history, Table 13.
22 The figure for 1919-48 is from Raymond Goldsmith, A Study of Savings in the United States,V o l .I I I ,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956, Table V-3.
23 See Endnote 8.
24 See Endnote 9.
and then grew rapidly to 28 percent in 1900. All these are the estimates provided by Robert
Gallman.
21




however, to an Equipment fraction some 39 percent larger than it was in 1900. The impact of the
relative growth of short-lived capital, therefore, would have been little different in the two periods.
And on this basis we judge that the contribution from the growth of Capital Quality to the growth
of labor productivity was of the order of only one-tenth of one percent a year from 1870 to 1900.
Having in mind these considerations regarding both Labor Qualityand Capital Quality, we think it
reasonable to regard the nineteenth century estimates of crude TFP as at least roughly comparable
with the more refined figures for the twentieth century.
What do these estimates of refined TFP growth represent? We regard them mainly as
measures of technological progress actually incorporated into production together with the gains
from economies of scale – insofar as the two can actually be usefully separated. We discuss this
matter in an Endnote.
23 As a residual, however, the figures also include the effects on growth of
whateverotherfactorswemayhavefailedtoidentifyandmeasureandwhichhaveoperatedthrough
channels otherthan thosewehavemeasured.
24As a residual, moreover, refined TFP is theinheritor
of all theerrors that mayresideinthedataorlackofdataandintheestimatingprocedures bywhich
they are put together.
We observe, finally, that the technological progress that moves refined TFP is the
technological progress (and theeconomies of scale) that is “actuallyincorporated into production.”
Even in a progressive economy such as the U.S., however, the pace of actual incorporation may
differ from the underlying rate of advance in practical knowledge. The main reason for such a
difference in the U.S. stems from the fact that a portion, probably a major portion, of advances in
knowledge must be embodied in tangible equipment and structures and often placed in new
locations. Similar changes are needed to exploit the potential gains from economies of scale. True,
not all advances of knowledge require such embodiment; some take the form of changes in
managerialpoliciesandproceduresthatrequirelittleornonewcapital.Bettercontrolofinventories
may be an example. But new, redesigned, or relocated equipment is needed to realize a large,
presumably the major, share of advancing knowledge.-2 7-
25 Our formula was first derived and presented by Richard Nelson, “Aggregate Production Functions and
Medium-Range Growth Projections, American Economic Review, LIV, No. 5 (Sept. 1964), 575-606.
Suppose we take it that the gross capital investment of each year – at least in twentieth-
century America – embodies the most advanced technology available to the investing firms of the
year. If so, the average level of technology actually in use during a year depends on whether the
capital stock that has accumulated is madeup moreorless largelyofrecent orolder, partlyobsolete
“vintages” of capital and so of embodied technology. In short, it depends on the average age of the
capital stock. It follows that the growth rate of technology actually incorporated into production
depends on three factors: (1) the fraction of new technology that requires embodiment; (2) the
growth rate of “age-neutral” embodied technology (that is, the rate at which embodied technology
would be incorporated into production if the average age of capital stock remained constant); and
(3)a“vintage effect”, which is the change in therateofembodiment becauseofthechangeperyear
in the average age of the capital stock over a period of time. For any given rate of age-neutral
embodied progress, measured progress will be faster if the age of capital is declining, but slower if
age is rising. As between two periods, the growth rate of measured progress would be retarded if
average age rises faster or declines more slowly in the second period than in the first.
We offer some rough estimates of the vintage effect in an Addendum to Tables 1: IV, and
1: IVA. The formula we employ,
25 the assumptions we make, and the data we use are described in
the Appendix Note on the vintage effect. Forreasons explained in that Note, we think the figures in
the Tables may underestimate the actual effects of fluctuations in the rate of change in the age of
capital stock. Nonetheless, the main lesson we draw from the figures is that the vintage effect may
beofconsiderablesizeincomparisonsbetweenTFPinparticularsuccessive“long-swingintervals.”
When acombination ofGreat DepressionandGreatWarproducedadramaticdeclinein thegrowth
oftheprivatecapitalstock,itsaverageagerosemarkedlyandrefinedTFP,expressingtheactualrate
of incorporation of technological progress, was driven below the presumptive underlying rate of
advance of knowledge. With the return of peace and prosperity, the growth rate of the capital stock
rebounded, the average age of capital fell and the rate of incorporated progress exceeded the rate of
underlyingprogress.BeforeallowingforthevintageeffecttherateofrefinedTFPgrowthfrom1948
to1966standshigherthanthatfrom1929to1948.Allowingforthevintageeffect,thereverseseems
to have been true. (Table 1: IVA). But the two intervals offset one another, and the long-period
measureofthevintageeffectfrom1929to1966isessentiallyzero.(Table1:IV).Thatisonereason
wepreferthe long-period measures of Table 1: IVto thoseofTable1: IVA. And, as said earlier, for
the same reason, we prefer the figures of the long period from 1855 to 1890 rather than those for its
componentshorterperiods,thelong-swingintervalacrosstheCivilWarandtheintervalofrebound
from 1871 to 1890.
5. What Measured Growth Fails to Measure
Readers were warned early in this chapter that the output growth that is measured in the GDP is an
imperfect approximation to the growth we really seek to measure and understand. Besides many-2 8-
26 This simple statement exaggerates the difficulty somewhat. For some goods, but not for all, price indexes have
tried to account for quality change insofar as the change consists of an identifiable physical component whose base-
year cost can be established or estimated.
minor problems, the GDP, as it has been measured until now, largely misses the additions to
consumersatisfactionsmadebynewtypes ofgoods and services as theyenterthemarket, gradually
spread and come to account for larger shares of consumer expenditures. Nor does the GDP
successfullytake account of improvements in the qualityof pre-existing goods and services. These
failures stem from the fact that thepricedeflators, which transform the value of aggregate output in
currentpricesintomeasuresofrealoutputinconstantprices,arethemselvesmeasuresofthechange
in the cost over a period of a bundle of goods and services of constant composition and quality.
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The composition in each period of the priced bundles does, indeed, correspond to the
proportionsinwhichconsumerexpendituresweredividedamongthevariousobjectsofexpenditure
in either the initial or terminal year of each measurement period. In American data, these have been
periods of ten years or even longer in the earlier data; they are five-year periods now. Yet, even
within these periods, the composition of expenditures on the types and qualities included in the
standard bundle changes. More important, the quality of goods within bundles generally rises and
new types of goods appear on the market. The improvement in quality has been caught quite
inadequately for most of our two centuries and the true significance of new goods for consumer
satisfaction not at all.
Between periods, thecomposition ofthebundles measured is changed. But thegrowthrates
of one period are then linked to those of a preceding period in a way that does not recognize the
higher capacity of the new or improved products that are represented in the second bundle to meet
the basic needs that consumers seek to satisfy – except insofar as the new goods have higher base-
year prices per unit than those of the products they replace. Thus, as said, if a unit of penicillin has
the same base-period price as a mustard plaster, the two count equally. Yet the penicillin can save
the life of a patient with bacterial pneumonia, while the poultice is at best harmless. For the same
base-period price per hour of service, electric light bulbs provide more light than the gas mantles,
kerosenelampsandwaxcandlestheyreplaced.Theyeliminatedtheneedtotrimwicks,cleanglobes
and maintain thesupplyofkerosene– and theyreduced thefirehazard. Thelength oftheuseful day
was extended. Electric-powered washers, dryers and refrigerators reduced the drudgeryand fatigue
of housework; they freed women for a more varied and interesting life. Together with automobiles
and extended hours for marketing, the new household appliances helped women enter paid
employment.Tothatextent,thegrowthofmeasuredoutputisraised.Littleofthevalueofthesenew
products or a myriad other examples of new goods and services is caught by the standard measures
of output.
Suppose their true value could be captured, how would the growth rates of output over the
two centuries be changed? We can be confident that output growth rates would look higher in both
centuries.Butwouldthetwentieth-centuryratesberaisedmorethanthoseforthenineteenth,orvice
versa? In the absence of true and comprehensive measures, we cannot say with assurance, but we-2 9-
27 See Simon Kuznets (1946), [National Product Since 1869, New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research], Tables II-11 and II-16.
28 See Endnote 11 to Part One.
can make a tentative judgment. We think that the twentieth century saw the appearance and spread
of more new and improved products and services of benefit to consumers than did the nineteenth.
A representative consumer of 1800, if transported forward to, say, 1870 would have found
the composition of consumer expenditures familiar in many ways. About 74 percent of consumer
expenditures still went for food, clothing and shelter.
27 The percentage was still as high as 65 in
1890. By 1989, it was only 37. Much of the decline, of course, represents only the inelasticity of
demand for basic necessities as income rises. But the point is that it is within the rising margin for
expenditure on products beyond the provision for these basic necessities that the great changes in
the character of goods and services and in the quality of products has taken place, and these are
largely the developments of the twentieth century.
28
Majortwentieth-centurydevelopments intransportation,communications,informationand
entertainment and, most important of all, in the provision of health care and the length of life itself
transformed the character and quality of life for people. A few summary figures are enough to
suggest the importance of the changes brought bynew goods and services in the twentieth century.
Table 1: V
Private Transportation and Communications Equipment in U.S. Households, 1899-1990
1899 1920 1950 1990
Passenger cars per household - 0.33 0.93 1.54
Telephones per 1000 people 13.3 123.4 258.1
1
Households with telephones (%) - 35.0 58.2
1 93.3
Households with radios (%) - 0.2
2 92.8 73.3
Households with TV (%) - - 8.9 96..37





Sources: Historical Statistics and Statistical Abstract, 1994.-3 0-
29 See Endnote 12 to Part One.
30 For these calculations we use the average annual per capita real output growth rates from Tables 1: I and 1: IA
for the periods starting in 1800-55 (for 1800 to 1847), the weighted average of 1855-90 and 1890-1905 (for 1855 to
1900, the weighted average of 1890-1927 and 1929-48 (for 1900/02 to1949) and 1929-89 (for 1929/31 to 1989).
The survival prospects for the members of the (white) male birth cohort starting life in 1991 have improved
remarkably, as has been noticed, but their prospects for per capita real income growth – over the expected 73 years
that the mortality table for that year would allow them – remain especially cloudy. If the 1966-89 growth rate of real
GNP per manhour is projected into the future, implicitly assuming that manhours per capita remained constant, they
might anticipate experiencing an average lifetime gain of only 144 percent, or substantially less than that enjoyed by
the 1930-1 birth cohort. On the other hand, implicitly assuming that the lowered rate of labor productivity growth
over the 1966-89 period is transitory and there will be some rebound, the (higher) growth rate of GNP per capita
during the 1966-89 period could be projected forward, indicating a gain of 237 percent between 1991 and the year
2064. When we take the geometric average of these pessimistic and optimistic estimates, the “golden mean” figure
turns out to be an expected lifetime average real income gain of 184 percent, which is, more or less, a satisfying
continuation of the experience of the 1929-31 birth cohort. Of course, more of that projected proportionate measure
of material improvement would be “enjoyed” by the 1991 cohort when they are at older ages. And, indeed, a larger
part of it is likely to take the form of health care services.
With the benefit of vaccines and antibiotics, the incidence of the more serious infectious
diseases (other than AIDS) has declined over the last century to almost insignificant levels. With
these developments and with the advances in the treatment of malignancies and of diseases of the
liverandheart,deathrateshavedeclinedrapidlyandthelengthoflifehasbeengreatlyextended.The
expectationoflifehadbegunlengtheninginthesecondhalfofthelastcenturyasthebetterprovision
for purewaterand forsewagesystems and waste disposal reduced urban death rates. But the rate of
increase of life expectancy at birth doubled during the first half of the present century and then
continued to rise. At the turn of the century a new-born infant could expect to live till 48. By 1991,
this figure had risen to 73, a gain of a quarter-century. At later ages, the gains in length of life came
later. At 40 expected life was about the same in 1930 as in 1900, but since 1930, expected life at 40




gross) income that might be experienced by the members of the cohorts of white males born at
successivedatesbetween1800and1991.Forthosebornattheopeningofthenineteenthcenturythe
expected lifetime improvement was 54.8 percent, whereas the representative member of the cohort
born in 1855 could have anticipated a 101 percent increase in average real GNP per capita within
his lifetime. By 1900-2 the mean lifetime rise in average real income for new-born males had
increasedfurther,to126percent,and,forthoseformingthecohortbornjustastheworldwassliding
intotheGreatDepression,thatis,in1929-31,theaveragegainexperiencedoveranexpectedlifetime
was as great as 188 percent.
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There were, of course, other new products with transforming significance: such as the
household appliances alreadymentioned that helped freewomen from household drudgery, and the
air conditioners that made the South more attractive both for work and for life at home. And the
servicefromallthesenewproducts,thetelephones,theautomobiles,themotionpictures,radiosand-3 1-
TV’s, the vaccines and antibiotics improved immensely as time passed and as the original
innovationscametobesupportedbyroads, servicestations and repairservices,byTVbroadcasting
stations and networks and, in the case of medical care, by the scientific training of physicians and
by better chemistry and biology and by better instruments for diagnosis and treatment. In all these
areas, the new products and services, their quality improvements and supporting facilities, formed
complementary complexes that supported the spread of the initial innovations and increased their
value to consumers.
Itseemstousthattheseimportanttwentieth-centurydevelopmentsinconsumergoods,which




passu in the estimates of labor productivity growth.
Theeffectofmorecomprehensivemeasuresontheinter-centurydifferenceinthegrowthrate
oftheoutputofcapitalgoodsismoredifficult to gauge. Theimportant product developmentsofthe
nineteenth century were, indeed, in the sphere of capital not consumer, goods. This meant such
products as the cotton gin, steam engines for factories and mines and the belts and shafting that
transmitted the power to the new textile and apparel machinery and to wood and metal-working
machinery and machine tools. It meant steam ships and railroad structures and equipment and the
electric telegraph. And all these new capital goods improved in quality over the course of the
century. Taken into account, the measured growth rate of capital goods output in the nineteenth
centurywould certainlyappear as substantiallymore rapid than it now is. But would this change be
greater than an analogous reform of the capital goods output figures in the twentieth century?
Thatishardtosay,fortherewere,ofcourse,alsoimportantnewandimprovedcapitalgoods
that were introduced during the last hundred years. Gasoline-powered trucks took over much of the
older railroad-freight business; diesel-electric engines replaced steam. Airplanes replaced railroad
passenger trains. Gasoline-powered tractors replaced horse-power on the farms. Telephone
communication became universal in the business world. Factories were illuminated and air-
conditioned, and so wereoffices and stores. Factorymachinerywas electrified. Physicians, dentists
and hospitals were equipped with X-ray equipment, then with the CAT scan and then with
equipmentformagneticresonanceimaging.Thepainofroutinedentistrywasgreatlyreducedbythe
modern dental drill. Finally, in the last two decades, the computer has become the most important
category of new business investment. It would be hard to say whether a more comprehensive and
adequate national accounting system would raise the nineteenth-century growth rate of the real
output of capital goods more than it would do in the twentieth.
If we treat this ambiguous result as meaning that the significance of new capital goods was
about equally great in the two centuries, then the presumption about the comparative growth rates
of output in the two centuries remains. With a full accounting for the significance of new and
improved products, thetwentieth-centurygrowth rateofoutput would exceed that in thenineteenth
century– byan even greatermargin than ourpresent measures suggest. But even ifonethought that-3 2-
31 See Endnote 13.
32 The quantitative picture of U.S. macroeconomic growth in the nineteenth century presented here differs in
some particulars from that in Robert Gallman’s chapter in Volume 2 of the Cambridge Economic History of the
new products meant more for the growth of capital formation in the nineteenth century than it did
in the twentieth the presumption would not be seriouslyweakened. Gross private investment in the
last third of the 1800s, when capital formation was especially strong, absorbed only some 20 to 25
percent of GDP. And the percentage became even smaller in the course of the 1900s.
Thisjudgmentabouttheeffectofreformedmeasuresonthegrowthratesofoutputinthetwo
centuries carries over to comparisons of labor productivityand TFP. Better measures, if theycould
be made, would, therefore, support a judgment that the contribution of the advance of knowledge
to thegrowth rateofoutput was, indeed, greater in the last 100 years than in thecenturybefore. The
difference would then have been even more pronounced than the standard data now available
suggest.
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These speculations about the significance of new and improved goods and services –
uncertainastheymaybe–areintendedtohelpusmakeabetterjudgmentaboutdifferencesbetween
growthratesofoutputoverlongperiodsoftime.Ourdiscussionwasconfinedtodifferencesbetween
two successive centuries. They say nothing about differences between successive shorter periods
such as those in our tables. More important, even a reformed system of output measurement, if it
couldbecontrived,wouldnotyieldameasureofthegrowthofeconomicwelfare,althoughitwould
help us make such judgments. Measures of output and judgments about welfare are separated by
manyproblemsandpuzzles.Sometakeusfarbeyondwhatanysystemofoutputmeasurementcould
grasp. Our own speculations about per capita output growth look at past experience from our own
perceptionofthevaluesofpeoplenowliving.Howelsecouldapresent-dayobserverviewthepast?
But a representative person living in 1800 or 1850 might place a different value on today’s output
of goods and on the way of life involved in its making and spending.
There is much more that is germane to a full picture of the long-run course of economic
changes affecting the welfare of Americans. Aggregateoutput tells us nothingabout the division of
income among income classes or among other divisions of our society. It does not deal with the
character of work, its toilsomeness, dangers, stimulation or torpor. It does not count the costs of
growth, such as insecurityin jobs and income or the costs of higher average income and population
such as congestion and pollution. Output and its associated income are important considerations in
an assessment of economic welfare. They are not the whole story.
6. A Provisional Summary
Fivemajordevelopments definetheprofileofgrowth across thetwocenturiesofmoderneconomic
growth insofar as this can be drawn from the available statistics.
32-3 3-
United States. Endnote 10 of Part One provides a reconciliation of the two views, showing that the differences arise
largely from differences in the choice of periods, our use of gross private domestic product measure of output rather
than net domestic product, and of manhours rather than worker-years for the measure of labor services.
(1) Sustained growth with modern characteristics began in America during the first half of
thenineteenth century. It started slowlywith an averagerateofpercapitaoutput growth well below
one percent a year over the first half of the century. There was substantial acceleration between the
first and second halves, and again at the turn of the century. Since then, for a full century (1890-
1989), per capita output growth has risen steadilyat a rate hovering around 1.8 percent a year when
measured by private output across “long periods.” As a result per capita output now stands at a
measured level six times as high as a century ago [Table 1: I].
(2) The sources of per capita growth have changed dramatically. A first change was in the
relative importance of labor input per head versus output per unit of labor input. In the first half of
thenineteenthcentury,theywereofequalimportance.Inthesecondhalf,thelaborproductivityshare
rose to two-thirds. And then for three-quarters of a century (1890-1966), the growth of labor input
percapitaturnednegative,andlaborproductivitygrowthhasutterlydominatedthegrowthofoutput
percapita[Table1:II].ButtheperiodofSlowdownsince1966hasseenwhatisprobablyatransient
reversion to the pattern of the nineteenth century. The coming-of-age of the Baby Boom cohorts
combinedwithanacceleratedentryofwomenintopaidworktomakelaborinputagainanimportant
source of output growth [Table 1: III].
(3) Other major developments consist of the changes in relative importance that occurred
among the sources of labor productivity growth [Table 1: IV]. In the nineteenth century taken as a
whole, and more particularlyin the second half, the growth of tangible capital per manhour was the
most important proximate source of labor productivity growth. It was largely responsible for the
great speed-up of growth between the first and second halves of the nineteenth century. In the
twentieth century, however, the growth rate of tangible capital per manhour was slower, and its
decline in relative importance was large [Table 1: IV-Addendum].
(4) In some part, its decline was offset by the growing twentieth-century contributions of
Labor and Capital Quality, essentially by the rising educational level of the workforce and by the
growing importance of short-lived, high gross return capital equipment relative to that of land and
long-livedstructures[Table1:IV].Theriseofeducationmaybeseenasasymptomofastillbroader
rise of knowledge-carrying intangible assets, a development that we have still to take fully into
account. But the relative rise of rapidly depreciating capital equipment within fixed reproducible
business assets, is another expression (and a tangible one) of the economy’s emergence from an
earlier epoch of extensive growth to its present dependence on technological progress.
(5) Our measures of TFP growth include such gains as derived from both technological and
organizationalinnovationsproper,improvementsinallocativeefficiencyofbusinessenterprisesand
markets, and economies of scale. Extensive growth, involving rapid population growth and land-3 4-
settlement, together with its concomitant provision of a great transportation network of local,
regional and national roads, canals, river ways and railroads was the material basis for great gains
from economies of scale, as well as the erosion of local monopolies and their attendant
inefficiencies. These may have been a very large element in the TFP growth of the nineteenth
century.Inthetwentiethcentury,however,thisgavewaytomorerapidtechnologicalprogressbased
on the advance of practical knowledge with an ever more important scientific base. That progress
went on for three-quarters of the present century at a rapid pace. As measured by refined TFP
(including further gains from the economies of scale) the pace was more than 3.5 times faster than
in the earlier century’s second half [Table 1: IV].
(6)Risingtotal factorproductivitythusbecametheprincipal sourceofthepresent century’s
rapid growth in both labor productivity and real output per capita, but this is only one facet of the
more complicated and interrelated temporal evolution taking place in the configuration of growth
sources. The shifting pattern of relative importance among the latter is concisely displayed by the
two panels of Table 1:VI. The left-hand frame shows the relative contributions of capital-intensity
and input quality (factor composition) improvements to the labor productivity growth rate, based
upon the estimates in Table 1: IV. The right-hand frame shows the percentage contributions made
by these sources to the rate of growth of real output per capita, and reflects the fact that the rates of
growth of labor productivity and labor input per capita are complements in the growth rate of real
output per capita manhours. The great rise in the importance of (refined) TFP growth between the
centuries emerges clearly from this table, and especially dramatically in per capita than of labor
productivity.-3 5-
Table 1:VI
The Relative Importance of the Sources of Growth: U.S. Private Domestic Economy
Percentage Contribution to the
Growth Rate of Labor Productivity
Percentage Contribution to the Growth
















1800-1855 49 - 51 55 22 - 23
1855-1890 65 - 35 28 49 - 23
1890-1927 31 7 62 -15 36 8 71
II Twentieth Century
1890-1927 26 7 67 -4 27 7 70
1929-1966 17 25 58 -45 25 36 84
1966-1989 46 52 3 33 35 40 12
Sources: Computed from growth rates in Tables 1: II and 1: IV.
Weend this section with a question, or, more precisely, a bundle of related questions. Up to
apoint,thebroadprofileofinter-centurydifferenceswehavedrawninsourcesofgrowthseemseasy
to accept. One can well believe that the growth of labor input per head became weaker and began
to decline in the present century when immigration was restricted and, when, as incomes rose,
workers chose to take part of their potential gains in shorter hours and greater leisure. One can well
understand that land settlement and development came to an end around the turn of the centuryand
thataftertheverygreatnineteenth-centuryinvestmentsintransportand intheprovisionofthebasic
infrastructures oftownandcitylifehadbeenmade,theimportanceofthegrowthoftangiblecapital
should decline. Indeed, the evidence supporting the view that such a change occurred is even
stronger than these considerations suggest, as subsequent sections will show. Yet not everything in
this historical picture is so transparent. Questions arise mainly from our findings about the pace of
TFP growth itself, the inter-century contrast and the relations between technological progress and
the contribution from capital accumulation.
On the face of our numbers, TFP growth including both technological progress proper and
economiesofscaleseemsverylowinthenineteenthcenturyandespeciallyinthesecondhalf,when
it rose at an average rate of only 0.37 percent a year, although per capita output growth was twice
as fast as in the first half, and when the growth account suggests that three-quarters of that increase
wasattributabletotheacceleratedgrowthoftangiblecapitalpermanhour.TheTFPfigureonitsface-3 6-
seemssmallabsolutelyandsmallrelativetoitspaceinthetwentiethcentury(beginning1890)when
the speed of TFP growth from 1890 to 1966 appeared to be at least 3.5 times faster. We may well
believe the suggestion that technological progress was faster in the twentieth century than in the
nineteenth. But was TFP really so much slower in the nineteenth, when the great investments in
transportation and the introduction of steam railroads and the telegraph created local, regional and
national markets and, presumably, large economies of scale, when steel replaced wood and fragile
iron, when harvesting was mechanized, steam power came to factories, the machine tool industry
developed and the repetitive assembly of interchangeable parts became common?
Turningtothetwentiethcentury,oneaskswhetheragrowthaccount that allows onlyforthe
growth of tangible capital does not turn a blind eye to the rise of a newsourceofgrowthintheform
of intangible capital. It is not quite a blind eye since our account makes allowance for the growth of
labor quality by formal schooling. That, however, is hardly sufficient. There are other components
ofintangiblecapital,accumulatedbyon-the-jobtraining,organizedR&Dandthecostlyorganization
of the administrative infrastructure of large-scale business.
Having in mind our observations of measured capital accumulation and TFP, we point to a
generalproblem.Thegrowthaccountsonwhichwehavebasedourdescriptiongaintheirclarityonly
at a cost. They assume that the various sources of growth rise or fall and achieve their effects
independentlyofoneanother.Intheworldofthestandardgrowthaccounts,capital,whethertangible
or intangible, accumulates regardless of the pace of technological progress. The growth accounts
assumethattechnologicalprogressis“neutral,”raisingthereturnsanddemandsforlaborandcapital
in equal proportion. Theypaynoattention to changes in thecharacteroftechnological progress that
influence the kinds of capital required: land, structures, equipment; tangible capital or intangible.
Andtherearereverseeffects that run from capitalaccumulationtotechnologicalprogress.Weshall
not understand the forces that have made the pace and proximate sources of twentieth-century
growthdifferentfromthenineteenthuntilwefacetheseproblems.ThatisthejobofPartTwoofthis
chapter.Part Two
The U.S. Economy’s Shifting Growth-Path
A significant interpretative challenge is posed by the changing magnitudes and the shifting
constellation of relationships amongthe summarygrowth rate estimates for longperiods examined
in Part One. As those aggregative measures pertain to the proximate sources of rising real income
per capita, we are faced with the task of finding a way to make sense of the rather dramatic
transformations that have taken place over the past 200 years in what might be termed the
“morphology of American economic progress.” What we can provide here will necessarily be less
than a full “explanation” of the salient features of that dynamic process, and much less than a
definitive account. We propose, instead, an historical interpretation whose principal elements can
be classified under two main headings, which might be referred to in an approximate way as
subsuming “global dynamic drivers” and “evolving national and regional contexts.”
Under the first heading we include forces having largely to do with the development and
dissemination of scientific, technological and organizational knowledge of an essentially
transnational (Northern Atlantic region) character, but which, of course, came to be expressed in
particularistic forms in the North American setting. In the second category are influences that
reflected more uniquely American attributes of the economic environment. Among the latter were
cultural legacies, social and political styles, institutional habits and routinized commercial and
technical practices surviving from the past; learned conditions that were formed by the peculiar
experiences of an immigration societynewlycolonizing a vast and sparselysettled region that was
richlyendowedinitsnaturalresourcepotential;andstillothers,whichreflectedparticularAmerican
national responses to political and social circumstances that unfolded on the world stage during the
twentiethcentury.WeseethehistoricaldramaoftheU.S.economy’sdevelopment,andthechanging
characteristics of its growth-path, as having been shaped bythe interplaybetween those two sets of
forces.
Toprovideanarrativeoverviewofourinterpretativeaccount,wemaybeginbytakingnotice
of those powerful forces of temporal development that can best be viewed as generic, “global”
tendencies:theyareinternationallysharedadvancesinscienceandtechnology,consideringthelatter
of those changes broadly to embrace knowledge pertaining to the organization and management of
economicactivities aswellasto theindustrial arts. Theemergenceofthelogicofknowledge-based
economic development in the U.S. during the present century, and many of the institutional
adaptationsthathavesupportedandreinforcedthatprocess,isthusnottobeunderstoodasaunique,
national phenomenon. This was instead the manifestation of a broader and more global process,
which took particular forms in the U.S. setting.-3 7-
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1. A Narrative Overview
The era ushered in by the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century in Britain saw a
definite and increasingly pronounced movement in the direction of what we today think of as
conventional “capital-deepening” economic development – the accumulation of stocks of fixed
tangiblereproducibleassetsthatroseinrelationshiptotheconcurrentflowofrealoutput.Partofthis
tendency involved the growing relative importance of fixed capital vis-à-vis working capital
inventories, reflecting the development of tighter technological complementarities between new,
inanimatelypoweredproductionfacilitiesandnaturalresourceinputs,includingcapital-energyinput
complementarities; there were relative labor-saving advances, stemming from the creation and
extension of the possibilities of substituting machinery and non-human power sources for human
effort and skill, but which turned out also to be less conserving in their usage of the raw materials
that were being mechanically processed. Although the exploitation of these new technological
possibilities became palpable first in the British economyof the late eighteenth century, theybegan
to manifest themselves with increasing force in the U.S. even within the first half of the nineteenth
century.
The American Economy’s Development Path in the Nineteenth Century
In the U.S., the period stretching from the 1830s through the 1880s saw manufacturing in general
follow the path of transformation of production systems that had already been blazed in the textile
sector. But the transition from the artisanal shop to the factory in this period was neither equally
swift nor uniform in what was entailed across the range of industries, as the work of Jeremy Atack
andKennethSokoloffhaspointedout.
33Evenas lateas1870,asubstantialportion(albeittheminor
part) of value added in a number of consumer goods industries (such as boots and shoes, clothing,
furniture, meat-packing and tobacco) came from establishments employing fewer than seven
workers, and using no inanimate power sources; and there were still some branches of production
in which artisanal shops remained the norm. The growth in the scale of production units, and their
accompanying transition to greater use of water-powered and steam-driven machinery, entailed
changes in the technology of manufacturing processes, and in the organization of work, materials
procurement and marketing. But the success of the new factory regime was especially dependent
upon the reduction of transportation costs and increasing access to reliable, “all-weather”
transportation facilities.
Thesedevelopments wereaccompanied byincreasing “roundaboutness”ofproduction, and
the substitution of tangible capital for artisanal labor in a widening range of industries that came to
cater to and encourage the formation of mass markets for their output. The transformations thus-3 8-
34
This theme is more fully elaborated in section 2 of this Part, but the reader may wish at this point to consult
Endnote 1 to Part Two for clarification of the concepts of "labor-saving" and "capital-using" bias, and the
corresponding notions of "neutrality" of technological progress to which these terms implicitly make
reference.
35
See Albert Fishlow (1966), “Productivity and Technological Growth in the Railroad Sector, 1840-1910,”
in Output Employment and Productivity in the United States After 1800, Vol. 30. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1966.
entailed increases in the ratio of tangible capital to output at the macroeconomic level, and
expansions in the scale of productive plant – with corresponding resource savings and increasing
capitalandrawmaterialsintensityofproduction–atthemicroeconomiclevel.Thenewpossibilities
forprofitablysubstitutingcapitalforlaboremergedthroughprocessesofexperienced-basedlearning,
and trajectories of deliberate inventive exploration. The latter paths of innovation had been
historically selected by the conditions of relative labor scarcity, and relative natural resource
abundance under which early manufacturing activities were established in the U.S. These were
characteristically “biased” in a direction that was increasingly "labor-saving" and "capital-using".
The overall impact of this bias in nineteenth-century industrial innovation, therefore, was towards
raising the ratios of tangible reproducible capital to labor, and to real output. Indeed, those ratios in
the economy rose more than would have been called for merely by the inducement that changing
relativefactorpricesprovidedtosubstitutecapitalforlabor,withintheconstraintsofanunchanging




and most prominently in the setting of the U.S. The reasons for this, and its implications for the
comparative international performance of the American economy both before and after the 1890-
1913 era (during which U.S. industries ascended to a position of world leadership), are matters that
will occupy us, particularly in Part Three. There we will bring our interpretation to bear upon the
question of international convergence and catchup in levels of productivity and per capita real
income that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century.
Asecondkeyaspectofthemid-nineteenth-centurytransformationwhichscarcelycanbeheld
to have been a uniquelyAmerican development was theextension ofan increasinglydenserailroad
network, and the ensuing reductions in transport charges and transit times that underlay the shift
from waterborne carriage and overland freight and passenger haulage by wagon and stage-coach.
These were improvements to which not only greater coverage of the continent with trackage, but
increasing train speeds and capacities, and the elimination of gauge-breaks and the growth of
“through-freight” service were contributing, especially after the Civil War.
35 Their impacts in the
restructuring and regional economic integration of the economy, and their further ramifications in
the re-organization of industrial and commercial enterprises, were both far-reaching and profound.
Internal transport improvements contributed to breaking down the “protective tariff-walls”
ofdistance,frozenlakesandrivers,andmuddyroadsthatpreviouslyhadshelteredinefficientlysmall-3 9-
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local manufacturers and wholesalers. Expanded market access, by the same token, continued to
increase the economic viabilityof ever-larger, fixed-capital intensive industrial establishments and
thereby contributed to the aggregate capital-intensity of the manufacturing sector. Thus, over the
period from 1870 to 1900, according to Robert Gallman’s (1986) estimates, the aggregate ratio of
reproduciblecapital to valueadded (in constant prices) rose by81 percent in themanufacturingand
mining sectors, whereas it had risen by 57 per cent over the previous thirty-year interval.
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This picture just sketched of industrial transformation as the new and significant tendency
ofthepost-bellumdecades(1870-1900),however,mustbetemperedbyarecognitionofthatsector’s
comparative situation vis-à-vis the rest of the U.S. economy. The level of the aggregate mining and
manufacturingcapital-netoutputratio(incurrentprices)remainedbelowthecorrespondingratioof
the comprehensively defined agricultural business sector, even though it was moving upwards
towards it during these decades. Although, by the same measure for the industrial sector, the
roundaboutness of the industrial commodity-producing sectors well exceeded that characteristic of
commerce and other private business, the manufacturing and mining capital-output ratio was only
approximately one-fourth of that prevailing in the transportation and public utilities sectors. Thus
the growth of the demand for transportation, and the latter’s connection with the public utilities
infrastructure requirements of an increasingly urbanized population, were the powerful proximate
driving forces in the economy-wide rise of the capital-output ratio.
Continuity and Change in the Trajectory of Technological Innovations
New and contrasting tendencies in the progress of technologically relevant knowledge became
evidentfromtheclosingdecadesofthenineteenthcenturyonwards.Afurtherstepintheprogression
ofindustrial development, following on from thesupplantingoftheartisan shop bysteam-powered
factories, saw the beginnings of assembly line methods of mass production. This was a movement
that maybe said to have sprung from the fusion of two manufacturing principles. The first of these
derived from the continuous flow transfer techniques (for thedisassemblyofanimal carcasses)that
werebeingimplementedandelaboratedinChicago’slargemeat-packingplantsduringthelate1870s
and 1880s; the second involved the methods of production by interchangeable parts that during the
same period had been brought to full practical realization in the manufacture of the Singer Co.’s
sewing machines, and McCormick harvesting machinery.
Yet, morethan two moredecades passed beforetheculmination ofdevelopments alongthis
characteristically American trajectory of technological evolution, in 1913, when the Model T
automobiles began rolling off the assembly line of Henry Ford’s Highland Park Factory on the
northern edge of Detroit. Great advances of production engineering had been made by the Ford
MotorCo.during1908-13,involvingtheintegrationofmachineshop,mechanizedfoundryandsub-
assembly operations, the automated conveyor slide, and the accompanying implementation of-4 0-
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Frederick Taylor’s ideas in the standardization of work routines and establishment of “work
standards” at Highland Park.
Butthosedevelopmentswentbeyondmerelyrevolutionizingthebusinessofbuildingmotor




and construction of theHighland Park plant, and this, alongwith the subsequent publicitythat Ford
himself gave to the idea of “mass production,” contributed to the rapid diffusion of these new
techniques throughout American manufacturing. They were quickly imitated by other automobile
producers, even those producing far smaller runs of cars. Within a decade, conveyor systems were
being applied to the assembly of many other new and complex durable goods, including vacuum
sweepers and radios, among the range of electrically powered household appliances that were
gaining popularity in the 1920s. In 1926, Henry Ford himself described the generic principles of
massproductionas“thefocusinguponamanufacturingprojectoftheprinciplesofpower,accuracy,
economy, system, continuity, and speed.”
Accompanying the dawn of the “Fordist” stage in the evolution of manufacturing, the
opening decades of the twentieth century saw the fruition of earlier departures in the inorganic and
organicchemicals industries, and inelectricalmanufacturingand supplyindustries. Theseheralded
therisingimportanceofscience-basedindustryandorganizedindustrialinnovation.Ultimately,the
late nineteenth-century developments in those two particular fields – associated with the work of
Haber, Solvayand Dupont, and that of Edison, Ferranti and Siemens – greatlyexpanded the sphere
of new industrial applications of organic chemistry, telecommunications, avionics and the
commercial exploitation of biological knowledge in agriculture, animal husbandry and medicine.
An increasing ability to control, and hence to predict the experimental process, and the
movement of essentially trial-and-error learning activities from semi-controlled industrial
environments into the laboratory, speeded the organized search for technologically exploitable
knowledge.Thereductionoftheexpectedcostsanduncertaintiessurroundingtheinventiveprocess,
in turn, workedtoincreasetherateofreturn on R&Dinvestment, and henceincreased thereadiness
of firms to commit resources to new process and product research on a regular basis. Integration of
R&D as a competitive strategy within the orbit of business management planning was thereby
encouraged, as was the extension of the R&D approach to the area of production engineering –
particularly in those industries (such as heavy chemicals) where the production of new products
entailed radical redesign of manufacturing processes.
Twofurtherconsequencesmaybeseentohavebeenentailedbytheforegoingdevelopments.
First was an increasing demand for scientists and engineers and supporting personnel, who could
carry on the necessary knowledge-generating and knowledge-applications activities. That created-4 1-
new incentives for individuals to seek (and invest in) the necessary university training. The
prospective demand from industrial employers also stimulated efforts on the part of colleges and
universities to adapt existing curricula, or establish entirely new areas of instruction that would be
better attuned to those needs. This was a movement that around the turn of the century was already
beginning to carry the land grant colleges beyond an initial commitment to responding to the
vocational needs of farmers, and into the realms of mechanical and mining engineering. Secondly,
andsomewhatanalogously,thedevelopmentoforganizedresearchincorporatelaboratoriesbrought
both growing company financing of R&D expenditures, and political interest in the expansion of
public and private charitable patronage of research to create a basic knowledge infrastructure that
would further raise the private rate of return on applications-oriented R&D. Most of the
developments just cited, however, remained nascent, or very limited in quantitative importance at
the dawn of the twentieth century. They were harbingers of the coming morphology of growth that
would assume full-blown form in the U.S. after World War II.
Itisimportantforourstory,however,tore-emphasizethattheU.S.economydidnotpioneer
single-handedly in the fundamental advances of scientific and engineering knowledge that formed
thebasisfortheriseofitsnewestformsofindustrialactivity.International(especiallytrans-Atlantic)
participation in the process of invention, and the rapid diffusion of new contributions to the
technologies emerging in the fields of machine tools, chemicals, electricity, and automotive
engineering,alreadywasquitestrikingintheperiod1870-1913.Yet,inbeingquicktomovetowards
exploiting the commercialization opportunities that had been created by the advances of the
underlying knowledge base, the industrial sector of the American economy already had achieved a
particularly advantageous long-run position in this regard when the nineteenth century drew to its
close – the recurringlydepressed macroeconomicconditions and financial instabilities ofthe1890-
1907eranotwithstanding.Thestartthathadbeenmadetowardsthecreationofawholegroupofnew
industriescameontopofthesolidfoundationslaidinthepost-CivilWardecades:aheavyindustrial,
mining and minerals processing sector, which was served byan extensive network of railroads that
gave all-weather access to a national market of continental dimensions.
The Exploitation of Natural Resource Abundance
Many features of the industrial structure that at this time was undergoing consolidation and
reorganization reflected specifically American conditions that in the preceding centuryhad shaped
the path of the country’s economic development. Thesewere first, the great abundance, varietyand
cheapness of natural resources and primary materials; second, the emergence in the course of that
century of the largest-scale domestic market in the industrializing world. Both conditions favored
a fuller exploration and exploitation ofthat century’s dominant trajectoryof technological progress
than was possible in European circumstances. The technological path was materials-intensive and
tangiblecapital-usingbutscale-dependent,andAmericanconditionswereespeciallycongruentwith
it. Large market scale encouraged the invention and use of expensive machinerywhose costs could
be spread over large sales to a wide market. Abundant and cheap materials facilitated the invention




Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976: Ch. 2.
thanreal;itreducedoverallproductioncostsbyallowingfirmstodispensewithrelativelyexpensive
workers, and especially with higher skilled craft labor. At the outset of its industrial development
America possessed abundant virgin forests and brushlands, and, in the Age of Wood that preceded
the Age of Iron, this profusion of forest resources generated strong incentives to improve methods
of production that facilitated their exploitation, to use them extravagantly in the manufacture of
finished products (such as sawn lumber and musket-stocks), and to lower the costs of goods
complementarytowood(suchasironnails,totakeanhumbleexample).IndescribingAmerica'srise
to woodworking leadership during the period 1800-1850, Nathan Rosenberg aptly writes:
"[I]t would be difficult to exaggerate the extent ofearlyAmerican dependence upon
this natural resource: it was the major source of fuel, it was the primary building
material, it was a critical source ofchemical inputs (potash and pearlash), and it was
an industrial raw material par excellence."
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Beyond that stage, the industrial technologythat had emerged bythe decades at the close of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century was based firmly on the
exploitation of the continent’s endowment of minerals: on coal for steam power, on coal and iron
oreforsteel,andoncopperandothernon-ferrousmetalforstillotherpurposes.Americanenterprise,
reprisingits earlynineteenth-centuryperformance in risingto "industrial woodworkingleadership"
by combining technological borrowing from abroad with the induced contributions of indigenous
inventors,nowembarkedupontheexplorationofanothertechnologicaltrajectory:thenewpathwas
premised upon, and in turn fostered the rapid and in some respects environmentally destructive
exploitation of the country's vast mineral deposits, just as in the preceding era wastefullyimpatient
use had been made of the nation’s virgin forest resources.
During the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing into the early twentieth
century, the dominant path of technological progress and labor productivity advance continued to
benaturallyresource-intensive,butmadeincreasinglyheavyuseofmineral resourceinputs,aswell
as being more markedly tangible-capital-using. This particular path of innovation was, moreover,
scale-dependent in its elaboration of mass-production techniques and high-throughput operating
strategies for business organizations. Although the characteristic features of this technological
trajectoryindividuallycan betraced backtoindustrialinitiativesinboth Britain and theU.S. earlier
in the nineteenth century, the ensemble found fullest development in the environment provided by
the North American continent.
As has been indicated, one source of the country’s advantage in following this particular
trajectory of biased innovation stemmed from the congruence between its pattern of input
complementarities, and the North American continent’s abundant and cheap supplies of primary
materials. The new methods of production substituted tangible capital equipment for labor, while
making more intensive use of raw materials and energy. Their profitabilitywas therefore enhanced
where the relative prices ofthelatterinputs werelowerin themid-nineteenth centuryphases of this-4 3-
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evolution, the costs of coal as a source of steam power, of coal and iron ore for steel-making, and
of copper and still other non-ferrous metals, bulked larger in the total costs of finished goods than
subsequently has come to be the case. Those economic circumstances, from the middle of the
nineteenth century onward, had acted as a stimulus for programs of public and private investment
aimed at discovering, developing and intensifying the commercial exploitation of these mineral





exploration and development. These derived largely from the perceived growth of demand, as
American manufacturing shifted away from heavy concentration on the processing of agricultural
and forestry products, and towards the production of minerals-based capital and consumer goods.
Therewas,therefore,afruitfulinteractionbetweenthedevelopmentofprimarymaterialssupply,the
advanceofAmericantechnology,andthegrowthofmanufacturing,constructionandtransportation
activities serving the large domestic market.
40
Thus, the twentieth century's opening quarter saw the continued influence of some of the
same features of the U.S. resource endowment. Thereafter, for a variety of reasons that we discuss
in Part Three, natural resource abundance in general, and mineral resource abundance specifically,
became of smaller importance over the broad spectrum of American economic activity. In special
ways, however, it remained apotent influence. Anotableinstanceis thecontinuing discoveries and
advances in the exploitation of the country’s known petroleum resources, which were extended
westward to the southern California basin during the opening quarter of the century.
41 These
developments yielded far more than the nation’s growing exports of crude oil and high value
distillates, such as gasoline and kerosene, and even more than the resource base for the future
industrialization ofthepart of the countrythat bordered on thePacificOcean.
42 Elsewhereat home,
petroleum products becamepart oftheunderpinning for theriseofcar, truck and tractorproduction
and the expansion of the automotive services sector during the 1929-66 era until it was responsible
for roughly a tenth of gross domestic product originating in the U.S. economy. Still more directly,-4 4-
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the abundance of domestic petroleum supplies yielded by exploitation of the oil fields of West
Texas, Oklahoma and southern California contributed to the creation of a wide group of new
petrochemical-based manufacturing industries in which America took a technological lead.
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Another important set of region-specific influences was linked to the development of an
economicallylargenationaleconomythatwasintegratedbytransportandcommunicationssystems
of continental reach, and which, in comparison with other contemporaneous societies, would soon
become remarkably homogeneous in its political and social structures. From an early point in its
history, the U.S. was among the pioneers in the elaboration and replication of large, spatially
distributed technological systems, including systems of business organization and public service
provision. Like airline systems, the multi-divisional and multi-plant corporations, and the public
school and university systems, the electricity supply and telephone systems first developed locally
and regionally to achieve conventional economies of scale. They were then replicated across
localities and regions to form dense and extended networks (with corresponding network
externalities) that differentiated the American economy from all but a few others by the mid-
twentieth century.
Rising Intangible Investments and the Transformation of Human Resources
Formationoftheselargeproductionorganizationsandsystemsofdistributionthatwerecomplexand
intricatecreatednewdemandsformanpower,with needsfornovelskillsemergingasoldoneswere
rendered obsolete or redundant. The absorption of European immigrants into the American
workforce in the post-Civil War decades was facilitated by the substitution of mass production
technologies that reduced artisanal skill and training requirements for production workers, while
raising demands for non-production workers in clerical and managerial positions. Yet, over the
course of the twentieth century the overall demand-side impact has been quite unambiguously that
of supporting a rise in the minimum level of educational attainment in the population, while
expanding the proportion of the workforce that had undergone prolonged periods of formal
education.
Thetwentiethcenturyhaswitnessedtwodistinctwavesofhumancapitalformation.Thefirst
of these was centered in the first quarter of the century and involved the extension of High School
education to a large segment of the population, whereas the "college education" movement, which
formed the second wave, gathered momentum after the mid-point of the century. In the closing
decade of the nineteenth century, only rather less than half of the population in the age range from
5 to 24 years was enrolled in some regular educational institution. From that low base c.1890, the
pace of progress began to quicken: this was reflected two decades later by the accelerating rise of
the average number of school years completed byall males in the age group 25 and older: it rose by
6.4 percent in the decade 1910-20, by 7.6 percent in the following decade, and so on, until the-4 5-
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decadal rate of advance topped 10 percent during the 1940s.
44 The average number of years of
schooling among American males was thereby raised from 7.56 to 11.46 between the birth cohort
of 1886-90 and that of 1926-30, and the average annual rate of increase shifted upwards by a bit
more than 1 percentage point.
Claudia Goldin's (1998) research brings out the striking fact that approximately 70 percent
ofthisincreasewasaccountedforbyincreasesinsecondaryschoolingalone.
45Themalehighschool
graduation rate, for example, stood at 10-15 percent for the cohort born in the 1890s, but rose to
nearly 50 percent for those born after World War I. High school thus became part of the system of
mass educationinAmericaduringthis era,whereas previouslyit was typicallyeither the final stage
of the training of school-teachers, or a requirement for the tiny minority of the population who
sought a Bachelor’s degree (or the professional equivalent thereof). Whereas almost one-half (49
percent)of the high school graduates ofthemid-1880s went on to receiveaBachelor’s degreefrom
an American institution of higher education, the widespread extension of high school education in
thefollowingdecadesbroughtthatfractiondownto30percentby1906,andto22percentby1926.
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Although the stock of graduates from U.S. institutions of higher education was rising very
rapidlyearlyin the century, it was still negligiblysmall, and its formation was neither a significant




regions in the North before 1914, and by the 1930s had largely been completed – with the
widespreadachievementofgenerallyhighattendancerates,asignificantlylengthenedaverageschool
year, and substantial graduation rates – everywhere in the country save for the still largely
agricultural South.
The early phases of this movement, however, cannot properly be understood as merely an
automatic, market-induced adjustment of the nation’s labor supply, in response to occupational
demand shifts driven by technological and organizational innovations in industry. It seems only-4 6-
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reasonable to suppose that an important impetus for this movement derived from the increasingly
widespread public awareness of the developing statistical association between high school
attendance and subsequent access to “better quality jobs,” even jobs in blue collar occupations. By
working backward from the comprehensive schooling data presented in the 1940 census, Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz have been able to show that the percolation of high school graduates
throughoutthemanufacturingsectorinitiallywasextremelyuneven;thatthoseindustrieswhichhad
been built upon the newly emergent science-based technologies – such as aircraft, electrical
machinery,andpetroleumrefining–employedlargenumbersofhighschoolgraduatesinbothblue-
and white-collar jobs, and it appears that this pattern goes back at least as far as the 1910s.
47
Detailed job descriptions and qualifications, developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics between
1918 and 1921, reflected the increasing role of schooling-based skills, such as “knowledge of
weightsandmeasures,”“record-keepingandcomputations,”“knowledgeofhowtosetmachinesand
test results,” “special ability to interpret drawings,” and so forth. Yet, these were quite atypical
among the mass of manufacturing pursuits, and in the older, staple industries such as meat-packing
andcottonmanufactures,virtuallynojobsarelistedashavinganyrequiredlevel ofschoolingat all;
even a “loom fixer,” the most important and skilled worker in the weaving room, was not expected
to have more than a common school education. Furthermore, even in the newer industries drawing
on newer technologies, the job descriptions of this era suggest that very limited levels of cognitive
masteryactuallywereexpected. Actual command ofscientificknowledgeas a job requirement was
limited to a tiny fraction of the overall work force, and these positions typically required post-
secondary training if not professional degrees.
The new and more rapidly growing industries, nonetheless, had ample reasons for adapting
their hiring criteria and job descriptions to match the curriculum of high school education. Another
recent reading of the evidence from the pre-1929 era, byDavid and Wright (1999), suggests that in
setting hiring standards certain personality traits, such as patience, reliability, and general
amenability to instruction, were given equal if not greater prominence than were the more strictly
academic cognitive qualifications. In the technologically more sophisticated industries, and
especially in branches of manufacturing where continuous production processes raised both
productivityandthedamagethatincompetenceorcarelessnesscouldcause,employersincreasingly
sought workers who could accustom themselves to changing work routines, and would be
dependable in executing mechanically assisted tasks. High school attendance and high school
completion appear to have constituted signals of these attributes, and of the motivation to respond
toexperience-basedwagesandjobpromotionincentivesthatweredesignedtostabilizeandupgrade
the qualityof the workforce in theleadingmanufacturingfirms duringthis era. Thus, it was in their
interestbothtoadvocateandtoexploitthepublic’ssubsidizationofthesecondaryeducationsystem-4 7-
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as a screening mechanism, through which “signals” of those desirable qualities could more readily
be acquired by workers who also would be willing to enter blue-collar occupations.
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But, there were other social, political considerations that came into play in America’s
precociousinitiationofmasssecondaryeducation.Middle-classsupportforpubliceducationbeyond
the grade school level, especially in preparation for the “genteel,” non-manual pursuits, was
increasingly vocal during the decades immediately surrounding 1900, and this impetus was
reinforcedbypoliticalconcernstopromote“Americanization”amongfirst-generationcitizens.Such
motives were quite compatible with perceptions on the part of employers that increasing cultural
homogeneityofyoungmembersoftheworkforcewouldservetoincreasetheinterchangeabilityand
adaptabilityofthelaborforce,therebyfacilitatingthereplicationofstandardizedworkroutines and
labor management practices within and across regional labor markets – at least as far as concerned
the white workforce. These influential currents of opinion, which issued in the provision of tax-
funding for state and local programs of mass secondary education, may be seen as part of the
response evoked bythe heavyinflux of “new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in the
period.Consequently,beginningmostnotablyin theMidwest (and, moregenerallyinthoseregions
of the North where there were relatively fewer youths from low-income foreign-born households,
who needed the earnings from their labor in factories and shops), the 1890s saw an increasing
fraction of young Americans attending and completing High School.
Thuswassetinmotionthedramaticandsustainedgrowthofthenation’sstockofintangible
human capital, led by the increasing educational attainments of its workforce. Reinforced by
industrial and derived occupational shifts that increased thedemand forlongerschooling,itlaid the
foundations for the subsequent transition to mass collegeand universityattendancethat marked the
post-WorldWarIIera,andwhichhascontinuedtheupwardcourseoftheU.S.population’saverage
educationalattainment.Ofcourse,thepaceatwhichtheschoolingleveloftheworkforceasawhole
could rise during 1886-1926 was slower than the speed at which high school completion was
diffusing through the population. As the more schooled males were the last to enter the workforce,
the full effect of the increase in years of schooling had to wait for the retirement of successive
cohorts of older workers since so few of them had as much as a year of high school attendance.
Indeed,accordingtoGoldin,ofthecohortofmalesbornin1886-1890whosurvivedtoreport
theireducationalattainmenttothe1930censustakers(whentheywere40-44yearsold),72.5percent
had fewer than eight years of formal schooling, and only17 percent had 12 or more years.
49 Among-4 8-
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the entire U.S. male population aged 25-34 years old at the time of the 1930 census, 24.4 percent
reported having had four years of high school education and beyond, whereas the corresponding
figure among the 25-34 year olds in 1910 had been only 15.7 percent. The average speed at which
high school completion had spread through the male population of prime working ages was thus
about 2.2 per cent per annum during the 1910-30 interval. The comparable rate rose on average to
7.5percentagepointsperannum overtheinterval between 1930 and 1960, bywhichdatewellmore
than a majority of them (53 percent) had at least completed high school, and a significant minority
had completed four years of college.
50 Something must also be given to the effects of closing
immigration to the U.S. after 1918, in creating conditions that facilitated the speed of the shift
towardshigheraverageeducationalattainments,andsoprovidedtheskillsandworkerqualitiesthat
were complementary with the new technologies and the more complex systems that were being
developed.
"Collegeeducation"hadbeenararityamongtheAmericanpopulaceuntilthelatterdecades
of the nineteenth century. The seventeenth and eighteenth century origins of institutions such as
Harvard College, Columbia College and Yale notwithstanding, it was not until the 1860s that




it was not until 1888 that the total number of academic doctorates awarded annually in the whole
countrymoved past the 100 mark.
51 While it took more than a half-centuryfor the number of HEI’s
to double from the level that had been reached in 1880, the average number of faculties per
institution had undergone a 3.5-fold expansion during those 50 years, and the annual number of
Bachelor’s degree recipients per institution had increased 5-fold. Still, only2 percent of America’s
23-year olds received a Bachelor’s (or equivalent professional degree) in 1910, and in 1930 the
corresponding figure remained below 6 percent.
The major period of advance in the college and university education of the labor force,
therefore, has been a feature of the post-1929 era, and it only began to make a large impact on the
quality of the workforce during the late 1960s and 1970s when the large birth cohorts of the post-
World War II “Baby Boom” were moving through the universities. Between 1930 and 1948 the
number of college graduates expressed as a proportion of all those who had graduated from high-4 9-
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school four years before was raised from 22 percent to 27 percent, a level that was maintained
through to the mid-1960s. Thereafter, the early years of the Vietnam War era witnessed a further
sharp rise, so that by 1969 the 31 percent level had been reached. At that date the number of
Bachelor’s degree recipients represented more than one-fourth of the nation’s 23 year-olds, twice
the proportion that had been achieved in 1948. The “golden era”of post-World War II economic
growth also saw the first substantial movement into postgraduate education since the 1920s, as the
numbers receiving doctorates swelled from approximately 4,000 in 1948 to 28,000 in 1969.
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Tangible Capital-Saving Innovations and Quickening Total Factor Productivity Growth
The substitution of fixed capital for skilled artisanal labor that was characteristic of the preceding
era now gave way to a new twentieth-century tendency that was augmented in strength by the
prospects of declining fertility and slowed labor force growth (unrelieved by any possibility of
revival of mass immigration). With the resumption of rising real wages following World War I,
53
capital-labor substitution continued to be encouraged, but there also were opportunities to reduce
unit costs of production by developing ways of intensifying the utilization of fixed facilities. This
was a strategy that was first implemented in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
consolidation of railroads, and the technological innovations designed to increase train-speeds and
power utilization. Its roots can also be found, as Alfred Chandler has pointed out, in the high
throughputmanufacturingregimesthatappearedafter1870,whenproductionanddirect-sellingwere
extended to serve increasingly wide markets.
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Along with the new managerial focus and increasing expertise devoted to increasing the
throughput rate of production and marketing enterprises, there came savings on the costs of
inventoriesofgoodsinprocessandstocksoffinishedproducts, all ofwhich worked inthedirection
ofloweringthemarginalcapital-outputratiointhenation'smanufacturingsector.
55Withthecoming
ofenhancedtransportationandcommunications facilities,it alsowas feasibletoachievehighstock
turnoverrates, and narrowed margins in thedistribution trades; thelatenineteenth centurythus saw
the appearing of the pioneers of that strategy among the large-scale retail businesses – such as
Marshall Fields, Macy’s and Sears Roebuck. But, throughout the next half-century, in the
distribution sector small, low-turnover and high-markup firms managed to co-exist with the high-5 0-
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share of the market throughout the interwar era and early post-World War II years, also owed
something to the imposition of differential taxation of chain-stores bystate legislatures earlyin the
twentiethcentury,andtheintroductionof“pricemaintenancelaws”(startingwiththepassageofthe
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936).
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Thetechnologicaldevelopmentsthatexpandedthescopeforcontinuousprocessindustries,
such as the reorganization of batch production systems to move them towards an around-the-clock
shift-working basis, and the managerial changes that were required to coordinate the flows of men
and materials in these high-throughput operations represented innovations of the “tangible fixed-
capital augmenting” kind. These contributed to the turn-around in the trend of the real tangible
capital-output ratio, which in the first decade of the present century commenced a secular fall not
only in the manufacturing sector, but in the private business economy at large.
A marked acceleration of total factor productivity (TFP) growth took place in the U.S.
manufacturing sector following World War I. This surge saw the annual growth rate jump fully 5





era, but it seems nonetheless clear that the discontinuity revealed by comparison of the decadal





1.5 percentage points per annum during 1899-1914, to 5.1 during the period 1919-29.
While this historical break in the productivity trend was not a phenomenon unique to the
manufacturing sector, it was heavily concentrated there. John Kendrick’s (1961) estimates of the-5 1-
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decadal increase in total factor productivity (TFP) during 1919-29 were approximately 22 percent
forthewholeoftheprivatedomesticeconomy,whereasthecorrespondingfigureformanufacturing
was 76 percent, and for mining 41 percent. The proportionate increase of TFP in transportation,
communicationsandpublicutilitiesexceededtheaveragefortheU.S.privatedomesticeconomyas
a whole by lesser amounts, while the farm sector was in last position with a relatively low gain of
14 percent.
At the heart of the story, then, was manufacturing, where the acceleration was particularly
pronounced and pervasive among the main industrial groups. The movements of the partial
productivity indexes for these same industry groups over the course of the 1919-29 interval shows
a striking positive correlation, which was a departure from the tendency in the preceding decades.
For industrial labor productivity increases to be associated with decreasing capital productivity,
rather than capital-deepening, reflected in a rise in real capital inputs per unit of real output,
manufacturingindustriesbothinaggregateandattheindustrygrouplevelwereundergoing“capital-
shallowing” or rising capital productivity after 1919.
A long period of stasis in the real unit costs ofindustrial laborduring1890-1914 came to an
endwiththeoutbreakofWorldWarI,andtheensuingrapidriseinthepriceoflaborinputsvis-à-vis
the prices of both capital inputs and gross output was sustained during the post-War decade. The
change in relative factor prices thus was in a direction that would be expected to induce the
substitution of capital for labor within the pre-existing set of production technologies. Therefore, it
is particularly striking that after 1919 the rise of capital-intensity in U.S. manufacturing proceeded
at a greatly retarded pace. Between the 1889 and 1909 census benchmark dates, the ratio of capital
inputsperunit oflaborinput was risingat theaveragerateof2.6 percentagepoints peryear,andthe
pace quickened to 2.8 percent per annum over the decade 1909-19. But, as John Kendrick’s (1961)
figures show, despite the upsurge of real wage growth, during the 1920s the growth in capital-
intensityslowedto(1.2percentagepointsperannum)wellbelowhalfitspreviouspace.Thischange,
andtheemergenceoftangible“capital-shallowing”tendencieswithwhichitwaslinkedrepresented
a new departure, which one of us (David 1990, 1991) has connected to the concurrent diffusion of
anewfactoryregimeinwhichtheproductivepotentialitiesoftheelectricdynamowere,atlast,fully
exploited by the “unit drive” system in which independent motors were placed on each machine.
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It is also worth noticing that there was an easing of another previous source of upward
pressure on the aggregate capital-output ratio. That pressure had come from the demand to create
urban infrastructures – in the form of housing, streets, sewers and local transportation facilities – to
serve the commercial distribution and industrial centers of new regions of the country that were
beingopenedupforpopulation-intensiveformsofeconomicexploitation.JamesDuesenberry
60long
ago observed that the successive waves of internal migration, which had carried the “urban
frontier”westward during the nineteenth century, had the effect of increasing the demand for fixed-5 2-
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wide variety of mathematical problems; it preceded Wallace Eckert’s more widely mentioned “mechanical
programmer” (1933), which linked various IBM punch-card accounting machines to permit generalized and
complex computation.
capital in new locations, yet did not cause an offsetting, commensurately rapid run-down of the
corresponding capital stock components in the older cities of the Eastern seaboard. Of course, the
urban infrastructure of the latter region was coming to be more intensely utilized to accommodate
the large influx of immigrants arriving from Europe in the period 1880-1914. But, until late in the
century,thebalanceofthoseforces,workingincombinationwiththerelateddemandsforexpanded
transportinfrastructureintheWest,wasoperatinginawaythatheldthemarginalcapital-outputratio
above the average capital-output ratio in the economy as a whole. With the closing of the frontier
and the choking off of European immigration (by World War I, and the subsequent imposition of
legislative restrictions in the U.S.), this former demographic mechanism no longer functioned to
sustain a secularly high ratio between the level of the desired fixed tangible capital stock and the
level of the real gross domestic product.
Management of large technological and commercial systems also called for new techniques
for “communication and control.”
61 These rendered more effectivethepush forever-higherrates of
utilization of fixed capital facilities, and faster stock-turn to lower the costs of inventory holds of
goodsinprocess.Thesamecapital-savingmotivationinthedriveforimproved“control”hadplayed
a role in initiating pioneering U.S. advances in information systems – from the telegraph system’s
close relationship to the railroad industry’s operations and the activities of wholesale distributors
starting in the mid-nineteenth century, to the twentieth-century development of a nation-wide
telephone network, and of computer systems in the twentieth century. To cite another, and
emblematiclink ofthis kind, themodern digital computergrewout ofVannevarBush’s designs for
“differential analyzers,” an analogue computer that was sought for the purpose of performing the
calculations necessary for real time management of electrical power supply systems.
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Engines of Growth – The Recurring Dynamics of General Purpose Technologies
Thus, however distinct and different was the new technological thrust that has characterized the
twentieth century – encouraging through its demand effects the rise of investment in intangible
productive assets in the form of more highly educated people and stocks of R&D-generated
innovations,andreducingthedemandforconventionaltangiblecapitalgoodsinrelationshiptoreal
output – in these developments there also were some important continuities from an earlier epoch.
Perhaps the most striking among these was the way in which a succession of “general-purpose-5 3-
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technologies”cametobeelaboratedandimplementedintheU.S.duringthepresentcentury.General
purpose technologies open up new opportunities for innovation – in both inventive and
entrepreneurial activities – rather than offering a complete, self-contained and immediately
applicable solution to one or another specific problem.
63 In that sense, their nature enables further
changes, inducing further investment of resources in the creation of clusters of complementary
innovations; and their pervasive penetration into products and processes across a wide and varied
range of industries permits their own further elaboration and enhancement to exert a greatly
magnified impact on productive performance throughout the economy.
Thus,inthetwentiethcentury,theextensivedeploymentandcontinuingdevelopmentofthe
electric dynamo, mass production in fixed transfer-line factories, telecommunications via the
electromagnetic spectrum, internal combustion engines fueled by petroleum distillates, and, most
recently,themicroelectronics-baseddigitalcomputer–representedarecurrenceofdynamicpatterns
of innovation and diffusion that were experienced earlier, in the age of the steam engine, factory
system,railroadandtelegraph.
64Thesourcesofthescientificandengineeringknowledgeunderlying
the creation of these “enabling technologies” have been international, rather than peculiarly
American.Buttheseinnovationsfoundpracticalexpressionandextensivecommercialdevelopment
first and most fully in the United States’ highly flexible and adaptive social and economic
environment.
Consequently, the specific forms that emerged from the initial implementation of these
generalpurposetechnologiesduringthetwentiethcenturyowedmuchtotheparticularlegacyofthe
country’s nineteenth-century development. Their subsequent diffusion within a widening
internationalsphere,inturn,hastransmittedtomanysocietiesintheeconomicallydevelopedworld
some portion of the legacyof that earlier era of “American exceptionalism.” Abroad, as previously
had been the case within the sphere of the U.S. domestic economy, the drive to exploit this
accumulating body of knowledge and know-how has been a powerful force for “convergence”–
reshaping the organization of production and distribution globally, and transforming the nature of
work, consumption and leisure activities in the process of raising material standards of living.-5 4-
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This last point will be brought out more explicitly, below, in the discussion of Tables 2: I and 2: II.
2. Interpreting the Macroeconomic Record
TheU.S.macroeconomicrecordthatweexaminedinPartOneexhibitsanumberofstrikingfeatures
which distinguish the morphology of the long-term growth path during the twentieth century from
the economy’s growth characteristics in the preceding century. The contrasting dynamics of those
twoepochsisevidentfromthemovementsofkeymacroeconomicratios,andabriefreviewofthese
at this point will serve to highlight the new nature of the growth process. It will be seen that the
following five salient points of contrast in the macroeconomy’s movements also have been
perceptible at the lower levels of aggregation, which were touched upon in the foregoing narrative
overview.
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(1) The trend of labor productivity (real gross output per manhour) has been upwards
throughout the whole course of the national experience, but it underwent a quickening that became
evident from the mid-nineteenth century onward, and a still faster long-term rate of growth
(approximating 2 percent per annum) has been maintained throughout the present century.
(2)Thetrendintheratioofrealgrossoutputtototalfactorinput,orTFP(refinedindex),also
was upwards over the course of the nineteenth century, but at a pace that remained very moderate
in absolute terms until the century’s closing decades, averaging only a fraction of the approximate
1 percent per annum trend growth rate of TFP (refined) that characterized the whole of the period
between1890and1989. Withinthatcentury-longspan,however,thetrendinthepaceatwhichTFP
was rising did not remain constant: starting in the 1920's, it accelerated to an average annual rate
approaching 1.5 percentage points, which was sustained over the 1929-66 interval. The collapse of
the TFP residual which then ensued appears both in its magnitude and its extended duration to be
a turn-around quite without precedent in the nation’s economic history.
(3) A rising ratio of tangible capital services per manhour labor input has accompanied the
rise of labor productivity, but in the twentieth century the gap between the trend rates of growth of
tangiblecapitalservicesandmanhourshasnotbeenaswideasitwaspreviously.Ontheotherhand,
since the closing decades of the nineteenth centurythe rise of investment in education and training,
and in organized R&D activities, has meant that the ratio of theservices of intangiblecapital inputs
to tangible labor inputs (i.e., manhours) has grown at a much faster pace, both absolutely and
relatively than before.
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(4) The ratio between inputs of (gross) tangible capital services and real gross output rose
markedly over the whole of the nineteenth century, although its approximate doubling was-5 5-
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68
These trends may be inferred directly from a comparison of the growth rates for the stock of total tangible
reproducible capital and real gross private domestic product shown in Table 2: I, or from the movements of
the constant dollar tangible capital-output ratio for the U.S. domestic economy that can be calculated from
t h ed a t ai nT a b l e2 :I I .
concentratedwithinthecentralperiod,stretchingfromc.1835toc.1890.
67Bycontrast,startingsoon
after the beginning of the twentieth centurythe trend in this ratio turned downwards, and remained
markedly so until early in the post-World War II era; the tangible capital-output ratio continued to
driftdownwardsatslowingpaceduring1948-73andhasapproachedstabilitythereafter.
68Although
we presented no explicit estimates of the growth of the intangible capital stock over the course of
the nineteenth century, reasons were given for surmising that it could not have been rising much
faster than inputs of manhours and, consequently, must have been growing slowly by comparison
withthetangiblereproduciblecapitalstock.Fromthelatenineteenthcenturyonwards,however,the
ratio between the intangible and the tangible stock of capital has been rising rapidly, as will beseen
more explicitly from new estimates that we shall introduce, below.
(5) The share of the gross private domestic product represented by the earnings of labor
actually declined during the nineteenth century, whereas it has followed an upward trend in the
present century. It was the rising share of output represented by the gross private returns (imputed)
to tangible reproducible capital that was responsible for the nineteenth century contraction in the
share of labor, because the share of output represented by rental income on the stock of non-
reproducible tangible wealth (unimproved land) remained essentially constant. During the present
century, the expansion of the labor income share has been largely concentrated in years between
1929 and 1973, and, as shall be seen, this reflected the growing portion of labor earnings that can
be attributed to the relative accumulation of human (intangible) capital.
The patterns of change in these macroeconomic relationships that characterized each of the
centurieswithinourpurview,andthecontrastbetweenthetwoepochs,bothcallforexplanationand
interpretation. In the interpretive account developed in the three following sub-sections (2.1 -2.3),
these quantitative trends are viewed primarilyas reflections of, and direct and indirect endogenous
responses to underlying developments affecting the rate and direction of technological innovation,
broadly conceived. Our interpretation carries some quite direct implications about the altered
behavior of U.S. savings that has been observed at the macroeconomic level during the twentieth
century.Thissectionthereforeconcludesbytouchingbrieflyuponthatquestion(insub-section2.4).
2.1 The Critical Role of Technological Progress and the Changes in Its Direction
Although the changing pace and character of technological innovation figures centrally in our
reading of the U.S. historical experience of growth, “the progress of invention”– as it was referred-5 6-
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to by economic writers in the nineteenth century – should not be seen as a wholly independent,
autonomous force driving the process of growth. On the contrary, many of the determinants of the
generation and diffusion of innovations quite clearly were endogenous to the economic system. At
the same time, the main features of the course of technological and organizational innovation that
so powerfullyshaped the economy’s growth-path in each century, were neither formed exclusively
by the concurrent American economic environments, nor were their effects confined to the U.S.
domestic product and factor markets.
Forthepresentpurposes,then,technologicalevolutioncanbestbeconceptualizedasatrans-
national, global force whose underlying tendencies in regard to pace and direction manifested
themselves particularly clearly in the American setting. This was in some part due to the nature of
the precocious contributions that inventive activities taking place in the young Republic had made
totheexpandinginternationalpoolofindustriallyusefulknowledge.But,perhapsmoreimportantly,
inasmuch Americans were notable borrowers of technologies (and underlying scientific principles)
from Europe, it also reflected the comparatively greater plasticity of the economic environment in
thisregionofEurope’sNewWorldsettlements.Theyoungandundevelopedstateofthecountryleft
much scope for institutions, capital structures and cultural attitudes to become adapted in ways that
werecongruentwithsuccessfuleconomicexploitationoftheproductivepotentialitiescreatedby“the
progress of invention.”
There were many channels through which technological advances directly and indirectly
shaped the path of U.S. economic development.
69 Of course, we see such developments as
contributing in a straightforward way to improving the overall efficiency of the economy’s use of
the factors of production. But the effects of technology changes extend beyond that, and impinge
upon the endogenous dynamic processes through which productive inputs are created. This applies
notonlytotheimpactoftechnologicalchangeuponthederiveddemandsforstocksofconventional
capital in the form of reproducible structures, equipment and livestock. The ways in which the size
and commercial value of the known reserves of non-reproducible(depletable)natural resources are
influenced by technologies of exploration, resource extraction, and processing, also are embraced
within this view. So too are the shifts in the derived demands for specific intermediate inputs of
naturalresources,shiftsthatmayemanatefromtechnologicallyinducedchangesinthemixofgoods
and services produced byother sectors of the economy. In addition, ofcourse, thereweredirect and
indirectimpactsuponthemarketforlaborservicesofdifferent kinds, stemmingfrom thecombined
effects of technological change and the alteration of the nature and extent of available capital
equipment.-5 7-
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Another way of putting the foregoing propositions is to say that our reading of both the
macroeconomicandthemicroeconomicevidencefromtheU.S.economy’sexperienceoverthepast
twocenturiesleadsustoviewtechnologicalchange(broadlyconceived)ashavingnotbeen“neutral”
in its effects upon growth. The specific meaning of “non-neutrality” in this context is that technical
and organizational innovation had effects upon the derived demands for factors of production, and
thereby affected the relative prices and the composition of the heterogeneous array of productive
assets in the economy.
70 But, significantly for our interpretation, the size of the respective asset
stocksalsowasaffectedintheprocess.Bydirectlyandindirectlyimpingingonstructureofrealrates
of remuneration established in the markets for particular types of human labor and skill, andfor the
services of specific tangible and intangible capital, the course of technological and organizational
innovation altered keyconditions governingthe growth rates ofthevarious macroeconomicfactors
of production.
Twomainmotifsthereforewillrecurin thefollowingdiscussion. Thefirst themelaysstress
onthenon-neutralityoftheimpactsofinnovationsonthedemandsideofthemarketsforproductive
inputs,andtheconsequentnecessityofrecognizingtechnologicalchangeascontributingtocomplex
interactions among all the proximate “sources of growth.” It was valid for us to present the total
factor productivity growth as a separate element, additively entering the growth accounts ( in Part
One) as a component of the growth rate of labor productivityand, hence the pace of increase in per
capita real output. Yet, the non-neutral character of technological progress invalidates simplistic
identification ofthelatterwith thegrowth ofevenrefinedmeasuresoftotalfactorproductivity.The
second themeis an extension and elaboration upon thefirst: it concerns thedifferences between the
twentieth and the nineteenth century in regard to the predominant patterns of bias in those “non-
neutral” technological impacts. We argue that as a consequence of the altered nature of the “bias”
of innovation, the twentieth century witnessed shifts among the relative demands for productive
assets.Thenewtendenciesledawayfromtheaccumulationofstocksoftangiblereproduciblecapital
and towards theformation ofintangible productive assets byinvestments in education, trainingand
the search for new scientific and technological knowledge.
We proceed next (in 2.2) to set out the grounds for our broad characterization of the thrust
of nineteenth-centurytechnological progress as havingbeen labor-saving but tangible reproducible
capital-using in its effects. Then we turn to examine the respects in which the twentieth century
witnessed significant new departures from those tendencies (in 2.3). The salient macroeconomic
trends areshown, byarguments analogous to thoseapplicableto the nineteenth centuryexperience,
tobeconsistentwiththebroadcharacterizationoftechnologicalchangeashavingbecomeintangible
capital-using but tangiblereproducible capital-saving, as well as remaining relativelylabor-saving.
By taking into consideration the relatively rapidly growing inputs of intangible capital that were
omitted from the standard growth model underlying the growth accounts in Part One, we arrive at-5 8-
an augmented set of growth accounts and a further “refinement” of the residually estimated,
multifactor productivity growth rate during the twentieth century.
In broadening the scope of the growth accounts to include the formation and utilization of
intangible capital, our analysis implies a somewhat unorthodox view of the long-term trends in the
supply of savings. This is briefly exposed in sub-section 2.4, where it is argued that there is little
evidencetosuggestthatthelong-termgrowthoflaborproductivityandpercapitarealincomeinthe
U.S. has been increasingly tightly constrained by adverse shifts in the aggregate supply of savings.
Instead, we take an expanded view of savings behavior as largelybeing responsive to the effects of
innovation-driven changes on the demand side of the relevant asset markets, and so becoming
progressively oriented towards new and unconventional forms of “savings.” This has involved a
dramatic growth of the relative importance in the national wealth portfolio not only of stocks of
consumer durables, but of stocks of intangible knowledge-assets created by expenditures on
organized R&D, and, of still greater quantitative significance, the formation of intangible human
capital by public and private investments in education and training.
Thisexpansionofthegrowthaccountingframework–toincludeunconventional,intangible
capital inputs – will be seen to exacerbate, rather than mitigate what undoubtedly is the major
puzzling feature of the U.S. growth record during the closing quarter of the century: the striking
collapse of the multifactor productivity growth rate. In doing so, the findings from the expanded
growth accounts draw attention in a rather dramatic way to the question of whether, and by how
much the "productivity slowdown" observed in the post-1966 period is an artifact of measurement
problems, particularlythose affecting the estimated growth rate of real GDP. We take up this issue
along with other proposed explanations of the productivityslowdown in the concluding section (3)
of Part Two.
2.2 The Changing Direction of Technological Progress and the Residual's Rise
An issue that needs to be addressed at the outset is whether it is justifiable to accord such central
importanceto theinfluenceoftechnological progress in thenineteenth century, and thereforeto not
view U.S. growth during the twentieth centuryas being fundamentally distinguishable from that in
the previous epoch on the ground that technological change has come to have a far greater impact.
Of course, this is a matter of what one means by "the economic impact" of technological progress.
But, could it not beargued,onthebasis oftheverylowabsoluteestimates wepresentedforthepre-
1890s TFP growth rate, and the subsequent pronounced “rise of the residual,” that technological
progress was really a rather insignificant factor in U.S. nineteenth-century growth, and emerged as
a potent force only in the twentieth century with the advent of the science-based industries and
organized research and development activities? Such a reading of the growth accounting results is
one that we would reject most firmly.-5 9-
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Some allowance must of course be made for the possibility of measurement errors, but a quantitative
evaluation leads to the conclusion that the gap in the long-term TFP growth rates of the magnitude indicated
is too large to be dismissed as an artifact of measurement errors. See Endnote 10 to Part Two 2 on this
issue.
Weholdthatposition,however,notbecausetheoccurrenceofsolargeanaccelerationinthe
rate of productivity growth renders the underlying estimates themselves somehow suspect;
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because there are good grounds for doubting that advances in fundamental scientific understanding
of physical phenomena have come to play a much more central role in industrial (and agricultural)
process and product innovation since the end of the nineteenth century. Rather, our view is that, in
general neither the pace at which technological change proceeded, nor the importance of its
"contribution to economic growth" can be gauged by simply considering the absolute growth rate
of total factor productivity, or the size of the relative contribution being made by the latter to the
growth oflabor productivityand real output per capita. Although therearespecial circumstances in
which such a direct interpretation of the growth accounts would be justifiable, those so-called
"neutrality"conditionsregardingthefactor-savingeffectsoftechnologicalinnovationdidnotobtain
for the U.S. economy during most of the nineteenth century. Nor have they obtained during the
twentieth century.
Yet, departures of "neutrality" themselves need not take an invariant form. It is preciselyin
themacroeconomicevidenceforthealterednatureoftechnology'snon-neutralprogressthatwefind
an important keyto understanding the rise of the TFP residual – and with it the other developments
that distinguished the macroeconomic growth path taken in the twentieth century from the course
along which the U.S. economy previously had been developing. The apparent difference between
thetwocenturiesinrespecttotheTFP growth ratethus reflects asubstantivedifference. It involved
not merelyan acceleration in the underlying pace of internationallyshared technological advances,
but a shift in “the direction of innovation” away from the very pronounced nineteenth-century bias
towards labor-saving and tangible capital-using innovations.
One way to grasp intuitively what the existence of such a “bias” would imply for our
interpretation of the TFP growth rate is, first, to recall the alternative, formally equivalent way in
which the residually estimated measure of multifactor productivity can be obtained, as shown by
equation (3) in Part One, Section 4: it is simply equal to the weighted average of the partial
productivitygrowth rates of the various factor inputs, in this case full-time equivalent manhours of
laborandthecombinedservicesoftangiblecapital(inconstantdollars).Sincewehaveseenthatthe
ratio between inputs of tangible capital and output was rising, it is evident that this must have
worked against the rise in labor productivity, dragging the weighted average of partial productivity
growth rates downwards.
The second step is somewhat more exacting, as it involves showing that the opposing
movements in the labor and (tangible) capital productivitytrends were reflecting changes in the set
oftechnologicalpossibilities,ratherthanbeingsimplyamatterofthesubstitutionofcapitalforlabor
in response to the rising relative price of the latter inputs. For this purpose it is best that brief but-6 0-
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The simplified presentation in the text distinguishes only labor and tangible capital inputs, and derives
from a more general production model that “nests” the growth accounting frameworks implemented in Parts
One and Two for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. The underlying general model is set
out and discussed in the Technical and Statistical Appendix 1: Note on a General Form of Production
Function with Factor-Augmenting Technological Change.
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The other things being held constant for the purposes of this exposition are the relative shares of the factor
inputs. Just as an average factor share weight is used for each interval when implementing the conventional
growth accounting in Part One, the same set of within-period weights would be employed in the alternative
calculation just described. If the factor shares were tending to change over the course of the interval in
question, this could either reinforce or counteract the quantitative effects of the bias of technological change
upon the resulting multifactor productivity growth rate. We return to discuss the significance of this point in
the text below. Note that there is no reason for the rates of change in the partial productivity of labor and
capital to correspond immediately with the respective input rates of efficiency growth, since the partial
productivity ratios would also be affected by changes in the input proportions due to factor substitution.
nonetheless explicit reference is made here to the hypothetical aggregate production function
underlying our growth accounting framework.
We may imagine a function describing the relationship between real output Y(t) at a given
moment in time and inputs of labor and total tangible capital, in which each of those input service
flows (measuredinits“natural”units,e.g. manhours in thecaseoflabor, and constant dollars in the
case of the various elements ofthetangible capital stock) enters multiplied byits own time-varying
index of productive efficiency, EL(t) and EK(t), respectively. The functional relationship involving
inputsthusmeasuredinefficiencyunitswillbeassumedtoremaininvariantovertime,althoughthe
relationshipbetweenoutputandtheinputsmeasuredin theirnatural units is presumed to change,as
a result of the impact of technological and organizational innovations upon the respective input-
specific efficiency index.
Now using the gross income shares of the factors in lieu of the respective input elasticity
weights,onemayidentifytherefinedresidualTFPgrowthrateastheweightedaverageofthegrowth
rates of the individual indexes of labor efficiency and capital efficiency:
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( 5 ) ................. Y *-[ 2LL* - 2KKT*] = E* = 2LEL*+2KEK*.
Itthenisplainthatthedirectimpactofacapital-usingtechnologicalbiaswouldbeto expand
thedemand forcapital input services relative to the flow of real gross output, given thepre-existing
real rate of return. That is tantamount to a negative rate of growth in the index of average capital
efficiency,whichwouldtendtooffsetthecontributionbeingmadetooverallinputefficiencygrowth
(E*) from concurrent labor-saving technical changes that were registered in the positive rate of
growth of the index of average labor input efficiency, EL*.
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ThisisasmuchastosaythattherefinedTFPresidual(E*)canbedirectlyinformativeabout
thepaceoftechnological change(or, more strictly, about paceofefficiencyimprovements deriving-6 1-
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“Hicks neutral” innovations satisfy this condition, and leave the capital-labor input service ratio
undisturbed (so long as relative factor prices are unchanged). But, as Endnote 1 to Part Two points out, the
latter way of stating the condition strictly might more accurately be described as that of "Salter neutrality."
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This “absolute capital-using bias” also violated the condition known as “Harrod-neutrality”. See Endnote 1
to Part Two for further discussion.
therefrom) onlyin the special circumstancewherethedirection of innovation is “neutral” : namely,
whenEL*=E K*=E*,sothattheinnovationdoesnotaffecttherelativemix offactorinputs.
74 What
we find, however, is that over the course of U.S. economic history in general technological change
has not been neutral in this sense.
Specifically, the dominant macroeconomic bias of innovation in both the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries was relatively "labor-saving", that is, (EL*-E K*) > 0 contributed to raising the
desired ratio of tangible capital inputs per manhour. But, in the nineteenth centurythis bias was far




Tangible Capital-Using, Scale-Intensive Technology and Increasing Economic Roundaboutness
Thetechnologicaltrajectorythatemergedinnineteenth-centuryAmericaandpersistedintotheearly
years of the twentieth century was both tangible capital-using and scale-dependent. Exploiting the
technical advances of the time demanded heavier use of machinery per worker, especially
power-drivenmachineryinevermorespecializedforms.Butit required operation on anever-larger
scale to render the use of such structures and equipment economical. Furthermore, it required
steam-powered transport by rail and ship, itself a capital-intensive and scale-intensive activity, to
assemble materials and to distribute the growing output to wider markets.
Contemporary observers understood what was happening during the closing quarter of the
nineteenth century in terms that were closely related to this. They spoke of technological progress
as achieving gains in the productivity of labor by increasing the “roundaboutness” of production;
innovations could be incorporated into production, on this view, only by the agency of raising the
economy’sstockoftangiblecapitalgoodsinrelationtotherealflowoffinalgoodsandservices.Or,
putting the point slightly differently in the terminology of those times, “the progress of invention”
was tendingto raisethephysicalcapital-outputratiothatproducerswouldchooseat anygiven level
of the real rate of interest.
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Technological progress and enlargement of markets appear to have operated with specially
great force to encourage capital accumulation during the nineteenth century. The widening
introduction of steam engines as a prime-mover in transportation, and for new power-driven
machinery, the development of the iron and steel and other heavy, capital-intensive industries, the-6 2-
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Frank W. Taussig, Wages and Capital, New York, 1897: p. 10. In this, Taussig was closely echoing the
earlier views of Henry Sidgwick (The Principles of Political Economy, 2nd Edition, London, 1887: p.133):
Though the progress of Invention – including the developments of the great system of cooperation
through exchange – does not necessarily increase the need of capital, it has, on the whole, tended
continuously and decidedly in this direction: the increase in the amount of consumable
commodities obtainable by a given amount of civilized labor has been attended by a continual
increase in the amount of real capital required to furnish these commodities to the consumer.
increasingrefinement ofnewsystems ofproduction ofstandardized products based on themachine
manufacture and assemblyof interchangeable parts all served to raise the relative rates of return on
new forms of tangible reproducible capital (given the same ratio of aggregate capital inputs to
output) and so encouraged their substitution for other assets as well as for labor services. All
required, at least as apermissivecondition, however, theenlargementofmarkets.Itwouldnothave
paid to use the larger quantities of specialized fixed plant and equipment unless their cost could be
spread over a large volume of sales. And the expansion of the railroad itself and of the telegraph
system it used served both to enlarge the national market and to permit and encourage the local
concentrations of industry, trade and finance that were required by the new factory system and that
held out a potential for advances in productivity.
All this is consistent with the teachings of a line of eminent economists who formed their
ideas upon thecloseobservation ofthenineteenth-centurydevelopmentsthathad been takingplace
undertheirowneyes.Intheirview,theprocessesoftechnologicaladvance,enlargementofmarkets,
more intricate specialization of labor and enterprise and the accumulation of capital appear as an
intimatelyinterconnectedprocess.Theyarguedthat,whiletechnologicalprogressdidnotnecessarily
involve enlargement of scale or the heavy investment of capital, the path of progress in the
nineteenth century tended strongly in that direction. Theyheld that advance characteristically took
the form of discovering new methods for increasing the "roundaboutness" of production (Eugen v.
Bohm-Bawerk),whichistosay,newwaystosubstitutecapitalgoods–andcapitalgoodsformaking
capitalgoods–forlabordirectlyappliedtoproducinggoodsforconsumersandproducers.Similarly,
it took the form of greater degrees of specialization of production, machinery and labor in an ever
more intricate system of exchange and cooperation – all of which is another way of expressing the
role of the enlargement of scale and specialization in realizing the potential of new knowledge and
inencouragingthesubstitutionofcapitalforlabor.FrankW.Taussig,oneofthefoundersofmodern
American economics wrote:
In the past, those inventions and discoveries which have most served to put the
powers of nature at human disposal have indeed often taken the form of greater and
more elaborate preparatory effort. The railway, the steamship, the textile mill, the
steel works, thegas works and electricplant – in all of these, invention has followed
the same general direction. But that it will do so in the future, or has always done so
in the past, can by no means be laid down as an unfailing rule.
76-6 3-
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See Endnote 6 to Part Two.
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The two parts of this story are brought together within the explicit framework of an augmented Solow
growth model, in Paul A. David, “A Tale of Two Traverses: Continuity and Change in U.S.
Macroeconomic History,” Stanford University Social Science History Workshop paper (October 22 1998),
revised March 1999.
Thisisaviewthat–inbothitscharacterizationofthepastbiasofinnovationtowards capital-
deepening, and its hesitation to extrapolate that tendencyinto the future – finds modern support, in
the literature of the economic history of technology and from econometric studies of American
industrial production during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
77 While the quantitative
macroeconomic evidence that is available is not conclusive in its support for this view, what there
islendsfurtherreinforcementofthepresumptioninitsfavor:thedataisconsistentwiththeclassical,
neoclassical and Austrian economists’ shared vision of long-term development as essentially a
process of "capital-deepening." Indeed, with appropriate allowances for the changes that have
occurred in the composition of the nation's stock of productive assets (changes that we interpret as
having been induced by the changing bias of innovation), we find in that shared vision an
illuminatingly unified way to comprehend the U.S. experience of economic growth during the
twentieth century, as well as the nineteenth.
2.3 The Testimony of the Macroeconomic Variables: Capital-Using Biases of Two Kinds
The growth rates for the factor input and real output measures that we have assembled in Table 2:
I tell a tale of not one, but two successive movements toward greater "roundaboutness" in the U.S.
economy'saggregatesystemofproductionsystem.Thisstoryisoneof“unityindiversity,”featuring
a contrast between historical epochs that have witnessed distinctive, yet in one sense closely
analogous changes in macroeconomic dynamics of the American macroeconomy.
78 Its quantitative
outlines may be summarized in the following broad terms.
The first of the two movements towards a high aggregate capital-output level involved the
accumulation of tangible reproducible assets. This was temporally concentrated during the middle
decades of the nineteenth century, as maybe seen from the upper panel (Panel A) of Table 2.I. Yet,
its force already was largely spent by the fin de siècle era (1890-1905), after which the trend in the
aggregate tangible capital-output ratio has been continuously downwards.
The emergence of a second capital-deepening drive has shaped the economy's growth
experience during the twentieth century, but, as this involved the rapid rise of the intangible capital
inputs in relation to real output, its quantitative dimensions are not fully visible within the
conventionalgrowthaccountingframeworkbasedupontheofficialnationalincomeandproductand
concepts.Inthelowerpanel(PanelB)ofthetable,therefore,wehave"augmented"theconventional
set of input and output growth rates by the inclusion of estimates for the rate of growth of the real
stock of intangible productive assets, which we denote bythe variable H* – since, as shall be seen,-6 4-
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See Endnote 7 to Part Two.
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These years of aggregate “capital-deepening” form the central period of what one of us (see David, 1977)
has called the nineteenth-century American economy’s “Grand Traverse.” The term refers to the movement
of the economy between different (steady-state) growth paths, each characterized by a constancy of the
capital output ratio and the real rate of return on capital (or, equivalently, constancy in the capital share).
(non-tangible) human capital forms the preponderant element within this part of the total U.S.
domestic capital stock. For growth accounting consistency, it is necessary to consider the rate of
change in a correspondingly "augmented" measure of real gross product, which we denote by the
variable YA*. The latter reflects the movements of the more comprehensive output measure that
includes, among other resource expenditures, the gross investments directed toward human capital
formation through formal education and training, and outlays forintangible non-human assets such
as are created through the performance of organized research and development activities.
We shall come subsequently to a closer examination of these matters, but for the present
overview it is important to note that the movement towards a higher intangible capital-output ratio
(H/YA)becameparticularlypronounced duringtheextendedperiodfrom 1929 to 1989. Thegrowth
of the intangible part of the stock overthecourseofthosesix decades was fast enough to more than
compensatefortheretarded pace of accumulation oftangibleproductiveassets. This brought about
areversal oftheprevious "capital-shallowing"trend that had characterized theeconomy–in regard
to both tangible and total productive assets – during the 1890-1927 era. But, rather than being a
continuous upward trend over the entire 60 years, virtually all of the implied post-1929 rise of the
total (tangible plus intangible) capital-output ratio has come about since the end of the 1960s.
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On the Tangible Capital-Using Bias of Technological Progress in the Nineteenth Century
In regard to ourcontentionthatthefirst ofthesecapital-deepeningepisodes owed agreat deal to the
absolute tangible capital-using bias of technological innovation over the decades running from the
1830stothe1890s,thekeymacroeconomicobservationsconcernthecoincidentupwardmovement
of the reproducible capital-output ratio and the expanding share of the gross returns attributable to
capital in the gross (private) domestic product.
The figures in the upper panel of Table 2: Ireveal that a positive gap was being maintained
between the growth rates of the entire reproducible capital stock and real output throughout the
period stretching from the mid-1830s to the end of the 1880s. From the underlying estimates it is
evident that the growth of the reproducible capital stock was sufficiently rapid, that it soon bulked
largeinthetotalrealtangiblestockandwasproximatelyresponsibleforthelatter’sriseataratethat
surpassedtheannualgrowthrateofrealoutputby0.5percentagepointsonaverageduringtheperiod
stretching from 1835 to 1890.
80 Over that interval the real reproducible capital-output ratio was
almost doubled, and the total tangible capital-output ratio rose by almost one-third. Just as the
contemporary economists opined, the development impelling this trend was a differentially more-6 5-
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Compare the constant 1860 price estimates of the composition of the U.S. domestic capital stock presented
in Table 13 (Panel D) of Robert E. Gallman’s chapter (“Economic Growth and Structural Change in the
Long Nineteenth Century’) in The Cambridge Economic History of the U.S.,S .L .E n g e r m a na n dR .E .
Gallman, Eds., vol. 2. From those figures the ratio of structures and equipment to the total of the fixed
reproducible components (which included improvements to farmland) can be seen to have been rising at
0.96 percent per annum during 1840-90; and it had been growing at virtually the same average pace (0.86
percent per annum) over the course of the preceding four decades.
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See Gallman, “Economic Growth and Structural Change,” in CEHUS, v.2: Table 13.
rapid accumulation offixed capital in theform ofstructures and equipment.
81This had been plainly
revealed by Robert Gallman’s exacting and detailed estimates of the changing distribution of the
fixedreproduciblestockinclusiveofimprovements madetofarm landduringtheperiod1840-90.
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Whereas at the beginning of the century(1799-1805) the stock of improvements made to farm land
constituted more than 62 percent of the nation’s fixed domestic stock of reproducible capital, that
share had been reduced to 47 percent by1840, and over the next half-centuryit dwindled to a mere
14.5 percent. Moreover, Gallman’s comprehensive estimates tell us that although in 1840 fixed
reproducible capital goods had represented only35 percent of the aggregate domestic capital stock
(valued in 1860 prices), that share had risen to 66 percent in 1890 and had fully doubled by 1900.
Yet, during the very same extended era, as one may see from the entries in Table 2: III
(Frame I), the share of gross income going to owners of reproducible capital underwent a sustained
enlargement, rising from an average of 19 percent during the 1800-35 interval to almost 34 percent
during the 1890-1905 period. The total property share thus rose by essentially the same
(proportional) extent, from about 32 to 46 percent according to the estimates shown in Frame I for
the fin de siècle period, and by only a little less if one consults the alternative total property share
estimate shown for 1890-1905 in Frame II of the table.
The concurrence of these two trends, one in the real capital-output ratio(s) and the other the
property share(s) carries a strong implication supporting our interpretation of the dynamics of
nineteenth-centurycapital-deepeninggrowthashavingbeendrivenbytechnologicallyinducedshifts
in the desired capital-output ratio, and consequently in the desired real investment rate. Had the
growthoftheaggregatecapital-outputratiobeenpushedupwardsimplybyanincreaseinthrift,this
would havehad to work entirelythrough theinduced substitution of capital for labor in production;
the higher rate of savings (gross) in relationship to the growth rate of the labor supply would have
led to a downward pressure on the real rental price of capital vis-à-vis the wage rate, and thereby
induced the substitution of tangible capital for labor. The behavior of the share data, however,
implies that the real rate of return was not being forced sharply downwards.
How far the relative return to capital would have been depressed in proportion to the
consequentriseofthetangiblecapital-laborratioiswhatismeasuredbytheelasticityofsubstitution,
whichwemayviewasaparametricfeatureofaggregateproductionrelationsintheeconomyduring
this epoch. Successiveeconometricinvestigations ofaggregateproduction function models of U.S.
private(andprivatebusiness)domesticeconomyin thepresent century, as well as aparallel inquiry-6 6-
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See Endnote 6 to Part Two, on econometric estimates of the elasticity of substitution.
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It is possible to obtain an estimate that puts the rate of capital-using technological change for the period
1835-90 at EK* = - 0.68 per cent per year. The corresponding rate of growth of the manpower inputs’
efficiency index is found to be 1.02 per cent per year. See Endnote 16 to Part Two for the method of
estimation.
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This interpretation of U.S. macroeconomic growth in the nineteenth century as a capital-deepening
“traverse,” and the implications drawn from that view, were initially presented in Moses Abramovitz and
Paul. A. David, “Reinterpreting Economic Growth: Parables and Realities,” American Economic Review,
63(2), May 1973: pp. 428-439; and more fully developed in Paul A. David, “Invention and Accumulation in
America’s Economic Growth: A Nineteenth Century Parable,” Journal of Monetary Economics,6
(Supplement), 1977: pp. 179-228 [published also as International Organization, National Policies and
Economic Development, K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, Eds., Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland,
1977.
forthenineteenth-centurydomesticeconomy,andnumeroussectoralandindustrystudies,allconcur
in finding the elasticity of substitution to be less than unity.
83 Unitary elasticity would imply, of
course, that the relative shares of the factors in gross output would be unchanged. But, if that
elasticity was less than unity, and if technological progress had been (Hicks) neutral, tangible
reproducible capital’s share in gross income would have been contracting, and labor’s share would
have been rising – as the latter was the slower growing of that pair of inputs. Yet, just the opposite
happened: in the first half of the nineteenth century the share of capital rose by 19 percent, and
during the second half the proportional increase was again 19 percent, for an overall 41 percent




the efficiencyof labor faster than the efficiencyof capital inputs, the pronounced capital-using bias
of technological innovation operated so as to offset the depressing effect that the accumulation of
capital goods tended to exert on the real rate of return.
84
A further aspect of these macroeconomic relationships enables us to venture a step farther:
the implied trend differential between the growth rates of the average efficiencyof manhour inputs
and average efficiency of the services of tangible capital during the nineteenth century turns out to
have been so pronounced that one has to conclude that it was the impact of technological and other
innovationsinthenineteenthcenturywhichworkedtopushthedesiredaggregatecapitaloutputratio
upwards.Equivalently,wemaysaythatintheabsenceofanyotherchangeinthecapital-outputratio,
the effect of technological progress was tending to raise the real rate of return on the existing stock.
In the event, however, it served substantially to moderate its downward course over the century.
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Table 2: I
Real Gross Output and Factor Input Growth Rates (percent per annum), 1800-1989
U.S. Private Domestic Economy
Y* YA*L *K T*K TQ*H * Y * - L * K T*-L KTQ*-L H - L*
Panel A: Frame I
1800-1835 3.84 --- 3.57 3.84 --- --- 0.27 0.27 --- ---
1835-1890 4.02 --- 3.32 4.51 --- --- 0.70 1.19 --- ---
1890-1905 3.80 3.81 2.41 3.64 (3.64) 4.40 1.37 1.20 (1.20) 1.94
Panel B: Frame II Y* YA*L *K T*K TQ*H *Y A*-L* KT*-L KTQ*-L H* - L*
1890-1905 4.25 4.26 2.28 3.49 (3.49) 4.40 1.94 1.16 (1.16) 2.07
1905-1927 3.31 3.70 1.24 2.43 2.43 4.40 2.43 1.18 1.18 3.12
1929-1966 3.05 3.17 0.52 1.85 2.52 3.88 2.64 1.32 1.99 3.34
1966-1989 2.86 2.84 1.61 3.11 4.00 3.82 1.21 1.48 2.37 2.17
Notes and Sources for Table 2: I: Description of Growth Rate Variables and Data Sources
Panel A:
Y*, L*: See Statistical Appendix, Sources for Tables 1: IA, and 1: IIA (Frame I), for real gross product, and
manhours, respectively.
YA*: Augmented real gross product for the interval 1890-1905 is based on Y* in that interval, adjusted by
extrapolating the growth rate of (YA/Y ) in the period 1890-1905, from estimates underlying the entries in
Panel B in this table.
KT*: Total real tangible capital stock (estimated as a constant price Divisia index of the reproducible and non-
reproducible tangible stock). See Statistical Appendix, Sources for Table 1: IVA (Frame I).
KTQ*: Total real tangible capital adjusted for (compositional) “quality change”: KTQ*= [KT*+ q K*] = KT*i nt h e
1890-1905 interval, by extrapolation of the argument in Part Two, section 2.3, based upon constant dollar
stock estimates showing that the composition of the tangible reproducible stock remained virtually
unchanged over the period 1910-29. See sources for Panel B of this Table.
H*: Real stock of intangible capital: See Panel B of this Table for sources of the 1890-1905 estimate.
Panel B:
Y*, L*, KT*: See Statistical Appendix, Sources for Tables 1: IA, and 1: IIA (Frame II).
1890-1905 and 1905-1927, based on underlying estimates in Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII (for Y, and L),
Table XV (for KT); 1929-1966 and 1966-89, from Statistical Appendix for Part One, Tables 1: IA and 1:
IIA, based on underlying data from U.S. NIPA (1992, 1993), for Y* and L*; Table 1: IVA (Frame II), from
BEA, Tables A6 and A9, for KT*.-6 8-
YA*: 1890-1905 and 1905-1927, from Y* adjusted by the growth rate of (YA/Y ) computed for 1905-29 from
augmented real domestic product estimates in Table 2: II, pt.A; 1929-1966 and 1966-1989 from Y*
adjusted by the growth rate of (YA/Y ) computed by interpolation from the Table 2: II, pt.A estimates for
1929, 1973 and 1990.
KTQ*= [KT*+q K*]: 1929-1966 and 1966-1989 adjustments of KT* for (compositional) quality change, using
estimates underlying Table 1: IV and 1: IVA, as described in Statistical Appendix. The growth rate
estimates for qK* appear in the Technical Appendix Note 2. See Sources for Panel A of this Table on the
basis of the estimate of qK* = 0 in the period 1890-1927.
H*: 1905-1927, 1929-1966 and 1966-1989 computed from Total Intangible Stock estimates in Table 2: II, pt.
A. See Statistical Appendix Sources for Table 2: II.-6 9-
Table 2: II- Part A
Real Gross Domestic U.S. Capital Stocks and Product
(billions of 1987 dollars, and ratios)
Part A: Stocks and Flows
Selected Components of Real Stock 1900-1910 1929 1948 1973 1990
Conventional Tangible: Total 3583 6075 8120 17490 28525
Structures and Equipment 2305 4585 6181 13935 23144
Inventories 300 268 471 1000 1537
Natural Resources 978 1222 1468 2555 3843
Non-conventional Non-tangible:
Total
1131 3251 5940 17349 32819
Education and Training 1001 2647 4879 13564 25359
Health, Safety, Mobility 120 567 892 2527 5133
R&D 0.1 37 169 1249 2327
Alternative Measures of Real Product
Conventional Real GDP 330 822 1300 3269 4878
Augmented Real GDP 410 1112 1715 4302 6395-7 0-
Source: See Statistical Appendix for Part Two: Notes and Sources to Table 2: II-Part A.-7 1-
Table 2: II - Part B
Real Gross Domestic U.S. Capital Stocks and Product, 1900-1990
Part B: Ratios Derived from Part A Entries
1900-1910 1929 1948 1973 1990
Ratio of Non-tangible Stock to
Conventional Tangible Stock
.316 .535 .731 .992 1.150
Ratio of Education and Training
and R&D Stocks to:
Conventional Real GDP 3.03 3.26 3.88 4.53 5.67




0.21 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.45
Ratio of R&D Stock to Fully
Augmented Real GDP
.0002 .033 .098 .290 .364
Source: calculated from entries in Table 2: II-Part A.-7 2-
Table 2: III
Gross Factor Shares: Input Weights for Conventional and Augmented Production Models:

















2 2 2 2L 2 2 2 2R 2 2 2 2K " " " "L " " " "KT 2 2 2 2L’ 2 2 2 2KT’ 2 2 2 2H
Frame I :
1800-1835 .683 .125 .192 --- --- --- --- ---
1835-1855 .623 .152 .225 --- --- --- --- ---
1855-1871 .536 .162 .300 --- --- --- --- ---
1871-1890 .553 .130 .317 --- --- --- --- ---
1890-1905 .539 .124 .337 .092 .000 .448 .461 0.092
Frame II : Labor inputs: Capital:
(2 2 2 2R+2 2 2 2K) (2 2 2 2KT-" " " "L)( 2 2 2 2KT- " " " "L) (" " " "L+" " " "KT)
2 2 2 2L = 2 2 2 2KT " " " "L " " " "KT = 2 2 2 2L’= 2 2 2 2KT’= 2 2 2 2H
1890-1905 .560 0.44 0.092 0.00 0.468 0.440 0.092
1905-1927 0.60 0.40 0.185 0.003 0.415 0.397 0.188
1929-1966 0.64 0.36 0.244 0.084 0.396 0.276 0.328
1966-1989 0.65 0.35 0.246 0.084 0.404 0.266 0.330
Sources:
Frame I. Standard Weights: See Statistical Appendix, Sources for Table 1: IV and 1: IVA (Frame I) discussion of imputed
factor share estimates. For 1890-1905 adjustments for intangible inputs, see Sources of Frame II estimates in this
Table. Weights for Augmented Inputs are the conventional shares minus "Land "K,respectively.
Frame II. Conventional gross factor shares are obtained for 1890-1905 and 1905-1927 by raising the net share estimates
from Kendrick, 1961, Table A-X for 1899-1909, and the average of 1909-19 and 1919-29, by 0.09, to allow for
capital consumption; for 1929-1966 and 1966-1929 see Statistical Appendix Sources for Table 1: IV and 1: IVA
(Frame II), factor share estimates. Imputed estimates of "Land "K,the gross returns on stocks of intangible human
capital, and on the stock of (non-human intangible) R&D capital, expressed as fractions of augmented GPDP,
respectively, are obtained by the procedures described in Statistical Appendix Sources for Table 2: III. Note that
2H = "L + "K.-7 3-
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These developments are summarized by Gallman's chapter (CEHUS, vol. 2), which gives references to the
relevant literature on nineteenth-century trends affecting the supply of savings.
87
See Endnote 9 for further elaboration of this point.
What this means, then, is that to the extent that the supplyof savings was elastic to the real rate of
return, as seems quite plausible, a portion of the rise that has been observed to have occurred in the
proportion of the nation’s aggregate income that was being channeled into net (and gross) savings in the
form of tangible reproduciblewealth, can be attributed to the upward pressure that biased innovation was
bringing to bear on the demand side of the market for loanable funds. Some part of the rise in the fraction
of income saved undoubtedly is traceable to independent supply-side shifts, stemming from altered
household savings habits, institutional innovations that improved bank and non-bank financial
intermediation,andothersuchdevelopments.
86 But,totheextentthattheaggregatesupplyofsavingswas
responsive to changes in the functional distribution of income, which would be the case if the propensity
to save out of the earnings of property exceeded that out of wages, the expanding share of income going
toholdersoftangiblereproduciblepropertyasaconsequenceofthebiasoftechnologicalchangeprovided
a mechanism through which the upward shifts in the demand for loanable funds tended to be met by an
accommodatingly high elasticity on the supply side.
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The Relative Rise of Real Stocks of Intangible Capital
Turning now to the twentieth century, we must begin by looking beneath the growth rates of those large
aggregatemeasuresoftangibleandintangiblecapitalinputs,whicharereportedinthelowerpanelofTable
2: I. This can readily be done by consulting the estimates in Table 2: II-Part A pertaining to the U.S.
DomesticEconomy,whereestimatesofthecomponentstocksvaluedinconstantpricesof1987aresetout
forbenchmark dates between 1900 and 1990. From theseit will beseen that thesecularriseofeach ofthe
principal categories of intangible assets – Educational and Training, Health, Safety and Mobility
(combined), and R&D – outpaced the accumulation of conventional tangible assets in the form of
commodity inventories, structures and equipment.
The main facts of the national “portfolio transformation” that this has involved stand out plainly
enoughfromcomparisonsoftheirrespectiveabsolute1987dollarmagnitudes:beginningfromalevelthat
was less than one-third that of the tangible capital stock in the first decade of the century, the size of the
real stock of intangible capital grew to match that of its tangible counterpart in 1973, and, by 1990 it
already was 15 percent larger. Thus, the ratio between the non-conventional (intangible) stock and the
conventional(tangible)componentsoftotalnon-financialwealth(whichappearsinthetopmostlineofPart
B of Table 2: II) increased by 3.5-fold over the 1900/1910-1990 interval as a whole, and was more than
doubled between 1929 and 1990.
Two distinct sets of secular forces can be identified as having been responsible for bringing about
thisstrikingtwentiethcenturyswitchinthecompositionofthenation'sportfolioofdomesticnon-financial
wealth.Ontheonehandwerethoseforcesthattendedtoreducethedesireddemandforwealthintheform
of tangible capital stocks at given levels of real income and the real rate of interest, and on the other were-7 4-
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Formation and Financing, Princeton University Press (for NBER), and John W. Kendrick (1961),
Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton University Press.
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See Fishlow, “Productivity and Technological Change in the Railroad Sector, 1840-1910” (1966).
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See, e.g., Thomas P. Hughes (1983), Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, Baltimore and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, and Paul A. David and J.A. Bunn (1988), “The Economics of
Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information
Economics and Policy, Vol. 3, pp. 165-202; Paul A. David (1991), “Computer and Dynamo: The Modern
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Schurr, et al., Electricity in the American Economy: Agent of Technological Progress,N e wY o r k :
Greenwood Press, 1990.
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See Harry Jerome (1934), Mechanization in Industry, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research;
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz (1998), “The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, pp. 693-732.
thesetofforcesthatweretendingtoraisethedesiredratiobetweenrealintangiblewealthandrealincome.
As the focus of the discussion in the following pages will rest upon the latter two, before going on it is
important to take note of the emergence of a number of significant tangible-capital saving developments,
especially during the first quarter of the twentieth century.
More intensive utilization of fixed capital facilities that were initially installed in large, lumpy
blocks, was a prominent source of gains in tangible capital productivity, which became especially
pronouncedfirstin therailroad transportation industryand thenewpublicutilities, particularlyelectricity
supply and telephone networks during the 1890-1905 era.
88 But it should not be supposed that this was
simply a matter of waiting until demand grew up to the levels of the capacity that had been originally
installed. As the research of Albert Fishlow has shown, for the case of U.S. railroads in the post-bellum






dynamos, and the integration of more extensive electricity distribution networks across with “load
balancing”becamepossible,permittedreductionsintheexcesscapacitythatwasentailedwhengenerators
were installed to meet daily and seasonal peaks in demand.
90
In manufacturing industries the introduction of continuous process production and the increasing
use of multiple shift-work in the years around 1915, and the diffusion of automated materials handling
technologies to increase the rates of charging and discharging of batch production processes, similarly
rested on technological innovations, including the growing use of electro-mechanical control systems in
chemicalplants,breweries,steelrollingmills,andthelike.
91 Moreover,duringthe1920sparticularly,the
introduction of the unit drive system of factory electrification in many industries completed the-7 5-
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Murray F. Foss (1997), Shiftwork, Capital Hours and Productivity Change, Boston, Dordrecht, and
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
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This partial productivity measure is the ratio between augmented real gross domestic product and the real
stock of fixed reproducible tangible capital. See Table 2: II-Part B, for the estimates underlying the
calculation.
replacementbywiresoftheformermechanicalmeansofpowertransmissionusingshaftsandbelting,and
this brought significant savings in fixed construction costs,as well as permittingreductions in lost output
during “down time” for retro-fitting of particular departments in the plant, or for reconfiguring the layout
of the factory floor to accommodate product changes.
Once initiated, this trajectory of development and diffusion of fixed tangible capital-saving
innovations has persisted into the 1929-66 era. Wartime pressures on capacity in the 1940s led to new
methods of intensive utilization which could be introduced in conjunction with plant renewals, but it was
notuntilthe1960sthatafurthernotableincreaseinthe“work-week”ofmanufacturingcapitaltookplace,
due to structural changes that increased the importance of the continuous production industries and the
extent of shift-working. According to the estimates prepared by Murray Foss, the index of intensity of
utilizationofmanufacturingcapacityroseattheaverageannualrateof0.38percentagepointsperannum.
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As manufacturing is a comparatively capital-intensive sector, capital-savings from these sources carried
considerable weight in the aggregate, but the share of manufacturing in gross private domestic product
shrank towards the 20-25 percent range in the post-World War IIperiod, setting a limit on their abilityto
raise intangible capital’s productivity economy-wide.
It is therefore significant that this era also saw a similar movement towards organizational and
technological changes that permitted greater fixed capacity utilization in the service sector: banks and
insurance using computers moved to time sharing of that equipment in the 1960s, while automatic teller
machines reduced the demand for numerous small retail bankingfacilities that typicallycould attain only
relativelylowlevels oftransactions throughput. In retail distribution, stores cateringto arisingnumberof




that alone would have accounted for roughly two-thirds of the concurrent increase (by 0.61 percentage
points) that occurred in the annual growth rate of fixed capital productivity.
93
A second major contributor to the differentially faster pace of accumulation of the intangible
portionoftheaggregatedomesticcapitalhasbeenthegrowingdifferencebetweentheaverageservicelives
of tangibles and intangibles, and the fact that the latter difference has also reflected the shifting internal
make-up of those broad classes of assets. Consider first the non-conventional intangibles: from the
estimatesoftheabsolute1987dollarmagnitudesinTable2:II-PartAitisseenthateducationandtraining
have remained the overwhelminglydominant element within the intangible stock. Indeed, the rise of this
particularformofhumancapitalhasbeenthedevelopmentthatmustbeassignedproximateresponsibility
for driving the secular shift towards intangible asset formation. Because the real capital stock figures we-7 6-
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1991.
are considering are estimated gross of depreciation (and obsolescence), the assumed average service life
of the intangible component reflects the dominance of the comparatively long-lived humans in whom
educational,training(andhealth)investmentshavebeenembodied;eventhoughitsshareofeducationand
training in total intangible capital drifted downwards, from 88 percent to 77 percent between the first and
thefinal decadeofthecentury, this was not sufficient to shorten appreciablytheextended averageservice
life of the entire class of intangible assets.
By contrast, however, the average service life of newly installed tangibles has fallen appreciably,
in part as a consequence of the rising relative importance of equipment relative to structures especially
from 1929 onwards, but also due to the shortening of the average service life of equipment itself.
94 Taken
inconjunctionwiththelongevityofeducationalandtraininginvestmentsembodiedinthelaborforce,this
shift towards a higher average rate of depreciation on tangible reproducible assets has meant that even if
a constant comprehensive rate of real gross savings had been allocated in an unchanged way between
tangibleandintangiblecapitalformation,theintangiblecomponentofthetotalU.S.realgrosscapitalstock
would have been growing at a differentially rapid pace – at least since 1929.
But it is evident also that these preliminary considerations cannot be the main part of the story of
the relative rise of the intangible stock, which, in any case, can be seen to have been underway since the
beginning of the century.
95 Demographyalso has had a hand in this development. On turning the problem
around so as to consider the historical evolution of an education-health care nexus from the prospective
viewpointofthelatenineteenthcentury,itis evident that theadvanceofscientificknowledgeinthefields
of medicine, including public health, contributed substantially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to lengtheningadult lifeexpectancy. It didsofirstbyreducingtheincidenceofdiseases such
as tuberculosis, which are economicallyverycostlybecause theydebilitate if not abbreviate the lives of
young adults, and subsequently by prolonging the potential working lives of mature adults.
96
Thesedemographicdevelopmentsmaybeseentohavehadtwoentwinedeffects.Ontheonehand,
by extending the prospective "service lives" of human capital investments, they worked to raise the
anticipated rates of return on formal education and training. An illustrative set of calculations conveys
some idea of the magnitude of the impact upon the demand for further education that this consideration
alonemayhaveentailed.Startingfromarepresentativeage-earningsprofileofU.S.maleworkersaged15
to 60 who had a grade school education, and the corresponding profile (with earnings starting at age 25)-7 7-
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Education,” Unpublished seminar notes, Stanford University Department of Economics, January 11, 1971.
They make use of the earnings functions for the two educational attainment categories from G. Hanoch, “An
Economic Analysis of Earnings and Schooling,” in B.F. Kiker, Investment in Human Capital, (1971).
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These average annual growth rates are computed as (H*-YA*)/(1+YA*) from the entries in Table 2: I.
for those who completed four years of college, one may ask what would be the effect on a rational
assessment of the economic return to opting for college completion of an improvement in adult life
expectancysuchasthatwhichactuallyoccurredbetween1870and1960. Usingtheage-specificmortality
schedules for theU.S. whitemalepopulation at thosetwo dates, thecorrespondingexpected values ofthe
(1960) alternative education-associated earnings profiles can be obtained, and the present value of those
may then be evaluated and compared by positing alternative time-discount rates. What a counterfactual
exerciseofthis kindrevealsisthattheimpactofthehistoricalimprovementinmalesurvival probabilities
in theU.S. was sufficientto raisetheexpected present valueofacollegeeducation by25%ifthediscount
rate were as low as 5 percentage points per annum, and by 60% if the discount rate was as high as 15
percentage points per annum.
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At the same time one should notice the implications of the tendencyfor the age distribution of the
U.S.workforcetoshiftupwardsovertheperiod1890-1940–bothasaconsequenceoftheearlytwentieth-
centurycontinuationofthefall infertilityratesuntilthelate1940s,andthesubsequentreductionsinadult
mortalitylevels. This meant that theaccelerated pacein the advance of knowledge and its translation into
new techniques of production and work routines increased the problem of obsolescence in the human
capital stock. Taken by itself, that would have contributed to depressing the average index of the human
capitalstock’sefficiency,whilstraisingthemarginalrateofreturntogrossinvestmentinintangiblecapital
formation through the education and training of young workers. As shall be seen, the movements of the
observable macroeconomic variable in the twentieth century are consistent with the existence of such a
secular bias towards intangible capital-using efficiency changes.
Intangible Capital-Deepening and the Growth Accounts for the U.S. in the Twentieth Century
The first point to be considered is that the rise in the intangible capital-output ratio was accompanied by
ariseintheshareoftotalintangiblecapitalintheaugmentedgrossproduct,asmaybeseenbycomparison
of the positive growth rates of the (real) ratio H/YA indicated for the U.S. Private Domestic Economy by
Table 2: I(Panel B),withthetrendin the share2Hthat appears in the lower panel of Table 2: III. Over the
whole of the 1905-89 interval the rate of increase of the former ratio averaged 0.74 percentage points per





the experience of the two centuries in the behavior of the corresponding gross factor shares, for the share
of augmented gross product that we have imputed to total intangible capital inputs rose along with the
intangible capital-output ratio.-7 8-
FromTable2:III(FrameII)itisevidentthattherisingimputedreturnsonintangiblehumancapital
were the quantitatively important development during the period 1890-1927, reflecting the labor force
impact of the High School education movement. When those returns are subtracted from the total labor
earnings, the resulting estimate of the share of “raw labor inputs” in gross (augmented) output shows no
rise during the twentieth century; indeed, the essential constancy of the share at the 40 percent level after
1890-1905 can be viewed as the eventual bound reached by the secular contraction that had begun early
inthenineteenthcentury.Privatelyandpubliclyfinancedexpendituresforresearchanddevelopmentbegan
to rise rapidly from initially negligible levels in relationship to national output during the 1920s, and the
sustained rise in this ratio over the next three decades produced the almost ten-fold rise in the ratio of the
real R&D capital stock to gross (augmented) product between 1929 and 1973, according to the estimates
presentedinTable2:II–PartB.Thatmovementunderlaytherapidexpansionoftheshareofgrossproduct
imputed to the non-human component of intangible capital inputs, an increase of approximately 8
percentage points between the immediate post-World War I and post-World War II years. Subtraction of
this component from the imputed gross earnings of all capital results in a sharper contraction of the gross
share of tangible assets (in augmented output) between the first quarter and the following part of the
present century. Thus, the share of all tangible inputs (human and non-human) is seen to have decreased
from approximately90 percent at the turn of the century(1890-1905)to the67 percent level that has been
maintained over the 1929-89 period.
The input growth rates and estimated factor shares are brought together in Table 2: IV-Part A to
provideamorecomprehensivegrowthaccountingfortheU.S.PrivateDomesticEconomyinthethreelong
periods since 1890. We make use of the adjustments for the changing composition of tangible assets,
previously introduced as a “capital quality improvement” in Table 1: IV, but make no corresponding
adjustment ofthelaborinputs, inasmuch as theestimates ofthegrowth ofthestockofintangiblesdirectly
and indirectly reflect compositional shifts in the expenditures and foregone earnings flowing into
investments in human capital. Because the contributions of the growth of intangible inputs per manhour
exceed the previously estimated contributions of improved “labor quality”, the resulting multifactor
productivityresiduals aresmallerineachoftheperiods than thecorrespondingentries in Table1: IV-Part
A. The reduction is quite minor for the pre-1929 period and moderate in the 1966-89 interval, but quite
pronounced for the 1929-66 period. Consequently, the new, “super-refined” TFP estimate (EA*) is found
to have declined from the 1.3 percentage point per annum high point it attained during the first quarter of
the century (it stood at 1.375 percentage points per annum in the sub-period 1905-27, slightly above its
average for 1890-1927).
If we accept the estimate of 1.00 percentage points per annum for the “refined” TFP growth rate
in thelongperiod 1871-90 (from Table1: IVA)as roughlycomparable with these figures, the picture that
emerges is one of acceleration to a peak in multifactor productivity growth reached during 1905-27,
followed bya return to the same (1 percentage point per annum) rate during 1929-66, followed byfurther
and sharp decline. The final row in Table 2: IV-Part A shows the post-1966 “slowdown” in our
comprehensive multifactor productivity growth rate amounting to a drop of 1.13 percentage points, a
decline somewhat smaller than that indicated bythe standard growth accounts presented in Part One, but
very substantial nonetheless.-7 9-
Table 2: IV-Part A
The Sources of Labor Productivity Growth:
Augmented Accounting Framework for U.S. Private Domestic Economy






















































- 1.43 + 0.081 -0.380 -0.299 -1.131
Notes and Sources: For cols. (1), (2)and (3)the growth rates and input weights from Table 2: I(Panel B),
combining entries for 1890-1905 and 1905-27 rates, geometrically averaged with appropriate relative
weights for lengths of sub-periods. Col. (4) is the sum of cols. (2) and (3). For col.(5): EA* is obtained as
a residual from col.(1) minus col.(4).-8 0-
Table 2.IV - Part B
The Relative Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth and the MFP “Slowdown”:





















1890- 1927 .0221=100 21.9 19.2 41.1 58.9
1929-1966 .0264=100 20.8 41.5 62.3 37.7




-.0143=100 -5.7 26.6 20.9 79.1
Sources: Calculated from entries in Table 2: IV-Part A.
InTable2:IV-PartBtherelativecontributionsoftangibleandintangiblecapital-intensitygrowth,
and of multifactor productivity change are calculated. The steadily mounting relative importance of
intangible capital per manhour, and, consequently, of total capital inputs per manhour forms a decided
contrast with the picture presented by the standard accounting in Part One. From this perspective the
decreased importance of multifactor productivity growth in the most recent period appears less of an
anomaly,andmoreacontinuationofpreviousdevelopments.Theresurgentrelativeroleoftangiblecapital-
intensity growth after 1966, which parallels the increased absolute size of the contribution to labor
productivitygrowth, is seen now as an accompaniment to the relative growth of the contribution of rising
intangible capital-intensity. We will return to consider (in Section 3, below) what light the standard and
expandedgrowthaccountingexercisesthrowuponthepost-1966“slowdown”inproductivitygrowth.For-8 1-
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See David, “Tale of Two Traverses,” (1988): Technical Appendix Note 2, footnote 5 for references to this
recent literature in the labor economics field, from which it appears that the elasticity of substitution
between skilled (educated) and unskilled (low educational-attainment) workers in the post-World War II
period lay between 1 and 2.
the moment, however, it simply may be noted that by considering the role of intangible inputs we have
made some headway in that direction. Whereas the standard growth accounts in Part One indicated that
more than the entire reduction of the labor productivity growth rate had to be attributed to the shrinkage
of the refined TFP growth rate, the results from Table 2: IV-Part B assign 21 percent of the decrease in
(augmented)outputpermanhourtothediminishedrateofincreaseoftotalcapital-intensitygrowth.Thus,
79 percent is left to be “explained” by the contraction of the multifactor productivity residual. All of the
diminished contribution from capital-intensity growth since the late 1960s, however, is traceable to the
reduced contribution made by intangible capital-intensity, so that the movements in that component may
berightlysaidtohaveplayedthepivotalroleinboththeaccelerationoflaborproductivitygrowthbetween
1890-1927 and 1929-66, and its subsequent deceleration.
Although the growth of intangibles per manhour and tangible capital per manhour were roughly
onaparintermsoftheircontributionstolaborproductivitygrowthduring1890-1927,theformerhasbeen
seen to have become more important in absolute and relative terms after 1929. This shift, brought out
clearlybyTable2:IV,reflectedtheunderlyinginfluenceofdemand-sideforcesfavoringtheaccumulation
of intangible rather than tangible assets. Evidently, the rise of the intangible capital stock in relationship
to both the tangible stock and to real gross product during the twentieth centuryevidentlydid not depress
the real gross rate of return on intangible enough to prevent the expansion of those assets earnings share;
indeed,theproportionateincreaseinthelattershareoverthecourseofthecenturywasactuallygreaterthan
the near doubling of the intangible capital-output ratio. On the face of it the implication would appear to
be clear: there must have been powerful forces offsetting the tendency for the relative accumulation of
intangibles to lower the marginal productivity of such assets.
The argument that the opposing force in question was an overall intangibles-using bias of
innovations,isnotquiteasstraightforward,however,astheonewewereableto advancein support ofthe
inference that technological progress during the nineteenth century was strongly biased in the tangible
capital-using direction. Although there is still ample basis for supposing that the elasticityof substitution
between “raw manhours” and tangible capital inputs is less than unitary, the same cannot be said for the
elasticity of substitution between the “raw manhours” and the intangible (human capital) components of
labor inputs. Since the elasticityof substitution between “skilled “ (or higher education attainment) labor
andunskilledlaborinputshasbeenfoundtoexceedunityinmanyeconometricstudies,
99itispossiblethat
the rapid growth of intangible (human) capital per manhour bore some responsibility for the increasing
share of intangible capital in (augmented) gross output.
In other words, with three (main) factor inputs to consider, and no clear basis for supposing that
the elasticity of substitution between intangibles and the other (tangible) inputs was less than unitary, in
ordertoinfertheexistenceofan intangiblecapital-usingbias ofinnovation, it is necessaryto considerthe
quantitativerelationships amongtheseveral input-specific rates of efficiencygrowth, and theircollective
relationshiptotheresidualmeasureofmultifactorproductivitywhenintangiblesaswellastangibleinputs-8 2-
100
David, “A Tale of Two Traverses” (1998): Technical and Statistical Appendix 3: Estimates of Trend
Growth Rates of Efficiency of Intangible Inputs, sets out the methodology, data, and resulting estimates.
The calculations are carried out in a manner consistent with the framework of the augumented production
function model and the data employed here.
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The latter effect combined with that of the rapid rise in the real stock of intangibles per manhour over the
period 1890-1927 to exert downwards pressure on the rate of return on intangibles relative to the
remuneration of unskilled (“raw”) labor services. In sub-section 2.4 of this Part, the discussion of “the
behavior of real rates of return on the intangibles stock” notices corroborative evidence of a decline over the





100 Throughout the era since 1929 the index of average efficiency of intangibles has trended
downwards,anditsrateofdeclinebecamemuchmorepronouncedduring1966-89thanithadbeenduring
1929-66. This worked to raise the real rate of return on intangible assets, given the ratio of intangibles to
other,tangibleinputs(andrealoutput),andtherebysupportedthecontinuingrelativeaccumulationofthat
broadclassofassets.Priorto1929,however,thetrendintheefficiencyofintangiblesappearstohavebeen
upwards at a pace and not very different from that of the efficiencyof tangible capital; other things being
equal, this operated to lower the real rate of return on intangible assets.
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Thebiasoftechnologicalandorganizationalchangestowardsintangiblecapital-usinginnovations





66. These “interactions” show the limitations of attempting to parse out the supply side of the long-run
development process into cleanly separable “contributions” that reflect the influence of forces affecting
the supplies of inputs, on the one hand, and the advance of technological knowledge, on the other. That
message will be seen to be more fullyborne out bya closer examination ofthedeterminants ofthesupply
of savings, the subject to which we turn in the following sub-section.
2.4 The Behavior of Private Saving: Binding Constraints or Adaptive Responses?
Risingflows of investment in intangibles and a diminished rate of net capital formation in tangible assets
bearproximateresponsiblityforthedifferentiallyfastergrowthoftherealstockofintangibles.Mainstream
thinking regarding U.S. macroeconomic growth in the second half of the twentieth century has focused
upontheretardedpaceoftangiblecapitalaccumulationasaconsequenceofdecisionsabouttheallocation
of (conventional) income between present and future consumption, and has analyzed the phenomenon of
a declining rate of private domestic investment (conventionally defined) without reference to the rise of
intangibles.Theexplanation has been sought byconsideringsuch developments in theU.S.economythat
could have adversely affected capital formation by constraining the supply of savings. Our view of the-8 3-
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See Endnote 12 to Part Two.
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The argument in the following sub-section draws upon the fuller presentation in David, “A Tale of Two
Traverses” (1998).
matter, however, is rather different. In emphasizing the interconnected influences operating upon the
demands for tangible and intangible capital, our interpretation suggests that it is more illuminating to
examine saving behavior within a broader framework that considers the financing requirements of non-
conventional as well as conventional productive assets.
The post-World War II era has seen the expansion of demand for new productive assets that are
not particularly well suited for financing through the mechanisms that are available in organized capital
markets andprivatefinancial institutions.Thefinancingofinvestment ingeneral forms ofhuman capital,
through education, through private capital markets, is virtually impossible in a society of free men and
women. Such investments carry very significant risks, arising from the asymmetric distribution of
informationabouttheintellectualcapabilitiesandmotivationsofthestudent,aswellasproblemsofmoral
hazard and debt default. It has proved possible to mobilize substantial amounts of private capital for
“student loans” onlythrough a combination of highlyselective screening in the case of leading to finance
professional training, and the government intermediation in the form of guarantees of the principle and
interest. Health investments are even more imperfectlyserved byprivate capital markets, and so must be
paidforoutofcurrentincomeseitherdirectly,orthroughthepurchaseofinsurance.Likewise,intangibility
and the uncertainties that surround the research and development activities, mean that R&D performance
cannot bedebt-financed to anyverylargeextent, and so must competeforexternal equityfinancing, or be
funded internally through the retention of corporate earnings.
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Thefinancingproblems posed bythis seculardevelopment in theU.S. economyhaveexacerbated
therathermoretransienteffectsofgovernmentfiscaloperationsaffectingtheflowoffundsavailablefrom
domestic sources for conventional capital formation. Yet, in our view, there remains no persuasive
evidencethattherateoftangiblecapital formation hasbeenreducedbyanincreasinglybindingconstraint
imposed bythe increased unwillingness of Americans to forego current consumption. This much maybe
concluded from even a cursory review of private savings behavior over the course of the present century,
and secondly, from the absence of any long-term upward trend in the real net rate of return on
investment.
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The Supply of Savings in the Long-run: Is there a Problem?
Arecurringthemeindiscussionsaboutcapitalformationandlong-termeconomicgrowthsinceWorldWar
II has been the worry that structural changes in the U.S. economy may have reduced the private sector’s
propensityto save. Indeed, the view that the savings rate has been the active, quasi-exogenous element to
whose behavior the tangible capital-output ratio and the pace of capital accumulation have passively
responded, antedated the widespread adoption of neoclassical growth theory among macroeconomic
analysts. It had been articulated clearly by Simon Kuznet’s historical survey Capital in the American
Economy (1961). Kuznets regarded the falling rate of net national savings as the consequence of the-8 4-
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See, e.g. Michael J. Boskin, “Macroeconomics, Technology, and Economic Growth: An Introduction to
Some Important Issues,” in The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth,
Ralph Landau and Nathan Rosenberg, Eds., Washington, D.C.:National Academy Press, 1986: pp. 33-56,
for an expression of this argument. It predates the “new growth theory” view that a higher rate of capital
formation could in itself increase the rate of efficiency growth in the economy.
105
See Endnote 13 to Part Two.
combination of tightened constraints on the supply of private savings and growing government deficits.
Bothweredepictedasdevelopmentsthathadrestrainedthepaceofconventionalcapitalaccumulationand
productivity growth, especially after 1929; and such views have continued to be influential in recent
debates over U.S. macroeconomic policy.
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Although the notion of secularly tightening savings-supply constraints formed a background of
concern for the specific worries that began to be voiced with greater urgency during the 1980s in regard
to the effects of federal government fiscal policies upon net national savings, it properly should be
distinguishedfromthelatter.
105Ballooningfederaldeficitsundoubtedlywereamatterforseriousconcern,
but the supposed profligacy of the household sector, which some analysts have read in the downward
secular trend in the personal savings rate that appears in the national income and product accounts, has
been the more enduring theme. Yet, as may be seen from a dispassionate examination of the data, the
“official” personal savings rate is a seriously inadequate indicator of the behavior of the overall rate of




propensityto consume. Upon closer inspection, however, theyreveal two difficulties with that argument,
and immediatelycallintodoubtthesurmisethatthehouseholdsavingsratewas reduced bytheinstitution
ofthesocial securitysystem and kindred publicpolicychanges. In the first place, and most obviously, the
decline that appears from the table’s comparison between these savings rates for the “pre-WWI and
“Interwar” periods, long preceeded the establishment of the Social Security Act of 1935.
Secondly, the apparent decrease in personal savings rates is an artifact of the official national
income accounting conventions, which fail to register the marked changes that were taking place after
WWI in the forms in which households were actually accumulating assets. An increasing proportion of
income was flowing into expenditures on consumer durables – the range of which had been widened
dramatically during the 1920s with the introduction of radios, phonographs and a variety of household
appliances similarlypowered byelectricity, as well as private automobiles. Thus, between the pre-World
WarIandtheInterwarperiods,thepersonalsavingsrateofDPIfellbyalmost2percentagepoints,whereas
the ratio of consumer durables expenditures to DPIhad increased by5 percentage points. This appears to
havebeenaonce-and-for-all shift in household behavior, ratherthan thefirst step in asteadyenlargement
of the share of durables spending in income. A comparison between the period 1898-1916 and the post-
World War II period shows changes of just about the same magnitudes (the personal savings fraction in-8 5-
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See Endnote 14 to Part Two.
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See Endnote 15 to Part Two.
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For productivity studies, it is more satisfactory to move towards the private domestic business concept,
excluding the imputed returns on residential structures and consumer durables from output. Nevertheless,
we include savings in the form of durables expenditures here in order to make the point that there has been
remarkable stability in the private sector’s savings rate across the whole of the present century.
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The entries in Panel A of the table were obtained (in Paul A. David and John L Scadding, “Private savings:
Ultrationality, aggregation and Denison’s Law,” Journal of Political Economy, 82 (March-April), 1974: pp.
225-49, see Table 1) from regression estimates based upon annual data for years when the unemployment
rate for civilian workers was below 6.1 percentage points, within the various periods shown. The




tohavebeenaresponseto thedramaticfall in thesupplyprices ofthenewrangeofdurablegoods,andthe
new and more attractive installment credit arrangements that were introduced during the 1920s.
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Stability in the Comprehensively Measured Gross Private Savings Rate
When this is taken into account by defining gross private savings more comprehensively to include
consumer expenditures on durables, and augmenting GNP by adding the flow of gross rental services on
thestockofconsumerdurables,onearrivesattheGPSRAmeasureshowninthesecondrowofPanelA.
108
Strikingly, the level of this savings rate in the post-World War Iera turns out to be essentiallyidentical to
the 23-24 percent rate that prevailed in the pre-1916 era. Indeed, as may be seen from the first column of
Table2:VI,thetemporalconstancyoftheaverageaugmentedgrossprivatesavingsratehascharacterized
the entire century from 1869 to 1969.
The remarkable nature of that stability during the twentieth century is brought out by probing




seems all the more arresting in view of the shifts that have taken place in its underlying components: the
personal savings rate out of DPI rose slightly from the interwar level (excluding durables), but this was
offset by the fall in disposable personal income as a fraction of GNP. At the same time, the rise in gross
corporate savings rate out of gross corporate earnings net of taxes was sufficient to offset the decline in
the share of after tax gross corporate earnings in GNP.
This story continued, with only minor deviations, during the following two decades: in Part B of
Table 2: V the same set of average ratios for the GPSR and its underlying components are presented for
“fullemployment”yearsbetween1970and1990,soastoenabledirectcomparisonwiththeearlierentries
in Part A. Although during the 1970s the personal savings rate out of DPIshot up to alevel not seen since
thepre-WorldWarIera,andthiscombinedwithaslightriseinthegrossbusinesssavingsrateoutofgross-8 6-
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See, e.g., James M. Poterba, “Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil: Evidence from Britain,
Canada, and the United States,” Ch.2 in National Saving and Economic Performance, B. Douglas Bernheim
and John B. Shoven, Eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press for N.B.E.R., 1991: pp. 49-71.
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One would have to envisage this “household” as shifting its sources of current utility between public and
private consumption, and altering the corporate retentions rate (via its control of corporate policy), as well
as the balance between its holdings of financial and real (tangible) wealth, in response to technologically
driven changes in real rates of return, as well as in government tax policies and other exogenous
developments. Such an “hypothesis” was put forward by David and Scadding (1974) in a tongue-in-cheek
manner. At best this fantasy could be regarded as merely another parable, but, in this case, one that served
primarily to call attention to the absence of a more satisfactory explanation of the data.
aftertaxbusinessincometoboosttheGPSRtemporarilyto16.8percent,bytheendofthe1980s,thelatter
had returned to its long-term trend level of 15.4 percent.
The pattern of opposing movements in the underlying business and personal savings rates has
suggested that American households’ personal savings behavior in the present century may have been
affected by the increased attractions of accumulating wealth indirectly, via ownership of the corporate
sector. Equityholders might thus beseen to havetolerated an increase in the rate of retention of corporate
aftertaxearnings,andacceptedtherelativeexpansionofcapitalconsumptionallowances,inexchangefor
the escape this provided from double taxation of income from property. The contention that households
have no trouble in peering through the "corporate veil", and so take account of the net worth changes in
the enterprises whose equitytheyown,has prompted manyempirical studies and generated a distribution
of findings on both sides of the question. On balance, the hypothesis that personal and business savings
arelinked bysomesuch amechanism has foundempiricalsupportfrommacro-levelanalyses fortheU.S.
in the post World War II era.
110 Still, one cannot accept as a literal description of that mechanism the
theoretical model of a super-rational representative household – one that has maintained an essentially
constantconsumptionrateoutofgrossincomewhileopportunisticallyadjustingitsformsofconsumption
and its asset portfolio.
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The nature of the mechanism that has maintained the long-term stabilityof the U.S. gross private
savings rate remains very much a mystery, but, the obtrusive empirical fact is that it is not possible to
blame the slowed rate of growth of the domestic capital stock on the private sector’s supposedly rising
current consumption propensities. What should be said, instead, is that the U.S. private sector’s gross
savings rate has not been rising to accommodate the secular increase in the share of aggregate output that
is claimed by capital consumption allowances. Nor did it rise to offset the public sector dissaving that
occurred when the federal government deficit mushroomed in the 1980s.
ThestablityoftheGPSR(“Denison’sLaw”)isnot,however,theonlystrikinglong-runconstancy
that appears in the record of U.S. aggregate saving over the course of the twentieth century. Furthermore,
it may be pointed out that the persisting readiness of the private sector to forego current consumption is
greatlyunderstatedbythestatistics wejusthavereviewed.Actually,a23percentrateofgrosssavingshas
been maintained since the first post-Civil War decade. This fact is brought out by first column of Table
2:VI,whichshowsanaugmentedGPSRthattakesintoaccountsavingsintheformofconsumerdurables);
and the figures in the second column of that table press the point even further by presenting a still more-8 7-
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We have chosen to use the same denominator in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2: V-Part B, so that the
magnitude of the relative total resource costs of education can be inferred directly by subtracting column 1
from column 2. If one expresses the comprehensive measure of gross private savings as a ratio of the “fully
augmented GNP” estimates (which form the denominator of the rates shown in column 4 of the same table)
the result is to lower the level slightly, without materially disturbing its long-term stability.
comprehensive measure of the gross private savings. The latter has been formed by adding the total
resourcecostsofinvestments in education togrossprivatesavingsinclusiveofexpendituresonconsumer
durables, and expressing that total as a fraction of GNP augmented by inclusion of the estimated gross
rentalservicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables(thesamedenominatorasusedfortheratesinColumn
1). This shows that a comprehensive savings rate in the near neighborhood of 27-28 percent has been
maintained throughout the period stretching from the 1880s to the early 1960s.
112-8 8-
T a b l e2 :V - P a r tA
U.S. Gross Private Savings Rate (GSPR) and Its Components, 1898-1969
Rates and Ratios “Pre-World War I” “Post-World “Interwar” “Post-World
War I” War II”
1898-1916 1921-40 and 1921-1940 1948-1969
1948-69









.2326 .2260 .2171 .2262
Panel B: Average Rates and Ratios for All Years within Major Periods of the Twentieth Century
Ratios of Components of the 1898-1916 1921-1929 1949-1969
Augmented Personal Savings Rate: “Pre-World War I” “Interwar” “Post-World War II”
(PS +CED) / (GNP + GRD) .121 .117 .126
Personal Savings Rate Components:
PerS / GNP .067 .040 .044
PerS / DPI .080 .049 .063
DPI / GNP .837 .816 .698
Gross Business Savings Rate Components:
GBS / GNP .110 .106 .111
GBS / GBP after tax .663 .711 .807
GBP after tax / GNP .166 .149 .137
Definitions:
PerSA (Augmented Personal Savings) = CED (Consumer Expenditures on Durables) + PerS .
GNPA (Augmented GNP, Durables only) = GRD (Gross Rental Flow on Stock of Durables) + GNP.
GPS (Gross Private Savings) - PerS (Personal Savings) + GBS (Gross Business Savings)
GBS = Undistributed Corporate Profits + Corporate and Non-Corporate Consumption of Fixed Capital
DPI (Disposable Personal Income).
GBP after tax (Gross Business Profits after Taxes) = Business Proprietors’ Income + Rental Incomes of Persons with
Capital Consumption Adjustments + Corporate Profits - Corporate Tax Liability.
Source: Underlying data from P.A. David and J.L. Scadding, “Ultra-Rationality, Aggregation and “Denison’s Law,” Journal
of Political Economy, 82(2, Pt.1), March/April, 1974: Tables 1 & 2 for Panel A; Table 3 for Panel B.-8 9-
T a b l e2 :V - P a r tB
The U.S. Gross Private Savings Rate, from 1970 to 1990
Average Ratios For “Full Employment Years”:
1970-74, 1978-79 1986-90
Gross Private Savings Rate:
(PerS + GBS) / GNP .168 .154
Personal Savings Rate Components:
PerS / GNP .055 .038
PerS / DPI .080 .053
DPI / GNP .689 .718
Gross Business Savings Rate Components:
GBS / GNP .113 .116
GBS / GBP after tax .828 .927
GBP after tax / GNP .136 .125
Notes and Sources: Underlying data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, NIPA, as recapitulated in Economic Report of the President,
(February) 1997, Tables B-24, B-26, B-28. For comparability with the “full employ-
ment” for estimates in Table II.4.4 Panel A, the selected years are those in which the
unemployment rate among white male and female workers was at or below 6.1%.-9 0-
Table 2: VI
U.S. Educational Investment and Capital Formation Rates







































1869-1878 .225 .247 .027 .025
1879-1888 .239 .268 .036 .034
1889-1898 .245 .282 .046 .043




1940 .205 .253 .050 .046
1948 .235 .272 .055 .040
1956 .234 .278 .053 .048
1962 .224 .283 .069 .063
Notes:
aAugmented GNP includes imputed rental flow on stock of durables.
bGNP plus foregone earnings costs of education.
cGNP plus imputed rental flow on stock of durables plus foregone earnings costs of education.
1Period averages for educational investment costs based on terminal Census years, e.g., 1899-1908 uses the value
of numerators in columns 3 and 4 uses average of 1900 and 1910 estimates..
2 Estimated average GPSRA for full employment years (1923-29) in the 1921-1940 interval, from Table 2: V-Part
A.
3 Weighted average of 1920 and 1930: for col. 3, (.021) and (.045); for col. 4. (.020) and (.041).
Sources: Estimates of augmented gross private savings inclusive of consumer durables, and GNP plus rental flow on
consumer durables from underlying data for David and Scadding (1974). Estimates of direct costs and foregone earnings
cost of schooling from M. Abramovitz and P.A. David, Appendix 8-B to “Economic Bases of the Rise in Labor Quality”
(unpublished MS., Stanford University), and underlying worksheets ( June 1974/ November 1997). See text for discussion
of conceptual basis of estimates.-9 1-
113
See Endnote 17 to Part Two.
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See Endnote 18 to Part Two.
ThereisthusaverysubstantialmarginofgrossdomesticcapitalformationtakingplaceintheU.S.
economy, overand above conventional gross privatesavings flows directed to tangiblecapital formation.
This observation inveighs strongly against the notion that the aggregate supply of savings is inadequate
to maintain the former growth rate of the tangible capital stock. Rather, it suggests that there are other,
more attractive investment uses, and that these have continued to absorb the large share of America’s
growing productive capacity that the private sector continues to divert from current consumption.
The Growing Burden of Financing Education and Training Investments
The extension of secondary education of some form throughout the population, and the opening of
colleges’ doors to more than half of high school graduates, rank among the great social and economic
achievementsofAmericansocietyduringthepresentcentury.Butthesehavenotcomecheaply.Theannual
resource costs of this educational effort have grown enormously in absolute volume and in proportion to
the size of the national economy. When one considers not only the direct expenditures by households,
nonprofitorganizationsandgovernment,butalsotheforegoneearningsofstudents,itmustberecognized
that at the beginning of the present century it was still legal in many states for children to enter regular
work at age 11 or 12. Consequently, even at the beginnings of this movement, the earnings foregone by
the families of the youngsters sent to school, already bulked quite large in comparison with their relative
proportions in modern times. It is estimated that even as early as the last two decades of the nineteenth
century (see entries for 1879-98 in Table 2: VI, col. 3) the average total educational resource cost stood
as high as 4.6 percent of GNP adjusted to include the imputed value of the foregone earnings of students.
The beginnings of the rise in high school enrollments in this period entailed an upward step in the
national educational investment rate from the level a bit under 3.0 percent that had prevailed in the
immediatepost-CivilWardecade.ThattheshareofaugmentedGNPbeingdevotedtosendingAmericans
through grade school and elementaryschool alreadywas so big at this time was due primarilyto the large
costs estimated for the foregone earnings component of the total, reflecting the fact that the opportunity
costs of school attendance had yet to be curtailed by compulsory schooling laws and restrictions on the
employment of juveniles, and that in many states where schooling was compulsory this did not extend
throughhighschool.
113Bythe1920s,however,thesituationhadchanged,andtheloweredleveloftherates
estimated for that decade in the central row of Table 2: VI(cols. 3 and 4) are accordinglylower, although
theywould show a further rise over those at the beginning of the centurywere theyto have been made on
t h es a m eb a s i s .
114
Thepointjustnoted,regardingtheeffect ofshiftingsocial regulations affectingschool attendance
and the opportunity for juvenile employment, means that the level of the educational investment rates
shownfor1940onwardsisnotimmediatelycomparablewiththoseforearlierperiodsexceptasmeasuring
educational resource costs within the legal and institutional context that has prevailed more or less
unchanged throughout the second half of the present century. Focusing attention on the estimates for that-9 2-
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See Endnote 19 to Part Two.
116
See Endnote 20 to Part Two.
period (the lower panel of the table), the beginnings of a second and more pronounced rise of the
educationalinvestmentratearevisible.Asthepost-WorldWarII“highereducationboom”gotunderway,
the absolute resource costs soared: in real (constant price) terms the U.S. total resource costs devoted to
formal schooling expanded 10-fold between 1948 and 1962, as increasingcollege attendance contributed
strongly to a 6-fold rise in real resource costs per student.
By the early 1960s, the relative national burden represented by the total resource costs of these
educational investments had been pushed upwards from the neighborhood of 5 percent in the 1950s, to
reach7percentofGNPinclusiveofforegoneearnings.Anupwardshiftofsimilarlysubstantialproportions
isseenwhentotaleducationalresourcecostsincurrentpricesareexpressedasaratioofthecorresponding
current value of GNP fully augmented (that is aggregate productive potential including both the gross
rental services of consumer durables and foregone earnings of students): this measure of relative national





households provides another perspective on the massive scale of the income reallocation which has been
entailedjust in financingthe growth of human capital formation throughformal education.Leavingaside
thedirectcoststhathavebeenpaidforbytaxrevenues,andfinancedbystateandlocalbondissuessecured
by the prospect of future taxes, and netting out scholarships and grants received by college students,
virtually all the private costs of high school education and approximately 80 per cent of the private costs
of college education take the form of foregone earnings. Considering the ratio of the latter to the level of
disposable personal income plus foregone earnings thus provides a lower-bound estimate of the rising
relative claims made upon households’ potential income by private investments in schooling. Starting at
an average of 6 percent in 1889-1908, the share was reduced to 4 percent during the prosperous 1920s,
partly as a result of the markedly reduced birth rate in the early years of the century. By 1962, however,
theminimalsizeoftheproportionaleducationalburdenhadrisento11percent,andby1981itrepresented
20percentofdisposablepersonalincomeplusforegonestudentearnings.Allowingfortheswellingdirect
private costs of college attendance, the full extent of the burden moved into the range upwards of 25
percent during the 1980s.
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Over the course of the present centurythe education investment component has not been the only
component of intangible capital formation that has claimed a growing share of the U.S. gross savings
potential, but has been far and away the dominant claimant. According to recent estimates made by John
Kendrick (1994), by 1990 the share of educational investment in total tangible conventional plus non-
tangibleinvestment, which adds R&Dto theeducationalcomponent,hadreachedtheneighborhoodof35-9 3-
117
See, John W. Kendrick, “Total Capital and Economic Growth,” Atlantic Economic Journal, 22(1), 1996.
118
See Endnote 21 to Part Two.
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See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5),
October, 1990: pp. S71-S102; Charles I. Jones, “The Upcoming Slowdown in U.S. Economic Growth,”
Department of Economics Working Paper, Stanford University, (September) 1997; Charles I. Jones,
Introduction to Economic Growth, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997, esp. Ch. 5.
percent.
117 The corresponding share (as calculated from the estimates in Table 2: II-Part A) had been 22
percent in 1962, and was around 16 percent in 1900-10.
Thus,althoughthetwentiethcenturyhasseenappreciablymorethanadoublingintheproportional
claimsmadeforeducationuponthecomprehensivelymeasuredgrossflowofsavingsintheU.S.economy,
during the past three decades the relative expansion of that share has been particularly rapid. It has far
exceeded the long-term growth of the claims on savings for the other significant intangible investment
form, R&D, although it is the latter that has been claiming more and more theoretical and empirical
attention from economists in recent years. To be sure, R&D expenditures and the estimated real stock of
(cumulated)R&Dhavebeengrowingataspectacularratefromtheirnegligiblepre-1929levels.But,even
so, according to the available estimates for 1990 (in Table 2: II - Parts A,B) the volume of investment in
organized R&D remained merely a tenth of the concurrent educational resource costs, and the ratio
between the R&D stock and fully augmented GDP was only one-twelfth of the corresponding ratio for
education and training capital.
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In large measure the emphasis that the foregoing discussion has given to human capital formation
within the class of intangible investments, follows from the preponderant weight that the latter carries
within the accounting framework of our augmented Solow-model. Yet it should bebornein mind that the
continuedstrengthofthederiveddemandforinvestmentinhumancapitalitselfreflectsconsequencesthat
have flowed from the other, quantitatively minor component of intangible capital formation. The
significanceoftherapidriseofinvestmentinorganizedR&DfollowingWorldWarIIlieslessontheinput
side than on the output side of the growth accounts; it is seen in the persistingly high private and social
rates of return that have come to be expected from the generation of designs for new goods and services,
production methods, and modes of organization.
As we have seen, and as “new growth” theorists lately have been seeking to model,
119 there are
great externalities from the fruits of investments in scientific knowledge, in the engineering of ways to
realize economies of scale and scope, and in the development of new products that enhance consumers'
sense of well-being – even though the full extent of such benefits maynot be fullyrecorded in the official
nationalproductaccounts.Ideasofthosekinds,especiallywhentheyhavebeencodifiedandvalidated,are
likely to generate effects that readily “spill over” among individuals, firms and industries; they can be
repeatedlyusedandre-usedbysuccessivegenerations,andtherebycontributetomaintainingtheeconomy-
wide marginal rates of return on tangible and intangible factors of production alike.-9 4-
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See Endnote 22 to Part Two.
121
This is supported by the analysis of the detailed pattern of increases and decreases in the age-education
composition of the labor force for these decades in Abramovitz and David (“Technological Change and the
Rise of Intangible Investment,”1996: Table 8) and the accompanying discussion.
The Course of Real Rates of Return on Intangible Capital
What has been the effect of the massive formation of educational capital, and the accompanying
acceleratedgrowthofthetotalstockofeducationandtrainingassetsrelativetomanhourlaborinputs,upon
the average real rate of return to these intangible assets? The central and striking fact is that the
differentials in the average earnings rates of college graduates relative to high school graduates have
remainedremarkablystable,despiteanenormousincreaseinthepopulation’seducationalattainments,and
particularlyin the face of the tremendous pace of increases in average educational attainments during the
post-1929 era.
Itwouldindeedberemarkable,hadtherebeennocompressionwhatsoeverineducation-associated
earnings differentials duringtheearlierpart ofthecentury,especiallyatthehighereducational attainment
levels which initially were so thinly populated. This expectation is confirmed by the findings of Claudia
Goldin and LawrenceKatz's recent systematic surveyof the available wage data bearing on this question:
theschoolingpremium formaleclerical and officeworkers did indeed declinebetween1895and1939.
120
Nevertheless, when – during the era that followed – the rise of the educational capital stock would have
been exercising its most powerful depressing effects on the differential rate of return to human capital
formation, that downwards pressure appears to have been offset entirely by the forces that we have
identified as operating on the demand side of the labor market. For white male workers there has been a
remarkable degree of stability during the 1940-80 period in the ratios of lifetime earnings between high
school and elementary school graduates, and between college and high school graduates, save for a still
puzzling collapse in these differentials during the 1950s. Furthermore, in Table 2: VII one may examine
the results of some rather careful calculations that we have made of the private rates of return to




gains from high school and college completion were sufficiently high to mobilize political support in the
electorate for public programs to subsidize schooling at all levels, and to induce families to meet heavy
private costs, including the foregone earnings of their young college-bound youngsters. The second
inference is that the stability of the education-associated earnings differentials in the face of the relative
growth in the shares of the (male) civilian labor force who had completed high school and college during
the decades of the 1940s and 1950s was most likely due to favorable demand-side shifts.
121 In the same
way, the constancy of the educational rates of return in the face of a rapid rise in the ratio of the stock of
education and training capital to real gross product (augmented by educational production) is most
plausiblyexplainedfortheperiodinquestiononthesuppositionthattechnologicalandrelatedinnovations,
and organizational changes were working to raise the demand for the stock of educated workers.-9 5-
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See Abramovitz and David, “Technological Change and the Rise of Intangible Investment,” 1996: Table ;
and Stephen R. Barley, “The Rise of the Technical Labor Force in the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom,” Working Paper from the Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,
Stanford University. November, 1994.
A furtherimportant indicatorofthe human capital-using bias that operated in this era is to be read
inthechangeintheoccupationalcompositionoftheworkforce.
122Usingagroupingbybroadoccupational
classes and the schooling levels of the different occupations observed from the 1950 Census, one may
calculate by how much the average level of schooling of the whole work force would have increased
simply as a result of the shift in occupational composition. This is a crude measure but it alone accounts
for approximately half the actual rise in the average school level of the workforce that occurred between
1900 and 1960. Of course some of the occupational shift, especially that between 1900 and 1929, can be
thought to havebeen induced bythereduced earnings differentials paid forworkers who held high school
diplomas, so on that score rather less than half the observed increase might more properly be attributable
to a demand shift affecting the compression in educational premia, and the gaps between the earnings of
high school and college graduates were widening just in the period when significant increases in college
completion rates were beginning to affect the labor force.-9 6-
Table 2: VII
Rates of Return on U.S. Investment in Education
and on Tangible and Intangible Capital Stocks
Part A :
Private Internal Rates of Return for Different Levels of Schooling: U.S. Urban White Males
(Percent per Annum)
Years of Schooling 1939                                             1959
9-11 10.3 10.2
12: High School Grads 12.9 14.5
13-15 9.4 10
16+: College Grads 14.6 13.4
Part B :
Average Gross Social Rates of Return on Gross Capital Stocks by Major Category:
U.S. Private Domestic Business Economy
(Percent per Annum)
1929 1948 1981
Aggregate Intangible Stock Embodied
in Humans (excluding R&D capital)
4.6 5.5 4.2




Part A: Abramovitz and David, “Rise of Intangible Investment,” 1996: Table 7.
Part B: Gross returns on the Intangible Stock (comprising Education and Training, and Health,
Safety and Mobility) were computed from data in Kendrick (1994), Table 7, for the total
(Tangible and Intangible) Human stock earnings, adjusted by the average ratios of ("L/2L), from
data in Table II.3.1A: - "L/2L = 0.388, 0.431, and 0.431 were the averages for periods centered
approximately on 1929, 1948 and 1981 respectively. Gross rates of return for the “Nonhuman”
aggregate stock are those given by Kendrick (1994), Table 7.-9 7-
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 See the discussion accompanying Figures 1A and 1B in Abramovitz and David, “Technological Change
and the Rise of Intangible Investment,”1996 .
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Spence, Michael A., Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Processes,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974; Weiss, Andrew, “Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations
of Wages,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 1995: pp. 133-54. Spence (1974).
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See Abramovitz and David, “Technological Change and the Rise of Intangible Investment,”1996 for
discussion of the literature on increasing wage inequality in the post-1967 period.
The stability in the earnings premium for education in itself is not conclusive evidence that the
relative marginal social product of schooling was tending to be raised, in the absence of a responsive
increase in the supply of educated workers.
123 If employers view education as a signal that workers have
otherdesirablequalities–suchashighIQ,ambition,energy,acapacityforabsorbingcodifiedinstructions
andatolerationoforganizationaldiscipline–thedemandforschooledworkersmayrisewiththeextension
of education regardless of its contribution to “labor quality” viewed as the possession of cognitive skills.
Putting the point in a somewhat different way, the pure “signaling” value of educational
attainments renders the interpretation of these rates of return calculations problematic, as the work of
Michael Spence has suggested.
124 Yet, it should be borne in mind that the mere existence of a screening
function that educational qualifications serves does not vitiate the grounds for attributing some measure
of social productivityto educational expenditures. Foronething, gettingthe right workers matched to the
rightoccupationsandjobslotswillbeasourceofallocativeefficiencygainsforthewholeoftheeconomy.
Furthermore, although we have no way of knowing how important the screening process has been in
supporting the turns to secondary and post-secondary education, if only the signaling motive for seeking
further education to preserve relative earnings position were at work on the supplyside, the value of high
school and college diplomas should have been much depressed byextending those “indicia” to people of
progressively lower abilities.
TheinterpretationofU.S.labormarketdevelopmentsinthepre-1960eraisalsobroadlyapplicable
to the subsequent American experience: on our view, the upward trend of education-associated earnings
differentials overtheperiod sincethe1960s, and especiallytheexplosion ofthosedifferentialsthat began
in the 1980s, was driven by net shifts in derived labor demands that were shaped primarily by technical
change. That is to say, it represented the latest phase of a long-standing process, involving deep and
powerful forces arising in the biased character of modern technological change, and the changes in the
industrial composition of employment associated with the growth of aggregate and per capita income in
the economyat large. This view of the factor-market impacts of the intangible (human) capital-using bias
of technological innovation during the period 1966-89 is consistent with the implications of a related
argument, namely, that skill-technology complementarity effects – presumptively associated with the
introduction of new, computer-based information technologies – have been working also to widen wage
differentials within age, occupational, and educational attainment groups in the U.S. labor force.
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Thisparticularquestionremainsfarfromconclusivelysettled.Nevertheless,theevidenceassessing
various suggested causes of the growth of wage and earnings inequalities in the U.S. points to the-9 8-
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See Jan Tinbergen, Income Differences: Recent Research, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975; also, on this
theme, Jan Tinbergen, “Substitution of Academically Trained by Other Manpower,” Weltwirtschaftliches-
Archiv, 111(3), 1975: pp. 466-76.
preponderance of the influence coming from demand-side shifts stemming from the introduction of new
technologies and their complementarity with certain skills and capabilities for problem-solving that are
likely to develop with increased educational attainments. The consensus of recent expert opinion is that
during the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the intensification of this biased form of
“technological change” has resulted in greater premia being paid to workers with the appropriate
qualifications within each of a wide range of industrial sectors and broad occupational categories. This
trend,ratherthan declineofunionization and industry-widewagebargaining,ortheincreasedintensityof
international competition, that appears to have been the dominant factor responsible for the widening of
differentials within the upper half of the distribution of earnings among male high school graduates,
although it must be acknowledged that this, in its nature, is something of a residual explanation.
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The evolution of modern wage structures has been characterized by the economist Jan Tinbergen
(1975) as “a race between technological development and access to education.”
127 The insightful nature
of that remark is amply borne out by the long-term experience of the U.S. during the twentieth century.
Thatexperiencemightbedescribedmorespecificallyiflesssuccinctlyasaracebetweenthehuman-capital
using bias of technological and organizational innovation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
accumulation of intangible capital through education and training investments. Major changes in the
economic circumstances and behaviors of American households, and critical public measures affecting
accesstoandfinancingofeducation,wereentailedintheprocessthatkeptthisraceanapproximatelyeven
one for most of the century. But, the untoward resurgence of earnings as the century draws to its close
points to the possibility that the inherited infrastructure of institutions, public programs, and financing
mechanisms, may no longer be adequate to enable the U.S. economy to fully exploit the potential
synergeticinteractionbetweentechnologicaldevelopmentsandtheformationofcomplementaryproductive
assets.
Problems of this kind may be seen to be manifesting themselves in the persisting slowdown of
technological advance that can be realized as multifactor productivity growth, and so form a part of the
complex and puzzlingphenomenon that has marked thefinal quarterof the twentieth century. It therefore
is appropriate that the remainder of this Part should look morecloselyat thephenomenon of the so-called
"productivityslowdown," and the challenge that has posed for U.S. economic policy-makers and all who
seek a deeper understanding of the historical process of long-term growth.-9 9-
130
The measures of both labor productivity and refined TFP based upon “chain-weighted” output indexes for
the non-farm business sector reveal substantially slower growth during 1988-96, compared with the period
1966-88. See U.S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release USDL 98-187 (May 6,
1998). The indicated retardation in chain-weighted indexes of labor productivity also holds for the whole of
the private non-farm economy. See Endnote 24 for comparisons with the period 1950-72, and further
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3. The Puzzling Productivity “Slowdown”
The 23 years from 1966 to 1989 mark an important break in the long trend of acceleration in labor
productivitygrowth.Comparedwiththepreceding“long-swing”interval(1948-66),therecentgrowthrate
wasover60percentslower.Hadgrowthcontinuedatits1948-66rate,theleveloflaborproductivitywould
have been 54 percent higher in 1989 than it actually was. Other things being equal, so would output per
capita, and so would people’s incomes. There have been some new indications that labor productivity
growth has becomesomewhatmorerapidintheyearssince1989thanit was in theespeciallypoordecade
of the eighties, but it still remains far slower than its pace during the growth boom of 1948-66 or, indeed,
duringthelongerperiodfrom1929to1966.Withregardtotherateofincreaseinconventionallymeasured






Economists remain uncertain about the reasons for the persistence of the productivity slowdown.
What follows is a brief account of what can be said on the question with some degree of assurance, and
of other things that may be important but that we cannot either measure or otherwise verify with
confidence.
3.1 What the Growth Accounts Reveal
The roles played by the various proximate sources of growth, insofar as these can be identified and
measured bygrowth accounting methods, are revealed in Table 2: VIII– which has been directlyderived
fromtheaccountsinTables1:IVand1:IVA.Consider,first,theresultsofcomparingthesourcesoflabor
productivity growth in the long-swing intervals, 1948-66 and 1966-89. Of the total decline in the labor
productivitygrowth rate, amounting to 1.88 percentage points, a minor fraction can be attributed directly
to a lower rate of increase in tangible capital inputs per hour of labor. That leaves 87 percent of the drop
attributable to the shrinkage of the crude TFP residual, concerning the process of economic growth.
Nonetheless, the “refining” calculations presented by this table do help to dispel some of the
mystery, however limited a part. One can see that the slowed growth of labor quality was a minor
contributor to the retardation of the labor productivity growth rate, and the contraction in the crude TFP
residual between 1948-66 and 1966-89. Although the contribution of rising educational attainment in the
labor force remained as strong as ever after 1966, shifts in the age- and sex-composition of the working
population were an offsetting force. When the first wave of “baby boomers” began to come of age at the- 100 -
end of the 1960s, the entrance into the American labor market of successive large cohorts of young and
inexperienced workers exerted an adverse impact of average “labor quality.” This negative impact upon
labor productivity growth, however, was concentrated during the 1970s; it operated with diminished
strength in the following decade. Another essentially transient development was the effect of the
acceleration in the rate of entry of women into the workforce: as women’s earnings rates are lower than
men’s, their increased relative numbers adversely affected the (composition) index of labor quality. A
similar drag upon labor productive growth was exerted after the ending of the 1960s investment boom by
theslowedpaceofimprovementinthe“quality”ofinputservicesyieldedbythetangiblecapitalstock.The
upshot is that more than three-fourths of the retardation that occurred in the pace of labor productivity
advance (comparing 1966-89 with 1948-66) is attributable to the collapse of the refined TFP residual.
At least a portion of the latter contraction may be ascribed to the fact that the average age of the
tangiblecapital stock, which had been reduced rapidlyduring the postwarboom, ceased beingdriven still
lower during the 1970s and 1980s. But the “vintage effect” can account for only 8-9 percent of the labor
productivity slowdown between “the golden age” of 1948-66 and the “tarnished age” that ensued. Over
two-thirds of the fall in that growth rate remains to be ascribed to the “age-neutral” refined TFP residual.
From the left-most columns of Table 2: VIII it may be seen that the contrast between the 1966-89
trend period and the preceding “long period” 1929-66 was still more dramatic, and, if anything, deepens
the mystery of the slowdown’s sources. Taking that basis for comparisons, only the reduced growth rate
of labor input “quality” due to composition changes appears as a factor contributing to the retardation of
the trend rate of labor productivity growth. Indeed, more than the entirety of the latter change is
“explained” bythe fall in the conventional (refined) measure of TFP growth, and the vintage effect’s part
in that movement was quite negligible.- 101 -
131
On the problem of productivity surges and relapses, see David and Wright, “Early Twentieth Century
Productivity Dynamics” (1999).
Table 2: VIII



















1. Output per manhour -1.29 100.0 -1.88 100.0
Sources
2. Capital per manhour +0.14 -10.8 -0.24 12.8
3. Crude TFP -1.43 110.8 -1.64 87.2
4. Labor quality -0.09 7.0 -0.12 6.4
5. Capital quality +0.07 -5.4 -0.09 4.8
6. Refined TFP -1.41 109.3 -1.43 76.1
Addenda
7. Vintage effect -0.04 3.1 -0.16 8.5
8. Age-neutral refined
TFP
-1.37 106.2 -1.27 67.5
Source: Tables 1: IV and 1: IVA. We have deleted here the changes in the growth of Labor Quality
(and those in subsequent lines of the table) that might be calculated from the parenthetical figures in
Tables IV and IVA.
It is figures such as the foregoing that have led many commentators to regard the slowdown as
something of an unfathomed riddle. Certainly it must be admitted that this sudden pronounced change in
a magnitude that once was described as “a measure of our ignorance” simplyexposes a new and different
dimension of that ignorance, even though the change has been in the direction of erasing the residual
itself.
131 But, inasmuch as it reflects thenet effect ofall theremainingerrors ofmeasurement affectingthe- 102 -
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residual will not be a good indicator of the true change in the multifactor productivity growth trend – let
alone of changes in the underlying pace of technological progress, that is, of the advance of knowledge
actuallyincorporatedintoproduction.Itisimportantinthisconnectiontostressthattothedegreetowhich
welooktotheexistenceofmeasurementerrorstoaccountfortheslowdown,itmustbewiththepossibility
of a post-1966 increase in the magnitude of a net downward bias that we are concerned.
Taking account of inputs that are excluded from the conventional growth accounts is a
straightforwardwaytoaddressapotentialmeasurementbiasofthatkind.FromTable2:IV-PartA, where
we present the results of the augmented growth accounting exercise, one may compare the contributions
madebyincreasingtangible-andintangible-capital-intensityduring1966-89withthatduringthepreceding
long period, 1929-66. This strongly underscores the indications provided by the conventional growth
accountastowheretheproximateresponsibilitycanbeplacedforthefall in output permanhour:tangible
capital-intensitywasrisingsomewhatmorerapidly,whereasthegrowthrateofintangiblecapital-intensity
fell quite perceptibly (decreasing by almost 0.4 percentage points). The resulting slowdown in overall
capital-intensitygrowth maybe seen (from Part B of Table 2: IV) to account for a bit more than one-fifth
ofthe1.43percentagepointdropintheannualgrowthrateofoutputpermanhourafter1966.Butthefour-
fifths that remains to be ascribed to a slowdown in refined multifactor productivity (MFP) is still a very
substantialphenomenoncallingforexplanation.Theabsolutemagnitudeofthis“MFPslowdown”stands
at 1.13 percentage points, whereas the drop in the conventionally measured (refined) residual found in
Table2:VIIIis1.41percentagepoints.So,byextendingthegrowthaccountingframeworktoconsiderthe
trends in theintangibleinputs, it hasbeen possibleto account foranother0.28 percentagepoints, orabout
20 percent of the observed post-1966 contraction in thegrowth rateoftheconventional index of (refined)
TFP.
What might have caused this 1 percentage point fall in the annual pace of advances in the overall
efficiencyoftheprivatesector’suseofproductiveresources?Morethanonewell-knowneconomicanalyst
has suspected aslowingdown oftherateoftechnological innovation. Forexample, in a recent discussion
of the role of new goods in economic growth, TimothyBresnahan and Robert Gordon
132 rhetoricallyask:
IsitmerelyacoincidencethattheperiodofmostrapidgrowthofproductivityinUShistory
corresponded to the interval between roughly 1920 and 1965 when such fundamental
inventionsasthemotorcar,airtransport,electricmachines,lightandappliances,radioand
TV, chemicals, plastics, and antibiotics were, together with their supplementary and
subsidiary inventions, spreading through the economic fabric?
By implication, then, the slowing of TFP growth is thought to reflect a slowing in the rate at which the
impacts of “fundamental inventions” have spread through the U.S. economy.- 103 -
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For this argument, see Zvi Griliches (“Productivity, R&D and the Data Constraint,” American Economic
Review, 84(1), March, 1994: pp. 1-23.) The distinction between the two groups is significant, but less sharp
than the statement in the text suggests. For more disaggregated labor productivity growth data, using a four-
fold classification of industries by degree of data quality, see Robert J. Gordon, “Monetary Policy in the
Age of Information Technology: Computers and the Solow Paradox,” Paper presented to Bank of Japan
Conference, Monetary Policy in a World of Knowledge-based Growth, Quality Change, and Uncertain
Measurement. (18-19 June), 1998: esp. Table 4. Gordon’s analysis reveals that the post-1973 decline in
Of course, what is meant by “fundamental invention” is a difficult subject, and there is some real
danger of circularity if the definitional approach taken is one that rests upon assessments of the impact
upon productivity growth of various innovations in goods and processes. But even were one to suppose
thattherehadbeenaslowdownintherateofadvanceofknowledgeproper,itwouldbeimportanttoknow
why that suddenly had happened. Did it stem from a decline in efforts devoted to research and
development, or from the misdirection of such efforts? Or was it because, in the existing state of
knowledge,thepotentialforfurtheradvancehadbecomemorelimitedthanhitherto?Orcouldtheproblem
lie in the greater difficulties and associated resource costs entailed in exploiting the more recent
technological breakthrough in ways that would enhance productivity? This gives us quite an extensive
agenda for discussion in the remainder of this section.
But, before proceeding to take up these potential explanations for somewhat closer examination,
itisnecessaryfirsttoconsiderthepossibilitythatthemysteriousslowdownismoreapparentthanreal;that
it stems from errors of measurement on the output growth side of the accounts.
3.2 Is the Slowdown an Artifact of Mis-measurement?
The suggestion has been put forward, with increasing frequency in the past decade, that the “official”
statisticsfrom theNational Incomeand Product Accounts mayseriouslyunderestimatethetruegrowthof
real output and, hence the productivity growth measures; and that the downward bias deriving from this
source has become more severe in recent years. As to the first part of this proposition, the substantial
negativeMFPresidual(-0.31percentagepointsperannum)forthe1966-89interval,whichemergesfrom
the augmented growth accounting calculations in Table 2: IV, does indeed suggest the presence of some
output understatement. Indeed, unless one is prepared to believe that the U.S. has been suffering a form
of sustained “technological retrogression” that would have reduced the overall efficiency of inputs by 6
percent over two decades – it is necessary to suppose that our estimate of the growth rate of (augmented
real gross product) for that period is too low, at least by something on the order of 0.3 percentage points
per annum.
Thisinitselfisnotimplausible,asweshallseeshortly.Butittellsusnothingwhichwouldsupport
the second, and crucial part of the “Mis-measurement” explanation for the productivityslowdown. There
is a different argument, however, which directly addresses the latter phenomena. It rests on the dual
observationsthatthedeclinesoflaborproductivitygrowthwereconcentratedinagroupofservicesectors
in which real output growth is especially “hard-to-measure,” and that those sectors grew substantially in
importance rapidly during the very decades of the observed slowdown.
133 Although those assertions are- 104 -
productivity growth rates was experienced widely, across all the data-quality groups.
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“hedonic” deflators used to establish the real increase in computer output. It is the gains that stem from the
use made of computers which may not be taken into account adequately.
empirically well-founded, the question remains whether the effects of this structural change have been
quantitatively appreciable in relation to the magnitude of the slowdown. It turns out that, taken by
themselves, thoseconsiderations arenot sufficient to establish that this sourceofunder-estimation ofreal
output growth has been a major quantitative contributor to the appearance of a slowdown in the
conventionalmeasures.Alternativeimpactassessmentcalculationsconcurinfindingthatonlyaverysmall




it follows that wereMismeasurement reallyat thecore of the slowdown, this would haveto beso because
theinherentunderestimationbiasesaffectingthestandardmeasuresofrealoutputandproductivitygrowth
at the sectoral level– whatever their source – have secularly become more severe. In other words, the
supposed Mismeasurement bias cannot simply be a matter of the economy’s changing sectoral
composition.
Thereis,however,aratherdifferentlineofargument,whichrecognizesthatandcontendsthatthe
key mismeasurement problem really is one of “over-deflation being exacerbated by an increase in the
relative rate of introduction of new goods and services. This turns on the notion that new goods in
particularcreateproblemsofunmeasuredqualitychange,whichwould,accordingtothislineofreasoning,
have grown more pronounced in the US economy than had been the case formerly.
135 Of course, the era
that stretched from the aftermath of WWI through the post-WWII period witnesses the introduction and





mobile phones, might suggest. In the case of computers some of these have indeed been captured, by the
useofso-called“hedonic”pricedeflators,andsoarereflectedinthenationalproductgrowthaccounts.But
that has been the exception, rather than the statistical rule.
136 Elsewhere, the fragmentary data that are
available do indeed indicate that there has been a marked acceleration since the mid-1970s in the rate at
which new goods are being introduced into theflowofcommodities passingthrough wholesaleand retail
channels. This development may be linked in some degree with the rapid movement towards “mass- 105 -
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See Endnote 27 to Part Two.
customization” as an American business strategy, and with the enabling effects of applying advanced
information technologies in the industrial R&D process itself.
137
Although this is a line of inquiry that is sufficiently promising to merit further empirical
investigation, one also must acknowledge that the precise meaning of “new product” remains difficult to
pin down, especially in the context of inter-temporal and inter-industry comparisons. Moreover, even if
it could be accepted on its face, the supporting evidence adduced to date remains too scantly a basis on
which to claim that the recent productivityslowdown is largelyillusory. Thus there is a presumption that
theincreasedstrengthoftheover-deflationbiasintheeraoftheperceivedslowdownwasnotlargeenough
to justify searching for the latter’s explanation elsewhere, in real developments that were adversely
affecting the efficiency of resource use in the US economy.
3.3 Seeking “Real” Causes: A Line-up of Some of the Suspects
What sort ofdevelopments mustbeconsidered? Themessageofthegrowthaccountsdirects ourattention
to the sorts of changes that might reflect themselves in the rapid shrinkage of the refined TFP residual,
which means possible causes of an alteration in the underlying rate and direction of technological
innovations, and in the speed with which such innovations were being implemented and potential scale
economies were being exploited.
138
Flagging Technological Efforts?




back to the 1965 level and has remained so since. More to the point, these figures include the very large
portion of all expenditures financed bythe federal government. Duringthe1960s, this comprised over 50
percent of the total. And since the great bulk of federal expenditures supported research for improved
products supporting defense, space, and health, in which improvements, however valuable they may be,
donotregisterfully,ifatall,inmeasuredoutput,adeclineinsuchexpendituresdoesnotaffectthegrowth
of productivity as measured. In fact, the decline in the percentage of GDP devoted to research and
development (R&D) was confined to federal expenditures. The fraction supported by industry, the
universities and other nonprofit institutions leveled off but did not fall during the 1970s before resuming- 106 -
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first, because the statistics of private organized R&D cover onlya portion of the total effort. Theyneglect
the work of independent inventors and engineering consulting firms and also the work that takes place in
thosesmallerfirmsthatdonothaveseparatelyorganizedR&Ddepartmentsorlaboratories.Theimportant
work now directed to the invention of improved computer software by firms other than those integrated
companiesthatalsoproducecomputersisanotherneglectedsegment.Perhapsmostimportant,thestatistics
do not include the efforts made by managers, engineers, technicians, accountants, and others to improve
the efficiency of production and of all the ancillary departments of firms while they are engaged in the
ordinary routines of their jobs.
140
If a decline of organized R&D is not a major source of the slowdown, we must ask where causes
ofthecollapsein refined TFP can be found. A failure to incorporate the gains from advancingknowledge
fullyinto production is one such possible source. Insofar as incorporation means embodiment in tangible
capitalandintangiblehumancapabilitiesthrougheducationandtraininginvestments,thisalreadyhasbeen
addressed by assessment of vintage effects and the augmented growth accounts. There are, however,
advances in knowledge that do not require new investments in tangible capital. We must ask first why
management would not take advantage of them. Then we consider the possibility that some previously
important technological efforts that were not formally organized and, therefore, not represented in the
statistics of R&D, might have been diverted, in part, to deal with other pressing concerns. Next, it could
be that technological effort of whatever sort, organized or informal, may have become misdirected, less
well organized, or aimed in less fruitful directions. Finally, the emerging science-based technology may
have reached a state such that even though it holds out great potential payoffs, the adjustments in terms
of the organization of economic activities and social institutions remain more difficult to effect, and
costlier than was the case when, previously, technological progress consisted of continuing to advance
incrementallyalongwell-exploredeconomicpaths.Thislastsuggestionleadsustoentertainthethesisthat
theparadoxicalconjunctionofthecomputerrevolutionandtheproductivityslowdownreflectstheopening
phase of an extended techno-economic regime transition.
Managerial Misdirection of the Innovation Process?
In a much noticed book published in 1989, the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity
141 argued that
managerial practice during the 1970s had become marked by “short time horizons,” so that decision-- 107 -
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makingbecameundulyfocusedoncurrentandnear-termprofits,andonthepricesofcompanyshareswith
whichexecutivecompensationwaslinked.Thiswasthoughttohavedetrimentalconsequencesforthepace
of introduction of major innovations. Many important new products and processes, when first designed,
didnothavetheforms,thereliability,thedurability,thedistributionandservicecapabilities,andtheprice
to attract a large market, and therefore immediatelyto realize large private and social payoffs that would
be reflected in the productivity statistics. The early transistorized computers of the 1950s are perhaps the
classicexample. Moreover, ancillaryinnovations areusuallyneeded to complement thebasicinnovation,
as highly developed software is needed to make computers easy to use, and time-sharing was significant
inreducingthelarge-fixedcostbarrierstothewidespreadadoptionofmainframesforbusinessuse.Years
ofexpensearerequiredtodevelopthecomplementaryinnovationsandtobuildtheintellectualcompetence
and the corporate organization needed to create complex products and to build markets large enough to
reducetheircost,andwithoutthevisionrequiredtosustainthoseinvestments,commensuratelylargegains
might not be forthcoming.
AnumberofreasonswhyAmericanfirmshavedisplayedinadequatestayingpower,oraninability
toappreciatetheprofitpotentialofalong-termoutlook,werereviewedbytheMITCommission’sReport.
The cost of finance, as measured by real interest rates, was high in the United States during the 1980s, a
result of large federal budget deficits, the absence of compensatory increases in household savings rates,
and the consequent need to attract foreign capital. The profit rates – over and above the cost of finance –
demanded by American firms have also been high – usually as measured against a Japanese standard,
because the uncertainties of the long-term future are exaggerated. In a sense, these risks are realistically
gauged as high from the vantage-point of private managers, because American corporate finance and a
widespread public stock market leave firms open to takeover if their rates of current profit stay too low.
But it is possible that not all take-overs enhance productivity, so that private and social perspectives may
diverge in that assessment of risk.
Thesemanagerialchangesmayhavebeenaggravatedbystillotherconditionsthattendedtodivert
the attention of corporate managers from the search for efficiency. According to Edward Denison,
142 the
cumulation of government regulations and the intricacies of a complicated tax code have consumed the
attention of corporate chiefs and their staffs. Their energies have been drawn to meeting these problems,
todefendingtheirfirms from still heavier taxation and more costlyregulation, and to seekingthebenefits
of governmental favor. The bottom-line urgency of these matters has meant that the people who rose in
the corporate hierarchy were more likely to reflect a talent for dealing with governments and the public
than for reducing costs of production. Robert Hayes and William Abernathy, in a widely-noticed and
influential article, emphasized the harmful effects of what has become a standard doctrine of
management.
143Organization is decentralized into “profit centers”whoseefficiencycan bejudged month
bymonth bya small set of financial measures that permit management by“remote control,” but in which
“no one feels he or she can afford a failure or even a momentarydip in the bottom line.” The professional- 108 -
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managerhas cometo beviewed as “an individual having no special expertisein anyparticularindustryor
technology [who] can nevertheless step into an unfamiliar companyand run it successfullythrough strict
application of financial controls, portfolio concepts and a market-driven strategy.”
Alongwith others surveyingtheUS situationinthisperiod,
144theMITCommissionattributedthe
great success of the American economy in the twentieth century to “a system of mass production of
standard products for a large domestic market.” It was “a system of interdependent and mutually
reinforcingelements”: inexpensive and undifferentiated products, long production runs ofthesamebasic
models extended over years with only minor changes, and emphasis on price to the neglect of quality
improvement or design. It was based on a labor policy that sought control of the workplace through the
simplification of jobs, therefore a semi-skilled workforce, and through labor saving based on specialized
machinery, for which long runs of standard products were needed to spread capital cost. This mass
production model, with all its hierarchical organization and its managerial doctrine and outlook, had,
however, persisted into an era in which there is a new market demand for quality and variety and for
frequent change in product design and in which new technologies demand a more skilled workforce and
closer relations between firms and their suppliers, together with an ability to sell, to buy, and to produce
abroad. Whether even R&D-intensive firms, if left to themselves, would be able to adapt rapidly enough
to therequirements of“flexiblemanufacturing”was aquestion about which contemporarycommentators
were far from sanguine.
Manyof the perceived deficiencies in the management of industrial R&D were seen at the time to
be exacerbated, or at least not redressed by what was going on in the laboratories of America’s research
universities. There, in the view of some concerned industry leaders, the influence of a national policy of
federallysubsidizedsupportforbasicresearchhadresultedintheadvancementoffundamentalknowledge
was emphasized to the neglect of industrial applications of science and technology.
145 They deplored the
undue emphasis of engineering schools on the analytics of materials, electricity and electronics, and
biology while underemphasizing the problems of manufacturing. They were distressed by the poor
preparation ofAmerican youth both at secondaryand universitylevels inforeignlanguagesandhistoryas
well as mathematics and science. Theyexpressed concerned with the fact that American industry, judged
bythestandardsofGermanandJapanesefirms,neglectedthecontinuingeducationandtrainingofitsown
workers. The MIT Commission, however, was not primarilyconcerned to argue that after the 1960s what
actuallywereratherlong-standingAmericandeficienciesbecamemuchmorepronounced.Theconnection- 109 -
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between its diagnosis of threats to the international competitiveness of American manufacturing and the
slowdown in U.S. productivity growth is, therefore, problematic. Moreover, it left open the question
whether the technological advance potentially open to the country even in the absence of these
impediments would itself be strong. That is the issue to which we turn next.
Reduced Innovation Potential?
The real values of both total and private-sector expenditures on R&D have risen, not only in absolute
terms, but as a percentage of GDP, while the final residual in the growth accounts, presumably the fruit
of R&D, suffered a severe decline. There is a similar indication from the fact that the number of patents
issued to American firms and inventors has decreased and, indeed, decreased even more severely when
measured against the number of scientists and engineers engaged in research and development.
These are strong signs that the yield of technological effort in terms of new knowledge may have
fallen. Yet some authorities hesitate to accept this inference. Edward Denison
146 argues that it is hard to
believe that the potential advance of knowledge, responding, as it does, to the myriad unanswered
questions posed by earlier advances in basic science and practical technology, should have fallen so
severely and so rapidly as did the growth accounting residual after 1973. Zvi Griliches
147 points out that
econometric studies of the relation between R&D and patents in individual firms and industries yield
inconsistent results. He traced the decline in patents issued to Americans during the 1970s to the fact that
the staff of patent examiners remained limited while the number of patent applications (including those
byforeigners)vaulted.Moreover,thevalueofpatentsishighlyvariablebothwithineachyearandbetween
years. The time when a patent issued in a given year will, in fact, produce profit for the patent holder is
again uncertain and variable. And since most patents are for new products whose value is poorly
represented in measures of output, rather than for cost-reducing processes of production, the relation
between profits and measured productivity may differ widely from patent to patent.
Such considerations make it hard to infer with any assurance that the decline in the aggregate
growth accounts’ final residual in the face of rising expenditure for R&D means that the potential yield
of technological effort per dollar of expenditure had become smaller. If one rejects that inference, the
solution to the mystery of the slowdown would lie with the impediments to technical advance or the
misdirection of effort already reviewed. But we do not know how far the “impediments” can take us. In
the remainder of this section, therefore, we take up the hypothesis that the U.S. has been experiencing a
reductionin therateat which newtechnological possibilities could betranslated into realizedadvancesin
productive efficiency, and we ask why that might have been so.- 110 -
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These ideas, which owe much to the writings of Schumpeter, have received sympathetic discussion from
Christopher Freeman and Carlotta Perez, “The diffusion of technical innovations and changes in techno-
economic paradigm,” Science Policy Research Unit Paper, University of Sussex. January 1986; Christopher
Freeman and Carlotta Perez “Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles and investment behavior,” in
Technical Change and Economic Theory, G. Dosi et al., (Eds.). London: Pinter Publishers, 1989;
Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Third Edition. London:
Pinter Publishers, 1997. See also the account of the role of “macro-inventions,” as distinguished from
incremental technological advances, in Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and
Economic Progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
The Techno-Economic Regime Transition Hypothesis
The notion that the U.S., along with other advanced industrial societies, has been suffering the effects of
a prolonged dry spell in the possibilities of realizing large innovation-based advances in productive
efficiencyisonethatstartsfromtheobservationthatthehistoryofthepasttwohundredyearshasnotbeen
one of smooth and continuous advance in the frontier of technological knowledge. Rather, it has been
punctuated by a sequence of major innovations. These are deemed “major” in the sense that they proved
to be of economy-wide significance, carrying implications for productivity growth in many or all sectors
of the economy; and also, that they proved to be disruptive of existing industrial structures and a source
of sometime profound reorientation of economic activities.
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Noneofthesemajorinnovations, however, revealed its powerat onceor even quickly. Thesteam
locomotiveasfirstbuiltwouldneverhavehadawidespreadimpactontransportationevenifitcouldhave
been duplicated cheaply. Many improvements and ancillary inventions were needed. The boilers of the
early locomotives could not withstand the high pressures needed to haul heavy loads at high speed. The
earlyironrailsweretooweaktobearthestrainofheavy,fast-movingtrains.Airbrakeshadtobeinvented
tocontrolandreducespeedreliablyandquickly.Automaticcouplingdevices,wheninvented,speededthe
assembly and disassembly of long trains and reduced their dangers. Single-track railroads were not safe
orefficientuntilthetelegraphwasinventedandsignalingsystemscouldbedevisedandinstalled.Political
and financial problems had to be overcome – political in that the acquisition of rights of way demanded
governmentalchartering;financialaswellaspoliticalinthatthehugecapitalexpensesofrailwaysstrained
the capacity of financial markets and imposed risks, especially to build the Western roads, greater than
private investors were prepared to take. Thedevelopment of steam power for use in heavymanufacturing
posed similar technical, organizational and institutional challenges during the middle decades of the
nineteenth century; and so did the application of dynamo technology in central electricity-generating
stations, to lay the basis for a new, electric-powered regime of factory production during the first quarter
of the twentieth century.
Bydrawing an explicit analogybetween “the dynamo and the computer,” one of us (David, 1990,
1991) sought to use the U.S. historical experience to give a measure of concreteness to the general
observation that an extended phase of techno-economic regime transition may be required to fully
accommodate the digital computer as a general-purpose engine. This “regime transition hypothesis” has
suggested itself as a possible resolution of the so-called “productivity paradox,” wherein new computer
and information technologies (nowcommonlydesignated as ICT)havebeenrapidlyand visiblydiffusing- 111 -
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See Dale W., Jorgenson, and Kevin Stiroh, "Computers and Growth," Economics of Innovation and New
Technology 3(3-4), 1995 :pp. 295-316.
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See Endnote 29 to Part Two.
151
This point is developed more fully by Daniel E. Sichel, The Computer Revolution: An Economic
Perspective, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. But, for further discussion of Sichel’s
effort to resolve the “productivity paradox” with that quantitative argument, see also Paul A. David and W.
E. Steinmueller, “Understanding the Paradoxes and Payoffs of the Computer Revolution: Information
Technology and the Productivity Slowdown Revisited,” (April 1999), forthcoming as Ch.1 in Information
Technology and Productivity--From Paradoxes to Payoffs,P .A .D a v i da n dW .E .S t e i n m u e l l e r ,E d s . ,
Harwood Academic Publishers, forthcoming in 1999.
through the American economy at the very same time that the growth rate of TFP has fallen to historic
lows. An understanding of the way in which the transmission of power in the form of electricity came to
revolutionize industrial production processes tells us that far more was involved than the simple
substitution of a new form of productive input for an older alternative. In the current regime transition, as




features of the new production systems involved.
Recent estimates of the growth of computer stocks, and the flow of services therefrom, are
consistent with the view that when the “productivityparadox” began to attract attention, theUS economy
could be said to have still been in the early phase of the deployment of ICT. Figures developed by Dale
Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh reveal that in 1979, when computers had not yet evolved so far beyond their
limited role in information processing machinery, computer equipment and the larger category of office,
accounting and computing machinery (OCAM) were providing only 0.56 percent and 1.5 percent,
respectively,ofthetotalflowofrealservicesfromthe(non-residential)producerdurableequipmentstock.
But these measures rose at 4.9 percent in 1985, and had ballooned to 13.8 percent by 1990, and 18.4
percent two years after that.
149 Thus, the extent of “computerization”that had been achieved in thewhole
economybythelate1980swasroughlycomparablewiththedegreetowhichtheAmericanmanufacturing
sector had become electrified at the beginning of the twentieth century. When the historical comparison
is narrowed more appropriately to the diffusion of secondary motors, a proxy for the spread of the unit
drive, the growth rate for 1899-1914 is almost precisely the same as that for the ratio of computer
equipment services to all producers’ durable equipment services in the US.





We may use this historical analogy of the dynamo revolution quite legitimately when suggesting
that it is still too earlytobedisappointed that thecomputerrevolution has not unleashed asustained surge
ofreadilydiscernibleproductivitygrowththroughouttheeconomy. Butthatisnottoignoretheimportant
economic differences between electric current and digitized information. Nor is it the same thing as- 112 -
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The following draws upon the more detailed treatment of the co-evolution of computer hardware and
software technology from the mainframe to the personal computer, in W. Edward Steinmueller, “The U.S.
Software Industry: An Analysis and Interpretive History,” in The International Computer Software Industry,
D.C. Mowery, Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996: pp. 15-52; and also upon the discussion of the
implications of that history for the relationship between computer use and task productivity of the sort that
is most readily measured, in Paul A. David and W. E. Steinmueller, “Understanding the Paradoxes and
Payoffs” (1999).
predicting that the continuing relative growth of computerized equipment must eventually cause a surge
of productivity growth to materialize, and it says nothing whatsoever about the future pace of the digital
computer’s diffusion. Least ofall does it tell us that thedetailed shapeofthediffusion path that lies ahead
will mirror the curve traced out by the electric dynamo over the first half of the twentieth century. One
cannot simply infer the detailed future shape of the diffusion path in the case of the ICT revolution from
the experience of previous analogous episodes, because the verynature of the underlying process renders
thatpathcontingentuponeventsflowingfromprivateactionsandpublicpolicydecisions,aswellasupon
the expectations that are thereby engendered – all of which still lie before us in time.
Analysis of a contemporaryproblem’s historyformation, as well as the examination of analogous
historical experience, provides a wayin which the economic historian can speak to present issues. Rather
than reiterating the litany of complaints and disappointments of the “computer-skeptics,” who have
“resolved the productivity paradox" by dismissing computer technology as largely a snare and delusion
from the viewpoint of business users, portraying “the paradox” as merelythe figment of the over-inflated
expectationscreatedbythetechnology’sdesignersandpurveyors,wecantrytodrawsomefurtherinsights
by briefly examining the course which the evolution of computer technology has followed up to the
present. In particular, it seems useful to consider the way in which the personal computer’s commercial
triumphhasaffectedthelinkagebetweenthisformofcapitalequipmentandmeasuredproductivitychange.
Here there is a case to be made for viewing the path taken in the present as only one among a number of
availablealternatives–apathwhoseselection,viewedinretrospect,wasresponsivetoconsiderationsthat
led away from a tight coupling between new technological artifacts and the task productivity of the
individuals and work groups to whom those tools were offered.
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major implications not only for the success of personal computer technology and the hardware and
software industries based upon it, but also economic functionalityof the business organizations that have
sought to utilize it profitably. For the personal computer, as for its parent the mainframe, and its cousin
theminicomputer,adaptationandspecializationhavebeenrequiredtoapplyageneralpurposeinformation
processing machine to particular purposes or tasks. Such adaptations have proved costly, especiallyso in
the case of the personal computer. There is something of an historical irony that the core elements of the
adaptation problems attending this GPT's diffusion into widespread business application may be seen to
derive from the historical selection of the trajectory of innovation that emphasized the "general purpose"
character of the paradigmatic hardware and software components.- 113 -
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See Endnote 30 to Part Two.
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In the medium and large enterprises of 1990, what remained was a deep chasm between the "mission
critical" application embedded in mainframe computers and the growing proliferation of personal
computers. The primary bridge between these application environments was the widespread use of the IBM
3270, the DEC VT-100 and other standards for "intelligent" data display terminals, the basis for interactive
data display and entry to mainframe and minicomputer systems. From their introduction, personal
computers had software enabling the emulation of these terminals, providing further justification for the
PC’s adoption.
The origins of the personal computer required the invention of the microprocessor which was a
technical solution to the problem of creating a more general purpose integrated circuit to serve a specific
purpose, a more flexible portable calculator – a foundational application that ultimately proved
uneconomical, due to the lower relative costs of more specialized integrated circuits. During the 1970s it
wasrecognizedthatthemicroprocessorprovidedageneralsolutiontotheproblemoftheelectronicsystem
designer confronted by an ever growing array of application demands. During the same period, efforts to
down-scale mainframe computers to allow their use for specialized control and computation applications
supported the birth of the minicomputer industry. These two developments provided the key trajectories
for the birth of the personal computer. As microprocessors became cheaper and more sophisticated and
applicationsfordedicatedinformationprocessingcontinuedtoexpand,avarietyoftask-specificcomputers
came into existence.
One of the largest markets for such task-specific computers created during the 1970s was that for
dedicated word-processing systems, which appeared as an incremental step in office automation, aimed
atthetaskofproducingdocumentsrepetitiveincontentorformatsuchascontracts,purchaseorders,legal
briefs,andinsuranceforms,thatcouldbequicklymodifiedandcustomizedbaseduponstoredformatsand
texts. But, dedicated word processors were rapidly displaced by personal computers during the mid–-
1980s, as the latter were perceived to be more "flexible" and more likely to be "upgrade-able" as new
generations of software were offered by sources other than the computer vendors. Moreover, personal
computers could use many of the same peripherals, such as printers: because the widespread adoption of
the new technology raised the demand for compatible printers, the dedicated word processors found
themselves unprotected by any persisting special advantages in printing technology.
Sequels to the dedicated word processor's displacement were re-enacted during the 1980s in
numerous other market niches where dedicated "task-specific" data processing systems had begun to
emerge.
153 Thus, bythe end of that decade the disappearance of task-based computing in favor of general
purpose personal computers and general purpose (or multi-purpose) packaged software was thus largely
completed.
154 The early evolution of the personal computer can therefore be seen as having effectively
blocked the commercial development of an entire family of technically-feasible information processing
systems that focused on the improvement of "task-productivity" – in applications ranging from word
processing to manufacturing operations control. In many cases, it has also precluded the effective
developmentofcollective"workgroup"processeswhosesynergieswouldsupportmultifactorproductivity
improvement. Insteadof"breakingfree"fromthemainframe,thesegeneralpurposeenginesoftenwound- 114 -
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The availability of 24-hour telephone reservation desks for airlines, or the construction of worldwide
networks for securing hotel, rental automobile, or entertainment reservations, represent welfare
improvements for the customer. But these do not appear in the measured real GDP originating in those
sectors, nor in the real value expenditures on final goods and services.
up"slaved"tothemainframe,usingasmall fractionof their capabilities toemulatetheoperations oftheir





information processing activities of the varieties of business organizations that previously had embraced
mainframe technology. Rather than contributing to the rethinking of organizational routines, the spread
ofpartiallynetworkedpersonalcomputerssupportedthedevelopmentofnewdatabaseanddataentrytasks,
new analytical and reporting tasks, and new demands for "user support" to make the general purpose
technology deliver its potential.
The point of this narrative is not to claim that the process should be regarded as socially sub-
optimal,ormistaken from theprivatebusiness perspective.Aquantitativebasis forsuchjudgements,one
way or the other, does not exist, as yet. It appears that what was easiest in an organizational sense tended
to be the most attractive thing to undertake first. The local activities within the organization that were
identifiedascandidatesforpersonalcomputerapplicationsoftencouldanddidimprovetheflexibilityand
varietyofservicesofferedinternallywithinthecompany,andexternallyto customers that would, through
the intermediation of personnel with appropriate information system access, receive an array of service
qualityimprovements. Arguably, many of these improvements are part of the productivitymeasurement
problem,becausetheyaresimplynotcapturedintherealoutputstatisticseventhoughtheymightenhance
the revenue generating capacity of the firms in which they are deployed.
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3.4 Summing Up: The Persisting Puzzle
The preceding discussion has pointed to the possible persistence of a substantial unrealized potential for
accelerated technological progress in the application of the cluster of techniques that has formed around
the ever-faster digital microprocessor, and, in particular, a direction for technical advance that would
translate more immediately into resurgent productivity improvements. The gap reflects the decline of an
agingregimebasedonmassproduction,electric-poweredmachinery,combustionengines,andchemicals,
still not counter-balanced byan emerging but still immature regime built on the application of computers
andenhancedcommunicationthroughouttheeconomy.Thatsuchagapexistsseemstousaveryplausible
hypothesis, but sadly it is not one that can claim to have been established on quantitative foundations.
Indeed, it would be possible to do that now only through a residual procedure – removing the effects of
all other candidate “causes” and thereby determining how much of the MFP slowdown remained to be
attributed to the explanation at hand. How much a “regime transition gap” has been contributing to the-115-
productivityslowdown experienced in theU.S. sincethelater1970s simplyremains beyond ourabilityto
gauge at this point.
If, therefore, the enigma of the slowdown lies mainlyin our inabilityto fathom the reasons for the
decline in the residual component of the slowdown, the puzzle remains. Summing up this admittedly
rather unsatisfactory state of affairs, we can say with some assurance that the post-1966 collapse of the
MFP residual cannot be attributed in anylargeproportion to errors in measuringthegrowth of real output
within the scope of the conventional National Product Accounts. While there is reason enough to believe
that the available measures lately have understated the real output growth rate, at least by something on
theorderof0.3percentagepointsperannum,theevidencehasyettobeproducedthatwouldestablishthat
this represents a recent and not a long-standing state of affairs.
Neither does it appear that the realityof the productivityslowdown is traceable to a decline in the
volume of resources being devoted to research and development activities, nor to the weakening of what
we have referred to as “technological effort” more broadly conceived. There remain two classes of
possible causes. The first, which the MIT commission and others emphasize, is that the trouble lies with
a varietyof“impediments”that havecaused technological effort to be misdirected or its yield diminished
in a search for near-term returns at the expense of longer-term opportunities, and with a managerial
doctrine and industrial organization that remain devoted to a search for profit by the methods of mass
production of standardized products, with all its implications for educational standards, to the neglect of
a changing market. The second class is the possible gap in technological potential caused by the
senescence of an older technological pathway and the slow maturation of an emerging regime.
These alternatives are probably wide enough to envelop the actual possible causes, and they may
all have been involved in some degree. Major, sustained economic phenomena, such as the slowdown,
almost invariably are found to have been “over-determined,” in the sense of having many concurrent
causes.Butuntilwecandistributeresponsibilitybetweenthetwocontendingclassesof“real”explanations
considered here, and among the elements that compose them, our historical understanding remains less
than complete and so of only limited use as a guide to the future.-116-
155 See OECD, Is There a New Economy?, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
(June 14) 2000, p.1: The question in the title [Is There a New Economy?] is promoted, in particular, by the
remarkable performance of the US economy in recent years….The answer is probably ‘yes – in some respects’.
Some of the features associated with the ‘New Economy’ can actually be observed: stronger non-inflationary growth
linked to a rising influence of ICT. But this picture applies mainly to the United States and does not generalize across
countries [in the OECD].”
4. After the Slowdown, A “New Economy”?
Manyoftheworrisomepuzzlessurroundingtheproductivityslowdownofthelater1970'sand1980'sfaded
from view during the US economy’s recoveryfrom the1991 recession, and theywere all but forgotten by
the late 1990's, when the labor productivity growth rate in the private domestic economy was once again
above the 2 percent per annum mark. The prolonged expansion, and the sharp revival of the pace of
aggregate productivity advances, appeared to signal a discontinuity in macroeconomic performance, and
soon had elicited much talk about the so-called New Economy, its nature, the forces that might have
created it, and its future trajectory. The term “new economy” itself acquired a variety of quite different
connotations: for many commentators, it continues to refer primarily to the altered macroeconomic
configurationthatsawanacceleratingrateofgrowthofrealGDPandasteadilyfallingunemploymentrate
which, unexpectedly, did not giveriseto inflationarypressures on wages and prices. Someconnected this
withevidenceoftherevivaloflaborproductivitygrowththatbecameincreasinglyvisibleintheaggregate
statisticsfortheprivatesector,andemphasizedthatasthekeydevelopmentheraldingapermanentescape
from the US economy’s poor performance record during the preceding two decades.
For others, however, the productivity growth picture beneath the aggregate level was less than
entirelyclear,andthecoreofthe“NewEconomy”waspeculiarlyassociatedwiththegrowthofoutputand
employment in “hi-tech”industries, particularlythose involving information technologies and computer-
mediatedtelecommunications,andwiththeon-goingrestructuringofbusiness organizations andmarkets
that aredriven byadvances in the latter (ICTs). Thehigh and risingstock market valuations ofcompanies
in this sector, and the wave of venture capital that poured into new enterprises launched after 1993 to
exploitthecommercialpossibilitiesoftheexplosivelyexpandingInternet,seemedforstillotherobservers
tobetheveryessenceofwhatwasnewandpositiveinthesedevelopments.Indeed,intheexuberancethat
marked the century’s close, the Nasdaq stock market index came to beidentified with theNew Economy,
whereas the comparatively weak performance of the Dow-Jones index was disparaged as representative
of “the Old Economy.”
This welter of associations only serves to multiply the potential issues that might be addressed in
respondingto such aquestion as “Whither the New Economy?” Not the least among these is thelogically
anterior issue of whether or not, and in what sense (or senses) such a thing usefully can be said to exist.
In June of 2000 the OECD was taking a “wait and see” position on the question of whether or not there
wasanewdynamicofgrowthamongtheworld’sindustrialeconomies,particularlythoseinEurope.There
appeared to be less doubt that if “the New Economy” existed anywhere, it was thriving in the US.
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156 The leading publication of the Silicon Valley trade press offered its anxious readers an assortment of expert
opinion on its question: “Has the death of the dot-coms been greatly exaggerated?” See The Industry Standard,6
November, 2000: pp. 133ff.
157 As noted in Table 2: IX, the most recent BLS TFP growth rates (cited above) are “semi-refined,” whereas the
figures shown as “refined” in Tables 2 and 3 reflect full adjustments for the contribution to output growth
attributable to changes in the composition of capital inputs.
Nevertheless, by the following Fall, Internet business watchers, stock market analysts, and the surviving
“dot-com” principals themselves no longer were so convinced, even on the latter point.
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The question of the sustainability of the high and rising rates of aggregate productivitygrowth in
theUSeconomyraisesanintriguingsetofissues.Wasthisproductivitysurgeaphenomenonthatwillpass
into the annals of history(along with “the dot.com bubble”) as a remarkable but transient concomitant of
thefinalphaseofthemostprotractedUSexpansionofthepost-WWIIera? Thisquestion,andparticularly
itsconnectionswiththerolethatdigitalinformationtechnologiesareplayingintransformingthestructure
of the economy, presents a fitting focal subject on which to conclude the discussion in Part Two.
4.1 Towards Understanding the Productivity Growth Revival of the 1990’s
TherecentUSstatistics oflaborproductivitygrowth andtotalfactorproductivity(TFP)growthpresented
inTable2:IXsufficebothtomakethatquestionmoreconcrete,andtosuggestthebeginningsofananswer.
Accordingto the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ estimates, the average rate increase of real output per person
hour worked in the private business economy during 1995-98 was a full percentage point above the 1.5
percent per annum rate maintained during the first half of the decade (1990-95). Hence, it exceeded the
average productivity growth rate that characterized the decade of the 1980’s by essentially the same, 1
percentage point margin. The corresponding data for TFP growth records almost as big an acceleration in
absolute terms, that is, a jump of 0.8 percentage points. Relative to its previous level (of 0.5 – 0.6
percentage points) during the 1980’s and the 1990-95 intervals (respectively), this measure of the pace of
TFP growth therefore underwent a proportionate recovery in the late 1990’s that was considerably more
pronounced than the revival in the labor productivity growth rate.
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In the private business non-farm sector the acceleration of the corresponding TFP measure (from
the same BLS source) was slightlyless pronounced between 1990-95 and 1995-98: the rate rose from 0.6
to1.3percentperannum.Therehadbeenamoresubstantialpick-upinthepaceofTFPadvance,however,
amounting to a 0.3 percentage point rise between the average rates during 1979-90 and 1950-95. Thus,
reckoning from the experience of the 1980’s as a base, the following decade saw a quickening, two-step
acceleration that cumulated into a 1 percentage point gain in the annual pace of TFP increase, accounting
for nearly all the gain registered by the labor productivity growth rate of the private business non-farm
sector.
The picture just drawn serves to focus attention upon the prospects for future total factor
productivity(ormultifactorproductivity)gains,becausetheseweretheproximateagenciesresponsiblefor-118-
158 The average annual rates reported for TFP during 1948-98 are 1.4 percent in the private business sector, and
1.2 in the private business non-farm sector; the corresponding rates for 1995-98 are 1.4 percent and 1.3 percent. See
U.S. Department of Commerce, News Release USDL 00-27 (September 21), 2000.
159 This point (conveniently) holds in regard to the array of variant TPF growth measures in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
The “golden age” of post-WII growth referred to in the text is dated variously as 1948-73 and 1950-72 in the BLS
periodization, and as 1948-66 in the Abramovitz-David growth trend chronology employed by Appendix Tables 1:
IA and 1: IVA.
returning labor productivitygrowth during 1995-98 to the long-term average pacethat was achieved over
thewholeperiod stretchingfrom 1948 to 1995.
158 Theothersideofthis coin, however,is theduration and
severity of the deceleration in the growth of measured TFP that had marked the decades following the
1960’s. The latter experience is brought out more starklybya slightlydifferent, and more exacting set of
BLSmeasuresfor“refined”TFPgrowthintheprivatebusinessnon-farmeconomy.Thosefigures(inTable
2:IX)reflectamorecompletecorrectionfortheeffectsofcompositionalchangesincapitalinputs,aswell
as in the labor inputs.
The underlying rates also indicate that there was a two-step process of acceleration in the (refined
measure of) TFP growth, with a 0.5 percentage point gain recorded between the pace in 1972-88 and that
in 1988-92, followed bya 0.3 percentage point quickening between 1988-92 and 1992-96. Yet, as can be
seen from Table 2: IX, this revival was not sufficiently strong to erase the effects of the preceding
“slowdown”: the average annual growth rate of measured TFP for the period 1988-96 actuallycontinued
to fall to the negligible 0.11 percentage point level – lower than the average rate recorded for the long
interval of the “productivity slowdown” itself (1972-88).
The foregoing observations permit an initial response to the original question: clearly, these
productivity indicators for the US economy aren’t going to go on accelerating in the way they have done
since the early 1990's. The BLS has yet to release its estimates for TFP growth beyond 1998, and so we
must wait a while to learn whether the acceleration continued throughout the twentieth century’s final
years. Nonetheless, while it is not inconceivable that a further acceleration by as much as 0.5 percentage
points could have been achieved in the private business non-farm economy, it seems most unlikely that
the higher growth rate which would have been established bysuch a change could be sustained as a new,
long-term trend.
One way to arrive at this conclusion is to notice that the result of such a scenario (i.e., continued
acceleration)wouldbetantamounttotheUSeconomystagingacumulativeproductivityrevivalamounting
to 1.3–1.5 percentage points, therebybringing the average annual rate of aggregate (refined) TFP growth
all the way back up to the trend rate that had characterized the immediate post-World War II era, the so-
called “golden age of productivity improvements.”
159 In the latter era, however, many quite special
conditions circumstances prevailed in both the US and the international economy which contributed to
boostingproductivitygrowth;thatintheirverynaturethoseconditionswerenotself-renewing,andsogave-119-
160 See Moses Abramovitz, “Notes on Postwar Productivity Growth: The Play of Potential and
Realization,” Center for Economic Policy Research Publication No. 156, Stanford University, March 1989, and Part
III, section 3 below, for a compact exposition.
161 Former Federal Reserve Board member Alan Blinder (“The Internet and the New Economy,” Brookings
Policy Brief # 60, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, June 2000), for example, noted the temporal
coincidence in referring to the “tantalizing fact – that productivity accelerated at just about the time the Internet burst
on the scene.” But, he cautiously hesitated to infer that there was a causal connection: “Whether or not the Internet
was the cause of the speedup in productivity growth will be a matter for economic historians to sort out some years
from now….For now, however, it appears that the economy can sustain a higher growth rate than most people
thought plausible just a year or two ago. In that limited respect, at least, we appear to be in a ‘New Economy’.”
162 Economic Report of the President, 2001: Ch.3, p. 95; on productivity growth, see Ch.1, pp. 25-33.
163 Paul Krugman’s (“Dynamo and Microchip,” New York Times, February 24, 2000a) enthusiasm about
the reality of a technology driven surge in productivity did not suffice to quell his skepticism (“The Ponzi Paradigm,”
New York Times, March 12, 2000b) about the soundness of the macroeconomic arguments advanced by believers in
the existence of a “new paradigm.” Robert Gordon (“US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?,” American
Economic Review 89 (May), 1999: 123-128; “Interpreting the ‘One Big Wave’ in US Long-Term Productivity
Growth,” in Productivity, Technology, and Economic Growth, Bart van Ark, Simon Kuipers and Gerard Kuper, eds.,
Amsterdam: 2000b) has maintained, on a variety of grounds, that the “information revolution” is not an economic
phenomenon whose consequences will approach the magnitude of the transformations wrought by technological
innovations in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries. See also, e.g., John Cassidy, “The Productivity Mirage: Are
Computers Really that Important?,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2000, for a review of the recent recurrence of
way eventually to a subsequent macroeconomic environment characterized by reduced investment rates,
sluggish productivity advance and recurring inflationary pressures.
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Should weentertain thenotionthattheconsequencesofthetechnologies ofdigital computingand
computer-mediatedcommunications–associatedwiththedawningofthe“AgeoftheInternet”–constitute
the basis for the return of another extraordinary episode, featuring a comparably strong surge of
productivity advance? That, of course, is the view advanced by some advocates of the “New Economy”
hypothesis who see new information processing and telecommunications technologies as having played




“At the heart of the New Economylie the manydramatic technological innovations of the
last several decades. Advances in computing, information storage, and communications
have reduced firms’ costs, created markets for new products and services, expanded





to debunk the whole idea of “the New Economy” as being more “hype” than reality.
163 Rather than-120-
ICT-skepticism. On a rather different level is Gordon’s observation that labor productivity growth failed to recover
in many sectors of the US economy, so that the sharp acceleration of the late 1990’s actually has been quite patchy,
and concentrated heavily in the computer and telecommunications equipment, and software branches within
manufacturing.
164 This has been recognized in the literature at least since Thor Hultgren, “Changes in Labor Costs during
Cycles in Production and Business,” Occasional Paper 74, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1960.; and, since Walter Oi, “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor,” Journal of Political Economy, 70(4), December 1962:
pp.538-55), it has been explained in terms of the changing intensity with which “quasi-fixed” elements of the work
force, as well as other fixed factors of production are utilized.
engaging with the technical details of that debate, the following discussion takes to a somewhat more




ahead, by making the effort to delve first into the causes of the recovery in measured TFP growth that
occurredduringthesecondhalfofthe1990’s.Furthermore,aswillbecomeevident,withoutasatisfactory
account of what happened in theprecedingperiod of the productivityslowdown, it is going to be difficult
to understand the underlying sources of the revival.
Links between new technologies and sources of the late 1990's acceleration in measured TFP
Thereareat least threeproximatesources oftherevival of measured TFP growth that occurred duringthe
later years of the 1990's that we maylink with the effects of technological change, and, more specifically,
withinnovationsininformationprocessingandcomputer-mediatedtelecommunications.Theconnections
to which I wish to draw attention here, however, are rather less direct than those which economists
typicallyemphasizewhentheyinterprettheTFPgrowthrateitselfas measuring“therateoftechnological
innovation.”
Somepart of the apparent speed-up certainlywas due to the strength ofdemand growth, fueled by
thehighgrossprivatedomesticinvestmentrate,andthewealtheffectsuponconsumptionthatderivedfrom
the stock market boom. The move toward more intensive utilization of the employed labor force, and of
the existing stock of plant and equipment, has contributed to increasing measured productivity. In one
sense, this aspect of "the New Economy" isn't really new, because there is a long historical record of
pro-cyclical movements in the growth of TFP as well as of average labor productivity.
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But, how large an effect this can be said to have contributed to the recent surge of productivity
growthremainsamatterofsomecontroversyamongeconomists.ByextrapolatingfromtheU.S.historical
record, Robert Gordon (2000a) arrived at estimates showing the “cyclical component” accounted for
almost two-fifths of the post-1995 acceleration. Forthenon-farm privatebusiness economy, accordingto
Gordon, this component contributed 0.5percentagepointsofthe1.3 percentagepoint riseobserved in the
annual rate of growth of real GDP per hour; and the corresponding share was as much as three-fourths of-121-
165 See Margaret M. McConnell, and Gabriel Perez Quiros, “Output Fluctuations in the United States: What
Has Changed Since the Early 1980’s?,” American Economic Review, 90(5), December 2000: pp. 1464-74, who
attribute the decreased short term volatility of real GDP growth in the US after 1983 to this development in the
durable goods sector. Between the successive peak levels of the inventory-sales ratio in the years 1981-83, and 1991-
92, the proportional decrease amounted to 10 percent, but the downward trend resumed thereafter and brought the
ratio down by another 25 percent, to an unprecedentedly low level of 1.5 by 1998. Interestingly, the 1990’s also
witnessed the first persisting departure of the movements in the inventory-sales ratio for durable goods from the ratio
for non-durable goods. The latter continued to fluctuate around a stationary level (approximately 1.14) throughout
the 1990’s.
the smaller (0.86 percentage point) acceleration experienced in the part of the non-farm private business
sector not engaged in manufacturing durables.
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b), however, take the view that Gordon’s estimate over-states the
“cyclical” correction, and therefore yields too low a residual figure for the “structural component” of the
accelerationintheTFPgrowthrate.Disagreementsofthiskindreflectthedeeperproblemofextrapolating
from statistical relationships that prevailed in the past, when the pace and manner in which technologies
are diffused, and their effects upon the structure of the economy all have been changing. Gauged by
historical standards thestrengthofthepro-cyclicalupswingonthisoccasion, and theduration overwhich
the productivity rises have continued to offset upward pressure on input costs, would appear to be
something new. Moreover, there are some good reasons to believe that the large “cyclical component”
arrived at by Gordon’s calculations itself may reflect the application of digital information technologies
(from computers and databases to broadband telecommunication networks).
For example, these applications contributed to reducing required levels of inventory holdings of
both goods in process and finished products. In the durable goods industries the inventory-sales
ratios-output ratio has exhibited a secular decline since the early 1980’s, but after the early 1990’s its
downward course became particularly pronounced.
165 In addition, "smarter" scheduling of transportation
and production operations, and better coordination ofwork within and amongbusiness firms, reduces the
need to hold “inventories” of partiallyutilized workers and avoids plant and equipment beingidled while
awaiting the delivery of supplies. All of that makes possible the fuller utilization of the capacity of the
"fixed" inputs in production, and it shows up in measured TFP gains.
These sources of accelerated productivity growth, however, are the kind that are unlikely to be
sustainable. In the first place, the aggregate demand may not keep up with the expansion of supply
capacity,andtheresultingaccumulationofunwantedinventoryholdingisthenlikelytoreduceutilization
rates. A further consideration, also suggesting the limited sustainability of rapid productivity gains
achieved in response to demand pressures on capacity, is that the easier changes in the organization of
production and distribution tend to be the first ones to be exploited. As the low-hanging fruit get picked
off first, so the incremental gains become smaller and smaller. Similarly, when experienced workers no
longerwilltakeonmoreovertime,newworkersneedtobefound,hiredandinstructed,andthatmeansthe
employing firms must incur the added fixed labor costs which such activities impose.-122-
166 See, e.g., the chronology developed for this purpose by Moses Abramovitz and Paul A. David,
“American Macroeconomic Growth in the Era of Knowledge-Based Progress: The Long-Run Perspective,” Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series, No. 99-3, Stanford University, August 1999, 180
pp. [Published in part, under the same title, in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States,R .E .G a l l m a n
and S. L. Engerman, eds., Vol. 3, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 1-92.; Dale W.
Jorgenson and Kevin J. Stiroh, “U.S. Economic Growth at the Industry Level,” American Economic Review, 90(2),
May 2000: pp. 161-7, make essentially the same point in connection with their application of growth accounting at
lower levels of aggregation.
167 This caveat may be taken to apply equally to the contributions of Robert J. Gordon, “Does the ‘New
Economy’ Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 2000a: pp.49-
75, Stephen D. Oliner and Daniel E. Sichel, “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990’s: Is Information
Technology the Story?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 2000: pp. 3-32, and the US Department of Labor
2000, to the interpretation of the sources of the post-1995 acceleration in productivity growth.
The difficulty of making detailed time-series adjustments for the influence of such changes on
measured productivity growth encourages cautious practitioners of the growth accountants’ art to view
theirresultsasmostreliableforgaugingthelonger-termtrendrates,particularlythosewhichemergefrom
comparisons between points in the growth record where the economy is found to have been operating at
equivalently high rates of capacity utilization. Applying growth accounting methods for the analysis of
economic performance over comparative short time intervals, therefore, must be regarded as somewhat
more of a “risky business” than casual readers of the results often are left to suppose.
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There is a second "new" element to be noted in the recent US productivity growth story, one that
is not unconnected with the strength and the nature of technological changes accompanying the recent
economic expansion. A much larger share of aggregate production now involves intangible goods, such
as software and other digital information-goods, whose unit costs of production tend to fall rapidly with
growth in the volume of production. This has undoubtedly contributed to reinforce the pro-cyclical
productivity effect. In this sense one may say that the information technology revolution has been
contributing towards maintaining the importance of the sector of the US economyin which production is
characterized by conventional, old-fashioned economies of scale. Of course, the downside is that this
source of productivity growth is likely to be jeopardized by a weakening of demand and declining sales
volumes in the new information-goods sector industries.
Summinguptheforegoingdiscussion,onemayremarkthattryingtoquantifythevarious“sources
ofgrowth”on thesupplyside, inthewaythatconventionalgrowth accountingencourages us to do, is less




demand side and supplyside changes, and the interactions among various supplyside phenomena. Under
rather exacting assumptions, each of the latter factors could be quantified as neatly as they may be
distinguishedforpurelyconceptualpurposes.But,inpractice,theconditionsrequiredtoseparatethemfor
purposes of measurement are more typically not fulfilled. Thus, it has been noted that the effects of
technological innovation can alter thequantitativeimportanceat theaggregatelevel of productivitygains-123-
168 See above, Part 2, sect.3, for a more detailed treatment of the issues summarized here.
169 It is important to make it clear that this problem is quite distinct from the main source of upward bias in
the official “inflation rate” for the US, to which public attention was drawn by the 1997 report of the so-called
“Boskin Commission,” which criticized the BLS methodology formerly used in constructing the US Consumer Price
Index (see Jeff Madrick, “The Cost of Living: A New Myth,” The New York Review, March 6, 1997). Of the
approximate 1 percentage point per annum “overstatement” in the CPI’s average growth, about 0.7 percentage points
were ascribed to the effect of employing fixed quantity weights, i.e., calculating the (Laspeyres) price index for an
invariant “basket of goods.” The GDP deflator, by contrast, is defined as a (Paasche) variable weight price index, to
which this critique did not apply.
170 See, e.g., Brent R. Moulton, “GDP and the Digital Economy: Keeping up with the Changes,” in
Understanding the Digital Economy, E. Brynolfsson and B. Kahin, eds., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000: pp. 34-
48. This correction for quality improvements, however, being confined to one branch of manufacturing (and
extended subsequently to cover digital telecommunications equipment and software, creates statistical distortions in
the “real” (constant price) measures of the structure of the economy, and also has made the interpretation of
comparative international indicator of output growth and productivity much more problematic than it had been
formerly. For an excellent treatment of this little-recognized issue, see Andrew W. Wykoff, “The Impact of
that are derived from economies of scale; whereas the latter, in turn may alter the sensitivity of
macroeconomic performance to changes in demand conditions.
We should turn now to examine a third, and rather different development that underlay the
acceleration recentlyobserved in measured productivity, onethat is more likelyto persist, ifonlybecause
it brought the cessation of increasingly serious measurement errors that had been contributing to the
apparent“slowdown”oftheproductivitygrowthrateduringthe1970'sand1980's.Itwillbeseenthatthis,
too, has a connection with developments in the sphere of information technologies and their manner of
application. But on this point the argument is somewhat more intricate than it was in the first two cases,
and to present it properly requires that we first provide a little background on the vexed subject of
productivity measurement errors.
As has been seen, ever since the emergence of the “computer productivity paradox,” or “the
productivity slowdown puzzle” as it should properly be called, economists recurrently considered the
possibility that the shrinkage of the TFP residual was in whole or part an artifact of biases in the indices
of aggregate real product growth.
168 Among the more popular suspects in this regard is the problem of
obtainingunitpricesfortheproductsofserviceindustries,andtheconsequentdifficultyofmeasuringreal
product movements in a part of the US private business economy whose share in the current value of
production has been expanding. Suspicion also has fallen on the likely failure of the price series used as
deflators for the current value of production in a large number of commodity producing industries and
services to take sufficient account of the improvements in product quality. As a result, the rate of price
increases would tend to be overstated, leading to a downward bias in the measured growth of real output
andproductivity.
169Themagnitudeofthedifferenceinmeasuredrealoutputgrowththatresultedwhenthe
Bureau of Economic Analysis (in the US Commerce Department) introduced quality adjusted (so-called
“hedonic”) price deflators for just one industrial branch – the manufacture of computer equipment, has
served to underscore this more general worry.
170-124-
Computer Prices on International Comparisons of Labor Productivity,” Economics of Innovation and New
Technology, 3(3-4), 1995: pp. 277-294.
171 See above, Part Two, Section 3, and also David 2000, sect. 2.2, for details of alternative calculations
leading to this conclusion.
172 A different and deeper set of unresolved measurement issues, nonetheless, deserves to be noticed. As
W.E. Diewert and K. J. Fox, “Can Measurement Error Explain the Productivity Paradox?,” Canadian Journal of
Economics, 32(2), 1999: pp. 251-80, have pointed out, these particularly affect the expanding provision of
customized information services – whether in free-standing form, or in bundled with tangible commodities. The core
problems involve those of measuring the incremental utility that consumers derive from applications of information
technologies that lower the costs of reducing risk, whether by increasing the availablity of information to decision-
agents, or by reducing marginal costs of providing highly specialized forms of insurance.
ThefirstofthesetwosuspicionsofseriousmeasurementbiaswasemphasizedbyGriliches(1994),
who drew attention to the existence of a substantial gap between average labor productivity growth rates
in the better-measured, commodity-producing sector on the one hand, and a collection of “hard-to-
measure” service industries, on the other. He suggested that the expanding share represented bythe FIRE
bloc(Construction,Trade,Finance,Insurance,andRealEstate),andmiscellaneousotherserviceindustries,
would have exerted an increasing drag on the economy’s aggregatelaborproductivitygrowth rate. To the
extent that the differentially slower productivity growth in services was the consequence of understating
the growth of services output, the magnitude of the overall downward bias would have increased during
the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Now, it is not immediately apparent how those specific sources of measurement bias might bear
upon our understanding of the subsequent revival of productivity growth. Taking them in reverse order,
the hypothesized impact of the economy’s structural drift towards “un-measurability” turns out to be
quantitatively weak; at most it could have been responsible for only a tenth of the 1.3 percentage point
slowdown in the average annual rate of measured aggregate productivity growth after the 1960’s.
171
Consequently,eveniftherelativeexpansionof“poorlymeasured”serviceindustrieshadhaltedcompletely




that quality improvements have been going largely unrecorded in the official figures for real product
growth until lately. In other words, it was not so easy to come up with persuasive reasons for supposing
that the downward bias on this account had become more pronounced after the 1960’s, and so was
responsiblefortheappearanceofslowerproductivitygrowth.Indeed,accordingtoBresnahanandGordon
(1996), the rate of unmeasured quality improvements in durable goods was high during the early post-
WWIIdecades,andtherewerenoapriorigroundsforbelievingthatthedimensionsoftheoverallproblem
became more serious during the 1970’s and 1980’s – especially not in view of the introduction by the
BureauofEconomicAnalysisofGDPdeflatorsthatreflected“qualityadjustedpriceindices”forcomputer-125-
173 See above, Part Two, section 3.1, on new durable goods; R. Cole, Y. C. Chen, J. A. Barquin-Stolleman
et al., “Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes for Computer Processors and Peripheral Equipment,” Survey of Current
Business, 66(1), 1986: pp. 41-50. on the introduction of quality corrections using the “hedonic” price index
methodology; Brent R. Moulton, “GDP and the Digital Economy: Keeping up with the Changes,” in Understanding
the Digital Economy, E. Brynolfsson and B. Kahin, eds., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000: pp. 34-48, for
subsequent extensions of this initiative by the BEA.
174 See Paul A. David, "Understanding Digital Technology’s Evolution and the Path of Measured
Productivity Growth: Present and Future in the Mirror of the Past," in Understanding the Digital Economy,E .
Brynolfsson and B. Kahin, eds., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000: pp. 61-5, for further discussion and references on
mass customization, and on the data supporting the particular hypothesis about measurement bias that is advanced
here.
and peripheral equipment (and, more recentlyfor telephone switching equipment, semiconductors and so
types of software).
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A point that had emerged more clearly by the mid-1990's and that deserves recognition here,
however,directlyconteststhelatterview.It indicates theexistenceofanalyticalandempiricalreasonsfor
us to entertain the view that the relative magnitude of the underestimation of quality improvements, and
the consequent understatement of the real output growth rate, have not remained constant. Even though
the argument is somewhat novel, the two-fold claim advanced in the following paragraphs can be
summarized simply: firstly, the downward measurement bias in the US real output growth rate grew
significantly after the early 1970’s, but by the early 1990’s its magnitude had stabilized; secondly, this
temporal pattern arising from the underestimation of productivity quality improvements, was related
causally to the course of the ICT revolution.
From the middle of the 1970’s through to the early 1990’s new information technologies
increasinglywere being applied in ways that enabled firms to cut the costs of introducing new goods and
services, thereby encouraging firms to shorten their average product life-cycles, and to experiment with
"mass customization."
174 The proportion of sales revenues that were generated by newly introduced
products was therefore increasing. As economists have long been aware, the official government price
series tend to miss a good portion of the rapid fall that typically occurs in the relative prices of new
products when they still are very young. Because those price series are used to deflate the total sales
revenues of the industries introducing these novel goods, the resulting estimates of growth in the
industries’ real output, and in their productivity, tends to be understated.
Although this was not a "new" problem in the qualitative sense, it became a quantitatively more
serioussourceofbias,preciselybecausetherelativeimportanceofnewgoodsandserviceswasincreasing.
During the rapid transition to mass customization that was underway in the U.S. during the 1980's, the
average age of product lines was falling and the downward measurement bias in the output growth rate
therefore became more and more pronounced. These developments reflected in good measure the
applicationofnewinformationtechnologies,andrelatedorganizationalreconfigurationsinR&D-intensive
businesses. By enabling the integration of market research, new product design, production engineering,
and marketing, ICT use contributed to reducing the fixed costs of new product innovation, and shortened
the innovation cycle.-126-
175 See Paul A. David, "Understanding Digital Technology’s Evolution and the Path of Measured
Productivity Growth: Present and Future in the Mirror of the Past," in Understanding the Digital Economy,E .
Brynolfsson and B. Kahin, eds., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000: pp. 62-3, for discussion of underlying
preliminary estimates of the movement in the share of newly introduced products in the total product flow through
US retail distribution channels: this fraction was stable over the 1964-75 interval, rose dramatically between 1975
and 1992, and appears to have substantially stabilized thereafter. A supporting memorandum is available on request
from Paul David, setting out the assumptions and preliminary calculations used to derive the implications of those
movements for the temporary expansion during 1975-1992 in the magnitude of the understatement of the rate of
growth in real GPDP.
Thephaseintheevolutionofdigital technologythat characterized the1980’sastheeraof“thePC
revolution”maynothavedonemuchtopromotereadilymeasurablegainsintaskproductivity,forreasons
that alreadyhavebeen set out (abovein Part Two, section 3.3). Yet, what is ofmomenthereisthat it quite
evidently had unshackled innovative product design and marketing groups within many large
organizations, in part by freeing them from dependence upon (and, hence, from the tighter constraints
imposed by) hierarchically structured, mainframe-based information systems that served the control
functions of central management.
Therefore, mass customization, alongwith all that it entailed in thewayofmodern manufacturing
and inventory control, justly can be regarded among the palpable consequences of the ICT revolution of
the 1980’s. Yet, this was not appreciated at the time by economic analysts who tended to regard the
proliferation of PCs on office desks as little more than the miniaturization of mainframe computing; a
development which theysawasfailingtodeliverthesortofmeasurabletask productivitypayoffs that had
been realized in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, when mainframe systems released labor bytaking over many
back-room “number crunching” functions in banking and financial transactions, payroll and record
processing, and the like.
But, the movement towards mass customization which ICT advances had facilitated, in addition
to being directed towards other, more creative activities in which the notion of task productivity was a
moreelusiveconceptanditsmeasurementfacedsignificantobstacles, turned out tohaveaperverseeffect
upon themeasured productivitygrowth rate of the economy. This was theresult ofits interaction with the
prevailing, official routines for tracking the prices of new products. Putting the matter most simply, the
mass customization movement in this phase of the computer revolution, paradoxically, widened the gap
between the actual and the measured productivity growth rate even further than had been the case
historically.Howbigwasthisaddeddownwardbias? Thepreliminaryestimatesthat Ihavemadeindicate
that during the 1977-92 interval the increase in the magnitude of the underestimation bias mayhave been
very substantial, indeed: perhaps big enough to push the measured annual growth rate in the private
non-farm business economydownwards by0.3-0.5 percentage points, in comparison to what would have
been recorded had the effect of the bias in the price deflators remained unchanged.
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Yet, this ballooning of the gap between the actual and the measured growth rate of productivity
does not seem to have continued after the early 1990’s, certainly not at anything approaching its former
pace.Undertheconditionsenvisagedforthecalculationsthatwerejustcited,themagnitudeoftheupward
bias of the official price deflators was being enlarged simply due to enlarged share that sales of newly-127-
176 To make this rough calculation on the basis of the BLS estimates in Table 2: IX, one can start simply by
adding 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points to the 1.4 percent per annum figure shown for 1996-8, obtaining a “corrected”
range of 1.7-1.9 percent per annum for the latter period. But the Table 2: IX estimates are “semi-refined”, whereas
the 1.98 percent per annum average rate shown for 1950-72 by Table 2: IX, is the BLS’s “refined” estimate. Two
further “adjustments” are thus in order. In place of the BLS figure for 1996-8, we may start from the fully refined
TFP growth rate of 1.2 percent per annum that Stephen D. Oliner and Daniel E. Sichel (“The Resurgence of Growth
in the Late 1990’s: Is Information Technology the Story?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 2000: Table 4)
provide for 1996-9. That yields an “corrected range” of 1.5 –1.7 percent per annum for this recent period. Secondly,
in place of the rather high BLS estimate in Table 2 for the period 1950-72, we may substitute the more “refined”
TFP growth rate estimate of 1.7-1.8 for these years. The latter accords with the underlying (input composition
adjusted) estimates used by Robert J. Gordon, “Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure up to the Great Inventions of the
Past?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 2000a: pp .49-75.
introducedgoodsrepresentedinthetotalvalueofcommoditiesgoods(otherthancomputersandperipheral
equipment). For that to have continued, the pace of new product innovation would have had to go on
accelerating sufficiently to continue the upward trend in the average rate at which product lines turned
over. But, bythe early1990’s the force of the wave of “mass customization” appears to havebeen largely
spent: the average age of product lines no longer was dropping as quickly as had been the norm in the
1980’s, and the proliferation of variety within product lines began exerting stronger downward pressure
on the mark-ups initially commanded by newly “customized” products.
Consequently, this source of downward bias in the measured productivity growth rate was once
again stabilized – albeit at a substantially higher level (namely, by the added 0.3-0.5 percentage points)
than that which characterized the era preceding the “slowdown” of 1974-90. Had the drag exerted on the
measured growth rate continued to increase through the 1990’s, it would have masked some part of the
revival in the rate of growth of measured TFP that has been observable in the years since 1992. At this
point, perhaps, it should be emphasized that the burden of the preceding argument is that the magnitude
of the slowdown in measured TFP growth from the rates maintained during the “golden age” (variously
dated 1948-69, or 1950-72) was exaggerated by the worsening bias in the price deflators. Yet, the recent
acceleration of measured TFP growth – compared to thepaceofthelatterduring the late 1980’s and early
1990’s – cannot be attributed to a reduced degree of underestimation of the true rate of growth of output.
The first implication to be drawn from this is that the rebound of the measured TFP growth rate is
rightlyviewed as a real phenomenon, calling for an explanation as such. But, a second implication is that
if one wants to make historical comparisons with the “golden age” of productivity growth, it would be
necessary to adjust for the enlargement in the gap between the “true” and the measured rates of output
growth that had contributed to the apparent productivity slowdown. One may then notice that adding an
upward adjustment of as much as 0.3-0.5 percentage points to the growth rates presently found (in Table




As has been previously remarked, some substantial component of this “historically comparable”
adjustedTFPgrowthrateof1.5to1.7percentperannumintheyears1996-99, is cyclicallyinflatedabove
thesustainabletrend.But,becausethesourceoftheupwardadjustmentisonethatcanbereadasreflecting-128-
177 The proportionate contribution attributable to the “other non-farm business” sector after making these
corrections also is raised somewhat: it lies in the range from 47 to 52 percent, whereas the fraction (0.5/1.2)
suggested by the figures from Oliner and Sichel (2000: Table 4), implies a contribution of 42 percent.
178 See Stiroh (1998); Jorgenson (2000); Robert H. McGuckin, Kevin J. Stiroh and Bart van Art,
“Perspectives on a Global Economy: Technology, Productivity and Growth – U.S. and German Issues,” The
Conference Board Europe Report Number 206-97-RR, (Winter), 1997, esp. pp. 3-16 (“Computers, Productivity and
Economic Growth in the U.S.”).
multifactor productivity growth in sectors of the economy other than the vertically integrated computer
sector,thiscorrectioncarriesthefurtherimplicationthatthedirectimpactofproductqualityimprovements
in the latter sector now appears less crucial a source of the elevated rate of TFP growth. According to the
estimatesmadebyStephenOlinerandDanielSichel(2000),multifactorproductivitygrowthin“othernon-
farm business” contributed 0.5 percentage points to the total growth rate attained during 1996-99. The
adjustments for the under-estimated quality improvements (apart from semiconductors, computer and
peripheral equipment) would thus push the other non-farm business sector’s contribution up toward the
0.7 to 0.9 percentage point level.
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This goes some way towards removing the puzzling concentration of multifactor productivity
growthinthe“computer-producing” industries,anditscorrespondingabsencefromthe“computer-using”
sectors,whichhasbeenremarkeduponbyanumberofrecentstudies.KevinStiroh(1997,1998),andDale
Jorgenson (2000) have taken the view that the low rates of multifactor productivity growth outside the
computer-producing sector are no “puzzle,” but an entirely understandable consequence of the rapid fall
in the relative (qualityadjusted) price of computer capital services, which has induced substitution of the
latter for the services of labor inputs.
178 It is through that channel that they, along with Oliner and Sichel
(2000), now seethe information revolution as contributing indirectlyto raising the growth rates of output
and labor productivity in the economy at large; whereas it is the direct effects of multifactor productivity
advancesconcentratedintheindustriesproducingsemiconductorsand“computerinvestment-goods”that
have been responsible for the spectacular fall of the price-performance ratios in those products.
Byre-balancing that rather lop-sided picture in the wayIhave suggested here, one begins to form
aviewofthedigitaltechnologyrevolutionasasourceofefficiencyimprovementsthatgraduallyhavebeen
increasing in magnitude and permeating the economy. Such a view conforms more closely with our
expectationsofthewayinwhichfundamentaltechnologicalbreakthroughseventuallyprecipitatecascades
of technical and organizational innovation, which, in turn, are reflected in surge-like movements of the
economy’s total factor productivity growth rate. Whether or not the recent acceleration is to be seen as a
harbingerofdevelopmentsofthiskindremainsamatterofspeculation.Thestudyofhistoricalexperience,
however, can afford us considerable guidance in understanding the mechanisms, and the conditions that
may promote such far-reaching transformations of the economic regime.-129-
179 This is the other, more optimistic side of the “regime transition” hypothesis that is presented above, in
Part Two, section 3.3.
180 See the prescient comments by Herbert A. Simon, “The Steam Engine and the Computer: What Makes
Technology Revolutionary?”, EDUCOM Bulletin, vol. 22, pp. 2-5, whose use of the term “general purpose engine”
inspired the generalizations in Paul A. David, “General Purpose Engines, Investment, and Productivity Growth:
From the Dynamo Revolution to the Computer Revolution,” in Technology and Investment - Crucial Issues for the
90’s, E. Deiaco, E. Hörner and G. Vickery, (eds.), London: Pinter Publishers, 1991b, upon which Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg 1995, Helpman 1998, and others subsequently have built.
181 See, particularly, Elhanan Helpman and Manuel Trajtenberg, “A Time to Sow and a Time to Reap:
GPT’s and the Dynamics of Economic Growth,” Ch. 3 in General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth,E .
Helpman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, and Aghion and Howitt, “On the Macroeconomic Effects of
Major Technological Change, Ch.5 in Elhanan Helpman (ed.), General Purpose Technologies and Economic
Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
4.2 General Purpose Technologies and Productivity Surges: A Backward Glance
Putting aside the vexed issues of measurement, and the disentangling of transitory from the sustained
components in measured productivity growth rates that have occupied the preceding discussion, we now
can give closer consideration to the longer-term processes linking technological innovation, capital
formation, structural changeand sustained productivitygrowth. Consequently, it seems quite appropriate
to draw upon some of the interpretive insights that an historical perspective can bring to this subject; and




General purpose engines are the paradigmatic form of what economists today have labelled
“general purpose technologies”.
180 These typicallyare key functional components embodied in hardware
whichcanbeappliedaselementsormodularunitsoftheengineeringdesignsdevelopedforawidevariety
ofspecificinterrelatedoperationsorprocesses.Accordingly,ageneral purposeenginewill befound to be
ubiquitously distributed throughout such a system, and to be embedded in numerous and diverse
complementary technical and organizational relationships when the techno-economic regime to which it
gives rise has attained its fully elaborated, mature state. The notion of a general purpose engine, used in
that sense, constitutes the primitive of the more extended concept of a GPT, or “general purpose
technology”–aconceptualizationthathasbeengainingpopularityrecentlyintheliteratureofendogenous
economic growth models.
181 According to the formulation proposed originally by Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995: p. 84):
“Most GPTs playthe role of ‘enabling technologies,’ openingup newopportunities rather
thanofferingcomplete,finalsolutions.Forexample,theproductivitygainsassociatedwith
the introduction of electric motors in manufacturing were not limited to a reduction in
energycosts.Thenewenergysourcesfosteredthemoreefficientdesignoffactories,taking-130-
182 Richard G. Lipsey, Cliff Bekar, and Kenneth Carlaw, “What Requires Explanation?, Ch. 2 in Elhanan
Helpman (ed.), General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. pp. 38-43,
identify an extensive list of historical and contemporary GPTs, from power delivery systems (waterwheel, steam,
electricity, internal combustion) and transport innovations (railways and motor vehicles) to lasers and the Internet.
The concept has been extended to encompass “organizational techniques” (the factory system, mass production,
flexible manufacturing, and even the unit system for continuous process production). David and Wright (1999b), on
the other hand, argue against indefinitely lengthening the list, and recommend seeking in each historical context to
understand the hierarchical structure of the technological elements that were formed into systems around a core GPT.
183 See Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2000).
advantage of the newfound flexibility of electric power. Similarly, the users of micro-
electronics benefit from the surging power of silicon by wrapping around the integrated
circuits their own technical advances. This phenomenon involves what we call
‘innovational complementarities’ (IC), that is, the productivity of R&D in a downstream
sector increases as a consequence of innovation in the GPT technology. These
complementarities magnifythe effects of innovation in the GPT, and help propagate them
throughout the economy.”
Economists working in the spirit of the new growth theory have sought to generalize these ideas,
byidentifyingarangeofGPTsthatnotonlyfindapplicationsindiversesectorsoftheeconomy,butwhich
actascatalysts,inducingcomplementaryinnovationsin thoseothersectors. Theinterest ingeneralization
has in turn stimulated efforts to extend the list of historical examples, as well as to consolidate our
understanding of the defining features of GPTs.
182 According to the carefullydeveloped criteria proposed
by Lipsey, Bekar, and Carlaw (1998), GPTs share the following characteristics: (1) wide scope for
improvementandelaboration;(2)applicabilityacrossabroadrangeofuses;(3)potentialforuseinawide
variety of products and processes; (4) strong complementarities with existing or potential new
technologies.
James Watt's (separate condenser) steam engine design springs to mind readily as an example of
an innovation that meets these criteria, and, indeed, it is widely accepted as the GPT that is emblematic
of the first industrial revolution. One might notice that while this seminal invention dates from the early
1780’s, the elaboration of steam power technologyextended over the next three quarters of a century: the
automatic variable cut-off device, invented bythe American, George Corliss, who patented the device in
1849,resultedinverysignificantgainsinfueleconomies;italsogreatlyenhancedtheeffectivenessofthis
power source in applications requiring both regular continuous rotary power, and adjustment to sudden
variations of the load placed on the engine.
AsNathanRosenbergandManuelTrajtenbergrecentlyhaveobserved,
183thewidespreadindustrial
utilization of steam power in the US was a phenomenon that properly belongs to the second half of the
nineteenth century, and in considerable part was the consequence of the diffusion of Corliss’s engine
design. Prior to 1850 much the greater part of the stock of steam power capacity was devoted to marine
transportation (steamboats on the lakes and rivers), and to overland railway transportation, rather than
large-scalemanufacturing. Factoryproduction oftextiles in theUShadbegunbyharnessingwater-power
at sites along the Appalachian “fall-line” in New England, just as England’s mechanized cotton-spinning-131-
184 For example, it may be pointed out that the greatly increased engine speeds that were attainable with
Corliss-type steam engines in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, made these machines very attractive as
the power source for generating electric current in the era before the emergence of the steam turbine power plant.
This illustrates the general propositions (discussed below) that the process of deploying and exploiting a GPT is
typically quite prolonged, and much of its economic impact derives from the confluence with, and enhancement of
the benefits derived from other technological and organizational innovations.
185 See David 1991b on the important economic respects in which information and electricity are not
analogous; David 2000: pp. 77-82, for discussion of a number of other, mis-directed criticisms that have been
leveled against drawing parallels between the computer and the dynamo revolutions.
186 With specific reference to the appearance of these issues in the context of network activities such as the
electricity supply industry, see, e.g., Paul A. David, “Some New Standards for the Economics of Standardization in
the Information Age,” Ch. 8 in Economic Policy and Technological Performance, P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman,
eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, Paul A. David and Julie A. Bunn,"The Economics of Gateway
Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History," (with J. A. Bunn), Information
Economics and Policy, vol. 3, Winter 1988, pp. 165-202.
factories of the later eighteenth century had arisen initially along the swift-flowing streams of the
Derbyshire dales. The great urban-industrial agglomerations of the Lancashire cotton textile industry
emerged only subsequently, when the falling costs of steam-power released the mills from those rural
surroundings and the constraints of inelastic local supplies of labor.
Numerous additional observations concerning the technical and economic implications of steam
powerwoulddeservenoticeinaseparatetreatmentofthattrajectoryoftechnologicaldevelopment.
184But,
the line of argument we wish to develop is better served byfocusing on the parallels between the modern
digital computer (microprocessor) and another general purpose engine, one that figured prominently in
whatsometimesisreferredtoasthe"SecondIndustrialRevolution."Ofcourse,wereferheretotheelectric
dynamo. Although the analogy between information technology and electrical technology would have
many limitations were it to be taken very literally, it nonetheless proves illuminating.
185
The electric dynamos of the late nineteenth century, like modern-day computers, formed nodal
elementsofphysicallydistributed (transmission)networks. Both ofthem occupykeypositionsinwebsof
strongly complementary technical relationships that give rise to "network externality effects" of various
kinds, and so make issues such as induced innovation and compatibility standardization important for
business strategy and public policy.
186 In both instances we can recognize the emergence of a temporally
extendedtrajectoryofincrementaltechnicalimprovements,thegradualandprotractedprocessofdiffusion
into widespread use, and the confluence with other streams of technological innovation – all of which are
interdependent features of the dynamic process through which a general purpose engine acquires a broad
domain of specific applications. In each epoch, the successful exploitation of the new technology's
evolvingproductivitypotentialhasentailedthedesignandfinancingofinvestmentprojectswhosenovelty,
in terms of scale, technical requirements, or other characteristics, posed significant challenges for the
existing agencies supplying capital goods and the established capital market institutions.-132-
187 See Paul A. David and Gavin Wright, “Early Twentieth Century Growth Dynamics: An Inquiry into the
Economic History of ‘Our Ignorance’.” SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 98-3, Stanford University, Institute for
Economic Policy Research, (April) 1999a: Figure E1, and text discussion.
188 For further technological details see W. Devine, Jr., “From Shafts to Wires,” Journal of Economic
History, 43, 1983: pp. 347-72, and W. Devine, Jr., “Electrified Mechanical Drive: The Historical Power Distribution
Revolution,” in S. Schurr et al., Electricity in the American Economy, New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. and
Devine 1990.
189 See H. Jerome, Mechanization in Industry. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934,
esp. pp. 190-1.
The transformation of industrial processes by electric power technology was a long-delayed and
far from an automatic business. It did not acquire real momentum until after 1914 to 1917, when the rates
charged consumers bystate-regulated regional utilities fell substantiallyin real terms, and central station
generating capacity came to predominate over generating capacity in isolated industrial plants. Rapid
efficiency gains in electricity generation during 1910 to 1920 derived from major direct investments in
large central power plants, but also from the scale economies realized through integration and extension
of power transmission over expanded territories. These developments were not simply matters of
technology, but also reflected political and institutional changes that allowed utilities largely to escape
regulation by municipal and town governments, facilitating the flow of investment capital into holding
companies presiding over centrally managed regional networks. Together these supply-side changes
propelled the final phase of the shift to electricity as a power source in US manufacturing, from just over
50 percent in 1919 to nearly 80 percent in 1929.
187
But, the protracted delayin electrification was not exclusivelydue to problems on the supplyside
ofthemarketforpurchasedelectricalpower.Theslowpaceofadoptionpriortothe1920’swasattributable
largelyto the unprofitabilityof replacing still serviceable manufacturing plants adapted to the old regime
ofmechanicalpowerderivedfromwaterandsteam.Coexistenceofolderandnewerformsofcapitaloften
restricted the scope for exploiting electricity’s potential. Prior to the 1920’s, the “group drive” system of
within-plant power transmission remained in vogue. With this system – in which electric motors turned
separate shafting sections, so that each motor drove related groups of machines – primaryelectric motors
often were merelyadded to the existing stock of equipment.
188 When the favorable investment climate of
the 1920’s opened up the potential for new, fully electrified plants, firms had the opportunity to switch
fromgroupdriveto“unitdrive”transmission,whereindividualelectricmotorswereusedtorunmachines
and tools of all sizes.
The advantages of the unit drive technology extended well beyond savings in fuel and in energy
efficiency. It also made possible single-story, linear factory layouts, within which reconfiguration of
machine placement permitted a flow of materials through the plant that was both more rapid and more
reliable.AccordingtothesurveysofAmericanmanufacturingintheearly1930sdirectedbyHarryJerome
attheNBER,therearrangementofthefactorycontributedtowidespreadcostsavingsinmaterialshandling
operations, serializing machines and thereby reducing or eliminating “back-tracking”.
189-133-
190 See David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984, on Ford’s plant at Highland Park, Michigan; Jerome (1934) on overhead cranes,
forklift trucks, etc.; Nathan Rosenberg, “Chemical Engineering as a General Purpose Technology,” ch. 7 in Helpman
(1998), on the “unit process”; David (1991a, p. 344, for electric automatic controls and the unit process.
It is important to emphasize (especially for the benefit of economists engaged in modelling the
dynamics of growth driven by GPTs) that the historical transformation of the technical features of the
Americanfactoryregimeinvolvedmorethanthesimple“diffusion”ofaparticulargeneralpurposeengine
intheformoftheelectricmotor.Rather,anewsystemofmanufacturing,characterizedbyhigherandmore
rapidly rising levels of input efficiency, emerged from the confluence, or convergence, of factory
electrification with other trajectories of industrial innovation. Each of these had its own developmental
history and inventive momentum. Yet each received new impetus and acquired enhanced economic




(a) The fixed transfer-line layout of assembly operations that came into full fruition in the Ford
Highland Park plant on the eve of World War I diffused rapidly and widely during the 1920’s, because
HenryFord was deliberatelyopen in promoting the logicand engineeringspecifics ofthis system ofmass
production by means of interchangeable parts. Electric power transmission by wire, rather than by drive-
shafts,wasbettersuitedtothisnewmanufacturingregime,aswasevidentfromtheusemadeofgroupand
unit drives at Highland Park itself.
(b) Automated materials handling was a generic labor-saving development that featured
prominently among the new innovations of manufacturing mechanization in the 1920's and early 1930's;
these too did not require electrification, although in some cases such as the use of battery powered fork-




so were dependent upon purchased electricity for large-scale operations.
The confluence among these technological developments which transformed American




systems, and myriad innovations in computer programming and data storage and retrieval technologies.
Thepackageofelectricity-basedindustrialprocessinnovationsthatcameintouseduringthe1920’s
could well serve as a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological change. Electrification saved
fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings
themselves to be more lightly constructed, because they were more likely to be single-storey structures
whose walls no longer had to be braced to support the overhead transmission apparatus. The faster pace-134-
191 S. H. Schurr et al., Electricity in the American Economy. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990, esp. pp.
29-30 and 292-93.
192 See Paul A. David and Gavin Wright, “General Purpose Technologies and Surges in Productivity:




the entire plant no longer had to be shut down in order to make changes in one department or section of
the factory.
191 Notice too that Henry Ford's transfer-line technique, and the speed-up of work that it
permitted, was a contributory element of the high throughput manufacturing regime, as were the new
continuous process technologies that grew in importance during this era.
Theconsequent effects offactoryelectrification upon industrial productivityareconfirmed bythe
sharpfallrecordedinthemanufacturingsector’scapital-outputratioduringthe1920’s,adevelopmentthat
contributed significantly in the early twentieth century to reversing the nineteenth-century trend towards
economy-wide capital deepening. A pattern of capital-saving movements emerged quite pervasively
throughout American manufacturing: all but two ofseventeen majorindustrygroups experienced afall in
thecapital-outputratioduringthe1919-29interval,whereastheratiohadbeenrisingineveryoneofthese
groups during 1899 to 1909, and in twelve of the seventeen during 1909 to 1919. Furthermore, as David
andWrightrecentlyhaveshown,
192thisincreaseintheaverageproductivityoffixedcapitalinindustrywas
directlyassociated with theelectrificationofprimaryhorsepower,andthatcorrelation becamestrongerin
the course of the 1920’s.
At the same time, there was an equally pervasive surge in the growth average labor productivity.
The aggregate productivity growth rate for manufacturing in the 1920’s was over 5 percentage points
higher than the trend rate in the previous two decades, and, rather than being concentrated in a few lines
of industry, the contributions to this acceleration were very evenly distributed among all the industrial
groups. With both capital productivity and labor productivity rising concurrently throughout
manufacturing, it is not surprising that even when multifactor productivity growth is calculated for each
ofthemajorbranches–therebymakingallowanceforthegrowthinpurchasedinputsofenergyintheform
ofelectricitysupplied bycentralpowerstations–awidespread acceleration in therates ofgrowth ofMFP
is observed to have occurred between the “’teens” and the “twenties”.
Moreover, a significant positive statistical relationship is found between the magnitude of the
acceleration in the rate of TFP growth and the increase in the fraction of mechanical power derived from
secondaryelectricmotors.Thelatterratiointhiseraprovidesanindicatorofthediffusionoftheunitdrive
system of factory electrification. Its positive cross-section relationship with the measure of acceleration-135-
193 See Paul A. David, “Computer and Dynamo: The Modern Productivity Paradox in a Not-Too-Distant
Mirror,” in Technology and Productivity: The Challenge for Economic Policy, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris, 1991a, pp. 315-48. pp. 343-4 especially, on the cross-section regression model
and its quantitative implications.
194 See Harberger (1998).
195 See David and Wright (1999a).
in the MFP growth rate implies that at least one-half of the temporal acceleration during the 1919-29
interval can be attributed to this phase of the electrification process.
193
In terms of the metaphors recentlyemployed byArnold Harberger to characterize two contrasting
ways in which aggregate productivity growth occurs,
194 the 1920’s productivity surge was a “yeast-like”
expansion that involved essentially the entire US manufacturing sector, rather than the result of rapid
efficiency gains that had popped up in a small number of industries for idiosyncratic reasons, like
“mushrooms” shooting up at random places in a field. David and Wright recently have suggested that a
“yeast-like”processisexactlywhatwouldbeexpectedwhererapidproductivitygrowthwassurgingunder
the coordinating influence of a new GPT,
195 whereas the “mushroom-like” pattern that Harberger (1998)
observed in US manufacturing during the 1970’s and 1980’s was more typical of interludes when the
overall pace of productivity advance remained sluggish.
If we may reasonably characterize the pattern of multifactor productivity advances in the US
economyduringthe1990’sasmovingfrom“mushrooms”toward“yeast,”istherewarrantforanticipating




by venturing several historically informed speculations on these intriguing questions.
Reflections on the Future: From ICT Productivity Growth Paradoxes to Payoffs
It is likely that the U.S. will have to look to the further development of digital information
technologies, and their diffusion throughout the economy to sustain the future trend growth rate of TFP
at the levels that have been achieved in the US economy at the very close of the twentieth century.
Certainly, any further acceleration in TFP growth would have to come from that direction. This is not
meant as a discouraging view, either for the US or for the western European economies. Even in the
immediately foreseeable future, several promising technological trajectories appear to offer still largely
untappedpotentialsforproductivitygrowth,especiallyproductivitygainsofthekindthatourconventional
statistical indicators will be able to register.
Our vision of these has not been formed simply by extrapolating from previous historical
experience with the diffusion and elaboration of general purpose technologies. Nevertheless, from the-136-
196 See David and Wright (1999b), for fuller discussion of the interrelatedness of mechanization of
materials handling and factory electrification in the U.S. during the 1920's and 1930's.
197 See W. Wyatt Gibbs, “Taking Computers to Task,” Scientific American 277, no. 1 (July 1997): pp. 82-
9, and especially Donald A. Norman, The Invisible Computer: Why Good Products Can Fail, the Personal Computer
is So Complex, and Information Appliances are the Solution, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998., Ch. 11.
following comments on three of these emerging areas of ICT application, it will be apparent that the
recurrence of a pervasive alteration in the bias of factor efficiency growth – toward augmenting the
efficiency of conventional tangible capital inputs, and of routine labor services – is what is being
anticipatedhere.TheeffectsofthisuponmeasuredTFPinmanybranchesoftheeconomywouldthenbear
a resemblance to the productivity effects associated with the diffusion of the unit drive system of factory
electrification during the 1930’s.
One of the more rapidly emerging among these trajectories is the much-discussed expansion of
inter-organizational computing via the Internet. Such portents for the future involving what eventually
would amount to major structural transformations, may be seen in the expansion of inter-organizational
computing for the mass of transactions involving purchase ordering, invoicing, shipment tracking, and
payments.Allofthoseactivitiespresentlyabsorbmuchspecialistwhite-collarlabortime,anditisnotclear
thatitsdisplacementcanbemanagedsoeasilybycompanieswhoseday-to-dayoperationsdependinsome
degree upon the un-codified expertise of those employees. Nevertheless, the potential gains create an
attraction: recent estimates indicate that in many branches of economic activity 10-15% cost savings in
procurement activities will be available through the diffusion of business-to-business e-commerce. Still
higher percentage cost-savings in procurement and related inter-firm transactions are estimated, not only
for manufacturing, but for service activities such as freight transport, and media and advertising. Service
occupations such as these might be viewed as the modern day counterparts of the ubiquitous materials-
handling tasks in the manufacturing sector which became the target of innovative dynamo-based
mechanization during the 1920's.
196
A second significant cost saving trajectory is likely to emerge with the development and
increasingly widespread diffusion of new, specialized, robust, and comparatively inexpensive digital
"information appliances." This new generation of appliances includes not only the enhanced PDA’s
(personal digital assistants) that already are coming into use among PC users, but a variety of function
specific hand-held devices, and other robust specialized tools that will be carried on belts, sown into





The proliferation of interconnected special-purpose applicants of this sort also is likely to be
reinforced by “network externality” effects upon demand, and so would expand new market niches for
vendors of successive generations of “computer-related” hardware – the quality-adjusted prices of which-137-
198 The implication, then, is that analysts who apply the “dual” approach to measuring the rate of
multifactor productivity, such as Oliner and Sichel (2000), for example, are likely to find this growing branch of
manufacturing “contributing” to the aggregate TFP growth rate as the “vertically integrated computer sector”
presently does.
199 In the view of informed industry participants, some aspects of this transformation are closer than might
be supposed, although, characteristically, the more general purpose of the tools within this class of appliances have
(again) been first to attract commercial interest. At the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2001, Microsoft’s
Bill Gates spoke of the coming proliferation of devices, from mobile telephones and personal digital assistants to e-
books and detachable PC screens. Perhaps not surprisingly, he expressed optimism about the development of the
software required “to link them together seamlessly so that consumers can communicate and have access to up-to-
date information at the press of a button, whatever the device they’re using…: ‘We’re really on the threshold of
achieving all of those things,’” Gates is quoted as having announced. See, “Industry Leaders See a New Era in the
Tech Revolution,” International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2001, pp.1, 16.
200 See David (2000) pp. 84-5 on ‘teleworking’ in the U.S.; Robin Mansell and W. Edward Steinmueller,
Mobilizing the Information Society: Strategies for Growth and Opportunity, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000, for Western European perspectives.
201 See Robert J. Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?,” American Economic
Review 89 (May), 1999: 123-8, and Robert J. Gordon, “Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure up to the Great
are likelyto fall far faster than the costs of the inputs used in their manufacture.
198 But perhaps even more
significantly, this emerging trajectory of convergent information and communications technology





term gains in measured multifactor productivity, most notably from savings in infrastructure capital, as
well as through the reduction of the costs of measures required to abate pollution and environmental
degradation in congested urban areas. At present, “tele-working” remains still far from fullydeployed in
the US: only about a fifth of the workforce time in large service sector firms are providing data
communicationsnetworklinkswithemployees’homes,andmanyofthosearetryingout“mixedsystems”
of central office and “outside” work. As was the case historically with the group drive system of factory
electrification,substantialduplicationoffixedfacilitiescharacterizesthisstageinthenewGPT’sdiffusion.
So, significant capital-savings through reductions of required commercial office space and transport
infrastructures arelikelytoresultforthewholeservicesectoronlyas“tele-working”becomesmuchmore
widely and completely deployed. Moreover, many of the workers who are participating in tele-working




For these and still other reasons, it remains a good bet that economists who continue proclaiming
theirskepticismabouttheinformationrevolution’sabilitytodelivermajorlong-termproductivitypayoffs
are going to be proved wrong.
201 Yet those payoffs won’t come freely; theywill entail much learning and-138-
further, costly organizational adaptations. Nor should they be expected to materialize
overnight – even if a domestic macroeconomic environment conducive to long-term
investment were to be maintained, and were we lucky enough to escape real and financial
shocks in the international economy of the serious kind that could be triggered by the
recurrent threats to peace in the Balkans and the Middle East.
Table 2-IX: The U.S. Productivity Growth Revival of the Late 1990’s in Perspective
Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates of GDP Productivity Measures
for the U.S. Private Business Economy
BLS Measures 1973-1979 1979-1990 1990-1995 1995-1998
Output per person hour 1.3 1.6 1.5 2.5











All other capital services 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0
Labor input composition 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Semi-Refined TFP Residual* 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.4
*Compositional change corrections are made for labor inputs, but in the case of capital inputs the
only compositional changes accounted for are those between IT and non-IT capital, and changes
in the quality of the IT capital stock.
Source: Derived from U.S. Department of Labor, News Release USDL 00-267, September 21,
2000.
___________________
Inventions of the Past?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 2000a: pp.49-75, who continues to
maintain his position as the most throughtful and articulate economist among the “ICT skeptics.”- 139 -
202 This Part draws heavily upon Moses Abramovitz and Paul A. David, “Convergence and Deferred Catch-
up: Productivity Leadership and the Waning of American Exceptionalism,” Ch. 2 of The Mosaic of Economic
Growth, edited by Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor and Gavin Wright, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Material previously published there is used here with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press.
203 See Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, Paris: OECD, 1995: Table 1-3.
Part Three
American Growth in an International Perspective
How does the American growth experience compare with that of other countries? The economies
we hold up for historical comparison with the United States are mainly a sample of those that also
began a process of industrialization during the nineteenth century. These are the U.K. and the
continental countries ofWestern Europe.Wealsopaysomeattentiontoalargergroup that includes
not only Western Europe but also Canada, Australia, and Japan.
202
If we look back to the situation prevailing early in the nineteenth century, the U.S. level of
realGDPpercapitawassomewhatbelowthatoftheU.K.,thepioneerofmoderneconomicgrowth,
andthestillcommerciallyprosperousLowCountries(TheNetherlandsandBelgium.) Buttheyoung
Republic’s citizens already enjoyed some appreciable margin of material advantage over the
inhabitants of the long-settled region of Western Europe taken as a whole.
203 The estimates for this
period are surrounded by particularly wide margins of uncertainty, however, so we begin our
statistical comparisons in 1870 when better, if still not wholly reliable comparative data become
available. At that time, it was still true that the U.S. per capita real output level lagged behind the
U.K.’s, but America appears already to have established a substantial lead over the Western
European average and, with some exceptions such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
over all the other individual countries in the Western European group.
There then followed a long wave in the relative position of the United States. For eight
decades, American per capita output grew fasterthan that ofboth theU.K. and Western Europe. By
1913, America had gained the lead over the U.K. in per capita output and widened its lead over
Western Europe. And then, in an era marked bytwo world wars and the Great Depression, the U.S.
gained still larger leads. By1950, the U.K. level ofoutput per capita was onlythree-quarters that of
theUnited States and theWestern European average level was only56 percent as high. Since1950,
the relative position of Europe and the U.S. has moved the other way. Western Europe has been
catchingup;by1992,itsaveragelevel was up to 81 percentoftheAmerican.TheU.K.,ontheother
hand, has only held its own since 1950.
All this is succinctlydisplayed bythe figures in Table III: I-1. Theyare based upon thework
of Angus Maddison (1995), whose compilation of internationally comparable estimates of real
output, population, manhours, etc. provides the most widely accepted figures that trace such data- 140 -
204 Although the discussion here rests on Maddison’s (Monitoring, 1995) estimates, it should be evident
from the description of their method of derivation in the text that considerable difficulties surround the interpretation
of the level of comparisons as reflecting standards of material welfare at various points in time reaching back for
well more than a century. Part of the problem is the usual index number problems that are present in the various
underlying national series of real output per capita for each of the countries involved. But, there is the additional
difficulty of attaching a welfare interpretation to comparisons of the per capita level of output expressed in the
purchasing power parity equivalents based upon the structure of prices in the U.S. c. 1990. The recent work of
Leandro Prados de la Escosura (“International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820-1990: An Alternative Dataset,”
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper 98-64 (Economic History and Institutions Series 05), November
1998) undertakes to express GDP for a wide range of countries in terms of the purchasing power parities that
prevailed contemporaneously. These show that the U.S. per capita GDP level already closely matched that of the
U.K. during the first half of the nineteenth century.
205 See Maddison (1995): Appendixes B and C, for a more extended discussion of the problem of achieving
cross-national comparability in estimates of output levels; and Prados (“International Comparisons” 1998) for an
alternative methodology that yields comparable relative levels of GDP per capita. But whereas the movements of the
latter relatives over time reflect both differential rates of growth of real output and changes in the relative structure of
international prices, the Maddison-type relatives reflect only the differentials in real output and productivity growth.
In general, the degree of relative dispersion in these GDP per capita measures is smaller than those in the
corresponding Maddison measures of real GDP per capita, but the two sets of dispersion observations show much
the same movements over time.
over long periods of time.
204 The underlying figures derive from national estimates of GDP, which
are first rendered comparable across countries by converting estimates in national currency into a
common currency using the purchasing power parity ratios of a base year. This is 1990 in the case
of the most recent Maddison (1995)estimates. From that base, comparablefigures foreach country
are obtained for earlier, as well as later dates, by extrapolating its converted national output value
in thebaseyearbythemovement ofits own deflated GDP. This procedureforrenderingreal output
levelsindifferentcountriescomparableis acceptableifthemeasuresareunderstoodinthoseterms;
to read them as indicating relative levels of real income per capita, to which an economic welfare
interpretationcanbeattached,however,wouldentailacceptingstrongassumptionsaboutstabilities
in the structure of international prices. And, indeed, those assumptions clearly are suspect. The
resulting estimates, therefore, must be handled with a degree of caution that transcends the norm
expected in historical reconstructions ofthis sort, and werelyon them onlyin so faras theyprovide
some broad indications of relative levels of real output and productivity, and international
differentials in the movements of the latter over time.
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Table 3: I
Relative Levels of Real GDP per Capita, and per Manhour
in Europe and the U.S.A., 1870-1992
(U.S.A.=100)











1870 76 132 65 115
1900 67 112 - -
1913 63 95 57 86
1929 62 76 55 74
1950 56 72 45 62
1973 70 72 70 68
1992 81 73 87 82
a Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland.
Source: Maddison, 1995, Tables 1-3 and 2-7 (a).
Table 3: Ialso includes Maddison’s comparisons oflevels of labor productivity. Theyshow
the same great wave in the relative position of the U.S.: a long period from 1870 to 1950 when
AmericawasforgingaheadandgaininganeverlargeradvantageovertheU.K.andWesternEurope,
and then a four-decade period stretching into the 1990s when both Europe and the U.K. were
catching up. It is just this trend reversal in Europe and the U.K. vis-à-vis America that constitutes
the main problem for understanding American growth viewed in comparison with that of other




Relative labor productivity growth rates, however, have been the dominant component. Their
movements have been larger than those of labor input, and they have conformed consistently with
those of per capita output growth. Labor input, on the other hand, has sometimes moved in
agreement with per capita output and sometimes not. We believe, therefore, that it is the relative- 142 -
206 We do, however, deal with per capita output growth and its proximate components in the lengthy
Endnote 1 to Part Three.
growth rates oflaborproductivitythathavebeen theconsistent sourceofnational differences in per
capita output growth, and the remainder of this section deals with labor productivity.
206
1. The Theory of Catch-up and Convergence Versus the Record of Growth
The growth records of Europe and America during the long period between 1870 and 1950 present
a particular problem for explanation because they fit awkwardly into, and, in some respects, run
counter to the predictions of a theorynow widelyaccepted byeconomists, economic historians and
students of growth. This is the idea that countries that at any time find themselves behind a leading
countryintheirlevelsofproductivityhaveagreaterpotentialforfuturegrowththandoestheleader.
Until 1870, theleaderwas the U.K.; in the following decades, the countries of Western Europe did,
indeed, gain on the U.K. But in these same decades, the U.S. was visibly forging ahead. It not only
overtook but surpassed the U.K., and it widened a lead over Western Europe that was already
substantial in 1870. In this respect, the record is at odds with the theory.
Theperceptionthatbeingbehindcarriesapotentialforfutureproductivitygrowthfasterthan
a leader’s has been rationalized in the theory of catch-up and convergence. Stated in its most
elemental form, the theory refers to countries that differ only in their initial levels of productivity.
By this we mean that they face no persistent obstacles in exploiting the advantages that
backwardness is held to present.
The potential advantages of laggard countries have at least four sources:
They can modernize their capital stock by replacing their technologically obsolete
equipmentwithstate-of-the-artassetsbyimitatingorpurchasingthenewstate-of-theartinstruments
produced in leading countries.
Becausetheirlowlevels ofcapital perworkertendtoproducehighmarginalratesof
return, laggards tend to have high rates of capital accumulation – all the more since the new capital
can embody advanced technology.
Because they often have large numbers of redundant workers in farming and petty
trade, they can gain more from labor transfers from farm to nonfarm occupations and from small
shops to larger scale firms.
As the gains from the first three sources produce a growth in aggregate output and
in the size of the domestic market, a wider horizon of gains from the economies of scale presents
itself.
Theseforegoingconsiderationsleadonetoexpectthat,intheidealcircumstancesenvisaged
by the theory, countries whose productivity levels were at anytime low relative to that of a leading
country would tend to catch up. And, the rate at which catch-up would take place would vary with
the size of the initial gaps.- 143 -
These expectations actually were well met in the experience of the advanced, capitalist
countries during the period following World War II, as may be seen from Table 3: II. When the
periodopened,theproductivitygapsseparatingAmericafromtheWesternEuropeancountriesstood
at a historicallyhighlevel.TheyhadbeenenlargedbytherelativelyrapidgrowthoftheU.S.during
the years from 1870 to 1929 and then further enlarged by the severe impact of World War II on
Europe and Japan. Beginning after the war, however, there began a period of rapid catch-up, which
has now gone on for over four decades. It had brought the average level of productivity in Western
Europeto87percentoftheU.S.levelby1992.Belgium,France,Germany,andtheNetherlandshave
reached productivity relatives of 95 percent or better. And, as expected, when by 1973 the average
productivitygaphadnarrowedsubstantially,therateofcatch-updeclined.TheJapaneserecordsince
1950 was qualitatively similar. Moreover, since the Japanese level in 1950 stood much lower than
the European, its more rapid growth since also conforms to expectation.
Therecordofgeneralconvergencewithinthegroupwasalsoconsistentwiththepredictions
ofthetheory.Theadvancedcountrieshadconvergedonlyslowlyfrom1870to1913,andthenWorld
War II had caused the variance of productivity levels to rise. But after 1950 rates of convergence
were rapid, and, as the level of dispersion declined, the rates of convergence slowed down.
Thisrecordofconformitywiththepredictionsofcatch-upandconvergencetheoryafter1950
stands in sharp contrast with experience before that time. Although the productivity levels of both
European countries stood well below those of the U.S. as early as 1870, they did not catch up. Nor
did Japan, except between 1913 and 1938.
Thecontrastbetweentheexperiencesoftheyearsbefore1950andthosethatfollowedclearly
demands explanation. One may well think, as we do, that in the period, 1913 to 1950, the forces
making for catch-up were quite overwhelmed by two general wars, by the territorial, political,
commercial,andfinancialdisturbances that followed World WarIand bythevariantimpactsofthe
Great Depression. Such difficulties, however, cannot explain the failure of Europe to reduce its
productivity lag behind the U.S. during the more than four decades of peaceful development and
wideningcommercebetween1870and1913.Nordotheyaccountforthedevelopmentsthatreleased
theforces ofcatch-up and convergenceafterWorld WarII. Wegoontooutlineaframework within
which to consider these questions.- 144 -
Table 3: II
Rates of Catch-up in GDP per Manhour









1870 69 1870 20
1913 59 1870-13 -0.36 1913 20 1870-13 0.00
1938 56 1913-38 -0.21 1938 25 1913-38 0.89
1950 46 1938-50 -1.64 1950 16 1938-50 -3.72
1973 70 1950-73 +1.83 1973 48 1950-73 4.78
1992 87 1973-92 +1.14 1992 69 1973-92 1.91
Notes:
*The 12 European countries include the 11 named in Table 3: I, plus the United Kingdom.
**The rate of catch-up is the change per annum in the log of the mean level of productivity
relative to the U.S. times 100.
2. The Elements of Catch-up Potential and Its Realization
We may group the conditions that govern the abilities of countries to achieve relatively rapid rates
of productivity growth into two broad classes: those that govern the potential of countries to raise
their productivity levels, and those that influence their abilities to realize that potential.
The simple catch-up hypothesis would have it that the one element governing a country’s
relative growth potential is the size of the productivitydifferential that separates it from the leader.
Manifestly, however, the record of growth does not conform consistently to the predictions of this
unconditionalconvergencehypothesis.Theassumptionthatcountriesare“otherwisesimilar”isnot
fulfilled. There are often persistent conditions that have restricted countries’ past growth and that
continueto limit theirabilityto makethetechnological and organizational leaps that thehypothesis
envisages. We divide constraints on the growth potential of laggard countries into two categories.
One constraint consists of the limitations of “technological congruence.” Such limitations
arise because the frontiers of technology do not advance evenly in all dimensions; that is, with
equiproportionalimpactontheproductivitiesoflabor,capital,andnaturalresourceendowmentsand
with equal effect on the demands for the several factors of production and on the effectiveness of
different scales of output. They advance, rather, in an unbalanced, biased fashion, reflecting the- 145 -
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direct influence of past science and technology on the evolution of practical knowledge and the
complex adaptation of that evolution to factor availabilities, as well as to the scale of markets,
consumer demands and technical capabilities of those relativelyadvanced countries operating at or
near the frontiers of technology.
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It can easily occur that the resource availabilities, factor supplies, technical capabilities,
market scales and consumerdemands in laggard countries do not conform well to thoserequired by
the technologies and organizational arrangements that have emerged in the leading country or
countries. These may render it extremely difficult if not prohibitively costly, for firms, industries,
and economies to switch quickly from an already established technological regime, with its
associated trajectoryof technical development, to exploit a quite distinct technological regime that
had emerged elsewhere, under a different constellation of economic and social conditions.
The second class of constraints on the potential productivity of countries concerns a more
vaguely defined set of matters that has been labeled “social capability.” This term was coined by
Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky.
208 It covers countries’ levels of general education and
technicalcompetence;thecommercial,industrial,andfinancialinstitutionsthatbearontheirabilities
to finance and operate modern, large-scale business; and the political and social characteristics that
influence the risks, the incentives, and the personal rewards of economic activity, including those
rewards in social esteem that go beyond money and wealth.
Over time there is a two-way interaction between the evolution of a nation’s social
capabilities and the articulation of societal conditions required for mastery of production
technologies at orcloseto theprevailing“best practice”frontier.Intheshortrun,acountry’sability
to exploit the opportunities afforded by currently prevailing best-practice techniques will remain
limited by its current social capabilities. Over the longer term, however, social capabilities tend to
undergo transformations that render them more complementary to the more salient among the
emerging technological trajectories. Levels ofgeneral and technical education are raised. Curricula
and training facilities change. New concepts of business management, including methods of
managing personnel and organizing work, supplant traditional approaches. Corporateand financial
institutions are established, and people learn their modes of action. Legal codes and even the very
conceptsofpropertycanbemodified.Moreover,experiencegainedinthepractical implementation
ofaproductiontechniqueenhancesthetechnicalandmanagerialcompetenciesthatserveitandthus
supports further advances along the same path. Such mutually reinforcing interactions impart
“positive feedback” to the dynamics of technological evolution. They may for a time solidify a- 146 -
leader’s position or, in the case of followers, serve to counter the tendencyfor their relative growth
rates to decline as catch-up proceeds.
On the other hand, the adjustments and adaptations of existing cultural attitudes, social
norms, organizational forms, and institutional rules and procedures is neithernecessarilyautomatic
nor smooth. Lack of plasticity in such social structures may retard and even block an otherwise
technologically progressive economy’s passage to the full exploitation of a particular emergent
technology. New technologies may give rise to novel forms of productive assets and business
activities that find themselves trammeled byfeatures of an inherited jurisprudential and regulatory
system that had never contemplated even the possibility of their existence. For laggards, the
constraintsimposedbyentrenchedsocialstructuresmaylongcircumscribetheopportunitiesforany
sustained catch-up movement.
Taken together, the foregoing elements determine a country’s effective potential for
productivitygrowth. Yet another distinct group of factors governs the abilityof countries to realize
their respective potentials. One set of issues here involves the extent to which followers can gain
access to complete and reliable information about more advanced methods, appraise them, and
acquire the artifacts and rights needed to implement that knowledge for commercial purposes. A
second set of issues arises because long-term, aggregate productivity growth almost always entails
changes in industrial and occupational structure. As a result, the determinants of resource mobility,
particularly labor mobility, are also important. And finally, macroeconomic conditions govern the
intensityofuseofresourcesandthefinancingofinvestmentand,thereby,affectthechoicesbetween
presentandfuturethatcontroltheR&Dandotherinvestmenthorizonsofbusinesses.Byinfluencing
the volume of gross investment expenditures, they also govern the pace and extent to which
technological knowledge becomes embodied in tangible production facilities and the people who
work with them.
We now put this analytical schema into use in a specific historical context: how the U.S.
attained and enlarged its productivity lead from 1870 to 1950, and then what changed during these
years that released the catch-up and convergence boom of the postwar period. Because space is
limited, wepaymostattentiontotechnologicalcongruenceandsocialcapabilityandgiveonlybrief
notice to the factors supporting the realization of potential.
3. Bases of the Postwar Potential for Catch-up and Convergence
The dramatic postwar record of Western Europe and Japan creates a presumption that they began
the period with a strong potential for rapid growth by exploiting American methods of production
andorganization.TheproductivitygapsseparatingthelaggardcountriesfromtheUnitedStateswere
then larger than they had been in the record since 1870. However, the gains in prospect could only
be realized if Europe and Japan could do what they had not been able to do before: take full
advantage of America’s relatively advanced methods. The insistent question, therefore, is why
Europe, itselfan old centeroftechnological progress, had proved unableeventokeep pacewith the
U.S. during the three-quarters of a century following 1870.- 147 -
Technological Congruence: The Role of Primary Materials
Attention previously was drawn (in Part Two, Section 1) to the role that primary materials played
in supporting the development of the American economy along a high and rising tangible capital-
intensity path, and the concomitant boost this gave to the growth of labor productivity during the
latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The key elements in that contribution were, on the one hand, the importance of primary
materials in the costs of industrial products to final consumers and investors. On the other side was
America’s rich natural endowment and its success in developing it rapidly. And because transport
costswerethenalsohigh,thistranslatedintoasubstantialadvantageoverothercountriesinthecosts
of primarymaterials and of the final costs of manyindustrial products – a superiority evidenced by
America’sgrowingcomparativeadvantageasanexporterofnaturalresource-intensivemanufactures
from 1880 to 1929.
This helps account for the fact that it was the era of the 1880-1913 “minerals economy”
boom, that saw American labor productivity rising faster than that of the other advanced industrial
countries and eventually surpassing the level of Britain, the former world leader. With the passing
oftime,however,theimportanceoftheseinter-countrydifferencesdeclined–foratleastsixreasons:
First,technologicalprogressreducedtheunitlaborinputrequirementsinthemineralmining,
gas, and oil industries both absolutely and relative to the costs of processing.
Second,mineral resources werediscoveredanddevelopedinmanypartsoftheworldwhere
their existence had remained unknown at the end of the nineteenth century, so costs of materials at
points of origin and use outside the United States would have tended to fall. Furthermore,
technological advance increased the commercial value of mineral resourcedeposits that previously
were neglected and added new metals and synthetic materials to the available range of primary
materials and agricultural products.
Third, petroleum came to be of increasing importance as a source of power for industryand
transportation and also as feedstock for the chemicals industry. This reduced the disadvantage to
Europe of its well-worked mines and the lack of coal resources in Japan.
Fourth,transportationcosts both byland and seadeclined markedly, which reduced thecost
advantages enjoyed by exporters of primary products in the further processing of such materials.
Fifth, crude materials came to be processed more elaborately and, on this account, primary
products became a smaller fraction of the final cost of finished goods.
Sixth, and finally, services in which the materials component is small have become more
important, compared with foods and manufactures in which the materials component is larger.
For all these reasons, differences in developed natural resource endowments have counted
for less in recent decades than they had done earlier.- 148 -
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Technological Congruence: Capital-Using and Scale-Intensive Technology
Thetechnologythatemergedinthenineteenthandthatpersistedintotheearlytwentiethcenturywas
not only resource-intensive, it was tangible capital-using and scale-dependent. Exploiting the
technical advances of the time demanded heavier use of machinery per worker, especially power-
driven machinery in ever more specialized forms. But it required operation on an ever-larger scale
to make the use of such expensive structures and equipment economical. Furthermore, it required
steam-powered transport by rail and ship, itself a capital-intensive and scale-intensive activity, to
assemble materials and to distribute the growing output to wider markets.
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Tangiblecapital-usingandscale-dependentmethodsagainofferedatechnologicalpathalong
which the American economy was drawn more strongly, and which American producers could
follow more easily than their European counterparts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The early sparse settlement of America’s virgin lands and its abundant forest resources
made American wages relatively high and local labor supplies inelastic. And high wages in turn
encouragedthedevelopmentoftheera’scapital-intensivemechanicaltechnologies. Americanland
abundance, and the level, unobstructed terrain of the Midwest and trans-Mississippi prairies,
especially was well suited to the extensive cultivation of grain and livestock under climatic and
topographical conditions very favorable to the mechanization of field operations. None of these
developments could be replicated on anything approaching the same comparative scale within
European agriculture at the time.
The heavy use of power-driven capital equipment was further supported by the relatively




nations in 1913, exceeding that of the U.K. by5 percent, France by59 percent, and Germanyby38
percent.
These differences indicate the advantage that the United States enjoyed in markets for
automobiles and for the other new, relatively expensive durable goods, to which the techniques of
ascale-dependent,capital-usingtechnology(likemassproduction)especiallyapplied.TheAmerican
domesticmarketwasbothlargeandwellunifiedbyanextensivetransportationnetwork.Anditwas
unified in other ways that Europe at the time could not match. The rapid settlement of the country
from a common cultural base in the Northeastern and Middle Atlantic seaboard closely
circumscribed any regional differences in language, legal systems, local legislation and popular
tastes. In fact, Americans sought consumer goods of unpretentious and functional design in- 149 -
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preference to products that tried to emulate the more differentiated, elaborate, and custom-finished
look of the old European luxurycrafts. This taste structure, which was commented on repeatedlyat
international expositions where American manufactures were displayed alongside the top-quality
wares of the Europeans, owed much to the spirit of democratic egalitarianism that prevailed over
large sections of American societyand to the young nation’s freedom from a heritage of feudal and
aristocratictraditions andaestheticvalues.It fosteredtheentrepreneurial strategyof cateringtoand
actively creating large markets for the standardized products of large-scale production.
The American development of mass production methods was also encouraged by the
country’shigherandmorewidelydiffusedincomes,whichsupportedanampledomesticmarketfor
the new metals-based durable goods. By contrast, Europe’s lower and less equally distributed
incomes initially restricted the market for such goods to its well-to-do classes, for whom
standardized commodities had less appeal in anyevent, and therebydelayed the full application of
American mass production methods.
Yet,withthepassageoftimetheseAmericanadvantagesgraduallywanedinimportance.As
aggregateoutput expanded in Europe, the markets for more industries and products approached the
scale required for most efficient production, with plants embodying technologies that had been
developedtosuitAmericanconditions.Furthermore,thedeclineintransportationcostsandthemore





exports exceeded the growth of their collective GDP (both in constant prices) by89 percent. In this
era, rising per capita incomes also helped assure that scale requirements in the newer mass-
production industries producingconsumerand producerdurables would besatisfied for a widening
range of commodities. As larger domestic and foreign markets appeared, laggard countries could
begin to switch in athoroughgoingwayto exploit thecapital-usingand scale-dependent techniques
already explored by the United States. This was a path toward catch-up that would prove to be
especially important after World War II, even though it had begun to be followed by some large





theend ofthenineteenth century.Andinthenewcentury,thedirectionofinnovation, driven in part- 150 -
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by the advance of science, began to favor investment in intangible assets. In short, the new bias of
technological and organizational progress tended to raise the rate of return on investment in the
discovery and development of more advanced technology and in the creation of the more highly
educated workforce and citizenry needed to make use of it.
These were trends with global dimensions. Europe and Japan exhibited them though with
somelag.ButitwasonlywiththereturnofpeaceafterWorldWarIIthatthosesocietiescommenced
rapidly to apply techniques that previously had been developed and exploited by American firms.
In doing so, they positioned themselves to soon be able to keep pace with, and, indeed, contribute
to the further extension of those globally shared technological trajectories contemporaneously.
Social Capability
Even in the later nineteenth century, all of the presently advanced group had certain similar
features.
212Allhadsubstantiallyindependentnationalgovernmentsatleastasearlyas1871.Broadly
speaking, all the countries except Japan shared much of the older culture of Western Europe. Most
important, all the countries, again excepting Japan, have lived during the entire period under
basically stable economic constitutions that provide for a system operated mainly by business
enterprises coordinated by markets for goods, labor, capital, and land. In Japan, although a middle
classofmerchantshadarisenevenundertheShogunate,thecountryretainedmuchofitsolderfeudal
character until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Thereafter, however, it was rapidly transformed, and
by the turn of the century had established its own form of private enterprise, market economy.
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Beyondtheireconomicconstitutions,however,noteworthydifferencesworkedtoimpairthe
ability of European countries to catch up to the United States during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Nineteenth-century America presented a contrast with Western Europe in its
social structure, its people’s outlook, and their standards of behavior. In America, plentiful land
offered a widespread opportunity to achieve a satisfactory income by the standards of the time. It
fostered a relatively equal distribution of income and wealth and an egalitarian spirit. America’s
Puritan strain in religion tolerated and even encouraged the pursuit of wealth. The older European
class structure and feeling did not survive America’s wider dispersion of propertyand opportunity.
Americansjudgedeachothermorelargelyonmerit,and,lackingothersignsofmerit,wealthbecame
the main badge of distinction. America’s social and economic circumstances encouraged effort,
saving, and enterprise and gave trade and the commercial life in general a status as high or higher
than that of other occupations.
While the social background ofeconomiclifein thecountries of nineteenth-centuryEurope
was of course not uniform, there were certain commonalities in their divergence from American- 151 -
214 See, e.g., Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II, 1840, (Reprint, New York: Vintage
Books, 1945: First Book, Ch. X.
conditions of the time. In all the European countries, a traditional class structure – which separated
a nobilityand gentryfrom the peasantry, the tradesmen, and an expanding middle class – survived
into the nineteenth century. Social distinction rested more on birth and the class status it conveyed
thanonwealth.Insofarassocialdistinctiondidturnonwealth,inheritedwealthandincomecounted
formorethanearnedincomeorthewealthgainedbycommerce,andlandedwealthstoodhigherthan
financial wealth and still higher than industrial or commercial. The middle class who aspired to
membership in the gentry or nobility bought rural seats and adopted upper-class standards of
conspicuous consumption. In short, the social order of Western Europe diluted the characteristic
American preoccupation with material success.
These differences in the bases of social distinction – and therefore in the priority assigned
to economic attainment – influenced many kinds of behavior that matter for productivity growth.
They shaped the occupational choices of both the European gentry and bourgeoisie. When family
incomewas adequate, sons werepointed towards theoccupations that theupperclasses regarded as
gentlemanlyorhonorific:themilitary,thecivilservice,thechurchand,wellbehind,theprofessions.
Even in the sphere of business, finance held pride of place, all to the detriment of commerce and
industry.
In Europe, a related tradition from pre-industrial times influenced education in a way that
reinforcedthesepreexistingpatterns ofoccupational choice. Thecurriculain thesecondaryschools
continued to emphasize the time-honored subjects of the classics and mathematics; the faculties of
Europe’s ancient and most prestigious universities dwelt upon these and also theology, law, and
medicine. Throughout Europe, university curricula emphasized what was regarded as proper for
gentlemen destined fortheclergy,thecivil service, and theliberal professions.
214 Although training
inengineeringdidwinaplaceforitselfin both Franceand Germanyearlyin thenineteenthcentury,
its character in both countries was theoretical, concerned with preparing an elite cadre of engineer-
candidates to serve the state in administrative and regulatory capacities. In contrast, by the late
nineteenthcentury,engineeringschoolsinAmericaclearlyhadevolvedamorepractical,commercial
and industrial bent.
The striving for honorific status also helped to limit the size of firms because families were
eagertoconfineownershipandcontrolwithinthecircleofclosekin.Moreoveraristocraticstandards
ofqualityandindividualityinconsumptionworkedtoinhibitthedevelopmentofstandardizedgoods
and mass production, and they supported an extreme fragmentation of retail trade. Similarly, a
businessethosthatcanbetracedbacktothemedievalguildsdiscouragedaggressiveinnovationand
price competition in favor of maintaining a high standard of quality in traditional product lines. In
some countries too – England is a prominent example – class feeling delayed the spread of mass
education even at the primary level.- 152 -
Neither social structure nor outlook, however, remained frozen in their nineteenth-century
forms. As economic development proceeded, the social status and political power of European
business rose. The occupational targets of middle-class youth gradually shifted. Business and the
pursuit of wealth as a road to social distinction (as well as material satisfaction) became more
appealing. Entrepreneurs becamemorefamiliarwithpubliccorporations,morereceptiveto outside
capital as a vehicle for expansion, and more experienced in the organization, finance, and
administration of large-scale business. The small, specialized retail shop retained much of its old
importanceintothe1930s.ButafterWorldWarII,thebig,fixed-pricechainstoresexpandedbeyond
the beachhead that companies such as Woolworth, and Marks and Spencer, previously had
established in Britain. The American-style supermarket, aided by the automobile and the home
refrigerator, began to transform European retail food distribution.
The timing of this change around World War II is not accidental; the war itself had a
profound impact on social structure and outlook. In the aftermath of the war, great steps were taken
to democratize education. State-supported secondary schooling and universities were rapidly
expanded, literally hundreds of new university campuses were constructed and staffed, and public
support for the maintenance of university students was initiated. For virtually all the new students,
careers in industry, trade, banking, and finance became the mecca, not the traditional honorific
occupations. In France, even the polytechniciens joined industrial firms. Curricula were modified
tofitthemorepracticalconcernsofthismuch-expandedstudentpopulation.Schoolsofengineering
and business administration were founded or enlarged. Even Britain, the perennial laggard in
educational reform, responded byopening its new system ofcomprehensivesecondaryschools and
its new redbrick universities and polytechnical colleges.
The most important change of outlook was in the public attitude towards economic growth
itself. In the first half of the century, and particularly in the interwar years, the major concerns had
been income distribution, trade protection, and unemployment. After the war, it was growth that
gripped people’s imagination, and growth became the premier goal of public policy. Throughout
Europe and in Japan, programs of public investment were undertaken to modernize and expand the
infrastructure of roads, harbors, railroads, electric power and communications. The demand for
output and employment was supported by monetary and fiscal policy. The supply of labor was
enlarged byopeningborders to immigrants and guest workers. Productivitygrowth was pursued by
enlarging mass and technical education, by encouraging R&D, and by state support for large-scale
firms in newer lines of industry. The expansion of international trade, with all its significance for
industrial specialization, the equalization of factor prices and the transmission of technology, was
promoted by successive General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds, and by the
organization of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
We hold, therefore, that many features of European (and Japanese) social structure and
outlook had tended to delay catch-up in the nineteenth century. But these inhibitions weakened in
the early twentieth century, and, in the new social and political milieu of postwar reconstruction,
crumbled altogether. In the aftermath of World War II, these developments joined to reinforce the
vigorouscatch-upprocessthathadbeenreleasedbythenewconcordancebetweentherequirements- 153 -
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of the forms of technology and organization that had appeared in America and the economic
characteristics that now obtained in Western Europe and Japan.
Conditions Promoting the Realization of Potential
Following the severe disturbance of production and commerce caused by two world conflicts, the
post-World War I barriers to commerce, and by the Great Depression, the return of peace in 1945
proved the beginning of a time when advances in technology and better political policy supported
the rapid realization of potential growth.
Newconditionsfavoredthediffusionoftechnology.Transport,communications,andtravel
becamefasterandcheaper.Multinationalcorporateoperationsexpanded,creatingnewchannelsfor
the international transfer of technology, management practices, and modes of conducting R&D.
Heavier investment in R&D was encouraged by a closer connection between basic science and
technological applications, while the open, international character of much of the basic science
research communityfostered the rapid dissemination of information about new and more powerful
research techniques and instruments that were equally applicable for the purposes pursued in
corporate R&D laboratories.
Industry was able to satisfy a growing demand for labor without creating the tight labor
markets that might otherwisehave driven up wages undulyand promoted price inflation. Somekey
factors here were that unions had been weakened by war, unprecedentedly rapid labor productivity
growth in agriculture was freeing up workers from that sector, and Europe’s borders were opened
wider to immigrants and guest workers. U.S. immigration restrictions themselves helped to create
more flexible labor-market conditions in Europe.
Governmentalpoliciesatboththenationalandinternationallevelsfavoredinvestment,trade,
and thespread oftechnology. Thedollar-exchangestandard established at Bretton Woods, together
with U.S. monetaryand fiscal policyandU.S.capital exports,overcametheinitial concentration of
gold and other monetary reserves in this country. They sustained a chronic American balance-of-
payments deficit that redistributed reserves and ensured an adequate growth of money supply
throughout the industrialized world.
These and other matters that bear on the factors supporting “realization” in the post-World
War IIera deserve more ample description and discussion, which one of us sought to provide on an
earlier occasion.
215 We must confine this section largelyto the elements of a changing potential for
rapid growth by productivity catch-up. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the rapid and
systematicproductivityconvergenceofthepostwaryearsrestedonafortunatehistoricalconjuncture-154-
of strong potential for catching-up with the emergence of international and domestic economic
conditions that supported its rapid realization.
Many of the elements forming that conjuncture have now weakened or disappeared; most
plainlythelargeproductivitygapsthathadseparatedlaggardsfromtheleaderhavenowbecomevery
much smaller. The break-up of that favorable constellation of forces has slowed both the rate of
catch-up and of convergence within the group of advanced countries. The great opportunities for
rapid growth by modernization now belong to the nations of Eastern Europe, South and Southeast
Asia, and Latin America – provided theycan overcome the deep-rooted political obstacles and the
constraints imposed by their still-deficient levels of social capability.
Among the presently advanced capitalist nations, the question is whether the present
substantial equalityin productivitylevels will long persist. Will a new bend in the path of technical
advance again create a condition ofsuperiortechnological congruenceand social capabilityfor one




communication and biological and biomedical progress is yet to be revealed. The industrialization
of the huge populations of South and Southeast Asia may change the worlds of industry and
commerce in ways that are now still hidden.-155-
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Through Crative Destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 1992, pp. 323-51; Elhanan Helpman (ed.), General Purpose
Technologies and Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. See also Steven N. Durlauf and Danny T.
Quah, “The New Empirics of Economic Growth,” Santa Fe Institute Economics Research Program Working Paper,
1998, for careful discussion of the empirical implications of this literature, and an examination of the international
comparative data relating to the post-World War II era.
Afterword: The U.S. Historical Experience and Growth Theory, Old and New
The broad perspective presented here is one that long has informed our collaborative writings on
American economic history (and also some of the separately authored works that were developed
in the context of that collaboration).
216 It is a view that until veryrecentlyhas remained unorthodox
from the vantage point of growth-theorists working within the standard neoclassical tradition. Yet,
it will have been seen also to diverge in some important regards from the characteristic points of
emphasis in the literature devoted to “new growth theory.”
Of course, this interpretation is fully in sympathy with the emphasis lately being given (by
economists in quest of wholly endogenous models of long-term growth) to the role of advances in
knowledge flowing from investments in organized research and product development; no less with
the renewed attention to the dynamics of specialization and division of labor, and the latter’s
connections with the realization at the macroeconomic level of economies of scale and scope
deriving from access to widened markets.
217 While those themes certainlydo figure importantlyin
the present narrative, its subscription to some distinctive features of the applied macroeconomics
literatureinspiredby“newgrowththeory”remains decidedlyqualified.Several reasonsforholding
to “a different view” may now be indicated, by way of a conclusion.
To begin with, brief mention should be made of a technical matter that is perhaps of greater
interestfortime-seriesanalyststhanformostreadersofdescriptiveeconomichistory.Nevertheless,
it concerns thekeynotioninourinterpretativeparables ofsuccessive capital-deepening“traverses”
thatwereinitiatedbynon-neutraltechnologicalandorganizationalinnovations.Underlyingthatpart
of the discourse is an assumption of local dynamic stability, and of consequent convergence to the
next steady-state growth path in the historical sequence.-156-
218 See, e.g., the work of C. D. Romer, “The Pre-War Business Cycle Reconsidered: New Estimates of
GNP, 1869-1908,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1989, pp. 1-25, and other contributions reviewed in D.
Greasley and L. Oxley, “Explaining the United States’ Industrial Growth, 1860-1991,” Bulletin of Economic
Research, 48, 1996b, pp. 65-82. The latter report on their own analysis of the annual industrial production series for
the U.S. from the 1860s onwards, derived from W.G. Nutter’s series (Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet
Union, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the NBER) based on the Frickey index, which they spliced with
the Federal Reserve index of industrial production in 1919. When dummy variables are introduced to allow for
structural discontinuities affecting the trend, significant "breaks" are found c. 1901 and c.1973, the former being the
most pronounced. If that is treated as exogenous, Greasley and Oxley's (1996) statistical tests reject the existence of
a unit root in U.S. industrial production. They point out that C. R. Nelson and C. I. Prosser's (“Trends and Random
Walks in Economic Time Series,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, 1982, pp. 139-162) contrary finding of
"difference stationarity" in the U.S. industrial production data for the century preceding 1965 was based on an
analysis that assumed trend stationarity. These findings are thus broadly consistent with the interpretation here, for
we contend that the 1890-1905 era marked a watershed between two structurally distinct epochs of U.S.
macroeconomic growth, and implicitly assume that convergent traverses were underway during the more extended
periods before and following that interval, i.e., c.1835-c.1890, and c.1905-c.1989.
That, however, is directly at variance with the spirit of the "new growth" models which
endogenize all the proximate sources of rising labor productivity, including the growth of
knowledge,andtherebyescapetheconstraintsofdiminishingmarginalreturnstocapitalformation.
Such models carry the theoretical implication that their dynamic behavior is not convergent.T h e
empirical plausibility of adopting our analytical framework is therefore intimately related to the
econometricquestion of the existence or non-existence of unit roots, and otherstatistical indicators
of the persistence of shocks in the extended historical record of aggregate production.
Macroeconomictime-seriesanalystshavebeenmuchoccupiedlatelywiththelatterquestion.
FromsomeoftheirmorerecentfindingfortheU.S.overtheperiod1870-1990itappearsthatwithin
secular epochs that can be distinguished bymajor trend breaks, the empirical relevance of unit root
hypothesiscanberejectedbyeconometrictests.Inotherwords,withintheidentifiedepochs–whose
durations are of the same order as the “Long Periods” that figure in our account – the dynamic
process at the macro level therefore may be treated as essentially convergent.
218 This lends at least
a measure of technical statistical support for the assumptions that are embraced implicitly by the
particularstyleofgrowth-theoreticparablethatwefind,onothercountsaswell,tohaveconsiderable
heuristic value in interpreting of the American economy’s long-term performance.
The next point on which we need to qualify the claims of the “new growth theory” to
historical relevance concerns the differentiation between the successive American “traverses,” a
matterthathasbeencentralintheargumentoftheprecedingpages.Anypretensionsthatthepopular
formulationsofendogenousgrowththeorymightpossessempiricalvalidityofahistoricallygeneral
and universallyvalid sort, simplyfails to find support in theAmerican experience. Inparticular, the
key role in raising labor productivity and per capita real income that is now accorded to increases
in average educational attainment and the growth of human capital-intensity more broadly, cannot
be squared with the quantitative picture of U.S. economic progress throughout much of the
nineteenth century. Maintenance of a high level of literacy in important sections of the population
mayhave had a good bit to do with establishing a growth path characterized byhigh levels of labor-157-
219 On the consistency of this view with evaluations of the role of human capital formation through formal
education in the industrial revolution in Britain, see Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, London: Methuen,
1984. On the relevance of the cognitive content of the formal school curricula in the US during the nineteenth
century, see e.g., Albert Fishlow, “The American Common School Revival, Fact or Fancy?” in Henry Rosovsky
(ed.), Industrialization in Two Systems, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966; on nineteenth-century investment in
education see Albert Fishlow, “Levels of Nineteenth Century American Investment in Education,” reprinted in Fogel
and Engerman (eds.), The Reinterpretation of American Economic History, 1971, pp. 265-73. Journal of Economic
History, 1966: pp. 418-36; on education, “socialization” of the work force, and factory discipline in mid-century, see
A. J. Field, “Educational Expansion in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts: Human Capital Formation or
Structural Reinforcement?” Harvard Educational Review,46(4), November 1976; A.J. Field, “Economic and
Demographic Determinants of Educational Commitment: Massachusetts, 1855,” Journal of Economic History, 39(2),
June 1979, pp. 439-59. For quantitative studies showing the absence of strong, or even weak statistically significant
education-associated wage differences among manufacturing employees in northern and southern cotton textile mills
in the nineteenth century, see Harold S. Luft, “New England Textile Labor in the 1840s: from Yankee Farmgirl to
Irish Immigrant,” Harvard Business School, unpublished working paper, 1971; Thomas Dublin, Women at Work:
The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860, New York: Columbia
University Press; Cathy McHugh, Mill Family: The Labor System in the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1880-
1915, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. But see also, Susan A. Matthies, Useful Children: An Economic
Study of Child Workers in the Cotton Textile Industry, 1900-1910, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford
University, 1991, Ch.5, for findings of positive schooling effects on earnings rates among child workers in the
southern states, and northern states (separately), early in the twentieth century.
220 In addition to the qualitative indications, there is also some econometric evidence pointing to the
significant role of experience-based "learning-by-doing" among the microeconomic sources of rising labor
productivity, and real earnings rates reflecting the accumulation of individual worker experience, particularly in
textiles manufacturing. See, e.g., Paul A. David,"Learning by doing and tariff protection: a reconsideration of the
case of the United States cotton textile industry,” Journal of Economic History, 30(3), September 1970; Paul A.
David, "The Use and Abuse of Prior Information in Econometric History, A Rejoinder to Professor Williamson on
the Antebellum Cotton Textile Industry," Journal of Economic History, vol. 32 (3), September 1972, pp. 706-727;
Paul A. David, "The ‘Horndall Effect’ in Lowell, 1834-1856: A Short-Run Learning Curve for Integrated Cotton
Textile Mills," Explorations in Economic History, vol. 10 (2), Winter 1973, pp. 131-150. Significant experience
effects on differential worker earnings are reported for the cotton textile industry by Luft, “New England Textile
Labor,”(1971), McHugh, Mill Family (1988), and Matthies, Useful Children (1991).
productivity and per capita consumption. But, that says nothing directly about education's
contributions to a faster rate of growth in economic well-being. Furthermore, quite a number of
studies of the nature of schooling and the extension of basic literacy and numeracy in antebellum
America have raised substantial doubts about the immediate relevance of the cognitive content of
education to the processes through which the productivity of the workforce was being enhanced in
that era.
219 Bycomparison, the accumulation of workplace experience appears to have been a more
important determinant of differential earnings rates.
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Continuing further in this vein, it would seem that there is a greater measure of empirical
support – from detailed studies of the transformation of industrial technology at the plant and firm
levelduringthenineteenthcentury–forputtingmajoremphasisuponlearning-by-doingasasource
of increasing industrial efficiency. This, it might be recalled was the main message imparted bythe
pioneeringeconomicgrowthliteratureonendogenoussourcesoftechnologicaladvance,longbefore-158-
221 A. Alchian, “Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production,” Econometrica, xxxi (October
1963), pp. 679-73; Kenneth J. Arrow, “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,” Review of Economic
Studies, 29(2), 1962; Robert M. Solow, “Investment and Technical Progress,” in K.J. Arrow et al. (Eds.),
Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 89-104, 1960; Robert
M. Solow, “Perspectives on Growth Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), Winter 1994, pp. 45-54 are
classics among the more theoretical contributions in this vein. In addition to much richly detailed descriptive material
in standard historical sources for the period, such as Clark (1929) and Kirkland (1955), a number of econometric
findings identifying "learning effects" in integrated cotton textile production (power spinning and weaving mills),
mechanized shoe factories, and blast furnace and rolling mill operations, may be mentioned in this regard. See Paul
A. David,"Labour Productivity in English Agriculture1850-1914: Some Quantitative Evidence of Regional
Differences," Economic History Review, vol. 23 (3), December 1970, pp. 504-514; Paul A. David, Technical
Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth: Essays on American and British Experience in the Nineteenth Century,
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, Chs. 1, 4. (Second Edition forthcoming in Fall 1999
from Cambridge University Press); Peter Berck, “Hard Driving and Efficiency: Iron Production in 1890,” Journal of
Economic History, 38(4), December 1978, pp. 879-900, and Ross Thompson, The Path to Mechanized Shoe
P r o d u c t i o ni nt h eU S , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
222 This view is not unrelated to the theme of American economic exceptionalism having contributed to
shaping technology in ways that were “congruent” with national market characteristics and resource endowments that
were not replicated elsewhere during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Moses Abramovitz and Paul
A. David, “Convergence and Deferred Catch-Up: Productivity Leadership and the Waning of American
Exceptionalism,” Ch. 2 of Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor and Gavin Wright (eds.), The Mosaic of Economic
Growth, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
the current popularity of mathematical models of “endogenous growth.”
221 More recently, Gavin
Wright (1998) has elaborated the idea of learning-by-doing in social network environments, and
argued that the formation and transmission of particular design traditions, and characteristic
approaches in industrial and mineral engineering, constituted a “social learning process” that was
national in its scope, and which, by the early twentieth century, had created a technological culture
that was distinctively American.
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Considering the matter from the perspective of the nineteenth century U.S. economy, then,
the particular mechanisms seen by "new growth theory" as driving the process of productivity
improvement and rising real per capita income appear at best to have verylittle explanatorypower.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this assessment accords with the overall judgement reached by N. F. R.
Crafts'(1993)evaluationoftheseendogenousgrowthmodels’relevanceinaccountingforBritain’s
growth experience during the epoch of the Industrial Revolution.
But what of the more recent past, the modern experiences of the U.S. and other already
advanced industrial societies, experiences that are more likely to have informed the “new” growth
theory? Here the previouslynoted qualifications are no longer appropriate. The emphasis accorded
to intangible capital formation through education, and investment in organized R&D certainly is
warranted, as is the insistence that the mobilization of resources for those purposes has been at it
base a response to perceived economic payoffs. But the need to register some other qualifications
remains. Among these we should note doubts regarding the implicit, and sometimes explicitly-159-
223 See e.g., F.M. Scherer, “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented
Inventions,” in Innovation and Growth, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1984, Chap. 9; Richard R. Nelson and
Edward N. Wolff “Factors Behind Cross-Industry Differences in Technical Progress,” NYU Economics Department
working paper, 1996.
formalized assumption that there exists a global stock of technologically relevant knowledge, the
pace of additions to which remain highly elastic to the input of national research efforts.
Studies of the determinant of company investment in R&D in the post-World War II era
repeatedlyhave pointed to the importance of "science-based opportunities" as well as to conditions
affecting private appropriability of economic returns in affecting the pattern of research intensities
acrossindustrialsectors.Butwhattheseinvestigationsofinter-industrydifferencesalsorevealisthat
where the positive statistical association between high ratios of R&D to sales and the growth rate
of input efficiency emerges, the latter is largely accounted for by the indicators of strong "science-
based opportunities."
223 In other words, whereas the burden of the macroeconomic formulations of
the "new growth theory" has been to tell us that rapid technological advances can be endogenously
generated by the investment of resources in R&D which does not encounter diminishing marginal
returns,theavailableindicationsattheindustrialandline-of-businesslevelsuggestthatthisismore
true of the long-run than it is over the near term; "opportunities" for profitable investment are more
constrained by the slow, incrementally transformed and path-dependent state of the existing
fundamental scientific and engineering knowledge-base.
Furthermore, the growth of that knowledge-base, although surely substantially subject to
economic forces over the long run, cannot usefullybe portrayed – as it is in manyformal models of
the “new” genre – as being determined "endogenously" by the behaviors of individual agents and
organizations working wholly within the context of a particular, informationally insulated (and
isolated) national economy. It is, rather, a construction of the larger international systems of
knowledge generation and dissemination, to which public and privately-funded research activities
taking place under a varietyof economic and political conditions have been contributors. This may
poseamoredauntingchallengethanthenewgrowththeoryhasacceptedthusfar.Yet,forsomelong
time the way forward in theorizing about economic growth has tended to lie along the trail blazed,
however roughly, by students of quantitative economic history. It would seem fruitful to continue
further along that path by explicitly modeling the interactions among the knowledge-intensive
economies.
Lastly, we come to a point on which the perspectives of “new” and “neoclassical” growth
theorists tend to coincide, namely, in the undertaking to apportion responsibility for the growth of




about emphasizing the importance of seeing all aspects of the growth process – technological-160-
innovation included – as “endogenous” economic processes, while carrying out calculations that
seemingly accept the standard accounting approach as an informative explanatory framework.
Such clarity as the latter are able to achieve by assigning quantitative measures of absolute
and relative “importance” to the various sources of the growth of real output (whether on an
aggregate or a per capita basis) derives in reality from the growth accountant’s willingness to hew
to a particularly simplified view of the workings of the economy: namely, to treat the identified set
of“proximatesources”as though theyoperated quiteindependentlyofoneanother.Thatprocedure
rests on notions of the “neutrality of innovation” as constituting the typical state of affairs. By
contrast,wehavesoughttoputthosenotionsfirmlyasideinfavorofamorethroughly“endogenous”
interpretation of U.S. macroeconomic history, one that recognizes the shifting complex of forces
which continue to makenoveltyand structural changethe essence of long-term economic progress.E-1
ENDNOTES
I. Endnotes for Part One
1. Our table of growth rates across “long periods” is constructed by calculating weighted averages of growth rates that
combine long swing intervals during which growth was slow with those of the following long swing intervals when
growth was more rapid. We regard the second swing of each pair as, in part, a rebound from the first. We might at the
same time have calculated averagesthatcombine longswingsofrapid growthwith following periodsofslower growth.
The “relapse” case for such combinations, however, is weaker. In business cycles, for example, there is a strong
correlation between the severity of contractions and the strength of subsequent recoveries, but not the reverse. In any
case,acomparisonofourlong-periodserieswithatwo-periodmovingaverageofgrowthratesacrosslongswingsyields
theverysamepictureofalongaccelerationbeginningwiththesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyandcontinuinginto
the long-swing interval following World War II. There is only this difference between our series of long-period growth
rates in column (2) of the following table and the moving-average series in column (5). With our procedure, the severe
slowdown of the last quarter-century stands out clearly. In the moving-average series, the slowdown is hidden in an
average of the growth rate from 1946 to 1966 with that from 1966 to 1989. We prefer our procedure.








1835-55 0.366 1800-55 0.39 1800-55 0.39
1855-71 0.14 1835-71 0.27
1871-90 1.84 1855-90 1.06 1855-90 1.06
1890-1905 1.36 1871-1905 1.63
1905-27 2.45 1890-1927 2.01 1890-1927 2.01
II. Twentieth Century
1890-1905 1.93
1905-27 2.05 1890-1927 2.00 1890-1927 2.00
1929-48 1.96 1905-48 2.01
1948-66 3.11 1929-66 2.52 1929-66 2.52
1966-89 1.23 1966-89 1.23 1948-89 2.05
11800-35 and 1835-55 calculated fromGDP per capita fromDavid (1996). Table 7, Frame B, together with Population
GrowthfromHistoricalStatistics and Full-time equivalent manhours fromDavid (1996) Table 2.1. 1800-55 and 1855-
1989 from Table IIA, above.
2From Table II above.
3Calculated from Col. (1) in this table.E-2
2.ProfessorSolow,however,wasnotthefirstto attemptmeasuresofcrude TFP;prioritybelongstoJanTinbergenwho
published his results in 1942 in an article little noticed until years later. He was followed by others who studied TFP in
the aggregate economy: Fabricant in 1954 and one of the present writers, Abramovitz, in 1956. Both Fabricant and
Abramovitz depended on methods and data worked out by John Kendrick, whose great book on productivity trends
appeared in 1961. Meanwhile still others made similar studies confined to manufacturing or agriculture. Zvi Griliches’
“TheDiscoveryoftheResidual:AHistoricalNote”,JournalofEcon.Literature,xxxiv,No.3(Sept.1996),1324-30may
be consulted for a compact historical note on the discovery of the residual.
3.Amajorassumptionisthatthe returnsto the factorsofproductiondo notvarywiththescaleoftheeconomy,provided
that factor proportions are constant. Insofar as there really are returns to scale, the factor shares used as weights in the
formula will not exhaust the product, and the gains from economies of scale thus neglected in the contributions of the
factors will then form part of the TFP residual along with the gains from the advance of knowledge proper and other
unmeasured sources.
4.Theseobservationssuggestthattheshiftfromanerawhentangiblecapitalaccumulationwasthemajorsourceoflabor
productivity growth to one when total factor productivity growth became dominant took place around the turn of the
century. This conclusion, however, depends onthe definitionof“longperiods” onwhichTable IV is based. Those who
preferinsteadtolookatthemeasuresacross“longswingintervals”inTableIVAmightreachadifferentconclusionand
place the change a generation earlier in the long-swing interval, 1871-90.
We reject that view. We do not see the negative figure for TFP in the period spanning the Civil War as a
measure ofthelong-termforcesshapingtheeconomy.Weregarditratherasanindexofthe cost ofthe war itself, which
includes not only its physical destruction, commercial disruption and inflationary finance, but also the costs of its
aftermath, of demobilization, disinflation and Southern Reconstruction.
Theperiodthatfollowed(1871-90)sawasharpreboundfromthesedisturbancesinwhichmanydevelopments
took place that except for the War might have begun earlier and been carried out more slowly. The decades following
1870 saw the extension of the railway net, the resumption of westward expansion, a large increase in immigration and
thereorganizationofcorporatescaleandstructuretotakeadvantageoftheemergingpotentialoftechnologicalprogress
and the economies of the country's growing scale – all of which was, in part, the more concentrated exploitation of a
backlog of opportunity that had accumulated during the years of war and financial and commercial disruption. So we
think that the combination of the two subperiods as in Table IV is a useful wayto depict the underlying trend of growth
and its sources.
The changes in the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock – as distinct from the growth of capital per
manhour – is part of the same story. Between 1835 to 1855 and 1855 to 1871, the growth rate of the aggregate capital
stock fell by 19 percent. As a result, the average age of the capital stock would have risen, and since most innovations
in technology must be embodied in tangible capital, the pace at which new knowledge is actually incorporated into
production would have been reduced. The low level of TFP growth in the period crossing the Civil War is due in part
totheimpactoftheWaranditsaftermathontherateofcapitalformation.Thenbetween1871and1890,thegrowthrate
of the capital stock speeded up – by32 percent – with the effect of reducing the average age of the stock, increasing the
rate of incorporation of new knowledge into production and raising the growth rate of TFP. There is an analogous
development later during the long-swing intervals 1929-48 and 1948-66. In that case, we estimate that this “vintage
effect” was responsible for 30 percent of the acceleration of Labor Productivity growth between the two periods. This
is probably a lower bound. The effect may have been greater. See the discussion in the Appendix note on the vintage
effect below.
5.Variousstudieshaveusedthesemethodswithdifferentdegreesofrefinement.EdwardDenison’sestimates,onwhich
we rely for the years from 1890 to 1966, follow the methods just outlined. Denison, however, tried to make some
allowanceforworkercharacteristicsgenerallycorrelatedwithschoolingbutnotinthemselvesattributabletoeducation,
e.g. IQ and parents’ income and education. Such statistics as he could bring to bear suggested some 15 to 20 percent of
differences in earnings between levels of education are, in fact, due to these correlates of education. He adjusted his
weighting scheme accordingly and, of course, reached a smaller estimate of the contribution of education than he
otherwise would have done.E-3
The estimates of the BLS on which we rely for the years since 1966 are made by methods more refined than
Denison’sinsomerespects.TheBLSclassifiesmanhours,notbyage,butby“experience,”thatisbythenumberofyears
inemploymentaftertheendofformalschooling.Moreimportant,itclassifiesmanhoursintoage-sex-educationcellsand
weights the hours in each such joint cell according to the average earnings of workers who share the same three
characteristics. The interactions among the three are thereby taken into account.
6. Over the years between 1925 and 1989, the constant cost value (1987$) of the stock of equipment increased from 26
percent of the total of fixed non-residential private capital to 48 percent. The service lives used to determine values by
the BAE ranged from 7 to 33 years for different types of equipment and between 30 and 54 for different types of
structures(exceptfor"mobileoffices," 16years).The actual average age ofequipment wasalmost exactlyone-halfthat
of structures in both 1925 and 1989. (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993.)
7. The enrolment figures for 1850 are from the Census, as reported in Historical Statistics of the United States,S e r i e s
H433. The slowrise from1800 to 1850 conforms to less comprehensive evidence presented byAlbert Fishlowin“The
AmericanSchool Revival: Fact orFancy”? InIndustrializationinTwoSystems, edited byHenryRosovsky, NewYork:
John Wiley and Sons, 1966. The data on school attendance are from the U.S. Department of Education, Digest of
Educational Statistics, 1965, Table 5.
8. Some economists argue that the economies associated with the growing scale of the economy can be and should be
separately identified and measured. This was the position of Edward Denison (1974), one of the notable pioneers of
growth accounting, and his opinion is shared by others, for example Angus Maddison (1987). In this view, the growth
of market scale creates a potential, within the bounds of known and available technology, to reduce costs by organizing
the production of a given mix of goods and services in firms of larger scale, by increasing the number of distinct, but
related, goods produced by a single enterprise which can usefully spread a common burden of overhead (economies of
scope) or byconfiningthe activityoffirmstothe productionofa narrower, more specialized varietyofgoodsbutdoing
so ona larger scale – all subject to the sole proviso that thescaleofthemarketexpands. (Cf. Denison, 1974, pp. 71-75.)
This is a view which, in one form or another, has been the standard doctrine of economics since the time of
AdamSmith, and we too believe that growingmarket scale creates a potential for productivitygrowth. Indeed this view
is an essential part of an interpretation of modern American growth experience, as a later section will contend. Yet we
donotbelievethatmeasuresoftheEconomiesofScaleshouldappearasadistinctsourceinourgrowthaccount,separate
from technological progress itself. There are two general reasons.
First,noreliablemeasureshaveyetbeendevised.EdwardDenisonhimself(1974,1985)has,indeed,proposed
a measure based on the assumption that the economies of scale bear a simple relation, uniformover time, to the growth
of aggregate national product in the private, non-residential sector of the economy. It seems clear, however, that other
factors must have a share in determining the effective size of markets – notably, the facilities for transportation and
communication,bothwithinthecountryandwithothercountries,theclassandregionaldifferencesinincomes,education
and tastes that control the public’s tolerance for standardized commodities and services and, indeed, the success of
enterprises in their merchandising efforts to create the markets for standardized goods. Since all these conditioning
factors have changed substantially in the course of the two past centuries we think that the notion that there existed a
stable relation between aggregate output and the economies of scale may be safely put out of mind.
Our ownview,sharedwithothers,isthatthegainsfromanexpansionofmarketsare notvalidlyseparable from
the advance of knowledge itself. Onthe one hand, we believe that, for the most part, the productivitygrowth associated
with growing scale is similar in nature to technological progress in that its potential benefits can be realized onlyas the
result of a learning process. Howto organize the production and markets of firms efficientlyon a large scale or in more
specialized activity is not generally known in advance, but must be learned by actual practice and experience, and
sometimes bydeliberate research and development. In addition, we hold that the technological advances of the last two
centuries–andperhapsmoreparticularlythoseofthe nineteenthcentury–havebeentoalargedegreescale-dependent.
They could be incorporated into production only insofar as the scale, integration and specialization of firms became
larger. The practical realization of the advances of knowledge, therefore, has been limited not only by the extent of
markets, but also by the effort and costs required to learn how to create and exploit larger markets effectively.E-4
9. Some growth accountants, for example, have treated movements of labor and capital among industries in which
average earnings are different as an independent source of growth of output and factor productivity (Kendrick, 1961,
1973; also Denison, 1974, 1985, but only in the special case of the movement of farm labor on poor farms to nonfarm
occupations). Suchcalculationwouldbejustifiedonlyifaverageearningsdifferentialsamongindustrieswereinstances
of disequilibrium differences between, say, workers of given age, sex and level of education. Our own view, however,
is that, for the most part, average earnings differentials across industries stem from differences in the sex, age and
educational composition of their workforces. If, therefore, one has allowed for the contributions of overall changes in
sex, age and educational composition, as we have done, there would be double counting if we allowed as well for inter-
industrial shifts of labor among industries in which average earnings are different.
S.N.Broadberry(1996)haspresentedestimatesoftheimportanceofshiftsinindustrialcompositionfollowing
a different plan. His goal is to distinguish the growth rate of aggregate productivity attributable to the growth of
productivity within sectors assuming that the share of each sector in total output remains constant from the growth of
productivity attributable to change in the importance of each sector, assuming that the relative levels of productivity in
the various industries remain constant. (His formulae for carrying out this decomposition were first presented by Wm.
N. Nordhaus (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1972, No. 3, Appendix A). Broadberry’s most striking finding
is that only 55 percent of aggregate productivity growth was attributable to “within-sector” growth in a period running
from 1870 to 1913; the other 45 percent was associated with shifts in the sectoral composition of output. In the later
periods used by Broadberry, however, sectoral shift became less important, (1919-37, 33 percent; 1950-90, zero).
We have ourselves experimented with such a decomposition, using a somewhat different formula of
decomposition, data sources consonant with the aggregates used elsewhere inthis chapter and periods that are the same
or similar to those used in the other tables of this chapter. Our own estimates of “within-sector” productivity growth as
percentage of aggregate productivity growth follow:
1869/78-1913 1913-1929 1929-1948 1948-1966 1966-1989
56 87 80 95 92
The results suggest that it was only between 1870 and 1913 that compositional change was of first-rate
importance,andoverthatperiodourestimateisalmostexactlythesameasBroadberry’s.From1913to1948suchshifts
were a minor component of the total. And after 1948, theycounted for little. The significance of structural shift even in
the period when it was a large component, however, depends on the idea that the sectoral shifts arose from causes that
wereindependentofthesourcesofsectoraldifferencesinproductivitygrowthitself(whichincludedboththedifferential
growthincapital-intensityand the differences in technological progress underlying that). Thus, it is important to notice
that Broadberry’s descriptive decompositionanalysis has not established the role of inter-sectoral shift effects upon the
rise of the TFP residual in the period 1870-1913, or in the other trend intervals.
Between1870and1913,theshiftswereoftwosorts.Therewasalargedropintheshareofagricultureinoutput
and employment when the level of productivity in that sector was low and large gains in the importance of mining,
manufacturing, transport and trade where levels of productivitywere higher, in some cases much higher. The decline of
agriculture was a normal consequence of the usual inelasticity of the demand for food in a time of rapidly rising per
capitaoutputandincome(the“Engeleffect”).Theriseofmining,manufacturing,transportationandcommunicationand
trade, on the other hand, was, in part, simply the complement of the decline of agriculture as incomes increased and, in
part,theeconomy’sresponsetothecharacteroftheera’srapidtechnologicalprogress,whichwasminerals-intensiveand
capital-using, but scale-dependent. It demanded a heavy use of mineral and capital equipment but also much transport
and communication to support operations on an ever-larger scale. All this is a central theme of Part Two. For the time
being, perhaps it is enough to say that the “sectoral shift effect” may simply reflect one of the channels through which
“biased” technological progress of this era affected the pattern of aggregate input use, by altering the structure of
consumption and the industrial composition in the economy.
10. The summary in Part One, Section 6 describes the best quantitative profile of U.S. nineteenth-century growth that
we are able to draw, but it is not the only such picture of that era. Robert Gallman, whose fundamental reconstruction




part of the nineteenth century and the later part. It is 2.4 times as large between 1840 and 1900 than between 1800 and
1840. Its importance as a source of per capita GNP growth rises by 44 percent.
(b) TFP growth, which appears as the source of 61 percent of per capita GNP growth before 1840 in the
Gallman estimates, falls to 47 percent from 1840 to 1900, which again is in accord with the direction of change in our
tables although more muted in quantity.
(c) Most importantofallperhaps,thestrikingincreasebetweenthecenturiesintheimportanceofTFP growth,
which stands out so prominently in our picture, would appear as well if the Gallman figures for the nineteenth century
weresubstitutedforourown.Ifwedependonourownfiguresforthesecondhalfofthe nineteenthcentury,TFP growth
in the early part of the twentieth century was 3.5 times as fast. In the long mid-section of the twentieth century, it was
almost4timesasfast.UsingtheGallmanfiguresforthe second halfofthenineteenthcentury,thecomparabletwentieth
century relatives are 1.8 and 2, a large acceleration even if smaller than our own.
Thus, in Gallman’s tables, TFP accounts for a larger proportion of the growth of per capita output in the
nineteenth century and both labor and capital for smaller fractions. These differences are more pronounced in the early
part of the century than they are in the later. At the same time, there are resemblances between the Gallman estimates
and those presented here, which concern matters that underlie our interpretation of changes in the sources of growth
between the two halves of the nineteenth century, as well as between the two centuries.
The differences between the Gallman figures and our own reflect many differences in the procedures upon
which the estimates are built. There are two principal differences:
First, Professor Gallman depends on the number of persons in the Labor Force to represent Labor Input. We
estimate the annual aggregate number of hours of work. Our figures thus allow for changes in the persons engaged per
member of the Labor Force and for hours of work per person engaged per year. It is a drawback of our procedure that
persons engaged and hours of work can onlybe estimated very roughly. In the nineteenth century, however, when labor
wasshiftingrapidlyfromFarmstoNonfarmjobsinwhichannualhourswerehigher,wethinklaborinputwasfasterthan
the growth of the labor force above suggests. Our labor input, therefore, rises faster than Professor Gallman’s, and total
factor productivity growth is correspondingly slower.
Second, in the Gallman account, the shares of income, and thus the relative weights assigned to the growth of
labor and capital, are the same in both halves of the century. Our own weights are the same as Professor Gallman’s in
thefirsthalfofthecentury.Inthelatterhalf,however,ourestimateofcapital’sincomeshareishigherandlabor’slower.
And since capital’sgrowthwasfaster thanlabor’s, the effect isagainto raise the contribution of total factor input inour
account and so to reduce our estimate of the growth rate of TFP.
There are still other differences that arise because our dividing line between the two halves of the century is
1855; in Professor Gallman’s account it is in 1840. We end the nineteenth century in 1890, which, in accord with our
practice, is the midyear of the quinquennium at the end of a long-swing expansion. Professor Gallman’s terminal year
is 1900. The following tables are designed to bring out the major sources of difference between the two accounts of the
pace and proximate sources of the pre-1900 growth of “real output per capita.”
To increase the immediate comparability between the estimates underlying our tables and the figures that
appear in Table 7 of Gallman's chapter, we follow him here in taking GNP per capita as the measure of output (rather
than GDP or GPDP). Similarly, throughout the step-by-step sequence of growth rate comparisons below, we work with
hismajorperiodforthenineteenthcentury,1800-40and1840-1900,ratherthanthemorecomplicatedperiodizationwe
have developed – with the aid of underlying annual real GDP estimates for the years 1834-1909 which rest primarily
upon Professor Gallman's own pioneering research, as the Appendix on statistical sources describes.
In Panel A, we apply Gallman’s income shares to the growth rate of Labor Input and Capital Input (including
Land). These are Labor: 0.68 and capital 0.32, and are the same in both periods. We denote our figures as A&D.
Panel A: Comparison Adopting Gallman's Labor Input Concept and Standard Factor Shares
Output Growth Rates and
Contributions to Per Capita GNP Growth
Differences: Gallman-A&D
1800-1840 1840-1900 1800-1840 1840-1900E-6
Gallman A&D Gallman A&D
GNP 0.90 0.68 1.52 1.46 0.22 0.06
Labor 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.01 -0.12
Capital 0.28 0.22 0.69 0.63 0.06 0.06
TFP 0.55 0.40 0.71 0.59 0.15 0.12
These figures indicate that with these uniform assumptions the chief difference is in the rate of GNP growth
between 1800 and 1840, and it is this, allowing for trifling differences in the inputs, which accounts for the higher TFP
figure in the Gallman column. In the years 1840-1900, the GNP figures become very similar and the TFP difference,
small even in the early period, becomes even smaller.
In Panel B, we use Labor Input figures in the A&D column based on Hours of Work, but continue to use the
Gallman factor share:
Panel B: Comparison Retaining Gallman's Standard Factor Shares
Output Growth Rate and
Contributions to Per Capita GNP Growth
Difference: Gallman-A&D
1800-1840 1840-1900 1800-1840 1840-1900
Gallman A&D Gallman A&D
GNP 0.90 0.68 1.52 1.46 0.22 0.06
Labor 0.07 0.28 0.12 0.35 -0.21 -0.23
Capital 0.28 0.22 0.69 0.63 0.06 0.06
TFP 0.55 0.18 0.71 0.48 0.37 0.23
Now Labor Input in the A&D columns is faster; this enlarges Total Factor Input and reduces TFP. The
difference between the Gallman TFP growth and the A&D becomes larger.
InPanelC,wecontinuetomeasureLaborInputintheA&Dcolumnsbyhoursofwork,butnowweapplyA&D
factor shares to the growth rates of the factors in the A&D columns. Thismakesno difference in 1800-1840; our shares
are the same as Gallman’s. In 1840-1900, the A&D factor share of Capital rises to 0.44, while the Labor share falls to
0.56.
Panel C: Comparison Showing Combined Effect of Differences in Labor Input and Share Weights
Output Growth Rates and
Contributions to Per Capita GNP Growth
Differences: Gallman-A&D
1800-1840 1840-1900 1800-1840 1840-1900
Gallman A&D Gallman A&D
GNP 0.90 0.68 1.52 1.46 0.22 0.06E-7
Labor 0.07 0.28 0.12 0.29 -0.21 -0.17
Capital 0.28 0.22 0.69 0.87 0.06 -0.18
TFP 0.55 0.18 0.71 0.30 0.37 0.41
The differencesbetweenthe Gallmanand A&D figures from1800 to 1840 remainthe same, ofcourse, asthey
were in Panel B. In 1840-1900, the A&D labor contribution declines by .06 percentage points, but the AD capital
contributionrisesby0.24points.TheA&DTFPestimateis,therefore,reducedbythedifference.Manifestly,thischange
inthe factor shares (and corresponding input weights) helps account for the striking rise in Capital’s contribution inthe
A&D growthaccount between the first and second halvesofthe nineteenthcentury, for the especiallyslowTFP growth
in the second halfand for the fact that the accelerationinTFP growth between the second half of the nineteenth century
and that in the twentieth century shown by our estimates is even sharper than Gallman might find.
11. There were important quality changes even in the basic necessities, and these too were mainly a twentieth-century
development.Aslateas1940,some45percentofallhousingunitsstilllackedcompleteplumbingfacilities.Thefraction
was certainly much higher in 1900. By 1990, however, it was just 1.1 percent (Census of Housing as reported in
Statistical Abstract, 1994, Table 1214). There were other developments as well. Synthetic textiles, which first became
of some importance in the 1920s brought consumers new varieties of garments, cheaper, more durable, more colorful
andeasiertocleanthantheold.Newdevelopmentsinthepreservationandpurityoffoodsandbeverageswereimportant
in both centuries.
12. The underlying figures for years of expected life for white males run as follows:
At birth At 40 At 70
1900-02 48.2 27.7 9.0
1929-31 59.1 29.2 9.2
1991 72.7 35.6 13.9
Source: Historical Statistics, Tables B116 to 124; Statistical Abstract, 1994, Table 116.
13. The survival prospects for the members of the (white) male birth cohort starting life in 1991 have improved
remarkably, as has been noticed, but their prospectsfor per capita real income growth – over the expected 73 years that
the mortality table for that year would allow them – remain especially cloudy. If the 1966-89 growth rate of real GNP
per manhour is projected into the future, implicitly assuming that manhours per capita remained constant, they might
anticipateexperiencinganaveragelifetimegainofonly144percent,orsubstantiallylessthanthatenjoyedbythe1930-1
birthcohort.Ontheotherhand,implicitlyassumingthat the lowered rate oflabor productivitygrowthover the 1966-89
period is transitory and there will be some rebound, the (higher) growth rate of GNP per capita during 1966-89 could
be projected forward, indicating a gain of 237 percent between 1991 and the year 2064. When we take the geometric
average of these pessimistic and optimistic estimates, the “golden mean” figure turns out to be an expected lifetime
average real income gainof184 percent, which is, more or less, a satisfyingcontinuationofthe experience ofthe 1929-
31 birth cohort. Of course, more of that projected proportionate measure of material improvement would be “enjoyed”
by the 1991 cohort when they are at older ages. And, indeed, a larger part of it is likely to take the form of health care
services.
14. Measurement reform to take account of new and improved types of capital goods is thought by some economists to
mean not only a change in the growth rate of output, but also a change, for purposes of growth accounting, in the
calculated measure of the capital stock as a source of output growth. The appearance of new forms of capital goods,
however, is due to the progress of knowledge and its incorporation into production. To incorporate the result of such
change into measures of capital as a source of growth, therefore, would be wrong. The new forms of capital goods are
themselvestheexpressionofthegrowthofknowledge.Toinjecttheresultsofsuchprogressintoourmeasuresofcapital
accumulation in the growth accounts would be to confound the contributions of the capital stock with those ofE-8
technological progress. The proper practice isto applythe results of measurement reformto estimates of output growth
but not to those ofthe capital stockin a growth account. Edward F. Denisonprovides a thoroughand perceptive critical
discussion of the problem in his Estimates of Productivity Change by Industry, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1985: esp. Ch. 2.E-9
II. Endnotes for Part Two
1.Thedefinitionof“neutrality”givenbythetext,specifyingthattechnologicalinnovationshavenoeffectontherelative
input mix (given unchanged relative input prices), is strictly speaking referred to as “Salter-neutrality” – as it is due to
W.E.G. Salter (1962). This definition usually is applied in describing technical changes at the level of the individual
production unit, or the industry, where it may be supposed that the choice among available techniques is made byfirms
that are price-takers in the markets for their inputs. But it can serve equally well for descriptive purposes at the macro-
level, in the context of our acceptance of the aggregate production function metaphor.
The dual concept of the Salter-neutrality focuses explicitly upon the demand-side macro-level impacts of
technological change in the input markets, and so considers the influence upon relative rates of factor remuneration (or
more generallyonrelative productive asset prices), when aggregate relative factor proportionsremainunchanged. This
concept was introduced by John R. Hicks (1934). Under “Hicks-neutrality,” innovation changes the marginal
productivities of all inputs in exactly the same proportional degree, so that (assuming competitive factor market
conditions) the relative prices of the inputs would remain unaltered – except for changes traceable to shifts in their
relative supplies.




condition: given the capital-output ratio, Harrod-neutral technological progress neither decreases nor increases the real
rate of return on capital.
The usage of the terms “labor-saving,” and “capital-using” in connection with the consequences of
technological innovation maybe confusing if it is not understood that these refer to the impact upon the demand for the
respective inputs in relation to the volume of real output. Thus, the effect of innovations that are said to be (absolutely)
capital-usingwhentheytend(holdingconstanttherelativepriceofcapitalservices,vis-à-vistheotherinputs,andoutput)
toraisethedesiredratioofcapitalservicesperunitofrealoutput.Innovationsthatreducethedesiredcapital-outputratio
(measuring capital in natural units) may be properly described as “capital-saving” in an absolute sense, and the
corresponding holds for the absolute “labor-saving” ofinnovations. Hicks-neutral technical change is absolutelylabor-
savingandcapital-saving,inequalproportionatedegrees;whereastheconditionofHarrod-neutralityoftechnicalchange
would rule out the possibility of either capital-saving or capital-using effects, and guarantee that all innovations were
relatively “labor-saving” in the Hicksian sense of that term.
IncontextswhereeithertheHicksianortheHarrodianconceptsofneutralityareimplicit,economistsunderstand
the (relative) “ labor-saving bias of innovation” to refer to the effect of technological change in raising the desired
capital-labor input ratio (when relative input prices remain constant). Equivalently, theytake a (relative) “labor-saving
bias” of innovation to be one that tends to lower the ratio of the marginal productivity of labor inputs relative to that of
capital inputs, and thus to depress the real wage rate in relationship to the real rate of return on capital – given the pre-
existing ratio of capital to labor. Of course, a “capital-using bias of innovation” would be (Hicks) “labor-saving” in the
sensesjustdescribed; but it would go further, inraisingnot onlythe capital-labor input ratio, but the capital output ratio
as well.
The effect of technological change may of course be to increase the absolute level of the demand for inputs,
notwithstandingthepossibilityoftheinnovationsinquestionbeing“capital-saving” and/or“labor-saving”inthesenses
defined above. Changes in the absolute level of demand reflect three distinct sets of forces: (a) the effects of
technologicalinnovation(and scale economies) impinginguponthe desired amountsofinputsper unitofoutput, (b) the
effects on the desired input proportions (given output scale) of changes in relative input prices stemming from shifts in
relative input supplies, and (c) changes in the demand for the output in question. In the case of particular goods, or a
particular industry, the income effects of technological progress may be weak and, consequently, whether or not a bias
towards “labor-savinginnovation”causesreduceddemandsforlaborservicesintheindustrydepends uponthe strength
of the associated unit cost-savings, and the impact onthe quantityofoutput demanded byconsumers (ifand whenthose
cost-savings are translated into price reductions). Thus, the outcome in the case of a particular industry depends upon
the price elasticity of demand for its product, as well as the impact of the technological change upon unit costs. At the
aggregate level, inour one-sector parable of the economy, onlythe real income effects of technological change operateE-10
to offset the factor-saving effects of innovation. To a first-order approximation, the magnitude of those real income
effects is what is measured as an increase in total factor productivity.
2. Although the minerals-based, resource-intensive technologyproved to be the dominant path of technical progress in
all the presently advanced countries, America gained substantial first-mover advantages in whole-heartedly embarking
upon that path by undertaking infrastructural investments to explore, develop and reduce the costs of access to her
mineral resource deposits. As David and Wright (1997: Tables 1, 2, and Figure 2) have shown, Europe as a whole
possessedknownreservesofanumberofthekeyminerals,suchasironore,thatin1910wereaslargeasthoseidentified
in North America at the time, and the current rates of production of iron ore, coal and bauxite in Europe as a whole
exceeded that oftheU.S.in1913. But whenit came to petroleum, copper, phosphate, gold and other minerals, America
was out-producing the whole of Europe – even with Russia included, and there was no nation in Europe, to say nothing
of Japan, which approached the U.S. in the variety and richness of the mineral resources that actually had been
developed,ratherthanremainingin"reserve"status.Outof14importantindustrialminerals,Americain1913accounted
for the largest shares of world output in the cases of all but two – and for those two it was the runner-up. Domestic
industrial users of these inputs consequentlybenefitted fromthe greater dependabilityof supplysources, freedomfrom
exposure to foreignexchange risks, and lower transport costs.TheforegoingstatementsarebasedonDavid and Wright
(1997: Figures 3-5), and Wright (1990: Chart 5).
3. For these and the following statistics, see the underlying data in U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics
of the U.S. (1975), v. I: Series H-689, 696, 751,755, 756, 759, 764, 765. In 1930 recipients of doctorates represented
3.3 percent of the number who had received a Bachelor’s degree nine years previously (a relevant lag for purposes of
comparison, since the average period elapsed since receipt ofthe undergraduate in1930 was 8.7 years). In 1948 the lag
was10.8years,presumablyduetotheinterventionofWorldWarII,andtheencouragementofgraduateeducationamong
returning war veterans under the provisions of the G.I. Bill, but the doctorates of 1948 represented only 2.5 percent of
the number of Bachelor’s degree recipients from the class of 1937. The corresponding figure had risen to 6.6 percent
by 1969, however, at which time the lag between degrees was back down to 8.0 years. The level of these percentages
tends to overstate the actual continuation rate from baccalaureate to doctorate, because the distribution of completion
times for the higher degree is left-skewed, and the median and mode are therefore less than the mean. Since the
population of college graduates was rising throughout the period, this means that considering the mean lag for the
purposes of calculating the proportions results in denominators that are in each case too small.
4.“History,” said Voltaire, “is a fable agreed upon.” The truth of this oft-quoted aphorism impresses itself particularly
uponeconomic historians seekinganinterpretationofthequantitativerecordoflong-runmacroeconomic performance,
especially one set in very aggregate terms. Supply-side approaches to all but the most short-run dynamics have been
embraced almost universally in recent decades; most of the economics profession appears to have been thoroughly
persuaded byPaulSamuelson’s(1962) contentionthatthe idea ofa well-behaved productionfunctionleadsto the most
coherentandanalyticallyattractive“parables”thatcanbetoldaboutaggregatesupplyrelationshipsintheeconomy.This
approach appears to hold even more strongly today, following the revival of neoclassical supply-side macroeconomics
during the 1980s. Thus, as we remarked when first essaying the present approach, any history of an economy’s growth
composed in keeping with reigning theoretical macroeconomic fashion can be no more than “a parable agreed upon.”
Although the concept of an aggregate production function still draws some detractors, it has no want of tacit as well as
explicit endorsements. Plainly it underlies the now-standard procedures of modern “growth accounting,” even where,
as in our exposition in Part One, it has been pushed into the background; for it remains implicit in the suppositions that
there are well-defined elasticities of aggregate real output with respect to each of the classes of aggregated productive
inputs; that these elasticities are legitimately treated as parameters (within trend periods at least); and that the latter
correspond directly in magnitude to the respective shares of the real gross product paid to the factors of production.
Toacceptthenotionofanaggregateproductionfunctionforthepurposesoforganizingandexaminingthedata
inthisway,however,doesnotrequireturninga whollyblind eye tothedangersofreifyingtheconcept.Onthecontrary,
it is quite possible to envisage stable relationships amongaggregateoutputandinputs,andtheappearanceatthemacro-
level ofregularitiesinthe time trendsof relative factor proportions, asemergent systempropertiesarisingdirectlyfrom
market interactions occurring at the microeconomic level. One such approach has been explored in the "evolutionary
economics" literature, from Nelson and Winter (1977) to Metcalfe (1997). That approach eschews the notion ofE-11
optimization subject to production function constraints at the micro-level as well as at the macroeconomic level, and
seeks to account for statistical regularities at the macro-level as emergent properties of the interplay of underlying
dynamicprocesses.Itenvisagesinnovationsbeinggenerated,andnewproductsandprocessesbeingselectivelyretained
in commercial applications, by "boundedly rational" agents who operate in imperfect markets, under conditions of
ineluctable uncertainty. While we accept the usefulness of such an approach in interpreting the historical experience of
growth at the microeconomic level, we have not found it necessary for the present interpretive task.
Instead, the language of production function analysis may be employed descriptively at the aggregate level, as




on the microeconomic level. Quantitative macroeconomic stories related in such terms may be expected to direct
attention to potentially important issues, and to highlight promising specific hypotheses that deserve more detailed
historical investigation.
In sum, we view our “parables” about the historical behavior of the aggregate production function to have an
allegorical value: if they are not taken literally, they can perform the useful heuristic role of indicating in a short-hand
waythecharacterofunderlyingeconomictendenciesthatweremanifestingthemselvesatthelevelofsectors,industries,
firms and households. There is an inevitable tension, nonetheless, between the values of simplicity and clarity of
exposition that can be achieved in presenting rather broad-brush parables on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
realization of the aim of such heuristic story-telling – which is to indicate the salient points at which the resulting tale
makescontactwiththespecificcomplexitiesofthehistoricalexperienceofgrowth.Readersthereforeshouldbeprepared
to encounter a form of “histoire raisonnée” in which the discussion shifts back and forth between the two levels of
aggregation, and their corresponding two poles of explanatory attraction.
5. It is of course not unreasonable to approach the matter with some initial skepticism regarding the refined total factor
productivity estimates that appear in Part One's Table 1: IV for the earlier epoch. Undoubtedly there are some margins
of inaccuracyin the underlying data which could have worked to exaggerate the contributionto output growth made by
tangible reproducible capital, and so led to underestimation of the size of the (TFP) residual calculated for the epoch
ending in 1890. Yet, the contrast between the average annual estimate of 0.27 percentage points during 1800-90, and
the corresponding TFP growth rate estimate of 1.05 percentage points over the whole interval 1890-1989 (from Table
1: IV, Frame II) is too large to be dismissed as simply an artifact of measurement errors.
Indeed,sincethelatterperiodincludesthe1966-89periodoftheTFP“slowdown,”thereisroomfor suspicion
thatthedifferencebetweenthepre-andpost-1890ratesmightbeunderstatedat0.78percentagepoints;somepartofthe
post-1966 “slowdown,” perhaps as much as 0.2-0.3 percentage points per annum might reasonably be attributed to the
morepronounced underestimationofoutputgrowth.WerewetoraisetheTFPestimateforthe1966-89intervalby0.25
percentage points on that account, the average annual rate for the whole interval would rise to 1.10 percentage points,
and the gap between it and the average for the 1800-90 interval would therefore stand at 0.83 percentage points.
To get a sense of how implausible it is to suppose that measurement errors in the growth account for the
nineteenth century would be responsible for an apparent TFP acceleration of that magnitude, we can perform the
following simple calculation. Since the average share of capital in gross output is estimated at 0.38 over the 1800-90
interval, we can ask by how much the annual growth rate of the total capital stock during that epoch would have had to
be overstated in order for the latter form of measurement error to be responsible for just one-half of the apparent gap,
that is, for an understatement of the pre-1890 (corrected) TFP growth rate amounting to 0.415 percentage points.
The answer obtained (from 0.415/0.382) is large in both absolute and relative dimension: at 1.1 percentage
points, it says that the rate ofgrowthofthe total capital inputwouldreallyhavebeenonly3.15percentagepoints, rather
than the 4.24 percentage points per annum, an overstatement of approximately 25 percent. [The latter average growth
rate is found for 1800-90 fromthe measure C*entries in the upper panel of Table 2: I.] To account for the other half of
the gap, one would need to believe, in addition, that the average gross share of capital in GPDP also was overstated by
as much as 25 percent: it would have had to be 0.284, rather than the 0.382 estimate found for 1800-90 from Table 2:
I., a difference of 0.097 (= 0.415/4.24).
Fromtheresultsoftheaugmentedgrowthaccountingshownbelow,inTable2:IV,itwillbenoticedthatinsofar
aswebelievetheretohavebeenlittleornosignificantcontributionfromthegrowthofintangiblecapitalinthenineteenthE-12
century, the contrast in measured multifactor productivity growth rates between the pre- and post-1890 epochs would




industrial technology, the interested reader might begin with Abramovitz and David (1973a), Rosenberg (1976), and
Hounshell (1984). See Cain and Patterson (1981) on the bias of technological change in U.S. manufacturing industries
during the nineteenth century, and for comparisons with Britain, consult the careful quantitative work of James and
Skinner(1985),andBroadberry(1993).SeeAbramovitzandDavid(1973b),David(1975,Chapters1,4),David(1977).
CainandPaterson(1981)reportconsistenteconometricresultsonthebiasoftechnicalchangeinU.S.nineteenth-century
manufacturing industries, based on the more general translog production function specification.
Forquantitativeevidenceontheelasticityofsubstitutionandthebiasof“factor-augmenting”technicalchange
at the aggregate and industry levels in the U.S., see David and van de Klundert (1965); they find 0.32 for the estimated
long-run elasticity of substitution parameter in the private domestic (business) economy during 1900-60. Estimates
placing the elasticityparameter closer to unity, but still significantlybelowit, were obtained in earlier studies byIrving
Kravis,JohnKendrick,R.Sato,alongwiththeseminalstudyofArrow,Chenery,MinhasandSolow(1961),allofwhich
had implicitly or explicitly imposed an assumption of “Hicks neutrality,” which David and van de Klundert (1965)
relaxed. The latter found significant non-neutrality, with the trend in the relative efficiency of manhours rising at 0.7
percentage points per annum faster than that in the efficiency of capital. For the nineteenth century, similar allowance
for the possibility of Hicksian labor-saving bias has been found to yield estimates indicating a still lower elasticity of
substitutionandamuchmoremarkedrateofincreaseintherelativeefficiencyofmanhoursvis-à-visthatofconventional
tangible capital services.
7. This maybe seen for the Private Domestic Economyfromthe entries inTable 2: I (Panel B): the growthrates oftotal
tangible and intangible real stocks of capital (unadjusted for “quality of the tangible stock”) can be weighted using the
corresponding shares from Table 2: III (Frame II) to form C*=2KT KT*+2H H*; the growth rate of C/YA is then found
as (1 + C*)/(1 + YA *).
Alternatively, for the Domestic Economy, an increase of approximately 31 percent in the level of this overall
capital-outputratioisimpliedbythegrowthratesforthetangibleandintangiblecomponentsofthecapitalstockandthe
corresponding gross share data in Table 2: III, on the one hand, and the augmented output growth rates for the periods
1929-66and1966-89combined,withanincreaseof27percentoccurringinthelatterperiodalone.TheentriesinTable
2:II-PartApertaintothedomesticeconomy,ratherthantheprivatedomesticeconomy,andimplyasmallerproportional
rise in the ratio of total capital to augmented real GDP, froma level of 8.4 in 1929 to 9.6 in 1990 (measured in constant
1987dollarterms);butthemovementbetween1929and1973isslightlydownward–continuingthemuchmoredramatic
1905-29 downward trend evident in both the private sector and the whole of the domestic economy. Hence, both sets
ofestimatesconcurinpresentingapictureofquitepronouncedaggregatecapital-shallowingduringthecentury'sopening
third, and a resumption of capital-deepening in its closing third.
8.MakinguseoftheexpressionforE*inequation(5),onemaysolveforEKT*=E*-(2L)B*,whereweimplicitlydefine
the “bias parameter” B*=E L*-E KT*. The joint estimates of the elasticityof substitution and the parameter B* reported
byDavid(1975:Chapter1)forthenineteenth-centuryU.S.economyputtheelasticityofsubstitutionsignificantlybelow
unity,asnotedinthetext,andyieldB*=.017(i.e.,1.7percentagepointsperannum).Applyingthistotheinterval1835-
90, during which the rise in the capital-output ratio was concentrated, and over the course of which the average share
of labor was 2L = .573, and E* = 0.00294 (according to the data underlying Table 1: IVA), we obtain the pair of
estimates: EKT* = - 0.0068 and EL* = 0.0109.
9. This argument has been elaborated quantitatively, and implemented by P. A. David ("The Changing Morphology of
American Macroeconomic Growth – A Course of Lectures Delivered in the Faculty of Economics of the University of
Ancona," March1998:LectureNo.2.) Thisinvolvesestimatinga"Cambridge"-typeequationforthegrosssavingsrate
asafunctionofthepropertyincomeshare,basedupondecadalestimatesfortheperiod1800-1900;thelatterrelationship
can then be combined with the relationship derived from the aggregate (CES ) production function, in which the grossE-13
propertyincomeshareinoutputisafunctionoftherealrateofreturnandtheshifteffectsduetochangesintheefficiency
index of the tangible capital stock.
10. Based upon the changing shares of structures and equipment in the real value of business fixed investment, and
constant (Treasury Bulletin F) service lives of 39.5 and 14.4 years, respectively, the average service life of newly
installed business capital declined from 27.8 in 1927-9 to 20.7 by 1962. Our estimates of the composition of the real
stock of fixed reproducible tangible assets, in 1964 prices at benchmarkdates, showsthat the compositional shift effect
– which is the main source of the rise in the average rate of depreciation on the gross tangible stock – was negligible
during the first quarter of the present century – leaving aside the stock of consumer durables as is customary in the
national accounts. This may be contrasted with developments in the period following 1929, as shown by the following
percentages:
Percentages of All Types of Tangible Reproducible Capital Shown in:
Asset Type 1912 1922 1929 1949 1957 1961
_________________________________________________________________________________
Farm Residential Structures 4.6 4.5 3.5 3.0 2.5
Non-Farm Residential Structures 42.2 41.2 44.7 45.6 43.9 45.3
Non-residential Structures 33.3 32.6 31.4 26.8 24.6 24.9
Business Equipment 13.5 14.1 13.5 17.1 21.1 21.7
Business Inventories 6.3 7.6 6.8 7.5 7.8 8.0
___________________________________________________________________________Source:Theunderlying
constant dollar estimates were based upon U.S. Commerce Department, Surveyof Current Business (Jazi, Wasson and
Gross, 1962), for 1961 with special adjustments to derive the farm residential stock) in 1954 prices, which were then
extrapolatedtoearlierdates.ExtrapolatorswerederivedfromtheworkofGoldsmith(1958)onNationalWealthstocks,
and Denison(1962), followingmethodsdescribed fullyinAbramovitz and David, “StatisticalAppendixonthe Growth
oftheU.S.CapitalStock,”SourcesandNotestoTableV-A-1.(StanfordDepartmentofEconomics,1965:Unpublished
mss.).
From Technical Appendix Note 2 (on vintage effects), it is seen that holding constant the composition of the
tangible stockbyasset-category, the average service life decline for the tangible stock asa whole wasproceedingat the
average rate of -.25 percentage points per annum during 1948-66, and - 0.124 percentage points per annum over the
whole of the period 1929-89. This implied a decrease in the average within-category service life of approximately 5
percent,over eachofthose two intervals. The absence ofanypronounced trendsinthe make-up ofthe tangible stockby
servicelife-classinthe1912-29intervalisthemainreasonfortheassumptioninthatAppendixofnochangeintheindex
of (reproducible) capital quality during the 1905-27 interval.
11. Two points should be noted which bear upon both the forces underlying the rise of investment in human capital and
thesourcesofourestimatesofthetotalintangiblestock'sgrowthovertheperiod1905-29. (The detailsoftheestimation
procedures are provided in the statistical appendix cited in the Notes and Sources to Table II.4.1A.) The figures for the
benchmarkdatesfrom1929forwardaredrawnfromtheworkofJohnKendrick(1994).Toobtaintheestimatesfor1900-
10 (centered c. 1905) the 1929 figures for the components of the stock of intangible human capital have been
extrapolatedbackwardsonthebasisoftherealstockofcapitalformedbyinvestmentinformaleducation.Thisinvolves
twosuppositions:first,asseparateestimatesfortherealstockofcapitalformedbytraining,asdistinguishedfromformal
schooling, are not available for this period, it was assumed that the two components were rising pari passu. Second, it
wasassumedthatthegrowthofthestockofeducationandtrainingcapitalcouldbetakenasaproxyforthatofthewhole
ofthe"human"componentoftheintangiblestock.Weshouldconsiderbrieflytheplausibilityofeachassumption,taking
each of them in turn.
Thefirstoftheseconjecturesappearsnotunreasonable,inlightofthenumerousstudiesbyJacobMincer(1967)
and others, which have concluded on the basis of data for the post World War II era that there is a strong degree of
complementarity between the formal educational attainments of workers and the amount of investments made (mainly
through deferred earnings) in their subsequent on-the-job training.E-14
Itispossiblethat future researchwill be able to establishthe point intime atwhichsuchcomplementariesfirst
began to emerge, and to relate them to the evolution of worker recruitment and internal labor market developments
affecting major public and private sector employers in the pre-1914 period. Should it turn out that on-the-job training
was to a greater degree a substitute for formal education during the early part of the century, the implication would be
that we have overstated the growth rate of the combined stock in the pre-1929 era. But, inasmuch as the rate of growth
of intangible capital inputs per manhour was relativelyslow, and the gross income share imputed for all intangibles was
comparatively low during the 1890-1927 period, it will be seen from Table 2-IV (below) that the relative contribution
to labor productivity growth from this source prior to 1929 was only one-third to one-half as large as that which
characterizedthepost-1929era.Consequently,anytendencytowardsoverestimationofthegrowthrateoftherealstock
of intangibles during the earlier era – for the reasons entertained above – should not be thought capable of having
materially distorted the main line of the story related here – viz., the greater impact of intangible capital-deepening in
the 1929-89 period.
The second supposition to be considered in this connection arises because our estimate for the total intangible
stock of human wealth c.1905 is based upon the estimated movements of the educational (and training) stock between
thatpointand1929, whichimplicitlyassumesthat the other componentsofhumanwealth–particularly,cumulatedreal
value of investments in health, as that is especially prominent among the latter – were growing at a pace matching that
of the educational and training component. In support of this supposition we may point out that the entries for the two
relevantitemsinTable 2:II, drawnfromJohnKendrick(1994),havemaintainedaroughlyconstantratio over the years
from 1929 to 1990. Moreover, considering the complementarities between investment in health and in education, one
finds good economic reasons to expect that such, indeed, should have been the case.
12. The retention of corporate earnings, rather than their distribution to stockholders in the form of dividends, tends to
reducethevalueofthecorporation'sequityissues.Risinginterestrateshavethesameeffect(givenanexpecteddividend
stream) and so will raise the cost of internal financing of capital formation of all kinds. But the incidence of this falls
especiallystronglyuponR&D investment because the alternative ofsignificantresort to debt financingisnot available.
This creates a potential for the capital market consequences of government deficits to adversely impact the rate of
companyfinanced innovative activity. The relevance ofthis to public debates about the long-termeffects ofthe decline
in the national savings rate during the 1980s is noted below.
13.SeeDavidandScadding(1974:p.237)forfurtherevidencesupportingtheviewofVatterandThompson(1966)and
Vatter(1967)thatthehighspendingondurablesintheyearsimmediatelyfollowingWorld War II reflectedbacklogged
demand, rather than a continuing structural shift. Indeed, the share of consumer durables in total personal consumption
expenditures has remained remarkably stable in the range between 0.135 and 0.145 from year to year throughout the
whole of the ensuing period 1959-89. See The Economic Report of the President (February 1997), Table B-14, based
upon NIPA from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
14. Olney (1992) points out that the growth of consumer durables installment purchasing during the 1920s was greatly
encouraged by changes in legal and institutional practices that reduced the risk of loss to the buyer from automatic
uncompensated repossession when payments were missed. There may be something to the argument that the increased
share of personal savings that has continued to take the form of acquisition of consumer durables after 1929 might owe
somethingtotheheaviertaxationofmarketincomesandexcisetaxesonnon-durablegoodsandservices,whereasincome
representedbytheflowofservicesproducedwithinthehousehold(usingthestockofappliancesandtransportvehicles)
remains untaxed. See David and Scadding (1974), p.237. But this cannot apply as an explanation for the shift that
occurred between pre- and post-World War I consumption patterns, since the relevant tax rates did not change very
significantly prior to 1929.
15.ThefigurespresentedinTableII.4.2B(upperpanel)forthepre-WorldWarIperiodarebaseduponestimatesoftotal
educationalresourcecostsderivedfromtheworkofFishlow(1966),butincorporatingthehigherallowancesforthecosts
of foregone earnings which Solmon (1970) has shown to be appropriate. The resulting estimates for this component of
educationalcostsareconsequentlymuchlargerthanthosewhichSchultz(1961)suggestsfor1900-10.Ontheotherhand,
the underlying estimates for the census years from 1920 through 1940 (in lower panel of the same table) incorporateE-15
procedures differing from those of Schultz (1961), which result in the downward revisions of his foregone earnings, to
allow for the fact that not all youths enrolled beyond the elementary grade would have been in the labor market.
16.Todoso,however,wouldineffectcountthesocietalcostsofthejuvenilelaborforegonebythelegislativerestriction
ofemploymentandtheextensionofcompulsoryschooling.But,assuchastandardcouldnottakeaccountofthepossible
countervailing social costs of child labor, we adhere to the practice of evaluating the opportunitycosts of schooling for
the individuals involved – taking the current legal framework and the prevailing social norms as given, and allowing
changes in the latter over time to affect the level of the estimates. For the time span of the estimates in Table II.4.2B,
therefore, no foregoneearningsallowanceismadeforelementaryschoolattendees.Intheestimatesfor the 1920s, 1940
and the post-World War II era, however, we do make adjustment to reflect changing probabilities that youngsters
enrolledinhighschoolandcollegeatvariousageswouldnotbeemployed–evenwhenandwheresuchworkwouldhave
been legal.
17. The 1981 estimate is from Abramovitz (1993: n.21). The underlying estimates (in constant 1929 dollars) for the
1939-59 period are those developed in M. Abramovitz and P. A. David, Appendix 8-B to “Economic Bases of the Rise
in Labor Quality,” (unpublished MS., Stanford University) on the basis of data in the Biennial Survey of Education in
the U.S., and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Digest of Educational Statistics and other sources.
18. These percentages are derived from the average ratio of DPI/GNP in Table 2: V-Parts A and B, and the ratio
[FE/Y(fullyaugmented)]inTable2:VI,col.4.DenotingtheformerratiobyDandthelatterbyF,onecanobtaintheratio
denoted as f =[ F E / D P I] =[F/(1-F)]/D. The desired magnitude then follows immediately: FE/(DPI + FE) = f /( 1+f ).
There is some offset to the argument for regarding the latter as an underestimate of the private educational cost claim
on available household income: while total private costs are roughly 20 to 30 percent above foregone earnings, the
estimate of foregone earnings in the numerator and the denominator of the ratio is made gross of income tax. From the
private vantage point it should be reckoned net of taxes. Taking the average ratio of DPI to Personal Income to be
approximately.88inthe post-World War II period, the estimate giveninthe textfor 1981, FE/(DPI + FE) = .20,should
beadjusteddownwardsto18.3onanaftertaxbasis.Sincetheratioofdirectprivate(aftertax)coststoforegoneearnings
inthepost-WorldWarIIperiodcanbeapproximatedas.25,another5percentagepoints(.23x.20x100)mustbeadded
to the numerator to get the total educational burden (net of taxes) as a percentage of available household income. The
resulting adjusted figure is thus 23.3 percent c. 1981.
19. However, it might well be the case that were they properly measured in real (constant price) terms, the disparity
between the growth of these two main components of intangible capital formation would be less marked than appears.
Boththesemeasuresofexpendituresonintangiblessufferforbeingjustthedirect and indirect costsofthe inputs, rather
than independent measures of investment goods production to which there would correspond unit product prices. One
might argue that the relative price of additions to the stock of R&D-produced scientific and technological knowledge
has fallen dramatically in relation to tangible goods prices, and also declined very significantly in comparison with the
relative price of increments of education-produced human capital. An important source of support for this view is the
observation that the technology of scientific and engineering research itself has been subject to very rapid progress of
a labor-saving and time-saving kind through the use of sophisticated instrumentation and computing, especiallyduring
the past quarter century (David 1993). That is a development that is generally conceded not to have been paralleled in
the education sector.
20. The trend holds within each subperiod (1895-1926, and 1926-39) in the case of males. See Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz, “The Decline of Non-Competing Groups: Changes in the Premium to Education, 1890 to 1940,”
NationalBureauofEconomicResearchWorkingPaper,5202,August,1995:Tables5,6especially.Theeducation-skill
premium for female clerks declined while that for female book-keepers rose (vis-à-vis production workers) over the
1895-1926 interval. The pattern of movement reversed subsequently, but the net change over the whole period 1895-
1939wasdownward.Inthecaseoffemaletypistsandstenographers,thepremiumdeclinedbetween1895and1926,but
was stable during 1926-39. See also Abramovitz and David (1996: OECD) for further evidence on U.S. education-
associated earnings premia pre-WWII.E-16
21. Between 1984 and 1994 the ratio of the earnings of the top decile to the upper half of the earnings distribution (the
so-called“90/50ratio”)rosebyroughly12 percentamongallmalehighschoolgraduates, and by14 percentamong255
34-year-oldmalefull-time,year-roundworkers.SeeTheEconomicReportofthePresident(February)1997,pp.170-175,
for further discussion.
22. The more refined figures obtain real output by deflating output in current prices by a price index in which prices of
individual goods and services are combined by weights that change as the composition of output changes. By contrast,
the official figures of the NIPA combine prices with the fixed weights of a base year (1992 in the latest revision; 1987
inthe formaltablesofthischapter).Indexeswithchangingweights(“chainedsuperlative”or “Fisher ideal” indexes) are
now accepted as superior, and NIPA itself is widely expected to switch to such indexes soon. The differences between
productivity growth rates based on the two concepts are shown below:
The Effects of Shifting from Fixed-Weights to Chain-Weighted Indexes of Real Output
Private nonfarm sector 1950-72 1972-87 1987-94
Labor productivity, official 2.24 0.99 1.21
Labor productivity, chain weight 2.57 1.19 0.92
Crude TFP, official 1.30 0.34 1.22
Crude TFP, chain weight 1.60 0.54 0.93
Private business sector
Labor productivity, chain weight 3.67 1.69 1.22
Refined TFP, chain weight 2.39 0.72 0.30
Sources.
Private nonfarm sector: Calculated from the figures in R.J. Gordon (1996), Table 6. The official
figuresare on the 1987 base. The terminal dates of the periods in the table above are the annual dates
closest to the quarterly terminal dates of the Gordon figures.
Privatebusinesssector:CalculatedfromtheBureauofLaborStatisticsestimatesinU.S.Department
of Labor, News Release, USDL 95-518, Jan. 17, 1996.
23. To make the point concretely we can follow Griliches (“Productivity, R&D and the Data Constraint,”1994) in
dividing the industries that produce the total output of the private sector between the “measurable” and the “hard-to-
measure.” The first consists of agriculture, mining, manufacturing and transport and other public utilities. These
industries produce commodities such as bushels of wheat, tons of coal, and yards of cloth or countable services, such
as ton-miles of freight and kilowatts of electric power. The second group consists of construction, trade, finance,
insurance and real estate (FIRE) and miscellaneous other services whose products differ so muchincontent and quality
that they are quite difficult to measure in countable units. The hard-to-measure group has been growing in relative
importance,andrising,indeed,withespecialrapidityinrecentdecades.Itsaveragepercentageshareofoutputwasabout
49 percent over the interval 1948-66 but over 58 percent from 1966 to 1989 – a rise of nearly 20 percent. For this
calculation, the average levels for the intervals were obtained roughly as simple averages of the levels in the terminal
years. 1948 and 1966 are from NIPA 1986, Table 6.1; 1989 from NIPA figures in Survey of Current Business, Aug.
1986,Table10.ThefigurescitedbyGriliches(1994)fortheperiods1947-69and1969-1990tellvirtuallythesamestory
– a rise in the hard-to-measure group’s share from 49.6 to 59.7.E-17
FromGriliches(1994:Fig.1)itisfoundthatthedifferencebetweenthetrendratesofoutputpermanhour(over
the whole period 1947-1990) for these two sectors amounted to about 1.4 percentage points, in favor of the better-
measured group. Therefore, a simple re-weighting of those trend growth rates would lower the aggregate labor
productivitytrend by0.13 points between 1947-9 and 1969-90. Butthisrepresentslessthan12 percent of the observed
slowdown that Griliches was seeking to explain.
Analternativeapproachtothequestionwouldallowforthefactthatthedeclineofthelaborproductivitygrowth
rate for the “hard-to-measure” group of sectors was far more severe than that of the “measurable” group. The
“measurable”productivitygrowthratedeclinedbyabout1percentagepointbetween1948-66and1966-89,whereasthe
decrease recorded for the hard-to-measure sector was about 2.5 percentage points. (These rates are based on measures
of industryreal gross product originating per person engaged drawn fromNIPA figures.) Consider, next, the following
hypotheticalcalculationwhichallowsexplicitlyforthepossibilitythatthehard-to-measuregroupofsectorsisespecially
subject to underestimation of its productivity growth as a result of an “over-deflation” bias.
According to the findings of the Report of the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index (the
Boskin Commission, 1997), the CPI overstates the rate or rise in the true cost of living – currently and “looking
forward”– by 1.1 percentage points a year, with a plausible range from 0.8 to 1.6 points. Suppose, then, that: (a) the
overall bias in the past was at the high end of this range, at 1.6 points a year, (b) this bias applied to the entire private
GDP deflator,(c)itwasconcentratedexclusivelyinthehard-to-measuresector,(and,therefore,wasmuchhigherinthat
sector than 1.6 points) but (d)t it had remained unchanged since the end of the War. A simple calculation can then be
made of the weighted bias – which takes account of the increase in the importance of the hard-to-measure sector. This
suggests that the overall bias would have risen between the rapid-growth period, 1948-66 and the slowdown period,
1966-89, by 0.22 percentage points. That amounts to 11.7 percent of our figure for total decrease in the trend rate of
laborproductivitygrowth(1.88points),whichcoincidesremarkablycloselywiththe(12percent)figureobtainedabove,
from the alternative calculation based data in Griliches (1994). The assumptions behind our second calculation are
extreme, and the result, therefore, may be regarded as an upper-bound estimate of the possible contribution of the
increased weight in the US economy of sectors belonging in the hard-to-measure category.
Closely related to the foregoing is the frequent observation in the literature that the pace of total factor
productivity growth in the US economy’s Service sectors has historically been slower than that experienced in the
commodity-producingsectors.Whetherornotthisreflectedadownwardbiasinthemeasurementofthegrowthofsome
(butsurelynotallindustries)withintheServicessector,orforother,realcauses, thesuggestionismadethatthegrowing
relative importance of Services in the US economy has been a significant contributory factor in the diminished pace of
TFP growth.Now,inasmuchastheriseinthe relative weight ofthe Service sector hasbeenacontinuousprocess,rather
than a development peculiar to the last three decades of the twentieth century, this lacks a priori plausibility as serious
candidate explanation for the sudden slowdown. Moreover, when directly assessed, it too fails to stands up to the data.
The best estimates on this question are those of Dale Jorgenson. ("Productivity and Economic Growth”, in Fifty Years
ofEconomic Measurement, ErnstR. Berndtand JackE. Triplett, Eds., Chicago, ChicagoUniversityPress,1990, Table
3.1.)Proceedingfromagrowthaccountingof51industrialsectorscomprisingthenationaleconomy,Jorgensonwasable
to decompose the (refined) growth rate of aggregate total factor productivity into two major elements. One is the
weighted average growth rate of productivity “within sectors”. It is a measure of the growth that would have been
achieved, given the actual growth rates of the 51 sectors, had there been no changes in the relative importance of the
individual sectors. The other, which is the difference between the growth rate of aggregate productivity and that of
“within sector growth,” is the amount attributable to reallocation. It is also the sum of the independently calculated
amounts attributable to the reallocation among industries of Value Added, Labor “Input” (Hours and Quality Change)
and Capital “Input (Stock and Quality Change)”. This calculation yielded the following figures for the change in
productivity growth between the slowdown period, 1966-85 and the preceding period, 1947-66:
Percentage points
Output per manhour -1.82
Aggregate refined TFP -1.14
Within-sector refined TFP -1.0
Reallocation -0.09E-18
Once again, the effects ofstructural or compositional change is found to be a whole order ofmagnitudesmaller thanthe
observed contraction in the productivity growth rate.
24. See Paul A. David andW.E.Steinmueller,“UnderstandingtheParadoxesandPayoffsoftheComputerRevolution:
Information Technology and the ProductivitySlowdown Revisited,” (April 1999), forthcoming as Ch.1 in Information
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A central defect in the official output measures, and the main source of the persisting underestimation of real
product growth, is their failure to capture improvementsinoutputqualitythatarisesfromthe introductionand diffusion
ofnewgoodsandservices,andtheircontinuingenhancement.Theproblemarisesinobtainingqualityadjustedunitprice
indexes, because the practise of “splicing in”, or “chaining” a price series for a new commodity to the price index for
a mature substitute commodity is prone to result in “over-deflation” of the value of goods and services produced.
Typically, the early history of a new product is marked by its most rapid phase of price decline, because it is then that
scale economies are achieved and elements of monopoly power (whether from patent protection or product
differentiation)tendtoweaken,therebyshrinkingtheinitialprofitmarginsthatproductinnovationscanoftencommand.
Consequently, the linked price series does not fall as fast as it should. This technical defect, however, is not in itself a
new problem. Nor is there reason to think that statistical procedures themselves have themselves become more biased.
(See Charles B. Hulten, “Quality Change in the CPI: Some Missing Links,” Jan. 1997, a technical paper prepared for
theFederalReserveBankofSt.LouisFallPolicyConference,Oct.1996.ForthcominginChallengeMagazine.).Onthe
contrary;manyimprovementshavebeenintroduced.Anincreaseintheseverityofthebias,therefore,couldhelpexplain
the slowdown only if there were reason to believe that quality change and the spread of new goods or their importance
has proceeded more rapidly during the slowdown period than in the immediately preceding decades.
25. There is another proposed explanation, not considered in the text, that for some while commanded attention and
which deserves at least passing mention. The steep increases in energy prices that marked the post-1973 years were
widely credited with depressing productivity growth. Several reasons were adduced. Energy users were forced to
economizetheiruseofpower.Thehigherpriceofenergymadepower-usingcapitalgoodslessvaluable.Engineerswere
led to seek productivity gains along less energy-abundant technological paths unfamiliar to them. The energy-price
increases supported a general acceleration of inflation and led public authorities to take contractionary measures that
depressed economic activity at large. The plausibility of these arguments weakened, however, when, during the 1980's
the real price of energy declined almost as much as it had previously risen; yet there was no commensurate recovery in
rates of productivity growth.
26. According to Luc Soete and Bart Verspagen, the total expenditures on the production of technology could amount
to anything between 2 and 3 times the officially measured expenditures on R&D activities. (See “Recent Comparative
TrendsinTechnologyIndicatorsintheOECDArea”inTechnologyandProductivity,Paris:OrganizationforEconomic
Cooperationand Development, 1991, 249-74. See also Denison, TrendsinAmericanEconomic Growth(1985), p. 28.)
One need not take these numbers literally to see that the official figures are a serious understatement of total
technological effort. The important question, however, is whether the official figures are biased indicators of the trend
of such effort. They probably are. Earlier in the century and continuing into the Sixties, the growing importance of
science-based research and the growth and spread of large firms tended to move larger fractions of technological effort
into specialized departments whose expenditures count in the R&D statistics. In more recent years, the rapid growth of
independentcomputersoftwarefirmsandtheexpandingR&Deffortsofotherservicesectorsmeanthatalargerfraction
of effort is being missed. The earlier trend meant that the official figures overestimated the growth of total effort. The
more recent developments mean that the official figures are understating its growth. The indications, therefore, are that
total technological effort, as measured by expenditures, has not declined since the 1960s; it may have grown.
27. The figures for the extent of diffusion of electric motors are from David, “Computer and Dynamo,” 1991: Table 3.
David (see “Digital Technologyand the ProductivityParadox,” 1999: section 6.1) also presentsadditional quantitativeE-19
indicators, including comparisons of the rate of decline in the real price of computer services with that of purchased
electricity and electrical machinery (of a constant kind), to substantiate the parallel between the two cases. While there
seems to be considerable heuristic value in this historical analogy, a cautious, even skeptical attitude is warranted
regardingthepredictionsforthefuturethatsomecommentatorshavesoughttoextractfromthequantitativeresemblance
betweenthetwotransitionexperiences.Foronething,statisticalcoincidencesineconomic performance aremorelikely
thannot to be mere matters ofcoincidence, rather thanindicationsthat the underlyingcausal mechanismsare reallyone
and the same.
28. See, for further discussion and sources, Steinmueller “The U.S. Software Industry” (1996). Digital Equipment
Corporation,theleadingminicomputermanufacturerretreatedfromitsverticalmarketingstrategyofofferingcomputer
systems specificallydesigned for newspapers, manufacturing enterprises, and service companies; it specialized instead
in hardware production, leaving the software market to independent software vendors. Similar decisions were made by
all of the US computer manufacturers. This process, which had begun in the late 1970s as an effort to focus corporate
strategy,greatlyacceleratedduringthe1980swiththeadventofthelarge-scalepersonalcomputerplatformsunitedunder
theIBMPCstandardorutilizingtheAppleMacintosh's.The"generalpurpose" softwareproducedfortheseplatforms
not only discouraged task-specific software, it also created a new collection of tasks and outputs specifically driven by
the newcapabilities suchas"desk top publishing" (typeset qualitydocuments), "presentation graphics" (graphic artist
qualityillustrationsforspeechesandreports),and"advancedwordprocessing"(theincorporationofgraphicsandtables
into reports). Allofthesechangesimproved the "lookand feel" ofinformationcommunication, its qualityand style, the
capability for an individual to express ideas, and the quantity of such communications. But singly and severally they
madeverylittleprogressinchangingthestructureofworkorganizationorthecollectiveproductivityoftheworkgroups
employing these techniques.E-20
III. Endnotes for Part Three
1.ThetablethatfollowsisasimpledecompositionofthegrowthratesofGDP percapitainEuropeandtheU.S.Itshows
the dominant importance of Labor Productivity growth over Labor Input per capita as proximate sources of output per
capita in the twentieth century (Panel A). Indeed, after 1913, labor productivity determined the direction of movement
ofoutputpercapitawhilethegrowthoflaborinputpercapitaactedonlytooffsetsomeoftheforceoflaborproductivity
growth. The same comments apply to a decomposition of the difference between U.S. and European growth rates of
output per capita (the “U.S. Advantage”) which was negative since 1950 as shown in Panel B.
Growth Rates of GDP per Capita and its Components
U.S. and Europe, 1870-1992
Panel A: Growth Rates
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1992











1.31 -0.35 1.66 1.40 -0.30 1.70 3.95 -1.03 5.03 1.84 -0.55 2.39
11
countries
1.28 -0.37 1.65 1.40 -0.30 1.70 3.82 -0.98 4.85 1.80 -0.57 2.37
U.S. 1.80 -0.12 1.92 1.60 -0.90 2.50 2.40 -0.31 2.72 1.4 0.26 1.14
Panel B: The U.S. Advantage in Growth Rates
U.S. minus Europe











0.49 0.23 0.26 0.20 -0.60 0.80 -1.55 0.72 -2.31 -0.44 0.81 -1.25
11
countries
0.52 0.25 0.27 0.20 -0.60 0.80 -1.42 0.67 -2.13 -0.40 0.83 -1.23
Definitions:
10Europeancountries:Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Italy,Netherlands,Norway, Sweden.
11 European countries: 10 countries plus U.K.
Symbols: Y/P = GDP per capita; MH/P: Manhours per capita; Y/MH: GDP per Manhour, All italicized symbols
represent growth rates.
Sources: Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, Paris: OECD, 1995: for Y/P: Table 3-2; MH/P = Y/P -
Y/MH;f o rY/MH: Maddison, 1995, Table -J-4.
Between1870and1913,however,thingsweredifferent.Inthisperiod,theU.S.grewmorerapidlythanEurope
and enlarged an existing lead. Then, the U.S. growth of labor input per capita (input measured in manhours) worked
together with labor productivity to account for the American advantage over Europe in per capita output growth. This
differencewithlaterdecadesappearstosteminlargepartfromtheimportanceofthemassivepopulationmigrationfrom
EuropetotheU.S.ThisaddedsubstantiallytothegrowthoftheAmericanpopulation,butitincreasedthegrowthoflaborE-21
input in America still more. The immigrant population streamwas skewed towards men of working age and away from
dependent women, children and the elderly. And, of course, it had the opposite effect on European labor input and
population growth. All this stands in sharp contrast to the far more limited European migrant flow to America after
restrictions on immigration came into force in the early 1920s.
We owe our awareness of the importance of per capita labor input in accounting for the superior growth of
American per capita output in the period between 1870 and 1913 to the quite recent work of Jeffery Williamson, Alan
Taylor and their collaborators. (See references in the International Section of the General Bibliography to Taylor and
Williamson, 1997; Williamson, 1997, and the publications cited in their papers.) Their calculations serve to show that
America’s superior growth in manhours per capita then stemmed from the faster growth of its economically active
population (EAP), which they measure by the people aged 15 to 64, the people of working age. It was not due to
differences in the growth of the ratio of manhours per employed worker. Thus from 1870 to 1913, the American
advantage in per capita output growth can be decomposed, as follows:
GDP/P EAP/P MH/EAP MH/P Y/MH
10 European countries 0.49 0.29 -0.06 0.23 0.26
11 European countries 0.52 0.27 -0.02 0.25 0.27
Sources: GDP/P and Y/MH from Maddison, 1995, Tables 3.2 and J-4. EAP/P from Williamson 1997,
Table 2. MH/P = GDP/P - Y/MH. MH/EAP = MH/P - EAP/P (all figures are growth rates of the ratios)
WilliamsonandTaylor,however,carrythematterfurther.Theycontend that besides its direct effect onoutput
per capita, the growth of labor input per capita has an additional effect because it helps to determine labor productivity
growth. They provide two analyses of this effect, with contradictory results. In the first (Taylor and Williamson, 1997,
WorkingPaper,1994),theycalculatecounterfactualestimatesofproductivitygrowthfrom1870to1910,estimatingthat
growthasitmighthavebeenifmigrationhadbeenzero.Theyfindthatproductivitygrowthinthe U.S.wouldhavebeen
slowerthanit actuallywasand the opposite inEurope. And similarlywithoutput per capita. Thisimpliesthat theforces
other than migration that supported a U.S. productivity growth advantage were even stronger than the actual measures
suggest. And they remain to be explained.
The counterfactual calculationwascarried out subject to certainrestrictiveassumptions:thatthegrowthofthe
suppliesofreproduciblecapitalandlandwereindependentoflaborsupplyand that there were constant returnsto scale.
Moreover, in the counterfactual calculation itself, the equalizing effect of international trade on the relative wages and
productivities in trading countries was neglected. (It was treated separately by Taylor and Williamson and served to
support the results of the counterfactual calculation). These restrictive assumptions presumably are taken into account
implicitly in a second experiment carried out by Jeffery Williamson alone and reported in a draft circulated in 1997
(“Growth, Inequality, Demography and History,” Harvard Economics Department Working Paper). There Williamson
carried through a cross-country regression of the growth of output per capita between 1870 and 1913 on the difference
between the growth of the Economically Active Population (people aged 15-64) and the growth of the Dependent
Population. This measure – Williamson calls it DIFF – is itself only an alternative measure of the growth of the
Economically Active Population per head of the total population. In Williamson’s regression some half-dozen
characteristics of countries entered as additional variables. None proved to be of substantial importance. The influence
of DIFF, however, was both statistically significant and powerful. Applying Williamson’s results, it appears that the
American advantage in per capita growth over an average of European countries in the “age of mass migration” was
entirely attributable to the greater rapidity of America’s growth of DIFF and thus to the American advantage in the per
capita growth of the economically active population, a superior growth owing in good part to transatlantic migration.
Sincethesimpledecompositionofper capitaoutputgrowth(seeTableabove) suggeststhatonlyabouthalfthe
American growth advantage finds its “proximate” source in the growth of labor input per capita, the Williamson
regression suggests that the remainder must be attributable to a close positive relation between labor input and
productivity growth. It is important to notice, however, that the positive relation revealed by regression stands in sharpcontrast to the negative relation that emerged from the earlier counterfactual calculation. There is a presumption,
therefore, that the difference arises because the regression implicitlytakes account, among other possibilities, of forces
set aside in the counterfactual calculation: returns to scale, the interactions between labor supply and the supplies of
reproducible capital and land, and international trade, the last working perhaps in ways not contemplated bythe factor-
price equalization theorem.
The Williamson studies, with their emphasis on demography, are a valuable contribution to studies of the
relative growth of nations. Readers of this chapter will find that the questions that Williamson’s analysis suggests,
concerning scale and the interaction of factor supplies with one another, and with technological changes affecting
productivity, are pursued in our own analysis.
2. “Social capability” is a subject that has drawn the attention of historians and economists for many years. De
Tocqueville (Part 2, 1840) and Veblen (1915) are notable examples of older writings. Economic historians added
considerablyto this literature in the years following World War II, and the pages that followreflect their contributions;
especially, the essays by Arthur H. Cole, Thomas C. Cochran and others in the collective volume prepared by the
Harvard Entrepreneurial Research Center (1949), the series of biographies of businessmenedited byMiller (1952), the
essays on France by Sawyer (1951, 1954), studies of entrepreneurship in France and GermanybyLandes (1949, 1951,
1954) and Gerschenkron (1953, 1954, 1955); also Wiener’s (1962) controversial work on the role of culture and class
inBritain’srelativedecline.Inthefollowingdecadesthesubjectwaslargelyneglectedbyeconomichistorians,andonly
lately is being taken up again, as in Parker (1982, 1991) and Lazonick (1994). An even fuller view of social capability
would include the literature of public choice, economic organization and institutions, not onlyin economics but also in
political science and sociology.A1
1 Formally, the “well-behavedness” of the function consists in it being continuous and continuously differentiable
in all of its arguments. Further, we assume that the partial first derivatives with respect to each of the arguments are all
positive, and the second derivatives are negative – i.e. marginal products of the inputs are positive, but there are
diminishing marginal returns in all directions.
TECHNICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDICES
Technical Appendix Note 1:
A General Production Function with Factor-Augmenting Technical Change
The relationships in equations (1-5) of the text, in Parts One and Two, may be thought of as being "nested"
within the more general one-sector, closed economy model of production. The latter is described by the
“well-behaved”
1 aggregate product function that takes the following general form:
(6) YA(t)=Y{ L(t), K(t), R(t), H(t) } .
Here YA(t) is an appropriately defined measure of real gross output at time t, which reflects the production
and utilization of both conventional and unconventional (intangible) inputs. Correspondingly, the dated
inputsaremeasuresoftheservicesof“rawlabor”(L),reproduciblecapital(K),non-reproduciblecapital(R)
– such as land and depletable natural resources, and intangible capital (H). We use italics in this notation to




on this function. The first is that Y{ C } exhibits constant returns to scale, so that doubling all the input
measures would result in the doubling of output. This is tantamount to specifying that the elasticities of
output with respect to the inputs, denoted by ,i always sum to unity:
( 6 a ) ...................,L(t)+ ,K(t)+ ,R(t)+ ,H(t)=1, f o re v e r yt .
The second restriction is that the input services enter the production function measured in their respective
efficiency units, which is to say that the input of labor services at time t, as measured as the number of full
timeequivalentmanhours(ofbasicqualitylevel)L(t),adjustedbyanindexEL(t)thatindicatesthecurrently
prevailing level of productive efficiency of those “raw” labor services relative to their efficiency level at
some fixed reference date (t=0). The choice of the reference date is arbitrary and simply serves to fix the
scaling of the function Y{} .
Thus, the production function can be written :
( 6 b ) ............Y ( t)= Y{ L(t)@EL(t), K(t)@EK(t), R(t)@ER(t), H(t)@EH(t) } ,A2
2Forfurtherdiscussion,seeDavidandvandeKlundert’s(1965)introductionofthisgeneralformulationinaconstant
elasticity of substitution (CES) model of production.
3 The descriptive term “Augmented Solow model” has become popular in the recent growth theory literature,
followingthe workofMankiw, Romer and Weil (1991)andBarroandSala-i-Martin(1992),andwe use it here withthe
cautionthatthe“augmentation”towhichitrefersissimplytheexplicitinclusionamongtheargumentsoftheproduction
function of “factors” additional to conventional labor and capital. The usage here should not lead to confusion with the
specification of the aggregate production function as subject to factor-augmenting innovations reflected by changes in
factor-specific efficiency indexes, such as EL and EK.
which is referred to as the form with “generalized factor-augmenting technological change.
2 The latter
designationreferstotheassumptionthattechnologicalandorganizationalinnovations,andotherunobserved
temporal changes affect production by altering one or more of the input-specific indexes of average
efficiency.
For expositional purposes, especially when considering twentieth century trends, it is sufficient to
work with the (Divisia) aggregate KT in which the components of the total tangible capital stock –
reproducible and non-reproducible – are combined, and to emphasize the contrast between the growth
profiles of the total tangible capital stock and the stock of non-conventional and intangible capital, denoted
by H. Notice that a proper (Divisia) measure of the growth rate of tangible capital services in natural units
includesthekindof"qualitycorrections"forcompositionalchangethatareintroducedinthestandardgrowth
accountingframeworkforTable1.IV.Wethereforesuppressseparatenoticeofthenon-reproduciblecapital
inputs, R, that appears above, in equation (6), and, by total differentiation of the latter with respect to time,
obtain the following relationship for labor productivity growth in the “augmented Solow model”:
3
( 7 ) ...............( Y * A - L*) = E* + (2’KT)[KT*-L * ]+ ( 2H)[ H* - L*],
where
EA* / 2’L[EL*] + 2’KT[EKT*] + 2H[EH*] ,
and the respective average factor-shares in gross output (YA) over the time interval are taken as
approximating the respective input elasticities during the time interval:
2’L = ,L , 2’KT = ,K , 2H = ,H .
When a particular index increases with the passage of time, the effect is a proportional
“augmentation”oftheproductiveservicesoftheinputinquestion,whenthelatterisconsideredinitsnatural
units. In other words, in this model the impact upon aggregate output ofa10percentincreaseinthe average
efficiencyindex of our labor input measure would be equivalent to that of augmenting the physical number
of manhours worked by 10 percent. It should be noted that these input efficiency indexes may decline over
time, rather showing only positive changes; it is quite possible for biased technological change to lower the
efficiencyindexofoneoftheinputswhileraisingthatofanother.Suchaskewingoftheproductionisoquant
field may be referred to as an “input-using” innovation in the case of the former, whilst it is “input
augmenting” in the case of the latter. An innovation that is, say, reproducible capital-using in this sense is
one that (with everything else held constant) will raise the capital-output ratio that corresponds to a given





1 to Part Two) corresponds to: E*A / EL*=E KT*=E H*. Under the assumption that the elasticity of
substitution between labor and (tangible) capital inputs is less than unitary, (EL*- E KT*) > 0 corresponds
to the condition of a Hicksian (relative) labor-saving bias in technological change.
Technical Appendix Note 2:
On the Vintage Effect and Efficiency Improvements Embodied in Capital
The method of assessing the contribution made to measured total factor productivity growth by
“vintage effects” – on which lines 7 and 8 of Tables 1.IV and 1.IVA (in Part One) are based – is based on
the approach introduced and applied by Richard Nelson (1964). The following is adapted from Nelson’s
approximating formula, which partitions the TFP residual into three components:
E* = ( + 2K (K +[ - )a]2K (K ,
where,usingournotation,E*istherefinedmeasureoftheTFPgrowthrate(correspondingtothecrudeTFP
measure,A*,afteradjustmentsforlabor-andcapital-qualitychanges.Therateofdisembodiedtechnological
advance is here denoted by (, and for purposes of implementation we take it to be a fixed proportion, (1 -
" ), of the refined TFP rate: ( =( 1-" )E*. Since 8K represents the average annual growth rate of
technological change that is embodied in the latest tangible capital goods, and 2K is the gross factor share
estimateoftheelasticityofoutputwithrespecttotangiblecapitalservices,thesecondtermontheright-hand-
side of the equation (2K(K) represents the contribution of capital-embodied technical change to the refined
TFP rate. Were there to be no alteration in the age structure of the tangible stock, this termwould constitute
the whole contribution of embodied technical progress.
The third term on the right-hand-side of the equation is the contribution made by the so-called
“vintageeffect”,denotedhereinafterasV*.ItistheeffectontheTFPrateoftheaverageyearlychange(over
the indicated period) in the mean age (a) of the tangible capital stock, measured in years of age change per
year: [-)a](K is the percentage improvement in embodied capital efficiency due to the reduction of the
tangible capital stock’s age, which increases the weight of the more recent vintages in the aggregate.
Obviously, the vintage effect is negative when )a is positive.
By substituting our specification for ( we obtain the decomposition formula:
The vintage effect V* = (" E*){[-)a]/ [1-)a]} may be calculated directly, or obtained as a residual, by
subtracting the first two terms on the right-hand side from E*. The sum of the first two terms is referred to
as “total age-neutral” technological progress in Table 1.IV and the accompanying text in Part One.A4
4See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the
United States, 1925-89. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Jan. 1993, Table A-6.
To apply this formula, three data are needed to obtain the figures that appear in the Addendum to
Tables 1.IV and 1.IVA:
1. E* we identify with Refined TFP as this emerges in line 6 of Tables 1.IV and I.IVA.
2. The “ total capital-embodiment fraction” (" ), and its complement (1- "). We assume
conservatively that the latter number is 0.5, but readers can easily substitute higher numbers for ", thereby
raising the absolute and relative dimension of the portion of the total age-neutral TFP rate that is assumed
to be embodied, and, likewise, of the vintage effect. It is noted below that the division of E* between the
vintage effect and the total age-neutral effect is not affected by the choice of ".
3. The new data required are the average changes per year in the age of the capital stock: )a.T h e
Bureau of Economic Analysis
4 presents figures on average age for total gross private, fixed, reproducible
capital in constant prices and also for Equipment and Structures separately. These figures are derived from
the sums of annual gross investments cumulated over the estimated service lives of detailed categories of
Equipment and Structures. The categories and service lives are shown in the same source, Table B. For our
purposes, however, theaverageagesofthetotalstock,aspresentedbyBEA, are inappropriate. Theyreflect
changes in age due not only to changes in the age of particular types of assets but also to changes in the
composition of total capital by assets of different lengths of service life. The main change in composition
is the rise in the importance of relatively short-lived equipment compared with longer-lived structures. We
therefore used the BEA data to construct an alternative set of estimates for the average age of total capital
by calculating a weighted average of the ages of equipment and structures for the terminal years of each
period.Ourweights(constantfortheterminalyearsofeachperiod)weretheaveragefractionsoftotalcapital
made up of equipment and structures.
The following Table shows the calculations that underlie the entries in Table 1.IV:A5
Calculation of Age-neutral TFP Rate and Vintage Effect:
U.S. Private Domestic Economy, 1929-1989
(Growth rates in Percentage points per Annum)
1929-48 1948-66 1929-66 1966-89
1. Refined TFP rate: E* 1.43 1.47 (1.68) 1.45 (1.55) 0.04 (0.19)
2. Non-Embodiment fraction: 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3. Embodied TFP, with " = 0.5: 0.71 0.73 (0.84) 0.72 (0.77) 0.02 (0.09)
4. Rate of change in capital’s age
(i ny r s .p e ry r . ) :)a 0.14 -0.25 -0.05 -0.025
5. [ 1- )a] 0.86 1.25 1.05 1.025
6. Age-neutral Refined TFP rate
a) Embodied: (" E*)/ [1-)a]













7. Vintage effect (line 1-6) -0.11 0.16 (0.17) 0.04 (0.05) 0.00 (0.01)
8. Total Efficiency Growth Embodied
in Tangible Capital (lines 6a + 7) 0.72 0.74 (1.01) 0.73 (0.78) 0.02 (0.09)
The figures we reach are, of course, only the roughest of estimates. They rest on rather arbitrary
assumptions whose accuracyis difficult to assess. The Refined TFP fromwhich the calculation starts is not
a pure measure of technological progress and economies of scale, although we believe it to be a useful
approximation. The embodiment fraction is a guess, set on the lowish side, in order to produce figures that
are a lower bound to the estimated Vintage Effect. Further, for lack of evidence, we assume that the
embodiment fraction remains unchanged from period to period, but it may not. We think it likely that the
proper fraction may be larger, but possibly not very much larger, at least for the period 1929-66.
Onewaytoindirectlyassesstheplausibilityoftheguesswemadefortheparameter"istoconsider
the plausibility of the estimates it yields for the total rates of efficiency change that are embodied in the
tangible capital stock, which is found in Line 8 of the Table, as the sum of Lines 6a and 7. For this purpose
weproposeacomparisonwithanalternativeestimateoftherateoftechnologicalchangesreflectedinadated
index of the average productivity efficiency of quality-adjusted tangible capital inputs, EKT(t). This index
itselfmaybethoughtofas enteringthe aggregateproductionfunctionasamultiplierofthequality-adjusted
capital inputs.The growth rate of the latter we denote by( KT*+q K*), the second termin the brackets being
the “capital quality growth rate”; the embodied capital efficiency growth rate itself is EKT*.
Having defined this magnitude, the question now is how we might obtain an independent estimate
for it. We propose to do so by building upon the hypothesis that aggregate production relationships
(metaphorically summarized by an aggregate production function) in the twentieth century have been
characterized by strong “skill-technology complementarity.” For the period since 1929, with which we areA6
5 See the survey of early econometric work on this subject in Hammermesh (1993). Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987)
conclude,fromtheirexaminationofapanelofmanufacturingindustriesoverthe1960-80period,thattheshareofhighly-
educated labor in total costs was significantly greater where the capital-stock was younger (taking the latter as a proxy
for greater use of recent embodied technology). Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) find that across U.S.
manufacturingindustries,skill-upgradingduringthepast30yearswaspositivelyassociatedwiththelevelofinvestment
in R&D and computer equipment, as well as with high capital-output ratios. For studies that find positive correlations
betweenutilizationofformalcompanytrainingontheonehand,andtechnologicalchangeandsectoralcapitalintensity,
seealsoBarteland Sicherman(1995), Mincer (1989). The latter isaspertinent inthe present contextasistheevidence
forthecomplementarityofformaleducationalattainmentswithgreateruseofthelatestembodiedtechnologies,because
inimplementingthe hypothesisatthe aggregate, we use measuresoftotalintangible capitalstockper manhour inputper
labor. While education and training capital have remained the preponderant components of the total intangible stock
Hfromtheopeningofthecenturyonwards,itis true that the R&D componentofthelattermorethandoubledinrelative





combining census statistics for U.S. manufacturing industries at the 2-digit SIC level with corresponding
micro-levelsamplesofworkers’characteristics(includingformaleducationalattaintments),GoldinandKatz
(1998)haveshownthat“capital-skill”and“technology-skill”complementaritiesalreadyhademergedatleast
in that sector during the first quarter of the twentieth century.
Astronginterpretationof"theskill-technology,capital-technology"hypothesisinthepresentcontext
isthat(withinanytrendperiod)strictproportionalitywillbemaintainedbetweentheaveragequalityadjusted
stock of intangible capital per manhour, on the one hand, and the input of total “quality-adjusted” tangible
capital measured in efficiency units per manhour. The U.S. real intangible capital stock, as will be seen
belowfromPartTwo:Table2.II,ispreponderantlymadeupofhuman–educationandtraining–capitaland
is measured in constant dollar terms; we denote it by H(t), and dropping the time index (t), we write the
intangible stock per manhour as h = H/L. Correspondingly, the qualityadjusted tangible stockmeasured in
efficiency units per manhour is k =( K T@qK @ EKT)/L.
The strict complementarity hypothesis implies that the relationship h* = k* must hold over the
courseofeachtrendinterval.Fromthatweobtainasimpleexpressionforthegrowthrateoftangiblecapital-
embodied efficiency: (EKT*) = [H* - (KT*+q K*)]. All the data required to implement this formula are
readily at hand for the periods 1929-66 and 1966-89: the growth rates KT* and H* appear as entries in Part
Two: Table 2.IA. The underlyingestimates of the capital quality growth rate, qK*, may be found, simplyby
dividing the entries for the “Capital quality” contribution to growth that appear in Part One: Table 1.I –
which correspond to2KT(qK*), by the estimates of the gross tangible capital share,2KT,s h o w ni nP a r tT w o :
Table 2. IB.
The following Table displays the results:A7
Speculative Estimates of the Growth Rate of Total Tangible Capital-Embodied Efficiency:
U.S. PDE
(Average growth rates in percent per annum)
1929-1966 1966-1989
1. [H* - KT*] 1.48 0.90
2. qK* 0.67 0.89
3. EKT* (line 1 minus line 2) 0.81 0.01
The rough concilience of the speculative estimates of EKT * for these two periods with the
independentlyderivedfiguresinLine8oftheprecedingTable–.81versus0.73(.78)percent,and.01versus
.02 (.09) percent, respectively – is quite striking, both as to the magnitudes and their temporal movement.
ItsuggestsourpartitioningoftherefinedTFPgrowthratemaynotbesowideofthemark,howeverarbitrary
the underlying assumptions might seem.
Our judgment, therefore, is that the estimates of the Vintage Effect presented above, and in Table
1.IV, should be regarded as realistically illustrating the possible importance of changes in the rate of gross
tangible capital formation as it affects both the growth of the flow of physical capital services and the
concomitantaverageefficiencyeffectofchangesincapital’saverageage. Themainlessontobedrawnfrom
those estimates, and the point underscored by the text in Part One, is that “vintage effects” may well exert
important influences on the comparative growth rates of TFP in successive intervals of perhaps 20 years’
duration, and then probably only in exceptional circumstances – as in a comparison between a period of
severe depression or war, and the rebounding growth enjoyed when peace returns. But, over longer periods
whichembraceepisodesofdepressedcapitalformationandanensuingrebound,suchasisthecasefor1929-
66, the accompanying transient vintage effects are seen to be offsetting, so the overall effect fades out. This
provides a further, and concrete point supporting our focus upon the trends manifested over such extended
periods in the nineteenth century(where we have combined 1855-71with1871-90),aswellastheextended
twentieth century period 1929-66.
Technical Appendix Note 3:
Estimates of Trend Growth Rates of Efficiency of Intangible Capital Inputs
The interpretation of twentieth centurymacroeconomic trends as havingbeen shaped in significant
part by the emergence of a bias towards technological and organizational innovations that were intangible
capital-usingcanbesupportedbynumerical estimates of the growthrateE*H.Thelatterdesignatesthatrate
of “intangible capital augmenting” innovation, and should carry a negative sign when the changes in
efficiency are such as to raise the desired ratio (H/Y), given the same rate of return on the real intangible
stock, H. Therefore, finding the sign condition (E*H < 0) to be fulfilled for the U.S. private domestic
economy from 1929 onwards is an important point of quantitative substantiation for the argument we
advance.A8
For the reasons given by the text of Part 2, Section 2.3, it is not possible to infer the sign of E*H
immediately from the behavior of the input ratios and their shares in total product. Hence, a direct
computationisrequired.Thisrequiressolvingthewholesystemofrelationshipsdescribingtheinputspecific
rates of efficiency change.
These are: E*L,E * HL,E * L for the inputs of pure tangible manhours, intangible human capital, and
tangible and intangible labor, respectively;
E*KT,E * HK and E*K, for inputs of tangible capital, intangible, non-human capital and tangible and
non-human, intangible capital combined;
and E*H itself.
We thus have seven unknowns, and the following directly measurable magnitudes:
K*T,H * ,E * A,2L,2K (= 1-2L),2’L(=2L -"L),2’KT (=2K -"K),2H ="L +"K and q*K, fromAppendix Note
2.
Given seven equations in these magnitudes, the system can be solved from the seven unknowns.
Beginning with the residual, from Appendix Note 1, equation (7), we first write the definitional identities:
(i) E*A / 2’L E*L,+ 2’K E*KT + 2HE*H ;
(ii) E*H / ("L/ 2H)E * HL +( "K/ 2H)E * HK ;
(iii) E*L / (2’L/ 2L)E * L’ +( "L/ 2L)E * HL ;
(iv) E*K / (2’KT/ 2K)( E * KT +q * K)+( "K/ 2K)E * HK.
Then, from the specification that the bias of innovation is a time invariant parameter, we have
(v) 8 8 8 8 =( E * L -E * K)t , for all t.
which, under suitable separability conditions, can be obtained by regression estimation for the constant
elasticity of substitution production function:
(2*L’ - 2*K)t = [(1-F) ' F][ K *-L * ] t - [(1-F) ' F] 8 8 8 8 .
Fromthespecificationbasedonthestrictskill-technologycomplementarityhypothesis,inAppendix
Note 2, we have:
(vi) E*KT =H *-( K * T +q * K).
Finally, we specify a proportionality constant $$ 0 in the relationship
(vii) E*HK = $E*H .
A little algebra is needed to solve for E*H in terms of the known magnitudes and the parameter $.
One mayfirst substitute fromdefinitions (iii) and (iv) into equation(v)andsolve for E*L’; next substituting
(vi) in (i), we can solve for E*H in terms of E*L’ and the other known magnitudes, whence we can eliminate
E*L’ and obtain:A9
(viii) E*H ={ 8 8 8 8 -( E * A/ 2L)-2 ( 2’KT/ 2H)[ H *-K * T -q * KT ]}' [1 - (2H/ 2L)-$*],
where * / [( "K/ 2H)+( "K/ 2KT)] .
Referring back to equation (vi), we directly obtain E*KT. Using (ii) and (iii) to eliminate
E*HL, and (iv) and (v) to eliminate E*L, one obtains:
(ix) E*L’ ={ (8 8 8 8 +E * KT) 2L +E * H [2H - "K $]}' 2’L.
Substitution of the values of E*L’ from(ix) backinto (ii) and (iii) provides us with E*HL, and thence
E*L, whence using (v) we obtain E*K; and using (iv) we can find E*HK, to complete the solution.
The following Table shows the solutions for E*H obtained from equation (viii) using the indicated
values for q*K,E * KTand$,a sw e l la st h eE * Aestimates fromPart Two,Table2.IV-PartA,andapplyingthe
invariant parameter estimate 8 8 8 8 = .007 obtained by David and van der Klundert (1965) for the whole period
1899-1960. The magnitude of the shares, 2i, are those shown for the relevant intervals in Table 2.III, with
the 1890-1927 interval value found as the weighted average of the sub-periods 1890-1905 and 1905-27.
Given the heroic specification assumptions, and the use of “speculative” magnitudes obtained in
AppendixNote2,wecandonolessthancautionthereaderbylabellingtheresultsfranklyas “speculative”.
Table A3:1
Speculative Input Specific Efficiency Rates (Per Annum): PDE, 1890-1989
E*A/ 2 2 2 2L q*K E*KT [1 - (2 2 2 2H/ 2 2 2 2L)- *$ *$ *$ *$]E * H E*L’
Periods Assuming: $ $ $ $ =1
1890-1927 .0223 .0026 .0120 0.744 (0.742)* .0116 .0293
1890-1905 .0221 0 .0079 0.834 (0.833)* .0008 .0179
1905-1927 .0228 .0046 .0146 0.682 (0.679)* .0193 .0400
Assuming: $ $ $ $ =2
1929-1966 .0155 .0067 .0081 - 0.491 - .0079 .0212
1966-1989 - .0021 .0089 .0010 - 0.492 - .0215 .0027
*Note: Values in parentheses are found with $ = 2, essentially identical to those for $ = 1 in these sub-periods.
ThecomputedratesinTableA3.1forE*HandE*L’areconditionalonthespecificationused
inAppendix Note2tofindE*KT, and consequentlytheshare-weighted sum ofthesetwo rates is not
constrained to yield the same value as will be found by subtracting [2’KT (E*KT)] from the residual
estimates shownforE*Ain Table 2.IV-Part A. To insure consistencyof the full set ofinput specific
efficiencygrowth rates, we normalize the computed values of E*H and E*L’ bymultiplying each by
the normalizing ratio n = [E*A - 2’KT E*KT] ' [E*A - 2’KT E*KT] = n, where E*A = 2’L E*L’+ 2’KT
E*KT +2HE*H,usingthevaluesenteredinTableA3.1.ThefinalestimatesareshowninTableA3.2.A10
Table A3:2
Normalized Speculative Efficiency Growth Rates
Periods n nE*L’ nE*H E*KT
1890-1929 0.534 0.156 .0062 .0120
1929-1966 0.307 .0277 - .0103 .0081
1966-1989 0.273 .0007 - .0059 .0010A11
4. Appendix Tables and Statistical Notes and Sources
4.1 Statistical Appendix for Part One
This Appendix is arranged as follows. Section 1 contains Part One Tables IA through IVA, the Tables of
“Measures Over Long-Swing Intervals”. Section 2 is a description of the Sources and Procedures that lie back of the
figures for the nineteenth century. These are the figures in Frame I of each table, including Tables I-IV, the tables of
“Measures Over Long Periods” which appear in the text itself. Section 3 contains the descriptions of Sources and
Procedures that lie back of the twentieth-century figures, those in Frame II of each table, including Table V.
Section l: Appendix Tables to Part One
(We follow the numbering convention in the text, in which each (roman) numbered table is preceded by the
(Arabic) "Part" number.)
Table 1: IA. The Growth Rates of the National Economy and the Private
Domestic Economy, 1800-1989
Measures Over Long-Swing Intervals
Frame I The Nineteenth Century
GNP GPDP Population Per capita rates Intensive growth fractions
(%)
GNP GPDP GNP GPDP
1800-1855 3.99 3.93 3.03 0.93 0.87 23 22
1855-1871 2.92 2.69 2.55 0.36 0.14 12 5
1871-1890 4.92 4.97 2.30 2.56 2.61 52 53
1890-1905 3.80 3.80 1.91 1.85 1.85 49 49
1905-1927 3.40 3.30 1.61 1.76 1.66 52 50
Frame II  The Twentieth Century
1890-1905 4.29 4.25 1.91 2.34 2.34 55 55
1905-1927 3.42 3.31 1.61 1.78 1.67 50 50
1929-1948 2.44 2.21 0.98 1.44 1.21 59 55
1948-1966 3.97 3.95 1.64 2.31 2.29 58 58
1966-1989 2.69 2.86 1.00 1.67 1.84 62 64
Note: Here and in Tables 1. II-A through IV-A, the dates 1855, 1871, 1890, 1905 and 1927 are the midpoints of five year
averages ending with the peak year of a “long swing.” Thus the period 1855-71 is properly 1853-57 to 1869-73; 1871-90
stands for 1869-73 to 1888-92, and so on. Other terminal years are single years chosen to represent the peaks of long
swings.A12
Table 1: IIA. The Contributions of Labor Input and Labor Productivity
to the Growth of Output per Capita. Private Domestic Economy, 1800-1989
(Compound Growth Rates per Annum)







Frame I The Nineteenth Century
1800-1855 0.87 0.48 0.39
1855-1871 0.14 0.00 0.14
1871-1890 2.61 0.75 1.84
1890-1905 1.85 0.49 1.36
1905-1927 1.66 -0.77 2.45
Frame II The Twentieth Century
1890-1905 2.34 0.36 1.93
1905-1927 1.67 -0.36 2.05
1929-1948 1.21 -0.74 1.96
1948-1966 2.29 -0.82 3.11
1966-1989 1.84 0.60 1.23A13
Table 1: IIIA. Decomposition of the Growth of Manhours per Capita
Measures Across Long-Swing Intervals, 1800-1989











I. The Nineteenth Century
1800-1855 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.15
1855-1871 0.00 0.15 -0.02 -0.13
1871-1890 0.75 0.48 0.14 0.14
1890-1905 0.49 0.31 0.21 -0.03
1905-1927 -0.77 0.05 -0.43 -0.41
II. The Twentieth Century
1890-1095 0.36 0.31 0.16 -0.11
1905-1927 -0.36 0.06 -0.09 -0.33
1929-1948 -0.74 0.19 -0.14 -0.80
1948-1966 -0.82 -0.38 -0.35 -0.06
1966-1989 0.60 1.12 -0.11 -0.37A14
Table 1: IVA. Sources of Labor Productivity Growth, Private Domestic Economy, 1800-1989
Measures Across Long-Swing Intervals














1. Output per manhour 0.39 0.14 1.84 1.36 2.45 1.93 2.05 1.96 3.11 1.23
Sources
2. Capital stock per manhour 0.19 0.53 0.84 0.45 073 0.55 0.48 0.07 0.81 0.57
3. Crude total factor productivity 0.20 -0.39 1.00 0.91 1.72 1.38 1.57 1.89 2.30 0.66
4. Labor quality - - - 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.38 0.43 (0.22) 0.31 (0.16)
5. Capital quality - - - - - - 0.08 0.40 0.31
6. Refined total factor productivity 0.20 -0.39 1.00 0.81 1.53 1.28 1.38 1.43 1.47 (1.68) 0.04 (0.19)
Addenda
7. Gross factor share weights - - - - - - -
a. Labor 0.65 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.65
b. Capital 0.35 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.35
8. Vintage effect - - - - - - - -0.11 0.16 (0.17) 0.00 (0.01)
9. Age-neutral refined
total factor productivity - - - - - - - 1.54 1.31 (1.51) 0.04 (0.18)A15
Section 2: Sources and Procedures for Nineteenth-Century Data (in Frame I)
With some minor revision, the following description first appeared as an Appendix to a paper by Abramovitz, “The
Search for the Sources of Growth: Areas of Ignorance, Old and New.” This was published in the Journal of Economic History,
53, No. 2 (June 1993). A more detailed description of sources and procedures behind the output and labor input data for the
period 1800-60 is provided in David, “Real Income and Economic Welfare in the Early Republic,”1996 (see General
Bibliography). In Part One, Endnote (1) these estimates are compared with the alternative figures available from Robert
Gallman’s Chapter in Volume 2 of the Cambridge Economic History of the U.S.
The tables in Frame I include periods (1890-1927 in the long period measures, 1890-1905 and 1905-27 in the long-
swing measures) which provide an overlap between Frames I and II.
The estimates presented in Frame I rest on the Abramovitz-David figures first published in 1973 and, after minor
revision,inDavid,“InventionandAccumulation”(1977).Thoseestimates,whichintheearlierpapersreferredtotheDomestic
Economy, are now revised to refer to the Private Domestic Economy; and other revisions have been made since then as well.
Real Gross Private Domestic Product (RGPDP)
The growth rates were computed from an underlying constant dollar series, expressed alternatively in 1860 dollars,
whichwasformedfromchained Laspeyresoutputindices,using1840(censusyear)priceweightsfortheperiod1800/40,1860
(census year) price weights for 1840/1909, and 1929 price weights for 1909/29.
RGPDP was estimated by subtracting estimates of real government product (in corresponding constant prices) from
estimates of real gross domestic product (RGDP). The latter series consists of the 1977 vintage Abramovitz-David estimates,
on a comprehensive scope (so-called Variant II) basis, which includes the estimated value of home manufactures and
improvements made to farmland. The latter series are those that underlie the tables in David, “Invention and Accumulation.”
They differ notably in the 1800 to 1834/36 interval from the estimates reported for real gross domestic product earlier by the
authors due to revisions in the method of constructing estimates for the pre-1840 era – principallythe substitution of estimates
of labor inputs on a full-time equivalent manhours basis for those on a gainful worker basis.
Estimates of real government product, expressed in 1960 constant dollars, were derived from a chained Laspeyres
index. The constituent series for the period 1890/1929, in 1929 prices, is from Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United
States, Table A-III, col. 5 (“Government Purchases”). These were extrapolated from 1890 to 1840 on estimates of constant
dollargovernmentexpenditures,in1860(censusyear)prices.Thelatterserieswasderivedbydeflatingthesumofcurrentdollar
estimated federal government expenditures and expenditures on public education, from Lance E. Davis et al., American
Economic Growth, New York: Harper & Row, 1972: Tables 17.1, 17.2. The deflator used for this was the David-Solar
Consumer Price Index (From Table 5.A in P.A. David and P. Solar, “A Bicentenary Contribution to the History of the Cost of
Living in America” in Research in Economics History, Paul Uselding, Ed., Vol. 2, Greenwich, CT, 1997, pp. 1-80). The
resultingserieswasextrapolated from1840 to 1800 on estimates of constant dollar gross purchases ofthe federal government,
derived by employing the David-Solar CPI as a deflator for current dollar estimates from Paul M. Trescott (“The U.S.
GovernmentandNationalIncome,1790-1860,”TrendsintheAmericanEconomyintheNineteenthCentury(StudiesinIncome
and Wealth, Vol. 24), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the N.B.E.R., 1960: Table 2, p. 339.
Full-Time Equivalent Manhours in Private Domestic Economy
EstimatesofFTEmanhoursoflaborinputhavebeenderivedbysubtractingestimatedmanhouremploymentestimates
for government, military, and education sectors from the FTE manhours estimates underlying the tables in Abramovitz and
David, “Reinterpreting”(1973). The latter estimates were obtained fromestimates of the distribution of the gainfully occupied
work force among ten one-digit standard industrial classification sectors, assuming that constant within-sector ratios between
FTE manhours and gainful workers were maintained between 1800 and 1900. The level of the resulting series for the total
national (also domestic) economy was linked in 1900 to the FTE manhours estimates in Kendrick, Productivity Trends, 1961,
Table A-x.A16
TheunderlyingAbramovitz-Davidsectoralestimatesofthegainfulworkforce,whichwerebuiltontheearlierestimates
of Lebergott and of Gallman and Weiss (See General Bibliography) contain adjustments designed to reduce the
noncomparability between census observations up to 1860 and those after 1860. The adjustments were needed due to the U.S.
convention of not including free married women as part of the farm work force, which resulted in the complete elimination of
female former slaves from the agricultural work force counts. For dates from 1869 onward, estimates of black female workers
on farms were added to the agricultural work force figures. For the period before 1840 only three major occupational sectors
could be distinguished on a gainful worker basis: farm, nonfarm commodity production (with estimated interval weights for
forestryandfishing,mining,construction,andmanufacturing),andnoncommodityproduction.Themanhourspergainfulworker
coefficients for those aggregates in 1840 were applied in extrapolating the estimates backward to 1800. To obtain manhours
estimates for the private economy for the pre-1840 period, the difference in the national and private economy manhours trend
over the interval 1840/60 was assumed to have applied in the entire 1800/60 period.
Real Reproducible and Nonreproducible Capital Stock Index: C
Indices of the constant dollar net stock of reproducible tangible capital (inclusive of improvements to farmland), K,
andoftheconstantdollarnonreproduciblestock(unimprovedfarmland),R,wereaggregatedtoformaweightedgeometricindex
of real capital inputs for each trend period. The factor share weights used were the imputed returns to each type of property as
a fraction of the gross income from all (domestic) tangible assets. The weights, and the per annum growth rates of K and R,
respectively,arethosegiveninAbramovitzandDavid,“Reinterpreting”(1973):Table2,p.31.Thegrowthrateoftheresulting
aggregate index, C, is equivalent to a Divisia index, as the weights change each subperiod. The entries for C in Table IV were
obtained by the following operation: 1 + C = antiln[2R{ln(1 + R)} + 2K{ln(1 + K)}]; they differ slightly from those shown for
the same variable in Abramovitz and David, “Reinterpreting” (1973), where the percentage growth rates were erroneously
directly aggregated using the indicated weights.
Gross Income Share of Tangible Property
Average grossfactor sharesforreproducibletangiblecapitalinclusiveoffarmimprovements(netstockbasis), K, and
for land exclusive of farm improvements (R), from Abramovitz and David, “Reinterpreting”(1973): Table 2, were summed to
obtainthegrossshareoftangiblepropertyingrossdomesticincome.Trendperiodaverageswerecomputedasgeometricmeans
of gross factor share estimates for the terminal dates.
The estimates cited here were made by imputation, using average real net rates of return and depreciation rates for
privatereproducibleassets,andrealnetratesofreturnonprivatenonreproducibleassets,multiplyingeachbythecorresponding
ratio of the real net stock of capital to gross private domestic income. They are, therefore, entirely consistent with the GPDP
basis for the computations reported in Tables IV and IVA.
The estimates for the nineteenth century described here are clearly not the only treatments of the available evidence
that deserve consideration. Others are cited in the General Bibliography.
TheperiodsforwhichmeasureswereoriginallycalculatedarethoseshownintheMeasuresoverLongSwingIntervals.
Theyare meant to be measures between comparable phases of successive “long swings.” The earliest date, 1800, is simplythe
initial year of our data. In the rest of Frame 1, with one exception, growth rates were calculated from the average standing of
each series during the five years immediately preceding the onset of major business depressions. Thus “1855" refers to the
midyearofthefive-yearperiodfrom1853to1857, 1871 standsfor1869to1873,andsoon.1835,however,representsathree-
year period, from 1834 to 1836. The same system was followed through 1927 (1925 to 1929).
The growth rates over the “long swings” so distinguished in Frame I were then combined to form the Measures over
Long Periods. The rationale behind these combinations as they apply to the nineteenth century is set forth in the text.A17
Section 3: Sources and Procedures for the Twentieth-Century Data (in Frame II)
The twentieth centurytables contain periods (1890-1927 in the long-period measures, 1890-1905 and 1905-27 in the
measures over long swings) which provide an overlap between Frames I and II.
The terminal dates of periods beginning 1929 are single-year data for the peaks of the business cycles that mark the
termini of long-swing expansions and, in the measures over long periods, the termini of long periods.
In the twentieth century, the major decision involved in combining growth rates over long-swings into long-period
measures is also set forth in the text. In addition, we view the long period from 1890 to 1927 as the era of electrification. It
combines an early subperiod (1890 to 1905), when the potentials of electric power and internal combustion were only being
slowlyrealizedandapplied,withalatersubperiod(1905to1927),whenAmericanmanufacturingwasbeingrapidlyelectrified
and when gasoline-powered tractors, automobiles, and trucks came into their own. Finally, there are the years since 1966, the
years of productivity slowdown. It remains to be seen whether these years were also a time of backlogged potential, like 1929
to 1948, to be followed again by a sustained period of rapid realization of potential productivity growth.
The remainder of this Section of the Appendix provides Sources Notes for Frame II table by table.
Tables 1: I and IA
GNP 1890-1927: John Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XIX, Real gross product.
GPDP 1890-1927: John Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII, Real gross product.
GNP 1929-1988: National Income and Product Accounts of the U.S., 1929-88, vols. I and II, Washington, D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1992, 1993, Table 1.10.
GNP 1989: Economic Report of President, Jan., 1993, Table B-20, deflated by implicit deflator for Gross Domestic
Product, ibid., Table B-2.
Population: 1929-1966 Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1870,T a b l eA - 7 .
1966-1989 Economic Report of the President, Jan. 1993, Table B-29.
GPDP: GNP - Government Product
1929, 1948 NIPA 1929-58 Table 1.8
1966, NIPA, 1959-88 Table 1.8.
1989 Economic Report of President, Jan. 1993, Table B-9.
Tables 1: II and IIA
Output and output per capita: from Tables 1: I and IA
Manhours:
1890-1948: Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII.
1948-1989:NationalIncome and ProductAccount(NIPA), 1992 and 1993 and SurveyofCurrentBusiness,
July 1992.
Aggregatemanhoursinthe Private Domestic Economywere estimated fromNIPAasthe sumofaggregatemanhours
of full-time and part-time employees (NIPA Table 6.9) and the aggregate manhours of self-employed persons (family helpers
not included).
Aggregate manhours of self-employed persons were calculated as the product of the number of self-employed (NIPA
Table 6.7) and the average hours of full-time employees. The average annual hours of full-time employees were derived by
dividing the aggregate hours of full-time and part-time employees in each sector by the number of Full-time Equivalent
Employees (NIPA Table 6.5).A18
Output per manhour:
1890-1948. Calculated directly from Kendrick 1961, Table XXII.
1948-1989. Calculated from NIPA data for aggregate output and manhours.
Tables 1: III and IIIA
Population: Tables 1: I and IA
Manhours: Table 1: II
Labor Force:
1890-1905. Estimates by authors using Gainful Workers as a proxy.
1905-1927, from Lebergott, 1964, Table A-3.
1929-1989,President’sEconomicReport,Feb.1991,TableB-32.Figuresfor1929-1948areforpersons14andover;
thereafter, 16 and over.
Persons Engaged:
1890-1927, Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII.
1929-1989,1929-1988fromNIPA,1992and1993,Table6.8;1989fromNIPAtablesinSurveyofCurrentBusiness,
Table 6.8.
Manhours per Person Engaged:
Manhours from Table 1: II. Persons Engaged as above.
Tables 1: IV and IVA
For 1890-1927:
Gross output and manhours from Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII.
Capitalstockper manhour:NetcapitalstockfromKendrick, 1961, TableA-XV.Manhoursfromibid,Table A-XXII.
Labor quality: Based onfiguresfor the contributionsofAge, Sex,andEducationintheNationalEconomyin1909-29
from Denison 1962. The figures are adjusted for the difference between Denison’s share weights for labor
in National Income and the share weights for labor in Gross National Income in the Private Domestic
Economy.TherearefurtheradjustmentstoconformtoDenison’slaterproceduresandtoallowfortheslower
growth of workers’ education between 1890 and 1909.
Factor shares: Capital’s gross factor share is capital’s net share in Kendrick, 1961, Table A-10 plus an estimated
depreciation rate of 9 percentage points. The allowance for depreciation is the difference between capital’s
gross compensation as a fraction of gross national income and its net compensation as a fraction of net
national income as shown in Kendrick, 1973, Table A-V. Labor’s share is 1-minus capital’s share.
For 1929-66:
Gross output per manhour: From National Income and Product Accounts, of the U.S. (NIPA), as described in the
Sources for Tables 1: I and II, above.
Capital stock per manhour: Capital stock growth rates calculated from the sums of fixed private, reproducible, gross
non-residential capital stock and private residential capital stock from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993,
Tables A-6 and A-9. Manhours growth rates. See Table 1: II, Source, above.A19
Labor quality contribution: Calculated as the product of the growth rate of the labor quality index and the share of
labor, fromDenison’s(1985, Table 7-1) figuresfor the contributions of Age, Sex and Education in the Non-
residentialbusinesseconomy.ThefiguresareadjustedforthedifferencebetweenDenison’snetshareweights
and the gross "labor's share weights" used in this table.
Capitalqualitycontribution:CalculatedfromJorgenson,1973,Table15.Thegrowthrateoftheaveragequalityindex
is multiplied by the gross income shares for total capital (i.e. for reproducible capital and rent on non-
reproducible captial combined).
Factor shares. Capital’s gross income shares were calculated as the quotients of Private Gross Capital Compensation
in the Private Domestic Economy divided by the Gross National Income. Private capital compensation was
obtained as the sum of total capital consumption plus proprietor’s net income (less the imputed labor




Output per manhour and capital stock per manhour, as in 1929-66.
Laborquality:Estimatesarebasedonfiguresforthegrowthratesof“LaborComposition”,whichrepresentstheeffects
of Sex, Experience and Education, as given by Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) computer printouts
underlyingBLSBulletin2426(dec.1993). Theresultinggrowthrateswereraisedbytheratioofthegrowth-
rate level of the Denison figures to that of the BLS figures in the overlapping period, 1948 to 1966. The
original BLS figures are in parentheses.
Capital quality: Estimates are fromthe BLS figures for “Capital Composition” in the BLS computer printout referred
toabove.Theresultinggrowthrate was virtuallyidentical withthat ofthe Jorgensonfigureusedaboveinthe
overlapping period, 1948-66; so no adjustment was made.
Factor shares: See the description for 1929-66.
AddendumontheVintageEffectandAge-neutralrefinedTFP,1929-89.SeetheAppendixNoteontheVintageEffect
in Technical and Statistical Appendices, Appendix 1 (above).
Table 1: V
For sources of underlying data:
Left-hand frame: from the figures in Table 1: IV.
Right-handframe:Thebasesofthepercentagefiguresarethegrowthratesofgrossprivatedomesticproductpercapita
from Table 1: I.
The formula from which the sources of per capita output growth are calculated can be derived from Equation (1) in
the text in Part One, by subtracting the growth rate of population from each side. So derived, A*, the residual in the equation
isthegrowthrateofcrudeTFP. The contributions ofFactor Compositionchanges(i.e.,LaborQualityplusCapitalQuality)are
then added to the right-hand side, and E*, as the residual in the equation, is then Refined TFP.
The sources of the figures underlying the numerators in the right-hand frame in the table are as follows:
Manhours per capita: Table II.A20
Capital per capita: The growth rates of the capital stock itself are fromthe date sources shownfor capital in Table IV.
Population growth used to calculate the growth of capital stock per capita is from Table I.
Factor composition from Table IV.
Factor shares used to weight manhours per capita and capital per capita from Table IV.
4.2 Statistical Appendix for Part Two: Notes and Sources for Text Tables
Notes and Sources to Table 2: II-Part A:
For 1929-90, Parts A and B: Underlying data from J.W. Kendrick, "Total Capital and Economic Growth," Atlantic Economic
Journal 22(1), 1996: Tables 1A, 2B.
For 1900-10, Part A:
Line 1: The conventional tangible total stock was extrapolated to 1905 from the 1929 level, using the estimate of KT*f o r
1903/07-1925/29 from Table 2: I.
Lines 2 and 3: The sum of the tangible reproducible stock was found for 1900-10 as the difference of estimates of Lines 1 and
4.TheallocationbetweenLine2(structuresandequipment)andLine3(inventories)wasdeterminedfromthegeometricaverage
of two estimates of the share of inventories in the total: Gallman (1986: 204) gives 0.197. For 1900 in 1900 prices, and other
sources, see Abramovitz and David, “Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5 – Growth of the U.S. Capital Stock,” Table V-A-1
(unpublished memo, August 1964) for full details.
Acorrespondingestimateofthisratiowasobtainedfor1912(in1954prices)basedondatainGoldsmithNationalWealthTable
A-46.
Line 4: Natural resource stock estimate was obtained fromLine 1 multiplied bythe ratio of non-reproducible to total domestic
(non-monetary) wealth) in 1900, as given by Gellman (1986: 204, Appendix Table 4.A.1) in current prices.
Line 5: The non-conventional non-tangible total was extrapolated to (1900-10), centered on 1905 from the 1929 level, using
the estimate of H* for 1907-27 from Table 2: II.
Line 6: The education and training stock denoted here as H1 was extrapolated from the 1929 level, using our estimate of the
growth rate of H0*, the stock of educational capital (schooling only) for 1900-29. This assumes that H0*=H 1*. See Appendix:
Statistical Notes to Part Two, Table 2: II: The Intangible Capital Stock Growth before 1929.
Line 7: The 1929 ratio of Line 7 to Line 6 was applied to Line 6 in 1905, as it is found to be veryconstant for later dates in the
table.
Line 8: R&D stock in 1905 was found as a residual from Lines 5 minus the sum of lines 6 and 7.
TheaverageannualgrowthratesforH0*inthefollowingperiodsareestimated(inpercentper annum) as:4.05 in1900-29;3.27
in 1929-48; 4.17 in 1948-73; and 3.75 in 1973-90.
Notes and Sources for Table 2: III
For Frame I, 1800-90:
Gross Factor Shares in Gross Private Domestic Income are estimated by imputation of the average net rental rate
on non-reproducible capital (unimproved land), multiplied by the corresponding current capital-output ratio, and average
gross rental rate on tangible reproducible assets, multipled by the corresponding current dollar capital output ratios. This
was done to obtain indexes of the shares at census dates up to 1909, and the level of the respective shares was fixed byA21
reference to Denison’s (1962) estimates for the net shares, and an estimate of capital consumption from Kuznets (1955),
Table 9.
The averages for the periods shown were obtained by interpolation to the decade mid-points in the cases of 1835
and 1855, and interval averages of the shares were calculated from the terminal year estimates.
For Frame II, 1890-1989:
The Conventional Gross Factor Shares of Labor and Capital described in the Sources to Table 1: IV and 1: IVA
were adjusted, respectively, in order to remove the imputed returns to intangible human capital from labor income, and the
imputed returns to intangible non-human capital from property income. The adjustment method made use of augmented
gross product and comprehensive capital stock estimates in Kendrick (1994). For further description, see Paul A. David, “A
Tale of Two Traverses” (1998): Appendix Note on Statistical Sources for Estimates of Gross Product Elasticities with
respect to Inputs of Human Intangible and Non-Human Intangible Capital Services.B1
General Bibliography
I. Statistical sources, trends and fluctuations
The most convenient, authoritative compilation of long-term statistical information is the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1870, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1975.
The following sections contain references to outstanding sources of statistics on particular subjects together with
discussions by the compilers of the estimates and of the forces governing their trends and fluctuations.
A. National Product
Paul A. David, in “Real Income and Economic Welfare in the Early Republic,” Discussion Paper in Economic and
Social History No. 5, March 1996, University of Oxford, presents the basic estimates of national product used in this chapter
for the period 1800 to 1840. Alternative estimates may be found in Thomas Weiss, “U.S. labor force estimates and economic
growth,1800-1860"inAmericanEconomicGrowthandStandardsofLivingBeforetheCivilWareditedbyRobertE.Gallman
and John Joseph Wallis, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992. The figures underlying the estimates used
in this chapter for the decades from1840 to 1890 were made byRobert Gallman, “Gross national product in the United States,
1834-1909" in Output, Employment and Productivity in the United States After 1800 edited by Dorothy S. Brady, National
Bureau of Economic-Research, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 30, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. These,
however, have now been superseded by his chapter in Vol. II of the Cambridge Economic History of the United States,
“Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nineteenth Century.”
Thebasicdataforthedecades1890to1930aretobefoundinJohnKendrick,ProductivityTrendsintheUnitedStates,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961. Beginning 1929, the standard
figures are those of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis as presented in Department of Commerce, National Income and
ProductAccountsoftheUnitedStates,vol.I,1929-1958andvol.II1959-1988,Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice,
1992 and 1993. The figures are carried forward in the Department’s Survey of Current Business.
B. Population, Immigration and the Foreign Born
A classic publication on the growth of the U.S. population is that of Conrad and Irene B. Taeuber, The
ChangingPopulationofthe United States, NewYork: Wiley, 1958. The historical data are reviewed and discussed byMichael
R. Haines in “The population of the United States, 1790-1920" in this volume. His chapter has a useful bibliographical note.
Another analysis of the forces governinglong-termtrends and fluctuations is that of Richard A. Easterlin in his chapter in This
Volume (CEHUS,v o l .3 ) .
Simon Kuznets and Ernest Rubin, “Immigration and the Foreign Born”, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Occasional Paper 46, 1954, is a valuable paper of statistics and analysis bearing both on population and the labor
force.
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StanleyLebergott’sManpowerinEconomicGrowth:TheAmericanRecordSince1800,NewYork:McGraw
Hill, 1964 is a basic source of labor force figures together with an insightful analysis. See also the references above to David
and Weiss for the nineteenth century, to Kendrick for the early twentieth century and to the National Income and Product
Accounts for the period since 1929. All are cited above in Section I.A of this Bibliography.
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CapitalStockintheNineteenthCentury”inLong-termFactorsinAmericanEconomic Growth, edited byStanleyL. Engerman
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in Income and Wealth, vol. 51, 1986. For more recent data from 1890 to 1950 see John W. Kendrick, cited above in Section
I.A. Underlying Kendrick’s estimates are those of Raymond Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States,v o l .I I I ,
Princeton, J.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Fixed
Reproducible Tangible Wealth of the United States, 1925-89. Washington, D.C.:U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice, Jan. 1993,
contains the basic official estimates of the total and its principal components. The series is continued annually in the Survey of
Current Business.
II. Long Swings in Economic Growth
The pioneering studies of this subject were made by Simon Kuznets in Secular Movement in Production and Prices,
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1930 and ArthurF.Burns,ProductionTrendsintheUnitedStatesSince1870,NewYork, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1934. Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1954 is a thorough study of the inverse relations between long swings in British and American growth and their
connections with the movements of population and capital.
Simon Kuznets’ Capital in the American Economy, London: Oxford University Press for Nat. Bur. Econ. Research,
1961, Ch. 7 is a more mature and rounded statement of his view. Moses Abramovitz in “The Nature and Significance of
Kuznets’ Cycles”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX, No. 2 (April, 1961), 225-48, presents a quite different
hypothesis about the underlyingcauses ofthe long swings. This article also offers a brief surveyofthe precedingliterature and
extensive reference to the relevant evidence.
Notable studies of particular aspects of long swings may be found in Kuznets, “Long Swings in the Growth of
Population and Related Economic Variables”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, February 1958, 25-52;
KuznetsandRubin,“ImmigrationandtheForeignBorn”,op.citinSectionI.B,above;JeffreyG.Williamson,AmericanGrowth
andtheBalanceofPayments,Durham,NorthCarolina:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1964;RichardEasterlin,Population,
Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth, NewYork: National Bureau ofEconomic Research, 1968 (distributed by
Columbia UniversityPress, N.Y. and London); and Moses Abramovitz, The MonetarySide ofLongSwings inU.S. Economic
Growth (1973), reissued as Publication No. 471 by the Center for Economic Policy Research of Stanford University, 1997.
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Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Review of Economic Statistics (August, 1957) were the
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Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967, was a notable empirical study of
postwar experience in Europe and the U.S.A.
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